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Abstract
The increasing availability of detailed trade datasets is exposing limits in
existing trade theories that need to be addressed. For example, this Thesis
documents how the observed micro and aggregate trade patterns cannot be
explained by the combinations of functional forms and sources of heterogeneity
proposed in the existing literature. To fill this gap, it is here developed a
new class of space-augmented trade models based on quadratic utilities with
asymmetric varieties and heterogeneous consumers yielding rich patterns of
multi-dimensional heterogeneity across firms and markets. Different models
are analysed, each one associated with specific properties in terms of market
outcomes and underlying spatial structure. Hence, based on the observed or
desired properties of the problem at hand, trade practitioners can refer to this
Thesis to find guidance on which model suits better their research purposes. One
model in particular, called the “verti-zontal”, is identified as the mo...
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Introduction
The field of International trade is currently venturing into an era of ebullient transforma-
tion. Few other branches of economics experienced similar shock waves as a consequence
of increased data availability and the development of novel analytical techniques. Increas-
ingly detailed trade datasets are allowing researchers to unveil unprecedented information
on firm, product and market characteristics, shaking the ground on which traditional and
relatively new trade theories have been founded.
Until the second half of the twentieth century, traditional neoclassical trade theories
relying on comparative advantages and product specialization received great credit but
little rigorous empirical scrutiny, as their validation could only rely on intuition, inter-
nal consistency and rough macro-level evidence. These theories leveraged simplifying
working assumptions such as competitive markets, constant returns to scale and perfect
substitutability to provide analytically elegant models aimed at formalizing intuitions and
sketching general patterns, but not meant to capture the actual behavior of individual
market participants.
Yet, few researchers could have predicted how spectacularly unfit these models would
have proven themselves in working with the highly disaggregated trade data available
today at the product, firm-product, or even plant level. Indeed, during the last couple
of decades micro-level datasets uncovered many puzzling surprises. To give some con-
crete examples, no neoclassically educated economist would have guessed the amount
of intra-industry trade found in the data, which affects virtually every country, sector
and product traded in the developed world (OECD, 2010). Similarly, few could have
imagined that firms producing the same product, in the same place, at the same time,
with the same technology could be characterized by a large amount of heterogeneity in
size and productivity, among other dimensions (Bernard et al., 2003; Verhoogen, 2008).
These findings motivated the shift of the field towards a new generation of models, such
as Melitz (2003), blending cost heterogeneity à la Hopenhayn (1992) and love for vari-
ety à la (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) in a general equilibrium framework, with the aim of
providing proper theoretical underpinnings to the emerging empirical patterns.
While innovating on many technical fronts, new trade theories have retained a typ-
ical feature of neoclassical models: the focus on supply-side heterogeneity as the main
engine of differences trade patterns. These are explained in the two classes of mod-
els as stemming entirely from differences in productive efficiency or factor endowment,
whereas heterogeneities on the demand side of the economy have not received the same
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amount of attention, resulting in simplified demand structures with identical consumers
and symmetric preferences across varieties. This abstract representation of the economy
characterized an approach based on non-localized competition in which products are as-
sumed to be generally differentiated but no real attention is paid to the actual sources
of differentiation, consistently with the imperfect competition tradition à la Chamberlin
(1933), Robinson (1933) and Spence (1976). This way of modeling has long been con-
sidered antithetical to the school of thought advocating for an explicit accounting of the
sources of localized competition and product differentiation à la Hotelling (1929) where
firms are allowed to choose their address on a horizontal space, as in d’Aspremont et al.
(1979), or in terms of vertical attributes, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978), based on the
intuition that products can be interpreted as bundles of attributes (Lancaster, 1966).
These two approaches need not be mutually exclusive and are not contradicting each
other on substantive issues, but the development of an appropriate framework to ac-
commodate the two in a similarly rigorous yet intuitive fashion represents a daunting
challenge, which ranks still high the current economics research agenda. This is proven
by the efforts recently undertaken in the literature to augment purely supply-side model
with a more refined characterization of the demand side, be it in a more Chamberlinian
(Foster et al., 2008; Khandelwal, 2010) or more Lancasterian (Carballo et al., 2013; Chen
and Riordan, 2007) way.
The ambition of this PhD Thesis is to contribute to the achievement to this synthesis
by developing a framework able to reconcile the two ways of conceiving the demand side
of the economy, keeping the theoretical elegance and tractability of existing models while
improving their fit of empirical data. To this end, the following steps are taken. First, a
hermeneutic effort is undergone to realize a conceptual connection between Chamberlin
(1933) and Hotelling (1929), borrowing from location theory the analytical tools needed
to define and interpret the product differentiation components of monopolistic competi-
tion theories based on quadratic preferences. Second, it is shown how different variations
of the standard quadratic utility framework à la Ottaviano et al. (2002) or Belleflamme
et al. (2000) can be associated with underlying location problems and result in specific
empirical properties that can be exploited in applied research. Third, the empirical rele-
vance of this theoretical framework is tested by identifying one preferred variation of the
resulting quadratic models and checking whether it can be fruitfully deployed to ratio-
nalize trade patterns (at the micro and macro level) and obtain aggregate indicators of
market performance. Indeed, a by-product of this effort to develop and test a new model
of trade is the possibility to produce indicators of competitiveness at different levels of
disaggregation (from firms to countries) that can be used for policy purposes.
The framework presented in this Thesis is meant to push the frontier of trade re-
search in the direction of characterizing a general set of consumer preferences that can
enrich existing theories focusing on the supply side to better fit micro-level empirical
observations, within the boundaries of a rigorous demand setting with elements of both
localized and non-localized competition. The quadratic utilities preferences presented
in this Thesis can provide the flexibility and identifiability needed to model consumer
preferences in trade models, while allowing for both market-variety-specific variability
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and the possibility of building aggregate market indices of competition. Eight variations
are presented of the general framework, differing in the sources of demand heterogeneity.
For each variation, theoretical properties and empirical applications are discussed, but
one in particular is chosen as the best suited to accommodate existing evidence and deal
with trade data when the entire economy is concerned. It is a combination of vertical and
horizontal sources of variability, which is referred to in the Thesis as the "verti-zontal
model".
Hopefully, this Thesis can also turn out to be a useful handbook for practitioners of
trade research who want to exploit quadratic utilities in their studies but are not sure
about which particular specification to adopt or have reasons to believe that the market
they are studying is better approximated by models yielding specific empirical patterns,
for example in terms of quantity or price variation. To this end, the Thesis is organized in
such a way that can be promptly consulted as a methodological reference to find guidance
on which particular specification of a quadratic utility is best suited to address specific
modeling needs, in terms of market outcomes or underlying spatial problem.
In the field of international trade there is currently no uncontroversial definition for
the concepts of horizontal and vertical differentiation, let alone a consensus about the
details of this distinction. In models with love for variety with non-localized competition,
for example, the concepts of substitutability and horizontal differentiation tend to over-
lap because they are both applied to all the varieties symmetrically. In addition, their
impact on prices may coincide with the effect of vertical differentiation, which is normally
approximated with quality as a demand shifter. For this reason, the framework presented
in this Thesis turns to Hotelling (1929) and the Industrial Organization tradition to find
a more rigorous setting for the study of product differentiation. In this literature, there
has been a long tradition of clearly distinguishing vertical from horizontal differentiation
and the models presented in this Thesis build on the same clear distinction. However,
unlike Industrial Organization models, which emphasize strategic interactions between
firms and assume indivisibility of consumption, here the focus is on varying quantities
and the "weak interactions" typical of monopolistic competition, where firms’ behavior
is influenced by market aggregates which are unaffected by the choices made by any
individual competitor. This has the advantage of substantially simplifying the analysis
and the derivation of results while retaining competitive interactions.
The Thesis is divided in three parts: first the theoretical development of the frame-
work, then its empirical test, and finally some ideas for future development.
The theoretical part, titled "Monopolistically competing Chamberlin-Hotelling ten-
sion away", comprises Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Chapter 1 illustrates the use of a standard
quadratic utility without any source of productive or demand heterogeneity in the con-
text of a New Economic Geography with two regions of different size as the only source
of heterogeneity. In such a framework, the interplay between scale economies and trans-
port costs alone determines differences in the location of firms and consumer utility.
The system of preferences used in Chapter 1 is analyzed in depth in Chapter 2, which
characterizes the link between location theory and trade theories based on quadratic
preferences, spelling out the similarities and the differences between the two frameworks
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and defining precisely the assumptions that need to be altered to move from one to
the other. Then Chapter 3 describes the trade models based on quadratic preferences
resulting from the generalization of a standard location-theory problem and describes
the spatial interpretation and empirical properties associated with the resulting class of
models. To help intuition, simulations of market outcomes are provided for each model,
where the differences are explained in terms of corresponding sources of variability.
The empirical part follows, titled "Taking verti-zontal linearity to the data" and
constituted by Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, the preferred variation of the models
presented in Chapter 3 in the context of trade data covering the entire manufacturing
sector, the verti-zontal model, is taken to the data at the micro level (firms-products) to
adjudicate the robustness of its assumptions and the validity of its predictions, performing
several robustness tests. Chapter 5 takes stock of the empirical methodology developed in
the preceding Chapter to test whether the micro-level results still hold at more aggregate
levels of analysis and to present a simple, yet powerful methodology to develop measures
of country-product performance based on the verti-zontal model framework.
Finally, the last part of the Thesis, called "The ways forward", includes Chapter 6,
which investigates avenues for future theoretical and empirical development of the models
developed in the Thesis. In particular, it shows how the framework can be empirically
employed to explore issues related to asymmetric transport costs, validation of quality
measurements, the relation between income and preference for quality and the role of
input quality in determining firm profitability. On the theoretical side, two challenging
proposals for the future development of trade models based on quadratic preferences are
advanced, the first aiming to reconcile the oligopolistic market structure often observed
in reality with a framework mimicking the weak interactions typical of monopolistic
competition, with the only difference that firms are allowed to internalize the impact of
their product differentiation on the market aggregates. The second proposal for future
research is to delve further into the subtleties of the integration of localized and non-
localized competition features by developing a theory of endogenous location and pricing
in a multidimensional characteristics space. To this end, a different variation among
the ones presented in Chapter 3 is developed further, the verti-zontal with endogenous
substitutability patterns depending on the location of each variety in the characteristics
space. The resulting model can encapsulate more spatial information than the simple
verti-zontal, but it is less tractable and harder to test or employ empirically, which is
why it is left for future research.
Finally, the main results and achievements of the Thesis are wrapped up in a short
conclusion.
Part I
Monopolistically competing
Chamberlin-Hotelling tension away
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Chapter 1
Quadratic utilities and New
Economic Geography
In this first Chapter, a New Economic Geography (NEG) model without any source of
demand or supply heterogeneity is presented. The only departure from perfect symme-
try is the division of the economy into two regions inhabited by a different number of
consumers. The model’s spatial outcomes are therefore shaped uniquely by the tension
between the agglomeration forces of market size and scale economies and the dispersion
forces of trade costs and imperfect competition.
The Chapter thus shows how linear demands can be usefully deployed in the study of
agglomeration patterns. Specifically, it proposes a tractable framework that can be used
to investigate the long-run capital reallocation patterns triggered by transport liberal-
ization once the determination of freight rates has been endogenized, measuring also its
impact on welfare. Two policy scenarios are considered: one where the regulator fosters
competition by increasing the number of carriers imposing a unique tariff per route, in-
dependently of the direction of shipment, and one of complete deregulation, which leaves
carriers free to price discriminate by direction of shipment. Under the complete deregu-
lation scenario, profit-maximizing carriers are indeed shown to charge different prices in
the two directions of the same route, charging higher markups when delivering goods to
the less competitive regions. This pricing behavior in the transport sector counterbal-
ances the welfare-decreasing agglomeration forces associated with lowering trade costs
and ensures that transport liberalization maps into welfare gains both in the short and
in the long run.
This Chapter builds on a previous piece of research, resulting in the master Thesis
"Transport liberalization and regional imbalance" (2007), extending and refining it in
several directions.
1.1 Transport liberalization and regional imbalances
In the absence of product differentiation and economies of scale, trade costs can be
seen as just a source of price distortion decreasing the welfare of all market participants
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by driving prices up, profits down and leading to a mis-allocation of resources. This
consideration led policy makers to develop an attitude towards transport costs which
can be epitomized as: the cheaper, the better. Lower transport costs are expected to
lead to better integrated markets which in turn should result in improvements in citizens’
welfare through the reduction in prices associated with a more intense competition in
the final products’ market.
But are early welfare improvements meant to last in the long run? Do they depend
on the market structure in the transport sector? And are the resulting gains evenly
distributed among regions? This Chapter tries to answer these questions in the context
of a New Economic Geography (NEG) framework in which products are differentiated and
firms’ interactions are described as in the monopolistic-competition tradition (Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1991) with the additional feature of an endogenous transport
sector à la Behrens et al. (2009) where firms are also allowed to price discriminate by
direction of shipment, similarly to Behrens and Picard (2011). NEG models are typically
adopted to draw predictions on the spatial distribution of economic activities, which
then map into location-specific market outcomes. The key underlying idea is that, once
firms are allowed to relocate from one region to the other to equalize returns on capital
investments, market outcomes are affected in both origin and destination markets because
of an alteration in the competitive interactions between firms (Fujita, 1988; Gaigné and
Behrens, 2006; Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004).
This Chapter investigates the spatial agglomeration patterns and welfare implications
of a cost-reducing liberalization of the transport sector, with and without the possibility
for carriers to price discriminate by the direction of shipment. Following the intuition of
Behrens et al. (2009), transport costs are not treated as parameters after liberalization,
but they are determined endogenously by profit maximizing carriers providing an undif-
ferentiated transport service subject to capacity constraints. Two scenarios are analyzed:
the first one is a regulated liberalization regime in which prices are fixed per route (or,
say, distance), independently of the direction of the shipment, which follows the modeling
strategy of Behrens et al. (2009). The second is a complete deregulation regime, allowing
for price discrimination based on the direction of the shipment, similarly to Behrens and
Picard (2011), who analyze the case of a transport industry characterized by carriers
committing the same given level of capacity in the two direction of a route and defining a
pricing strategy that allows them to avoid "empties" (the so-called back-haul problem).
Differently from Behrens and Picard (2011), in this Chapter the carriers are allowed to
set up a different level of capacity in the two directions so as to relax the constraint of
an equal amount of quantities shipped in the two directions. This assumption is able
to accommodate the observation that about 60% of the containers shipped from Asia to
North America in 2005 came back empty, and those "that did come back full were often
transported at a steep discount for lack of demand," (Behrens and Picard, 2011), which
is consistent with a model in which carriers charge different prices in the two directions of
shipment but can pre-commit to direction-specific capacity level not to undercut prices
in one of the directions and reduce their profits.1
1To the extent that import and export procedures involve different activities, such as local sales
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Whereas the transport service is assumed to be undifferentiated, leading to a stan-
dard oligopolistic outcome à la Cournot (1838) in the presence of a pre-commitment
on capacity (Vives, 1999), the same is not true for the final goods transported by the
carriers. These are supplied in horizontally differentiated varieties produced by firms
operating in a monopolistic competition framework characterized by increasing returns
to scale and a limited amount of market power granted from the assumption that con-
sumers value variety. In particular, the use of a variable-elasticity-of-substitution utility
functions (Belleflamme et al., 2000; Ottaviano et al., 2002), allows firms in the model to
price discriminate across markets (as opposed to constant-elasticity-of-substitution pref-
erences yielding constant markups on costs) and conveniently treat transport costs as
linear rather than in iceberg terms. Linear transport costs have the notable advantage of
enabling economists to explicitly model the transport sector and thus allowing researchers
to study the impact of transport policies on the spatial distribution of economic activities
and ultimately on welfare. This is what also Behrens et al. (2007, 2009) and Behrens and
Picard (2011) do, by allowing transport prices to be determined endogenously as a result
of the transport market structure and the distribution of economic activity, which is in
turn affected by the transport costs. They show that the short-run static gains due to
liberalization (lower prices for consumers) can be offset in the long run by the dynamic
losses implied by inefficient agglomeration patterns and thus liberalization policies may
be detrimental to consumers’ welfare.
In the framework explored in this Chapter, however, there is no reversal of the short-
run (static) welfare gains in the long run. Similarly to Behrens and Picard (2011), trans-
port liberalization is shown to increase agglomeration, which affects welfare negatively,
but the gains in terms of lower prices and higher profits more than compensate the neg-
ative impact of agglomeration. This is true in the case of symmetric freight rates in the
two directions and even more so in the case of complete liberalization with asymmetric
rates. Indeed, for a given level of competition in the transport sector (as approximated
by the number of competing carriers), a complete liberalization regime is associated with
less industrial agglomeration than a liberalization regime with symmetric pricing. The
intuition behind this latter result is that, as compared to the unique-bilateral-tariff set-
ting, the tougher (softer) degree of competition in the core (peripheral) regions forces
carriers to charge a lower (higher) price to firms supplying those markets from the pe-
riphery (core), but this makes more convenient for firms to move to the periphery and
enjoy softer competition than in the core region and lower transport costs to serve the
core. One way to interpret this result is to look at the combined problem of the carriers
and final good producers in terms of the well-known Industrial Organization concept of
double marginalization (Tirole, 1988), where the profits that the two types of agents
can extract from the final consumers depend on the toughness of competition in the
downstream market, where the final goods are eventually sold to consumers.
personnel, facilities or marketing investments, carriers can achieve the desired level of direction-specific
shipping capacity when they enter the market. This preliminary commitment plays also in their own
interest, as it allows carriers to compete in quantities, à la Cournot, rather than in prices, à la Bertrand,
as discussed by Vives (1999).
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The model presented here has interesting policy implications in terms of the impact
of transport liberalization on total welfare and geographical fairness. In terms of total
welfare, a reduction in transport costs is always beneficial, but it comes at the cost of
higher disparities in industrialization between regions. The latter effect can be mitigated
by allowing carriers to price discriminate by direction of shipment, increasing the welfare
improvements of liberalization further. Therefore, a clear policy message stems from the
model: a full liberalization regime not imposing any restrictions on the market segmenta-
tion of carriers seems to be superior to a regulated market with symmetric low tariffs or
a liberalization where carriers are required to charge the same price in the two directions
of shipment of the same route (or to follow any other direction-invariant pricing strategy,
such as a distance-based one). However, once the most efficient type of liberalization
regime has been identified, policymakers have also to decide the extent of liberalization,
i.e. how many carriers to allow in the market, keeping in mind that when the number
of carriers is so high as to drive freight rates to marginal costs the differences between
the two liberalization regimes disappear. In terms of global welfare measured in terms
of real income, the answer would be as many as possible. Still, the level of industrial
concentration increases monotonically in the level of competition in the transport sector.
Therefore, if high levels regional disparities in industrialization are perceived as socially
harmful, policymakers may still prefer to let a lower number of competitors in and enjoy
a less concentrated economy.2
A final remark is that the analysis in this Chapter focuses on only transport costs
(if exogenous) or freight rates (if endogenous), but the same arguments and modeling
strategies could be adopted to capture different sources of trade costs, be them port or
airport fees, revenue maximizing import tariffs, trade insurance contracts or any other
endogenously determined variable source of trade costs which can be route- or direction-
specific.
The Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is developed in the
short run and commented. In Section 3 the relocation of firms in the long run is de-
scribed. In Section 4 the transport sector yielding endogenous freight rates is introduced
in the model, under two different regulatory settings: complete deregulation and unique-
bilateral-tariff liberalization. The two different regulatory regimes are compared in terms
of welfare and geographic distribution of industrial activity in Section 5. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
1.2 The model
Consider an economy composed of two regions: a more populated core, H, and a less
populated periphery, F (for notational purposes, the two regions are called i and j
when considered in general terms). Consumers exhibit quadratic preferences and the
economy is characterized by two sectors, one displaying constant returns to scale and
using one unit of labor to produce the numéraire, the other exhibiting increasing returns
2A preference for lower spatial concentration can be explicitly included in the objective function of
policymakers, keeping the rest of the model unaltered.
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to scale and using inter-regionally mobile capital and local labor to produce varieties of
a differentiated good. When the differentiated good is produced in i and sold in j, it
incurs a linear transport cost ti,j , whereas ti,i = 0. The value of ti,j is initially taken
as a parameter (under a regulated transport sector) and independent of the direction of
the shipment (ti,j = tj,i = t); then, it is determined endogenously in the transport sector
following two types of liberalization, one imposing ti,j = tj,i, which is called unique-
bilateral tariff (or symmetric tariff), and the other allowing carriers to price discriminate
by the direction of shipment, ti,j 6= tj,i, which is called complete deregulation (or full
liberalization).
Here follows a description of the economy, first in the short run and then taking firm
relocation into account (in the long run).
1.2.1 Consumers
The economy is inhabited by M identical consumers which are exogenously distributed
in the two regions and are endowed with one unit of labor, L, which is geographically
immobile, and one unit of capital, K, which can be invested in either region. The share
of people living in region i is expressed by θi, i.e. θH ∈ [12 ; 1] and θF = 1 − θH , so
that the absolute number of consumers living in that region is Mi = θiM . To simplify
the notation, in the rest of the paper whenever θ is left without subscript, it refers by
convention to θH , which can be interpreted as a measure of demand concentration in the
economy. The preferences of each consumer are captured by a standard quadratic utility
function (Belleflamme et al., 2000; Ottaviano et al., 2002):
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2i (s)ds−
γ
2
[∫
s∈Si
qs,ids
]2
+ q0, (1.1)
Where Ni is the mass of varieties present in region i, each variety being of negligible
size for the market, qs,i is the amount of variety s ∈ (0;N ] consumed by each consumer
i, the parameter α defines the intensity of preference accorded to the consumption of
the differentiated good, as compared to the homogeneous one, q0, whose marginal util-
ity is normalized to unity and used as the numéraire of the economy. The parameters
β ∈ (0;∞) and γ ∈ [0;∞] determine consumer’s love for variety by capturing perceived
horizontal differentiation of varieties (β) and the degree of substitutability (γ) between
varieties (Di Comite et al., 2014). Consumer are subject to the following budget con-
straint: ∫
s∈Nii
ps,iiqs,iids+
∫
s∈Nji
ps,jiqs,jids+ q0 = yi + q¯0, (1.2)
where ps,ii and qs,ii are the price (in terms of the numéraire) and quantities sold of
a variety s of differentiated good bought by a consumer living in the same region as the
producing firm; ps,ji and qs,ji are the price and quantities sold of a variety of differen-
tiated good bought by a consumer living in a region different from the one where the
producing firm operates; the parameter q¯0 represents the consumer’s i initial endowment
of homogeneous good (assumed to be large enough to allow the consumer to enjoy any
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level of consumption of the differentiated good); finally, yi is consumers’ nominal income
earned through the provision of factors L in region i and K in either one of the two
regions, in addition to the profits redistributed from the transport sector.3
Optimizing (1.1) subject to (1.2) with respect to qs,ii leads to the following linear
demand function:
qs,ji =
α− ps,ji − γQi
β
,
where Qi =
∫
s∈Ni qs,ids. This can be rewritten as
qs,ji =
αβ + γNip¯i
β(β + γNi)
− ps,ji
β
, (1.3)
where
p¯i =
∫
s∈Ni ps,ids
Ni
is a price index capturing the average price of all the varieties of the differentiated
good sold in region i.
The linear demand function (1.3) encloses the idea that the demand of a certain
variety s in market i falls when its price rises not only in absolute terms (own price effect,
ps,ji) but also with respect to the average price (differential price effect, Pi). However,
these effects exhibit a different magnitude, as the own price effect [− 1β ] is always stronger
than each cross price effect (which is negligible by definition) and than the sum of all the
cross price effects [ γNβ(β+γN) ]. In addition, notice that this demand structure allows for
variable elasticity of substitution in own and market prices:
s,ji =
δqs,ji
δps,ji
ps,ji
qs,ji
=
ps,ji
αβ − ps,ji(β + γNi) + γNip¯i .
For this reson, the quadratic utility is sometimes referred to as a Variable-Elasticity-
of-Substitution (VES) utility function, to differentiate it from the Constant-Elasticity-
of-Substitution (CES) types of preferences, associated with constant markups and no
pro-competitive effects on prices.
1.2.2 Firms
Turning to the production side of the economy, only two factors are used in the production
processes: a regionally mobile one, capital (K), and an immobile one, labor (L). The
perfectly competitive constant-returns-to-scale sector produces the homogeneous good
employing only labor. The monopolistically competitive differentiated manufacturing
3Notice that since wages are determined in the numéraire producing sector and profits are redis-
tributed to consumers in the two regions, no differences arise between the two regions in terms of
nominal income. The numéraire is assumed here to be freely traded, as common in NEG models, even
if this assumption has been shown from Picard and Zeng (2005) to have stronger implications than
generally thought. Indeed, the presence of transport costs in the homogeneous goods’ market (which is
assumed to be an agricultural good in their case) turn out to be a rather important dispersion force.
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sector, with single-product firms operating under increasing returns to scale, employs
both factors, capital in fixed amounts and labor proportionally to production. In the
manufacturing sector, firms’ profit can be expressed as follows:
Πs,i = (ps,ii − c)qs,iiMi + (ps,ij − c− t)qs,ijMj − rif, (1.4)
where c is the amount of labor needed to produce one unit of the differentiated good,
t is the linear transport cost, taken as exogenous, r is the return on capital invested, and
f is the amount of capital needed to set up a firm, which can be interpreted as a fixed
entry cost. Plugging (1.3) into (1.4) the profit function can be rewritten as:
Πs,i = (ps,ii − c)
[
αβ − (β + γNi)ps,ii + γNip¯i
β(β + γNi)
]
Mi +
+(ps,ij − c− t)
[
αβ − (β + γNj)ps,ij + γNj p¯j
β(β + γNj)
]
Mj − rif. (1.5)
Notice that the total number of firms in the economy, N = Ni +Nj , is a function of
the amount of capital in the economy and the fixed entry cost, N = K/f , but it is split
between the two regions according to the fraction of capital, λ, allocated to each region,
so that:
Ni =
λiK
f
; Nj = N −Ni. (1.6)
For notational convenience, when there is no subscript λ refers to the core region, i.e.
λ = λH , and it can be considered a measure of producers’ agglomeration.
1.2.3 Market outcomes in the short run
As manufacturing firms compete in a monopolistic competition framework, they are
assumed to maximize their profits, as captured by (1.5), through the choice of optimal
prices in their destination markets: the domestic and the foreign. Given that regions are
not fully integrated (in the sense that tij > 0), two different prices will emerge for the
same product in the two markets, whose level of competition is captured by price indices.
Firms take price indices as exogenous because they are assumed to be of negligible size.
Considering that there is no other source of heterogeneity except geographic location,
four segments can be identified in the market, as in each of the two regions there will be
one type of firm facing transport costs and the other not. The segments are then HH
and HF for the firms located in the core and FF and FH for the firms located in the
periphery.
The profit-maximizing prices chosen by the firms in region i are then:
ps,ii =
αβ + γNip¯i
2(β + γNi)
+
c
2
; ps,ji = ps,ii +
t
2
=
αβ + γNip¯i
2(β + γNi)
+
c
2
+
t
2
, (1.7)
which is the standard outcome of a monopolist facing a linear demand function,
the profit-maximizing price being just half of the highest possible price consistent with
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positive consumption levels, plus half of any marginal cost associated with production, c
and shipment, t, if applicable.
As expected, the differentiated varieties’ prices rise as consumers’ bias toward the
consumption of differentiated goods (α), marginal costs (c) or price indices (p¯) increase.
Product differentiation as well, as captured by the parameter β (the higher, the more va-
riety in consumption is appreciated) plays an important role, as can be better understood
by developing equation (1.7). Indeed, taking into account that
p¯i = Pi/Ni =
∫
s∈Ni
ps,i
Ni
ds =
Nii
Ni
ps,ii +
Nji
Ni
ps,ji = ps,ii +
Nji
Ni
t
2
= ps,ii + λj
t
2
(1.8)
and expressing p∗ only in terms of structural parameters (taking λ as a parameter
too, at least in the short run), it can be seen that:
p∗s,ii(t) =
β(α+ c) + γNi(c+ λj
t
2)
2β + γNi
; p∗s,ji(t) = p
∗
s,ii +
t
2
. (1.9)
From (1.9) it can be noticed that as β → 0 (or similarly as γ → ∞) consumers’
love for variety disappears and p∗s,ii → c + λj2 t and p∗ji → c +
λj
2 t +
t
2 . This is exactly
equal to the marginal cost of production plus a markup component deriving from the
acknowledgment that a share λj of firms in the market is characterized by higher marginal
costs of production and delivery, c + t, thus affecting the price index and relaxing price
competition. In fact, imported varieties pass-through to their consumers half of the
transport costs incurred, t2 .
A visual representation is provided in Figure 1.1 to help intuition. In the graph,
the operating profits associated with the sales of variety s are represented by the green-
shaded area between the profit maximizing prices, p∗s,ii and p
∗
s,ji, and the marginal costs,
c and c+ tji, up the equilibrium quantities sold, q∗s,ii and q
∗
s,ji.
Similarly, average prices in market i can be expressed in terms of the structural
parameters and transport costs:
p¯i =
Pi
Ni
=
αβ + (c+ λjt)(β + γNi)
2β + γNi
, (1.10)
which confirms that, as β → 0 (or γ →∞), then p¯i → c+λjt. This result is explained
by the fact that a share λi of the varieties found in the region has marginal costs equal
to c and a share λj of varieties has marginal costs equal to c+ t. Remembering that that
higher transport costs generate a less than proportional increase in final prices, it can
safely be claimed that in the short run (i.e., when the spatial distribution of economic
activities is considered fixed) transport costs aggravate the market distortions generated
by the existence of increasing returns to scale and love for variety. Consumers are hurt by
both the reduction in manufacturing firms’ profits and higher prices, which is a common
result in the NEG literature. In particular,
p∗s,ii(t) = p¯i −
t
2
λj ; p
∗
ji(t) = p¯i + (1− λj)
t
2
= p¯i +
t
2
λi,
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Figure 1.1: Operating profits for Core and Periphery varieties
from which two considerations derive. The first is that price differentials in price
between the domestically produced and the imported varieties are directly related to the
magnitude of transport costs. The second is that transport costs affect asymmetrically
the optimal pricing of the two varieties. Since λi > λj , importers’ deviation from the
average price in region i (charging a higher price than the average) is higher than domestic
firms’ (charging a lower price than the average). In addition, from equation (1.7) it can
be observed that prices of individual varieties and regional price indices can be seen as
strategic complements, as shown in Figure 1.2.
Equilibrium prices, as expressed in (1.9), could also be plugged into the demand
function (1.3), so as to obtain the equilibrium quantities only as a function of structural
parameters:
q∗s,ii(t) =
β(α− c) + γNiλj t2
β(2β + γNi)
; q∗s,ji(t) = q
∗
s,ii(t)−
t
2β
. (1.11)
As expected, the transport cost, t, enters positively in q∗ii and negatively in q
∗
ji, but
again asymmetrically. Indeed,
∂q∗ii
∂t
=
γNi
λj
2
β(2β + γNi)
;
∂q∗ji
∂t
= − β + γNi
λi
2
β(2β + γNi)
. (1.12)
This means that even if transport costs shift demand towards domestically produced
goods at the expense of imported ones, they create less demand on the domestic segment
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Figure 1.2: Strategic complementarity between ps,ii and p¯i.
than they destroy on the imported one. This implies that the total amount of consump-
tion in the differentiated sector is reduced and this implies that prices in each region rise
for both segments, as shown in equations (1.9) and (1.10).
As for the effects of industrial agglomeration, it can be noted that as long as λ > 12 ,
both prices and quantities are always lower in the bigger region than in the smaller
one, when t is equal in the two directions. Therefore, tougher competition in the bigger
region induced by lower transport costs benefits consumers in H by raising their real
wage (because the nominal wage is normalized to unity, but goods’ prices are declining).
However, the same is not true for the firms located in H. Indeed, in the short run the
profits of the firms located in the periphery increase in their export segment while the
profits and market share of the domestic firms decrease in the local market.
1.2.4 Consumers’ surplus
Based on the assumed preference structure shown in (1.3), the profit-maximizing pricing
shown in (1.9) and the corresponding quantities sold in equation (1.11), it is possible to
derive an expression to capture consumers’ surplus, which is the conventional tool used
to assess how the market structure is affecting consumers’ welfare. The idea behind the
analysis of the consumer surplus is that consumers in the economy would still buy some
units of the differentiated good even if prices were higher, given that the marginal utility
of consumption decreases in quantities. This means that at the actual equilibrium price,
the infra-marginal units consumed are paid less than what the consumer would accept
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to paid for them, thus providing more utility than is being paid for.
A visual representation is provided in Figure 1.3 to help intuition. In the graph,
Consumer Surplus derived from the consumption of variety s can be thought of as the
blue-shaded area standing below the inverse demand function, between the equilibrium
prices, p∗s,ii and p
∗
s,ji, and the maximum price associated with a positive consumption of
the good.
Figure 1.3: Consumers’ surplus from Core and Periphery varieties
Analytically, the utility associated with these gains can be quantified through the
analysis of the indirect utility function derived from (1.1). It can be expressed in function
of prices and income:
Wi =
α2Ni
2(β + γNi)
− α
β + γNi
∫
s∈Ni
ps,ids+
∫
s∈Ni p
2
s,ids
2β
− γ
2β(β + γNi)
[∫
s∈Ni
ps,ids
]2
+yi+q0, (1.13)
where nominal income yi is the sum of labor income, returns on capital invested and
profits redistributed from carriers in the transport sector.
The exact amount of consumer surplus associated with a particular market structure
can then be obtained by just plugging the equilibrium prices and income in the equation
(1.13), but the main interest lies not on in its value per se, but rather on its changes in
response to policy or technology changes. It can be noticed in (1.13) that consumers’
surplus is always negatively affected by price increases and the effect is stronger the
higher are prices:
∂Wi
∂ps,i
= −αβ − (β + γNi)ps,i + γNip¯i
β(β + γNi)
= −qs,ji < 0. (1.14)
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This implies that surplus is expected to be higher in the core region and every change
in transport costs (t) or industrial agglomeration (λ) affecting prices maps directly into
changes in the surplus of the consumers in the two regions through the price channel, in
addition to the impact on nominal income.
1.2.5 Factors’ remuneration
As mention earlier in the text, of the two factors of the model labor can be used to
produce the two types of good, the homogeneous under constant returns to scale and the
differentiated under increasing returns to scale, its supply being perfectly elastic at the
wage level corresponding to the value of the homogeneous good (the numéraire). Thus,
the resulting wage in nominal terms will be equal in the two sectors of the two regions.
As for capital, it is taken as fixed in the short run but it becomes mobile in the long
run. This means that, after a shock in transport costs, remuneration can temporarily
differ, but will eventually equalize across the two regions. Its remuneration is directly
related to the operating profits generated by firms in the two regions. Indeed, as capital
is the scarce resource in this economy, all the operating profits (the difference between
revenues and salaries) are absorbed by its remuneration. This can be interpreted as the
result of a bidding process in which any new entrant firm, if incumbents are making prof-
its, has room to offer a slightly higher remuneration and so attract all the capital of the
economy, thus leading to a fierce competition between firms to the advantage of capital
holders. As a consequence, as far as there is free entry of enterprises in the heterogeneous
goods’ manufacturing market and no heterogeneity across firms, consolidated profits are
equal to zero and the remuneration of capital in the two regions equate the operating
profits:
rs,i =
(ps,ii − c)qs,iiMi + (ps,ij − c− t)qs,ijMj
f
,
which can be rewritten as:
rs,i =
M
fβ
[
(ps,ii − c)2θi + (ps,ij − c− t)2θj
]
.
From this expression, it can be understood where the trade-offs concerning capital
remuneration stem from. Each variety is in fact extracting profits from two segments, the
domestic and the foreign, each having a different number of consumers (θiM and θjM),
different marginal costs of production and delivery (c and c+ t) and different local price
indices yielding different prices (ps,ii and ps,ij). This explains how, even in the absence of
any technological difference, subsidy or barrier to trade, the two regions can reach very
different levels of industrialization, just on the basis of differences in the consumption
levels.
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1.3 The long run: industrial agglomeration and regional im-
balances
In the long run, capital is free to move between the two regions. Thus, it will flow from
one region to the other until capital holders are indifferent between investing in one region
or in the other, i.e. when ri = rj , which can be rewritten as[
(p∗s,ii − c)2θi + (p∗s,ij − c− t)2(1− θi)
]
=
[
(p∗s,jj − c)2(1− θi) + (p∗s,ji − c− t)2θi
]
.
As long as transport costs t are taken as exogenous, it must be noted that this
relation holds only if transport costs are not excessive, i.e. if there is trade between
the regions. The maximum value consistent with the existence of international trade
in the two directions, which can be called t∗trade, can be computed as the value which
ensures qji in (1.11) or, equivalently, pji in (1.9) to be positive. In terms of the structural
parameters, it is
ttrade =
β(α− c)
β + γN2
. (1.15)
Focusing then on cases in which t 6 ttrade and solving the capital equalization equa-
tion, it can be seen that following relation holds between the agglomeration of consump-
tion and production:
λi − 1
2
=
2β(α− c− t2)
γN t2
(
θi − 1
2
)
, (1.16)
which implies that λi > θi as long as there is trade between the two regions (t < ttrade)
and θi > 1/2. This means that the region displaying a higher share of consumption,
θi > 1/2, will attract more than proportional quantity of capital and thus firms, λi > θi.
This phenomenon is called the Home Market Effect (HME).
Furthermore, it can be noted that ∂λi∂t < 0 when θi > 1/2, this meaning that lower
transport costs, when t is equal in the two directions, always leads to a higher degree of
industrial concentration in the regions with the highest level of consumption. A visual
representation of this process is provided in Figure 1.4, where is shown, for every θi, how
the range of possible values of λi changes in function of t ∈ [τ ; ttrade], where τ is the cost
of supplying the transport service (or alternatively, the lowest possible cost level, which
can also be naught and yield corner solutions).
Therefore, the magnitude of the effect is inversely related to the level of transport
costs in the two directions, so that a symmetric bilateral decrease in transport costs is
always bound to result in a higher degree of industrial concentration in the region with
the highest share of consumption (θi > 1/2), and intensify the HME.
In order to give an idea of the outcome interaction between θi and t in the definition
of the equilibrium agglomeration of economic activities in the economy, a simulation has
been run, where τ has been normalized to unity (which is the prevailing remuneration for
labor in the economy) and the other structural parameters have been chosen respecting
the restrictions on the domain of certain variable.4 The results of the simulation are
4For example, β should be bigger than γ for the own substitution effect to be larger than the cross
substitution effect.
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shown in Figure 1.5, where each line represents a different level of concentration of
consumption in the core (H) region, θH . It can be observed, for instance, that even a
low level of concentration of consumption, θH = 0, 53, associated with very low transport
costs, can lead to an almost total agglomeration of economic activities in the bigger
region.
To have a further idea of the extent of the Home Market Effect, it suffices to consider
that for t = ttrade, which is the highest value of t compatible with the existence of trade,
the following relation holds:
λi − 12
θi − 12
= 2 +
2β
γN
.
This means that, even if the highest possible transport cost is considered, defining
an imbalance as the difference between the actual concentration of production and con-
sumption, λ and θ, and a perfectly even distribution, 12 , it can be seen that imbalance
in production are more than twice as big as imbalances in consumption. This can be
seen as a lower bound for the Home Market Effect when transport costs are exogenous.
Higher levels of imbalance depend on structural parameters such as the bias towards the
consumption of different varieties, captured by β and γ, and the number of firms in the
economy, N , which is a function of the relative importance of the fixed cost of entry.
In order to give an idea of the size of the imbalance magnification effect associated
with the changes in transport costs, Table 1.1 shows the level of production concentration
associated with the lowest and the highest levels of transport costs used for plotting
Figure 1.5. It can be remarked that the ratio between imbalance in production and
consumption is constant in the level of consumption concentration θ but varies with the
transport costs.
Table 1.1: Quantification of the HME in the simulation: lower and upper bounds
θ λ(ttrade) λ(τ) θ − 12 λ(ttrade)− 12 λ(τ)− 12
0,5 0,5 0,5 0 0 0
0,51 0,521 0,583 0,01 0,021 0,083
0,55 0,604 0,916 0,05 0,104 0,416
0,6 0,709 1,33 0,1 0,209 0,83
0,65 0,813 1,75 0,15 0,313 1,25
0,7 0,917 2,16 0,2 0,417 1,66
0,75 1,02 2,58 0,25 0,52 2,08
θ−1/2
λ−1/2 : 2,09 8,31
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Figure 1.4: The Home Market Effect. On the left pane is represented the intuition behind
the agglomeration measure. On the right pane is shown the range of possible values of
λ, depending on the values of t and θ.
Figure 1.5: Simulation of changes in the agglomeration of industrial activities, λH , as a
function of transport costs (ranging from ttrade to τ) and agglomeration of consumption,
θH . The values of the structural parameters used in this simulation are the following:
α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2; c = 1; τ = 1; M = 100; K = 100; f = 10.
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1.3.1 Industrial concentration and market outcomes
Looking at the price, quantity and profit equations (1.9), (1.11) and (1.5) it can be noted
that all the relevant market outcomes are affected by the level of industrial concentration,
λ, in the core and in the periphery regions. Before turning to the impact of changes
in freight rates on the consumers, it can be useful to analyze the relationship between
industrial concentration, λ, and equilibrium prices and quantities, holding the freight rate
fixed, as could result for example from an exogenous shock in the relative concentration of
consumption, θ. Notice that, In order to simplify notation, the industrial concentration
parameter λ refers to the largest region when written without subscripts and can be
interpreted as an index of concentration for the entire economy given that only two
regions are considered in this analysis.
First of all, from (1.9) it can be seen that prices in the four segments would react as
follows:
∂pHH
∂λ
=
∂pFH
∂λ
< 0 <
∂pFF
∂λ
=
∂pHF
∂λ
;
∣∣∣∣∂pHH∂λ
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂pFH∂λ
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂pFF∂λ
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂pHF∂λ
∣∣∣∣ .
The price indices would change accordingly, as can be seen from (1.8):
∂PH
∂λ
< 0 <
∂PF
∂λ
;
∣∣∣∣∂PH∂λ
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂PF∂λ
∣∣∣∣ .
A rising level of concentration of firms in the bigger region is then expected to have
opposite and symmetric effects on the consumers’ surplus of the two regions. Indeed, in
the region hosting more firms tougher competition pushes prices down for both local and
imported varieties. The opposite happens in the less industrialized region. Since the total
number of firms in the two regions is determined exogenously by the fixed costs of entry,
the channel through which competition toughens in the bigger region is the reduction
in the number of imported varieties. A lower number of varieties is indeed internalizing
the transport costs in their final price, and thus domestic firms need to charge a lower
price to remain attractive for their consumers. In the smaller region, exactly the opposite
happens: as more goods are imported, the price index rises and firms accurately charge
higher prices to maximize their profits.
Similarly the effects of a change in the distribution of economic activities (λ) on
quantities sold of each variety can be analyzed from (1.11):
∂qHH
∂λ
=
∂qFH
∂λ
< 0 <
∂qFF
∂λ
=
∂qHF
∂λ
;
∣∣∣∣∂qHH∂λ
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂qFH∂λ
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂qFF∂λ
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂qHF∂λ
∣∣∣∣ .
Therefore, while changes in the freight rate, t, have been shown in (1.12) to be
distortionary and globally welfare reducing (since as they rise, the rises in quantities
of domestic varieties are more the counterbalanced by falls in quantities of imported
varieties), any change in the distribution of economic activities is just transferring exactly
the same amounts of quantities and price margins from one segment to another, as can
be easily seen through this new formulation of (1.9), (1.8) and (1.11). This means that,
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while reducing transport costs can have positive effects from a global welfare point of view,
the extent of spatial distribution is affecting only the relative prosperity of the regions,
but not their overall welfare. Thus, as economic imbalance grows between regions, no
beneficial effect for the whole economy can compensate for the potentially negative effects
of rising inequality in the distribution of economic activities.
It can also be noticed that quantities move in the same direction as prices, which may
be surprising at first sight, but it is not once it is realized that the parameter λ affects
directly the regional price index.
A visual representation of the results for the four segments is provided in Figure 1.6,
where the top arrows indicate the number of varieties produced in each segment, the
second ones indicate the quantities sold in each segment and the bottom ones refer to
the prices.
Figure 1.6: Core and Periphery effects of marginal changes in λ on market outcomes.
After the introduction on the market of less expensive varieties, whose demand is the
same as it was when they were imported but whose price is now free from the burden
of transport costs, even the reduction in selling price is not able to help domestic firms
keep their production levels as before in the bigger region. Firms exporting in the bigger
region then just follow, as their selling volumes are shown in (1.11) to be systematically
lower.
Summing up, from a firm’s perspective, after an exogenous increase in the concentra-
tion of economic activities, λ, prices and quantities of the increased number of varieties
produced in the core region fall in the domestic market and rise in the periphery. The
same happens to the fewer firms left in the peripheral region: prices and quantities fall
in the core and rise in the domestic market.
It could be interesting to note, at this point, that while the number of varieties and
the quantity per variety produced in F and sold in H decrease, the number of varieties
and the quantity per variety produced in H and sold in F rise. But what will then be the
overall effect on international trade? The answer is not a priori clear, as it depends on
transport costs and structural parameters in a complex way. The two components of total
trade flows (the flow from H to F and the flow from F to H) can be shown to behave
asymmetrically and move in opposite directions, i.e. QFH monotonically decreases in
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λ whereas QHF increases. Indeed, the total volume of inter-regional trade in the two
directions is determined by three elements: the number of people living in the importing
region, Mi,the individual consumption of each imported variety qs,ji and the number of
exported varieties (which coincides with the number of firms in the exporting region),
Nj . Formally, it is Qij = λiNijθjMjqij which, plugging (1.11), can be written in terms
of specific regional flows as
QHF = λN(1− θ)MqHF = λN(1− θ)M
β(2β + γN)
[
(α− c)β − t
2
(2β + γ(1− λ)N)
]
and
QFH(tFH) = (1− λ)NθMqFH = (1− λ)NθM
β(2β + γN)
[
(α− c)β − t
2
(2β + γλN)
]
.
Therefore,
∂QHF
∂λ > 0 and
∂QFH
∂λ < 0 ∀ feasible t (i.e. t < ttrade as defined in equation (1.15)).
This means that an increase in industrial agglomeration increases the shipments from
the core to the peripheral region and decreases them from the periphery towards the
core. The overall effect can be seen by combining the trade flows in the two directions,
Q(t) = QHF (t) +QFH(t), which can be written explicitly as
Q(t) = NM
(α− c)β(θHλF + θFλH)− t
[
λHλF γ
N
2 (θH + θF ) + β(θHλF + θFλH)
]
β(2β + γN)
. (1.17)
It is worth noting that the effect is always positive, for every feasible level of inter-
regional transport costs. Formally
∂Q(t)
∂λ
> 0 ∀t < ttrade.
1.4 Introducing the transport sector in the economy
Up to now, the transport cost t in the model has been treated as an exogenous param-
eter, shaping market outcomes in the differentiated good sector and the location choice
of firms. From now on, a transport sector is introduced in the economy, turning the
exogenously given transport costs into endogenously determined freight rates, similarly
to Behrens et al. (2009) and Behrens and Picard (2011). This analysis then feeds into the
next Section, whose focus is on how freight rates affect market outcomes and shape the
economic geography of the regions. Two different regulatory regimes for the transport
sector are considered, each one corresponding to a different type of liberalization:
• First, the case is considered of a transport sector in which carriers are allowed only
to charge the same price per route or, equivalently, to set the tariff based only
on distance and not on the direction of the shipment. This is referred to as the
unique-bilateral-tariff liberalization, or just symmetric freight rates;
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• Second, the case is considered of a transport in which carriers are left free to set
their prices freely and possibly segment their market based on the direction of the
shipment (which is the only source of heterogeneity among their clients). This is
referred to as complete deregulation, or full liberalization.
The central difference between the two regimes is, thus, the possibility of segmenting
the transport market into HF and FH sub-markets, shipping different amounts of goods
for different rates.
Regulators are also allowed to determine the intensity of competition in the transport
sector by choosing the number of carriers in the market. It is important to notice that
differences between the two regulatory regimes hold as long as the number of carriers is
small. When the number of competitors increases in the transport sector and competition
intensifies, prices converge to the marginal costs of production in the two regimes.
1.4.1 Market structure in the transport sector
Before showing how the transport sector is actually modeled, it will be useful to spend a
few words on the nature of the transport service to justify the modeling strategy. First
of all, it should be decided whether the transport service is to be considered within the
perfect or the imperfect competition framework. As a matter of fact, it can be claimed
that there are several dimensions over which firms operating in the transport sector
(from now on, carriers) can differentiate their service, both vertically (speed, punctual-
ity, traceability and so on) or horizontally (specializing in particular sector of the economy
or geographical areas). Yet, none of this would be conceivable in an economy character-
ized by identical consumers and identical firms producing a continuum of horizontally
differentiated varieties of the same good in four segments, whose only distinctive features
are the regions of production and sale.
Following this consideration, the transport sector is modeled in a more classical way,
treating the transport service as homogeneous. This said, if also free entry and no fixed
costs were assumed, prices would be pushed to marginal costs and the contribution of the
transport sector to the dynamics of the model would be null. The most straightforward
way to model the transport sector is then to turn to a standard oligopoly, in which a fixed
number of firms, K, compete in quantities or, equivalently, compete in prices after having
committed to a certain capacity (Vives, 1999). This would be a reasonable assumption,
as transport capacity and service infrastructures have to be prepared before the delivery
can effectively take place. This market structure is also convenient in terms of analytical
tractability, as the only decision available to regulators to shape the market outcomes is
to decide the numbers of competitors to allow in the transport sector.5
It should be noted that also Behrens and Picard (2011) model the transport service as
homogeneous and produced under constant returns to scale, but they model the market
5For simplicity, without loss of generality, the number of firms in the transport sector is chosen by
the regulator. In alternative, the amount of fixed entry costs could be decided by the regulator and
indirectly determine the number of carriers associated with a sufficient level of profits to cover the fixed
costs.
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interactions as perfectly competitive with freight rates equal to the costs of a round-trip.
In contrast, the oligopolistic structure suggested here allows firms to retain some market
power and charge a markup which can be used to repay the fixed costs of entry into
the transport sector if the regulator sets the number of competitors by issuing licenses
(or simply redistributed to consumers if no fixed cost is involved and the number of
carriers is chosen exogenously). The advantage of the approach followed here is that,
while it can also generate a perfectly competitive framework by setting the number
of competitors arbitrarily high, it still leaves one degree of freedom to regulators (the
number of competitors to allow in the market or equivalently the fixed entry costs) to
compare different policy options. In other words, in addition to comparing symmetric and
asymmetric pricing, it can also be shown how the level of competition in the transport
sector interacts with the transport liberalization regime adopted.
The other difference with respect to Behrens and Picard (2011) concerns the con-
straint on carriers’ capacity, which is not assumed here to be the same in the two direc-
tions of shipment, thus relaxing the back-haul problem. Even though the cargo space
may be the same in the two directions, indeed, additional fixed costs have to be incurred
to ship the goods from and to a specific destination (as for example the personnel devoted
to deal with import procedures, or the stocking facilities, or any kind of regulatory asym-
metries in the exporting and importing region). As for the marginal costs associated with
the shipment, it may be argued that the route-specific part (such as fuel consumption),
when considered per unit of good transported, may be much less relevant than direction-
specific marginal costs such as insurance, so that the cost of returning half-empty or not
completely full in the return trip can be assumed negligible.6 These assumptions imply
that capacity in this Chapter is treated as direction-specific, and the finite number of
carriers allowed in the market are allowed to use it as a commitment device to compete
in a standard oligopolistic outcome à la Cournot (1838) on each direction of shipment as
discussed by Vives (1999). This set of assumptions on direction-specific capacity and a
finite number of carriers allows the model to be consistent with the observation reported
by Behrens and Picard (2011) "that about 60% of the containers shipped from Asia to
North America in 2005 came back empty, and those that did come back full were often
transported at a steep discount for lack of demand," because it can indeed yield different
volumes of trade in the two directions of shipment and different prices.
1.4.2 Endogenization of the transport costs under a unique tariff
Assuming that all the carriers have the same marginal costs of shipment, after having
committed to a given direction-specific capacity, the operating profit function deter-
mining the kth carrier’s behavior resulting from the market structure adopted for the
6Of course, the importance in terms of price of route-specific costs such as unused cargo capacity or
fuel depends on the goods shipped. As noted by Hummels (2007), shipping the same volumes of coal or
computer microchips would result in a different relative importance of insurance over other types of costs.
Hene, depending on the types of goods that are shipped over a given route, different sets of assumptions
may be more appropriate. The set of assumptions used in this paper would be more consistent with the
shipment of goods with high value added per unit of weight.
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transport sector can be written as
Πk = (t− τ)qk, (1.18)
where t is the freight rate, τ is the marginal cost of transport and qk represents the
quantity of goods delivered by each carrier, qk,ij = Qij/k . Notice that the expression
capturing the total amount of international trade, as computed in equation (1.17), can
now be seen as the demand function associated with the transport sector. It is well
behaved in the sense that it linearly decreases in the parameter of interest, the freight
rate t, so that the carriers’ problem is well defined and yields an interior solution: as the
price of the transport service rises, the imported goods become more expensive and the
inter-regional trade flows decline. More formally, it can be shown that the elasticity of
international trade to transport costs is negative and decreasing in t:7
Qt = −∂Q
Q
· t
∂t
≡ −∂Q
∂t
· t
Q
⇒ Qt = t[θiλj(2β + γNλi) + θjλi(2β + γNλj)]
2(α− c)β(θiλj + θjλi)− t[θiλj(2β + γNλi) + θjλi(2β + γNλj)] ,
where Qt ∈ [0; +∞] ∀ t ∈ [0; ttrade]. A visual representation of the carrier’s problem
is provided in Figure 1.7, where it can be observed that the problem of the carriers closely
resembles the problem of suppliers of an intermediate input in the context of a double
marginalization setting (Tirole, 1988).
In order to solve analytically the carrier’s problem, it is convenient to express the
freight rate, t , in terms of the inter-regional flow of goods, given by (1.17), and then
maximize profit function (1.18) with respect to total quantities shipped. The inverse
demand for inter-regional transport is then
t(Q) =
(α− c)β(θiλj + θjλi)−Qβ(2β+γN)NM
λiλjγ
N
2 (θi + θj) + β(θiλj + θjλi)
and the resulting optimization problem of each carrier results in the pricing function
t∗ =
k
k + 1
τ +
2(α− c)β
(k + 1)
[
θiλj
(θiλj + θjλi)
(2β + γNλi) +
θjλi
(θiλj + θjλi)
(2β + γNλj)
]−1
. (1.19)
This expression has the advantage of being fairly flexible in terms of market outcomes.
In fact, ranging from k = 1 to k → ∞, all the possible market structures involving ho-
mogeneous goods are met. This latter case, indeed, corresponds to a perfect competition
7The analysis of the elasticity is rather convenient too in the study of monopolies and oligopolies.
Indeed, the multiplicative inverse of the price elasticity equals exactly the relative mark-up which a
pure monopolist will charge in the market. This result is easily generalizable to oligopolists by simply
dividing this value by the number of competitors. For example, in the case here analyzed, it would hold
the following relationship:
t∗ − τ
t
=
1
k
· 1
Qt
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Figure 1.7: Visual illustration of how final good’s demand structure affects the carriers’
problem.
framework where t∗ → τ , the marginal cost of production and profits are null. The op-
posite is true for the former case, where k = 1 and the monopolist can take advantage of
its market power and extract the maximum possible level of profits, charging the typical
price a monopolist charges when facing a linear demand function: half of the maximum
price compatible with positive amount of service sold, plus half of any marginal cost of
production on which it incurs.
As the system gets further away from a monopoly, prices fall: in other words, t∗
declines as the number of competitors, k, increases. Regulators can thus indirectly deter-
mine the resulting price in the transport sector by just setting the number of competitors.
Notice, however, that also λ is endogenous in the model and an explicit long-run
characterization of t∗ in terms of structural parameters alone would require also λ to be
written explicitly, as in (1.16). Given the analytical complexity of the resulting equations,
whose behavior cannot be studied through the computation of simple derivatives, the
long-run outcomes are analyzed using simulation throughout the Chapter. In Figure 1.8
are show the equilibrium freight rates on the two directions in the in the long run.
1.4.3 Endogenization of the transport costs under segmentation
In a completely deregulated regime, profit maximizing carriers are expected to segment
their markets because all the conditions for segmenting are satisfied: their revenues will
be higher, consumer screening is costless and arbitrage between consumers (firms involved
in inter-regional trade, in this case) is not profitable.
The first condition can be inferred by the analysis of the elasticities of trade flow to
the freight rate in the two segments. Since the elasticity in the segment from F to H
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can be shown to be higher than the one from H to F , applying the same price to both
segments would imply too high prices in the former segment and too low price in the
latter, which would not be profit-maximizing in the short run.8
The second condition holds because the key characteristic for segmentation is impos-
sible to hide, since the very purchase of the transport service in one region rather than
the other gives information about the segment which is being served.9
Finally arbitrage can be excluded, as the third condition states, because it is never
profitable to carry it out as can be argued from the following relationship, based on
equations (1.9) defining equilibrium prices:
p∗FF − p∗HH =
t
2
· γN(λH − λF )
(2β + γN)
< t.
This means that no third agent could make profits out of buying a good in one region
and reselling it in the other one, as long as some transport service has to be purchased.
Redefining economic variables under market segmentation
Once segmentation in the transport market is allowed, the relationships between eco-
nomic variables have to be rewritten to take into account of the potentially different
transport costs in the two directions of shipment. Here follows the description of the
economy under a segmented transport sector.
Consumer demand
The formal representation of consumers’ utility function is essentially unaffected and so is
the resulting demand function. The only difference with respect to the demand function
(1.3) is that the prices entering the demand function are now different, as they depend
on the segmented freight rates tji and no more on a unique t, as previously assumed:
qs,ji(tji) =
α− γQi(tji)
β
− ps,ji(tji)
β
=
αβ + γNp¯i(tji)
β(β + γN)
− ps,ji(tji)
β
.
Firms
In order to reflect the fact that exporters of the two regions are now facing different
transport costs, profit functions have to be slightly adjusted to account for the fact that
8An interesting result is that in the long run, after firms relocate due to the carriers pricing strategy,
the profits of the carriers turn out to be lower when they segment the transport markets as compared to
imposing a symmetric tariff, but it would probably not be reasonable to expect that each carrier takes
into account the aggregate relocation patterns of manufacturing firms when setting its freight rate on an
individual shipment.
9It can also be noted that the assumption of identical firms (or, at least, technologies of production)
rules out the possibility of alternative, cheaper ways of getting from one region to the other: if even one
firm were able to deliver its products to the other region in a cheaper way, indeed, all the other firms
would be also able to, leaving no room for the existence of a specific transport sector.
32 CHAPTER 1. QUADRATIC UTILITIES AND NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
t has now an origin and a destination, so it is tij :
Πs,i = (ps,ii − c)qs,iiMi + (ps,ij − c− tij)qs,ijMj − rif (1.20)
Also profit-maximizing prices have to be adapted:
ps,ii(tji) =
αβ + c(β + γN) + γNλj
tji
2
2β + γN
; ps,ji(tji) = ps,ii +
tji
2
(1.21)
Thus, the price index can be recomputed as follows:
p¯i(tji) =
Pi(tji)
N
=
αβ + (c+ λjtji)(β + γN)
2β + γN
(1.22)
An important aspect illustrated by this formulation of the price indices is that, as
long as t is fixed in the two directions, the price index in H is always lower than in F
because λH > λF , but this may not necessarily be the case when carriers segment the
transport market due to the additional impact of tji. Finally, given these prices and price
indices, the equilibrium quantities sold in the two markets become:
qs,ii(tji) =
(α− c)β + γNλj tji2
β(2β + γN)
; qs,ji(tji) = qs,ii(tji)− tji
2β
(1.23)
The segmented transport sector
The study of the transport sector’s dynamics will proceed as before. Carriers’ profits
maximizing behavior is reflected in the same way as in (1.18), with the only difference
that now the inter-regional flows in the two directions are considered and used as the
demand function for the segmented transport services, i.e. Qij(tij) in each direction.
The sum of these two regional components determines the aggregate inter-regional trade
flow:
Q = QHF (tHF ) +QFH(tFH),
where, for each region, exports to the other can be expressed as
Qij(tij) = λiNθjMqij =
λiNθjM
β(2β + γN)
[
(α− c)β − tij
2
(2β + γλjN)
]
(1.24)
This means that the transport services offered in the two segments are now traded
in different markets, each one characterized by a specific elasticity of inter-regional trade
flows to transport cost:
Qijtij = tij
(2β + γλjN)
2(α− c)β − tij(2β + γλjN) (1.25)
which are both increasing in the freight rate and in λ, but since λi = 1 − λj the
trade elasticity in the two regions move in opposite directions as industrial concentration
increases. Indeed it can be verified that
∂Qijtij
∂λi
> 0 ;
∂Qijtij
∂λj
< 0.
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From (1.24) it is then possible to derive the two inverse demand function in the
regions:
tij =
1
2β + γλjN
[
2(α− c)β − β(2β + γN)
λiNθjM
Qij
]
Then, plugging them into equation (1.18) and optimizing with respect to quantities,
the prevailing freight rates on the two segments become
tij =
k
k + 1
τ +
2(α− c)β
(k + 1)(2β + γλjN)
(1.26)
These two freight rates in the segmented markets can be compared with the equation
in (1.19), which describes the freight rate carriers would choose for the transport service
if not allowed to price discriminate. It can be noticed that their second term displays the
same numerator, but the denominator, which is the part in square brackets in (1.19), is
the weighted average sum of the value of the denominator in (1.26) in the two directions
of shipment. Given the higher elasticity of demand in the core region because of the
price pressure imposed by the presence of a higher number of varieties in the market not
being subject to transport costs, transport from the smaller to the bigger region will be
cheaper than under the unique tariff, but transport from the bigger to the smaller would
be more expensive in the short run:
tFH < t < tHF . (1.27)
Indeed, since the unique-bilateral-tariff pricing equation shown in (1.19) turns out to
be a weighted average of the two segmented tariffs (1.26), moving from a regulated tariff
system, implying a unique freight rate in both directions, to a deregulated one, leading
to segmentation, is likely to affect in a complex way all the agents of the economy: inter-
regional delivery would be cheaper from F to H, but more expensive from H to F and
this affects local consumers and firms in opposite ways, limiting the agglomeration in the
core region. The simulation of equilibrium freight rates in the two directions in the long
run is shown in Figure 1.9.
As noticed earlier, indeed, t∗ij also depends on λ, so the fact that agglomeration is
limited by segmentation in the transport sector (due to different elasticities of export
demand) implies also that in terms of structural parameters, in the long run, the relation
in (1.26) may not hold. In fact, if it is true also in the long run that tFH < tHF , the
different levels of λ associated with different liberalization regimes, for a given level of
competition in the transport sector (as approximated by the number of carriers), imply
that it is possible that tFH < tHF < t if the agglomeration patterns induced by the
symmetric tariffs are much stronger than those induced by asymmetric tariffs. This is
shown in Figure 1.10, where equilibrium freight rates in the long run are simulated for a
monopolist carrier (k = 1) and for an oligopoly of ten carriers (k = 10).
Further simulations are shown in the next Section to study the impact on welfare and
spatial agglomeration patterns of transport regime’s changes.
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Figure 1.8: Simulation of equilibrium freight rates in the long run as a function of
agglomeration of consumption, θH and competition in the transport sector (ranging from
k = 1 to k = 10) when tariffs are symmetric. The values of the structural parameters
used in this simulation are the following: α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2; c = 1; τ = 1;
M = 100; K = 100; f = 10.
Figure 1.9: Simulation of equilibrium freight rates in the long run as a function of
agglomeration of consumption, θH and competition in the transport sector (ranging from
k = 1 to k = 10) when tariffs are asymmetric. The values of the structural parameters
used in this simulation are the following: α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2; c = 1; τ = 1;
M = 100; K = 100; f = 10.
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Figure 1.10: Equilibrium freight rates in the long run, as a function of agglomeration
of consumption, θ and the number of carriers (k = 1 and k = 10). The values of the
structural parameters used in this simulation are the following: α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2;
c = 1; τ = 1; M = 100; K = 100; f = 10.
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1.5 Comparing regulatory regimes
In this section, the two kinds of liberalization are considered. The starting point is
an economy with high, symmetric transport costs before regulatory intervention. Two
policy options are then available to public authorities willing to reduce freight rates by
liberalizing the transport sector:
• A regulated unique-bilateral-tariff liberalization, imposing carriers to charge
the same price per route or, equivalently, to set the tariff based only on distance
and not on the direction of the shipment;
• A complete deregulation, allowing carriers to set their prices freely and possibly
segment their market based on the direction of the shipment (which is the only
source of heterogeneity among their clients).
Trade liberalization regimes are compared in a sequential way. First, the transition
from an expensive and heavily regulated framework to a unique-bilateral-tariff liberal-
ization is considered, as captured by an increase in the number of carriers. Then, the
additional effect of allowing carriers to price discriminate by the direction of shipment
is explored. The two regimes yield different results as long as the number of carriers is
finite, but converge to the same outcomes (pricing to marginal costs) as the number of
carriers increase.
1.5.1 Transport liberalization under symmetric tariffs
The focus of the welfare analysis is on the effects of transport liberalization on prices,
quantities and industrial agglomeration in the heterogeneous good sector. A visual
overview of the relation between transport costs and the most relevant market outcomes
in the four segments is provided in Figure 1.11, for ease of comparison with Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.11: Core and Periphery effects of marginal changes in t
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Prices and quantities
As for prices, equation (1.9) implies that that prices of the heterogeneous goods decrease
together with transport costs in the short run, but with different intensities in the different
segments. Looking at the first derivatives of (1.9) (or, equivalently, (1.21)) with respect
to t, it suffices to remind that λH > λF to see that
∂pHF
∂t
>
∂pFH
∂t
>
∂pFF
∂t
>
∂pHH
∂t
> 0.
A reduction in transport costs thus affects all manufacturing firms in the economy,
but while in the domestic segment firms located in the peripheral region (F ) are more
affected than those in the core region (H), the opposite is true in the export segments.
From a consumers’ standpoint this means also that prices in F will decrease more than
prices in H: this is a consequence of the higher share of imported varieties in the smaller
market. Indeed, it can also be checked from (1.22) that
∂p¯F
∂t
>
∂p¯H
∂t
,
which implies higher consumer surplus gains in the periphery than in the core in the
short run, with the overall impact in the long run depending on the extent of agglomer-
ation after the liberalization.
As for the quantities, (1.12) ensures that in the short run
∂qHH
∂t
> 0 ;
∂qFH
∂t
< 0
and
∂qFF
∂t
> 0 ;
∂qHF
∂t
< 0.
Note that, interestingly, movements in opposite directions have been found also as a
consequence of changes λ. However there is an important difference between the effects
of variations in the parameters t and λ: the latter, in fact, implies a zero-sum transfer of
quantities sold, i.e. a perfectly balanced and symmetric variation. However, this is not
the case for transport costs, whose variation yields∣∣∣∣∂qii∂t
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂qji∂t
∣∣∣∣ . (1.28)
This relationship shows why transport costs can be considered intrinsically distor-
tionary and why their reduction is unambiguously found to be welfare improving in the
short run.
Agglomeration and Manufacturing firms’ Operating Profits
As for the agglomeration of economic activities, it can be see from equation (1.16) that
a reduction in transport costs implies a magnification of the disparities in the long run,
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∂λH
∂t
< 0,
This reallocation of resources is triggered by a disproportionate impact of changes in
t on the firms based in the smaller region. It may appear counterintuitive, as firms in
the peripheral region have to incur lower transport costs to serve customers in the other
region. However, this effect has to be traded off against tougher competition coming
from the firms located in the core region, which now have easier access to the peripheral
markets. Equation (1.16) is derived from the equalization of capital remuneration across
the two regions and it signals that profits of firms located in the smaller region are affected
more severely than those in the bigger region from the intensification of competition due
to lower transport costs, so as to lead a higher share of region F ’s capital to flow toward
H and a higher relative number of varieties produced there.
In the short run (i.e. before capital remuneration re-equalize between regions), firms’
profits in the different segments are affected in a complex way. Indeed, two interacting
effects are at play: profits in the export segments rise as a consequence of higher mark-ups
(remember that firms pass through half of their linear transport costs) and quantities
sold. Yet, operating profits on the domestic market fall because tougher competition
lowers prices and quantities sold of each variety, i.e.:
∂ΠHH
∂t
> 0 ;
∂ΠFF
∂t
> 0
and
∂ΠFH
∂t
< 0 ;
∂ΠHF
∂t
< 0.
The overall effect in the short run can be deducted from the HME relationship in
(1.16), implying momentarily higher returns in region H as t decreases, ensures that
firms in the bigger region systematically outperform firms in the smaller one in the short
run, before capital returns are equalized again across the regions:
∂ΠH
∂t
>
∂ΠF
∂t
> 0.
Thus they earn higher profits than smaller region’s ones as a consequence of a reduc-
tion in freight rates.
As shown in the previous Sections, the level of industrial agglomeration, λ resulting
from transport liberalization depends on the concentration of consumption, θ and the
extent of competition in the transport sector after the liberalization, k. Figure 1.12 shows
a simulation plotting the lung-run equilibrium λ for different levels of θ and k.
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Figure 1.12: Simulation of agglomeration of industrial activities, λH , as a function of
agglomeration of consumption, θH and competition in the transport sector (ranging from
k = 1 to k = 10) when tariffs are symmetric. The values of the structural parameters
used in this simulation are the following: α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2; c = 1; τ = 1;
M = 100; K = 100; f = 10.
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Carriers’ profits
Considering the previously regulated transport sector as behaving like a monopoly or, at
least, assuming it to be a less competitive (because of fewer players) oligopoly than after
the liberalization takes place, the global level of profits generated by the transport sector
decreases because of a higher intensity of competition between carriers. In addition, this
already lower global amount of total profits has to be distributed across a higher number
of carriers.
The effect on the carriers’ sector profits for each variety shipped from i to j, ΠK,ji,
is illustrated in figure (1.13). Before liberalization, carriers’ profits Π0K,ji are described
by the area between the marginal costs of providing the transport service (in addition to
the marginal costs of production), c + τ and the price charged to the goods’ producers
(in addition to the marginal costs of production) c + t0ji. After liberalization, carriers’
profits Π′K,ji are instead captured by the area between the marginal costs of providing
the transport service (in addition to the marginal costs of production), c + τ and the
new price charged to the goods’ producers because of tougher competition (in addition
to the marginal costs of production) c+ t′ji. Of course, the lower markup is only partially
compensated by the higher volumes shipped per variety, which increase from q0∗ji to q
′∗
ji
because of the lower costs passed through from goods’ producers to consumers.10 Both
in the short run and in the long run, total profits of the transport sector decrease with
the liberalization while profits in the manufacturing sector increase, the relative size of
the two effects depending on the model’s parameters.
Figure 1.13: Graphical illustration of effects on carriers’ profits of changes in transport
costs between Core and Periphery
However, the existence of some residual market power (as long as k → ∞ or t → τ)
10Remember that half of the marginal costs of production and delivery is always transferred to profit-
maximizing prices under quadratic preferences.
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still causes some welfare dead-weight losses in the economy because every inter-regionally
traded product will still be incorporating both the mark-up applied by carriers for their
transport service and the mark-up applied by manufacturing firms. The former is caused
by the oligopolistic structure of the transport sector and the latter is due to the market
power conferred by the horizontal differentiation. As observed earlier, this phenomenon
mirrors what is usually called double marginalization in industrial organization and is
known to lead to an under-provision of good from both a consumers’ and a manufacturing
firms’ standpoints (Tirole, 1988).
Global welfare
The analysis above shows how, at least in the short run, transport liberalization (as any
other shock or policy whose result is to reduce the transport costs) is welfare improving
for the entire economy. The result is mainly driven by the evolution of prices, which fall
in all the four segments of the heterogeneous goods’ sector, as the transport costs fall.
An overview of the effects on prices, quantities, profits and consumer surplus is presented
in Figure (1.14) for the four segments.
Figure 1.14: Effects in domestic (left-hand pane) and foreign (right-hand pane) segments
of changes in transport costs
As noted in (1.13), indeed, the indirect utility function stemming from (1.1) can be
expressed as a function of prices and income,
Wi =
α2Ni
2(β + γNi)
− α
β + γNi
∫
s∈Ni
ps,ids+
∫
s∈Ni p
2
s,ids
2β
− γ
2β(β + γNi)
[∫
s∈Ni
ps,ids
]2
+ Yi + q0,
which shows that the higher the quantities consumed of a given variety, the higher
the welfare gain from its price reduction:
∂Wi
∂ps,i
= −αβ − (β + γNi)ps,i + γNip¯i
β(β + γNi)
= −qs,ji < 0.
An important remark is that the distribution of economic activities gets more un-
balanced while global welfare rises, which creates a clear trade-off for policy makers.
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Nonetheless, welfare improvements in the de-industrializing region, F , are stronger than
in the bigger region, because price reductions are more intense. However, from (1.8) (or,
equivalently, from (1.22) when tHF = tFH) it can be seen that, when t is identical in the
two directions of trade, F dwellers could never catch up entirely with the welfare level
of consumers living in H, in the absence of proper redistribution mechanisms.
Simulations show that in the long run the welfare gains realized in the short run are
not reversed under a wide range of parameter combinations.11 The increase in agglom-
eration does affect welfare negatively in itself, but it is a second-order effect as compared
to the first-order effect of lower prices (price indices decrease in both regions) and higher
profits in the manufacturing sector (because of higher markups in the inter-regional ship-
ments) caused by the decrease in transport costs.
1.5.2 Complete deregulation
The analysis of full deregulation leads to qualitatively similar but quantitatively differ-
ent conclusions. The departure from the symmetric transport cost towards a direction-
specific pricing implies that unique-bilateral-tariff liberalization and full deregulation
have different impacts on regional prices. In particular, as it has been noted, the sym-
metric outcome shown in equation (1.19) is the weighted averages for the two regions
of equation (1.26), where weights are represented by the relative number of firms and
consumers. Therefore, moving from a unique-bilateral-tariff liberalization to full deregu-
lation, transport prices in the two directions move in opposite directions, counteracting
the agglomeration effect due to lower freight rates.
Prices and quantities
The regional differentials on prices in the short run can be easily deducted by the analysis
of (1.21), keeping in mind the relationship stated in (1.27):
pSHH < pHH ; p
S
FH < pFH
and
pSFF > pFF ; p
S
HF > pHF ,
where the superscript S stands for market outcomes after carriers are allowed to
segment the transport market. What is worth noting is that prices increase for consumers
in the smaller region for both domestic and imported goods. The opposite holds for
consumers in the bigger region. This results in price indices diverging further, as can be
checked using equation (1.22):
p¯SH(tFH) < p¯H(t) ; p¯
S
F (tHF ) > p¯F (t).
11Welfare losses can be observed in the long run only when the number of firms approaches the number
of consumers, i.e. when the fixed costs of setting up a firm are very low. However, the effect is entirely
driven by the redistribution of profits to consumers and not by the consumer surplus as captured by
prices, but the quadratic utility framework is not the best suited to capture income effects because of the
assumption of a large enough endowment of numéraire to satisfy any level of consumption, so it would
be fair to say that the most robust results in this framework are the ones related to consumer surplus.
1.5. COMPARING REGULATORY REGIMES 43
This effect reinforces the relation noted in (1.8) and yields
p¯SH(tFH) < p¯H(t) < p¯F (t) < p¯
S
F (tHF ) .
Therefore, in the short run segmentation is expected to increase the gap in prices
between the two regions as compared to a unique tariff in the two directions. Interestingly,
this result is reverted in the long run, due to the restraint in agglomeration due to
asymmetric tariff, which keeps more firms in the peripheral region (for the same level
of competition in the transport sector) and thus reduces the share of varieties in the
periphery that have to incur transport costs to be consumed.
As for quantities, the impact of segmentation in the short run can be seen from
equation (1.23), taking into account the effect on prices shown in (1.27):
qSHH < qHH ; q
S
FH > qFH
and
qSFF > qFF ; q
S
HF < qHF .
Hence, once carriers are allowed to segment the transport market, each variety pro-
duced by the firms located in region F would sell more than under symmetric tariffs in
the short run, both in the local (because freight rates from the core are higher) and the
export segments (because shipping goods from the periphery to the core is cheaper). The
opposite is true of the firms located in H. Hence, compared to a unique-bilateral tariff,
in the short run complete deregulation implies higher levels of production in F and higher
employment in the manufacturing sector. In addition, given the higher level of domestic
prices, complete deregulation engender higher profits in the short run to the firms located
in F , as compared to a unique-bilateral tariff. This latter effect plays against agglomera-
tion and yields the following result. This result holds only partly in the long run. After
also relocation of firms is taken into account, indeed, simulations show that quantities on
the inter-regional export segment are higher under asymmetric tariffs than under sym-
metric tariffs, but the opposite is true for the domestic segment in the periphery, whose
sales are lower.
Agglomeration and Manufacturing Firms’ Operating Profits
In terms of agglomeration, due to the analytical intractability resulting from the feedback
loop of transport costs and agglomeration, the most suitable way to compare a unique-
bilateral-tariff liberalization regime with complete deregulation is through simulations.
It should be noted that once carriers are allowed to price discriminate by the direction of
shipment, equation (1.16) must be generalized to allow for the possibility of segmentation.
The agglomeration patterns as a function of transport costs and structural parameters
can thus be computed as
λi − 1
2
=
2β(α− c)
γN
(
θitji − θjtij
θit2ji + θjt
2
ij
)
+
β
γN
(
θjt
2
ij − θit2ji
θit2ji + θjt
2
ij
)
, (1.29)
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where capital remuneration in the two regions is now expressed in terms of two
different freight rates and the changes in profitability of firms in the two regions depend
on structural parameters and levels of concentration of consumption, θ, in a highly non-
linear way. It should be noted that replacing tij and tij with t, equation (1.29) turns into
(1.16). Thus, intuitively, it can be argued that, since the only difference between (1.29)
and (1.16) is transport segmentation and transport costs in the two directions follow the
ranking shown in equation (1.27) for a given level of λ, then agglomeration should be
restrained by the possibility of transport market segmentation. Simulations show that
this intuition is correct, as shown in Figure 1.15, which should be compared to 1.12,
where exactly the same structural parameters, levels of consumption concentration and
number of carriers are used as inputs of the simulation, the only difference being the
transport liberalization regime.
Figure 1.15: Simulation of agglomeration of industrial activities, λH , as a function of
agglomeration of consumption, θH and competition in the transport sector (ranging from
k = 1 to k = 10) when tariffs are asymmetric. The values of the structural parameters
used in this simulation are the following: α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2; c = 1; τ = 1;
M = 100; K = 100; f = 10.
The simulation confirms the intuition that transport market segmentation, as opposed
to a symmetric tariff, makes the core region less attractive for firms because it increases
the costs of shipping their products to the periphery and, at the same time, makes it
cheaper to produce goods in the periphery and ship them to the core. An analytical
short-run analysis of how profits are affected by segmentation in the transport sector is
complicated by the fact that, even if quantities rise for every segment supplied by firms
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located in F and falls fall for varieties produced in H, selling prices of each manufacturing
firm move in different directions in the domestic and the export segments, which are
populated a different share of the total population. Therefore, even if it surely holds that
ΠSFF > ΠFF ; Π
S
HH < ΠHH ,
there is no clear trend for ΠHF and ΠFH , because in the FH segment sales are higher
but prices lower and in the HF case the opposite holds in the short run. However,
since the agglomeration patterns are driven by the equalization of returns on capital,
the observation of lower levels of spatial relocation in the long run ensure that profit
differentials between the two regions in the short run are smaller under asymmetric tariffs
then under a unique-bilateral-tariff regime. This result is robust to different structural
parameters and number of competitors in the transport sector.
Global welfare comparisons
As in the case of symmetric tariffs, transport liberalization increases welfare under a full
liberalization regime because of the impact on prices in both regions. In order to compare
the two liberalization regimes in terms of welfare, a simulation has been performed, whose
results are shown in Figure 1.16 for a given level of consumption concentration. Welfare
levels under a complete deregulation are plotted in black for the two regions and for the
overall economy (weighing the welfare level of each region by its share of consumers); for
the unique-bilateral-tariff regime they are plotted in gray.
Figure 1.16: Simulation level of welfare in the two regions, and in the entire economy,
as a function of the level of competition in the transport sector (ranging from k = 1 to
k = 10) and liberalization regime. The values of the structural parameters used in this
simulation are the following: α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2; c = 1; τ = 1; M = 100; K = 100;
f = 10; θ = 0.55.
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As noted earlier, consumers in the core region always enjoy higher levels of welfare
than consumers in the periphery. In addition, complete liberalization yields always higher
levels of welfare in the two regions as compared to a liberalization regime imposing
a unique tariff per route. The ranking of liberalization regimes is robust to changes
in the structural parameters, but a caveat is due on the welfare impact of the extent
of competition in the transport sector. In fact, when the number of manufacturing
firms increase as compared to the number of consumers (for example, by altering the
fixed amount of capital needed to set up a firm, f) unreported simulations show that
intermediate levels of competition in the transport sector may be welfare superior to high
levels of competition. This result is driven by the nominal income effect of higher levels
of competition in the final goods sector (causing reduction in returns on capital in the
economy) that generate welfare losses in the peripheral region only partly compensated
by the gains from lower prices. At the limit, when there are as many firms as consumers
(f = 1), any reduction in transport costs decreases welfare instead of increasing it.
However, when the analysis of welfare is restricted to consumer surplus, which may be
the best way to account for welfare in a quadratic utility setting without income effects,
welfare results are again robust to different structural parameter values and confirm that
gains from transport liberalization increase as more carriers are allowed into the transport
sector.
There is an important implication stemming from the welfare comparison of transport
liberalization regimes. Since asymmetric tariffs are shown to be welfare superior to
symmetric tariffs, any policy aimed at reducing transport costs should keep in mind that
a decentralized market-driven reduction in transport costs (which can be obtained by
regulating only the number of entrants in the market) is to be preferred to an exogenous
reduction in transport costs, as can be obtained for example by keeping the transport
sector highly regulated and decreasing the tariffs. In order to be optimal, a reduction in
transport costs which does not result from a complete liberalization should indeed apply
different prices in the two directions of the same route depending on the elasticities of
inter-regional export demand to transport costs, but that means that the regulated sector
should mimic the decentralized market behavior. So it may be arguably more efficient to
allow carriers to set the prices maximizing their profits per segment of shipment, subject
to an entry fee. This solution ensures that, while in equilibrium the carriers’ profits are
redistributed to the public, their pricing strategies result in direction-specific freight rates
that increase welfare and restrain agglomeration in the core region.
One final remark on the impact of agglomeration on total welfare of the economy
is due. As often discussed in NEG models, agglomeration may be inefficient in terms
of welfare and turn static welfare gains into dynamic welfare losses. In the particular
framework studied in this Chapter this has shown not to be the case, unless an unreason-
ably high number of firms is assumed, however then negative impact of agglomeration
on welfare is confirmed. In Figure 1.17 is shown how the exogenous distribution of con-
sumption affects the level of welfare that can be attained in the two regions. On the left
pane is shown the case of a monopolist carrier and on the right pane a more competitive
transport sector. On the one hand, it can be noticed that when carriers can segment the
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transport sector (black lines in the Figure) the overall negative impact of consumption
concentration on welfare is the result of an improvement in the core region more than
compensated by a loss in the periphery, even if the weight of the welfare level in the core
increases with θ. On the other hand, when a symmetric tariff is imposed (gray lines in
the Figure), high levels of concentration in consumption cause losses in both the core
and the periphery, which signals a very inefficient level of agglomeration.
Figure 1.17: Simulation level of welfare in the two regions, and in the entire economy, as
a function of concentration of consumption and liberalization regime. On the left pane
with a monopolist carrier, k = 1, and on the right pane with k = 10. The values of the
structural parameters used in this simulation are the following: α = 10; β = 6.2; γ = 1.2;
c = 1; τ = 1; M = 100; K = 100; f = 10.
Another striking feature of the model highlighted by Figure 1.17 is that, while overall
welfare and welfare in the periphery always benefit from a complete deregulation, welfare
in core region (where most of the consumers live) is higher under a transport liberalization
regime where symmetric tariffs are imposed, except for high levels of concentration of
consumption (i.e. if the core region is much bigger than the periphery). This may give
rise to complex political economy dilemmas (as the preferred policy of the median voter
would not coincide with the first best) which add up to the usual NEG trade-off between
efficiency in terms of welfare and regional imbalances in terms of distribution of the
economic activities.
1.6 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter, a New Economic Geography (NEG) model has been presented where the
only source of heterogeneity across varieties is the location of producers and consumers.
Goods produced in one region and shipped to another have to incur transport costs,
which are first assumed exogenous and treated as a parameter and then endogenized
and obtained as the market outcome of a decentralized transport sector. Through the
endogenization of freight rates in the model it is then possible to study the welfare impacts
of different transport liberalization regimes and the corresponding location patterns of
the economic activity. Two liberalization policies are analyzed, the first one imposing
symmetric tariffs the two directions of a route, the second one leaving carriers free to price
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discriminate. Notably, the former type of liberalization is equivalent to an exogenous
reduction in transport costs, whereas the latter describes a competitive behavior, under
given market conditions.
The model shows that transport liberalization (or a reduction in exogenous transport
costs) is expected to yield static and dynamic welfare gains for consumers of the entire
economy. The result is not trivial, because in the short run cheaper inter-regional con-
nections induce tougher competition in the manufacturing sector and reduce prices for
consumers, but a typical result of NEG models is that the ensuing relocation of economic
activities may be inefficient in terms of welfare, making the overall impact on welfare not
a priori clear.
It is shown in this Chapter that transport liberalization turns out to be beneficial
for consumers under rather general conditions, but the choice of liberalization regime
matters. A full liberalization is shown to yield the highest level of overall welfare by
counteracting the inefficient agglomeration patterns resulting from a symmetric reduction
in transport costs. This is because the profit-maximizing pricing strategy of carriers
responding to differences in the elasticity of interregional demands implies charging higher
prices for shipments from the periphery to the core than vice versa. This makes it more
convenient to stay in the peripheral region for firms that would have otherwise (under a
symmetric tariff) relocated towards the core. An interesting analysis of the evolution of
transport costs, underlying the interaction between the transport sector and the rest of
the economy, has been conducted by Hummels (2007), who finds that ad-valorem prices
of ocean shipping and air shipping displayed sensibly different trends in the last fifty
years. Whereas the latter declined utterly because of technological progress, the former
kept constant as a consequence of increasing prices in upstream markets, underlying the
importance of the interaction between the transport sector and the other sectors of the
economy.
Under any liberalization regime, however, the model shows that the increases in
welfare are associated with higher regional imbalances in terms of economic activity.
As compared to a symmetric reduction of transport costs, the possibility for carriers to
segment the transport market is found to counteract the agglomeration forces associated
with lower transport cost, but does not manage to nullify them. This means that, if
policy-makers attribute an inherent value to an even distribution of economic activities
over the territory, they would not find it optimal to aim at the first best in terms welfare.
In addition, it has been show that there are some suboptimal policy options that would
make consumers in the bigger region better off than the socially optimal policy, which
may also be an issue for policymakers if they aim at pleasing the median voters.
Finally, two remarks in terms of policy relevance are in order. First of all, in the
present model only interactions between manufacturing and transport sectors have been
analyzed, thus nothing can be easily inferred about transport liberalization processes
affecting commuters or travelers. Second, the implicit simplifying assumption on which
this work has relied is that the most direct effect of liberalizations is to reduce prices.
This is not always true, but this doesn’t invalidate the underlying analysis, which can be
extended to different types of shocks affecting trade costs. The framework presented here
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can indeed be applied to other sources of change in trade costs, such as the efficiency gains
in transport derived from technological improvement or, conversely, the inefficiencies
generated by higher marginal costs of delivery (for example, trade tariffs, port fees, fuel
price and so on). Of course, when extending this framework to other contexts it should
be verified that the main modeling assumptions be relevant, such as the oligopolistic
market structure or the possibility of committing capacity (or setting prices) in specific
directions of shipment. When these assumptions do not hold, the results presented here
on welfare in the long run may not hold anymore, as shown for example by Behrens and
Picard (2011), who stress the back-haul problem faced by carriers by modeling an equal
level of capacity in the two directions of a given trade route and analyze the market and
agglomeration outcomes in such a perfectly competitive setting.
Summing up, in this Chapter a purely theoretical model has been presented. A
natural next step, as explored in Chapter 6, is to test empirically some of the implications
of the model, especially the ones concerning the determination of the freight rate in the
transport sector. In addition, the model has been developed only for two countries, but
it could be possible to extend it to a multi-country framework, even if it is very likely
that the complexity of the interaction between attraction (market size) and accessibility
(domestic competition and access to foreign market) effects, as noted by Behrens et al.
(2004).
The next Chapters are based on the same class of utility functions as the one adopted
in this Chapter, with a richer characterization of the demand side. However, this devel-
opment comes at a cost: the supply side of the economy is simplified to avoid adding
complexity when not strictly needed. Specifically, the number of regions in the economy,
the endogenization of transport costs and the long-run equilibrium outcomes are left in
the background in the rest of the Thesis.
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Chapter 2
Re-thinking product differentiation
in trade
In Chapter 1 it has been shown how, even in the context of homogeneous consumers, firms
and products, complex dynamics may emerge purely from market size, transport costs
and increasing returns to scale. These effects, in combination with firm heterogeneity
are considered by many theoretical trade modelers as being enough to capture most of
the relevant trade patterns, but is it really the case?
In this Chapter, a collection of recently published empirical evidence and some first-
hand observation are presented on the need to introduce at least two sources of hetero-
geneity on the demand side of the economy: one called "quality" and the other called
"taste". The latter is bound to affect only quantities sold, whereas the former is associ-
ated also with changes in prices.
First, the role quality and taste can play in reconciling theory and empirics is ex-
plained. Then, a clear link is drawn between spatial theories and new trade models of
monopolistic competition, discussing relevant implications and paving the way to Chap-
ter 3, in which quadratic utilities with different combinations of vertical and horizontal
differentiation are discussed.
2.1 Motivation: some stylized facts in the literature
As a result of the increased availability of micro-level data, implications and results of
new trade models can now be directly tested. Thus, early attempts to model heterogene-
ity through cost differences (following the lead of Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano,
2008) have recently undergone intense scrutiny. One directly testable implication of
models of cost heterogeneity is that, assuming a homogeneous demand structure for all
the varieties, higher prices should be associated with lower quantities sold. Authors
testing explicitly for this implication (Crozet et al., 2012; Hummels and Klenow, 2005;
Manova and Zhang, 2012; Verhoogen, 2012) tend to reject it and suggest that additional
dimensions of heterogeneity are needed.
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The usual suspect as a relevant source of additional variability is generally referred to
as quality1. As Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) point out, the interaction between product
quality and productive efficiency may help explain the "empirical fact that firm size is
not monotonically related with export status" and that "there are small firms that ex-
port while there are large firms that only operate in the domestic market". Also Brooks
(2006) proposes a similar explanation to account for the "tendency for Colombian plants
to under-export manufactured goods to the United States". In general, it seems reason-
able to expect that quality and efficiency have a different relative weight depending on
the industry, as Kneller and Yu (2008) suggest by looking at Chinese exporters and
Khandelwal (2010) confirms by studying US imports.
As a matter of fact, at a macro level, recent empirical works consistently report that
differences in product quality, as generally measured by differences in unit prices, are
an important determinant of the pattern of international trade flows across countries2.
However, it is important to notice that "international specialization is taking place within
products across varieties, rather than across products or industries" (Fontagné et al.,
2008). Therefore, ignoring idiosyncratic shifts in demand for single varieties within a
sector may bias results (Foster et al., 2008; Katayama et al., 2009) and hide rich under-
lying processes (Kneller and Yu, 2008).
The importance of quality in shifting demand seems to be confirmed also at a micro
level by trade data on a wide range of countries, such as China (Manova and Zhang, 2012;
Schott, 2008), Colombia (Brooks, 2006; Eaton et al., 2007; Verhoogen, 2012) and Mexico
(Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008). Furthermore, exploiting product-level Hungarian custom
data, Gorg et al. (2010) show that even the same product may be sold at a very different
unit price in different markets, justifying the claim that local competitive pressure may
be as important as idiosyncratic quality as a demand shifter. This view is confirmed also
within integrated markets, such as the EU in the case of the car industry (Goldberg and
Verboven, 2001), at virtually any geographical scale, even cities within the same country
(Engel and Rogers, 2001; Handbury and Weinstein, 2011).
Likely demand shifters such as quality-improving investments (Iacovone and Javorcik,
2008) and high-quality inputs (Verhoogen, 2012) are indeed consistently and significantly
associated with prices and turnover, but do not seem to perform well in predicting out-
put levels. Using plant-level manufacturing data on revenues and physical output and
focusing on firms serving local markets, Foster et al. (2008) show that "a large disper-
sion in output across producers of the same product" is observed, even "after taking into
account productivity variations and the movements along the demand curve associated
with these". The presence of this large unexplained variability may also be contribut-
ing to the puzzlingly weak relation between productivity and size (Brooks, 2006; Hallak
and Sivadasan, 2009) and to the empirical evidence of a bias towards domestic varieties
(Brooks, 2003; Chung and Song, 2008; Ferreira and Waldfogel, 2013; Goldberg and Ver-
1See, for example, Edwards and Lawrence (2010); Foster et al. (2008); Helble and Okubo (2008);
Hummels and Klenow (2005); Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) and Gervais (2010)
2Relevant works directly addressing this issue are Baldwin and Harrigan (2011); Hallak (2004); Hum-
mels and Klenow (2005); Hummels and Skiba (2004) and Schott (2004)
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boven, 2005). There seems to be no theoretical models of monopolistic competition that
take advantage of the information provided by "unexplained" output variability to adjust
price indices and other relevant measures of competition (Gaulier et al., 2008). This is
one key contribution of this thesis.
Besides technical efficiency, product quality and taste-driven idiosyncratic output
variations, another commonly envisaged variable affecting firms’ performance appear to
be product substitutability within and across sectors. Khandelwal (2010), for example,
claims that there is "substantial heterogeneity in product markets’ scope for quality dif-
ferentiation", relating within-sector competition between varieties to the "length" of the
quality ladder. According to the author, this could explain the heterogeneity across in-
dustries in the impact of low-wage competition on U.S. output and employment growth
reported by Bernard et al. (2006). Similarly, using data on geographically isolated mo-
nopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies in retail and professional industries, Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) find important inter-industry differences in entry threshold ratios, suggest-
ing that the patterns of substitutability vary across markets. Finally, running a principal
component analysis on the responses provided by owners of London-based businesses to
a set of questions about their priorities, Gordon (2010) notes that, together with quality
and efficiency, differentiation stands out as an important strategic dimension of competi-
tion, suggesting that firms do take indirect competition into account when setting their
pricing strategies and try to relax it by horizontally differentiating their offer within a
sector as well.
Finally, it is worth stressing that market-specific competitive pressure has consistently
been found to act as a demand shifter and affect the pricing behavior of firms (Ohno,
1989). In the case of multi-product firms, for example, Mayer et al. (2014) find that
tougher competition in an export market induces firms to alter their product mix by
skewing its export sales towards their best performing products.
2.1.1 An illustrative example: the car market
Before turning to the theoretical contribution and to the modeling and interpretation of
the empirical observations reported above, it may be useful to have a preliminary look
at how micro-level evidence on prices and quantities typically looks like. Looking at
the data can help visualize concretely what drives the empirical stylized facts mentioned
above. For this purpose it is possible to turn to a free and publicly available dataset on
the European car market used by Goldberg and Verboven (2001). Even if the car sector
is a very particular one, the patterns arising from the car data are perfectly in line with
what will be later observed on the Belgian export dataset shown in Chapter 4 and in
the micro-level literature in general. The reason for using the car evidence to motivate
the choice of assumptions is that these data can be easily verified by any reader, which
is useful given that access to firm-level data is not always granted.3 In addition, in this
dataset it is possible to observe product characteristics which are not visible on trade
data, so they will be used again later in the thesis, in Chapter 4, to provide some intuition
3The dataset can be found on http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/ndbad83/frank/cars.htm.
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on the connection between actual product characteristics and the model parameters in
an exploratory factor analysis.
In order to give an idea of typical trade patterns, prices and quantities are analyzed
in the five countries reported in the dataset (France, Italy, Germany, UK and Belgium)
in the year in which more car types were sold simultaneously in the five markets. From
Figure 2.1 it can be noted that the best year is 1999, when 72 varieties of cars were sold in
the 5 markets included in the sample. Notice that the entire number of varieties covered
in the 30 years considered is 410. Out of these, 117 were present in 1999, resulting in
463 market-variety observations.
Figure 2.1: Total number of car varieties in the sample and markets served by each.
The list of varieties considered is included in Table 2.1. In addition, some summary
statistics on the sample, and notably on prices and quantities, are shown in Table 4.1 in
Chapter 4, together with many other variables used to perform a factor analysis.
A price and a quantity rank is assigned to each car type in each market and, in
Figure 2.2, plot one against the other in all markets. Each dot in the figure represents
a combination of a price and quantity rank in a particular geographical market for a
particular variety of car.
If one assumes, as most trade models implicitly do, that all car types face the same
demand in every market, and that the only difference between car types is the cost at
which they are produced, one would expect all observations to lie around the diagonal
from top-left to bottom-right. Put differently, one would expect high-cost cars to rank
high in the price ranking (close to the origin on the price axis) with few people buying
them (top-left area of the figure). Low-cost cars, on the other hand, would sell a lot at a
low price (bottom-right area of the figure). If instead one assumes that quality is the only
source of heterogeneity and acts as a demand shifter, one would expect observations of
different car types to cluster around the diagonal running from bottom-left to top-right,
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Table 2.1: Car types present in 1999 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and UK.
Car types included in the sample
BMW 3 nissan primera audi a6 ford ka
BMW5 opel corsa audi a8 mercedes A
citroen xantia opel vectra audi a4 saab 9.5
fiat punto opel omega mitsubishi carisma seat arosa
ford fiesta opel astra renault laguna skoda octavia
ford escort peugeot 106 seat cordoba volvo S70/V70
ford mondeo peugeot 306 fiat bravo/brava alfa 166
honda civic renault clio peugeot 406 daewoo matiz/M
honda accord rover 200 skoda felicia ford focus
hyundai pony rover 400 suzuki baleno hyundai atos
hyundai lantra rover 416 nissan almera mazda demio
mazda 323 rover 400 audi a3 peugeot 206
mazda 626 seat ibiza citroen saxo saab 9.3
mercedes C klasse seat toledo volvo S40/V40 toyota avensis
mercedes E klasse suzuki swift alfa 156 volvo S80
mitsubishi colt toyota corolla citroen xsara rover 75
nissan micra volkswagen polo daewoo lanos toyota yaris
volkswagen golf daewoo nubira volkswagen lupo
volkswagen passat fiat marea volkswagen bora
with high-quality cars being highly priced and selling a lot and low-quality cars being
associated with low prices and poor sales in all markets.
Interestingly, Figure 2.2 shows that there is no clear correlation pattern between price
and quantity rankings. On average, the correlation between price and quantity rankings
of car types within markets is around -11%, with rank correlations ranging from 10% in
Germany to -30% in Italy, through -0.2% in Belgium, as shown in Table 2.2. This suggests
that a particular variety of car, displaying the same price ranking across markets, can sell
relatively well in one market but badly in another. Such a pattern is inconsistent with a
model where the only source of heterogeneity between models is productive efficiency or
quality. Consequently, an important first observation arising from the car data is that
more than one source of demand heterogeneity appears to be needed to fit micro-level
data.4
A second important observation arises from plotting price rankings between countries,
4Similar conclusions are reached through more formal analyses by authors such as Crozet et al. (2012);
Hummels and Klenow (2005); Manova and Zhang (2012).
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which is done in the left pane of Figure 2.3. Each dot in the figure now represents the
ranking of a car type in a particular geographical market compared to the ranking of that
car type in Belgium (horizontal axis), in such a way that a perfect correlation between
price ranks across markets would result in dots following the 45° line. Looking at the
left pane of Figure 2.3, it can be noted that bilateral price rank correlations are in fact
surprisingly high, ranging from 95.7% to 98.3%. A strong and positive price correlation
between markets corresponds to the prediction arising both from a pure cost and a pure
intrinsic quality model, but appears inconsistent with a model of differently perceived
quality. A model that assumes quality to be perceived differently in every market would in
fact result in a low price correlation between markets. When quality is introduced in the
model, it is thus assumed it to be variety-specific but not market-variety-specific. This
choice is also shown to be consistent with a rigorous interpretation of what is horizontal
and what is vertical in product differentiation.
A third observation arising from the car data stems from the right pane of Figure
2.3. There quantity rankings of car types between countries are plotted in a similar way
as price rankings in the previous figure. The pattern arising from quantity rankings is
very different. Bilateral rank correlations of car types averages 66% and can be as low as
49.5%, which is much less than the corresponding price rank correlations. Hence, while
price rankings of car types are quite stable across markets, quantity rankings are not.
In Section 4 evidence is discussed based on a detailed micro-level dataset on Belgian
exporters and show that these empirical regularities turn out to be extremely robust and
hold in virtually all markets and products considered.5.
All the bilateral rank correlations of prices and quantities associated with Figure 2.2
and the left and right panes of Figure 2.3 are shown in Table 2.2
Based on existing trade models incorporating either cost or quality heterogeneity or
both, one would expect quantity rankings to be just as regular as price rankings. What
this observation is saying, though, is that there appears to be a source of heterogeneity
affecting quantities that is not just variety-specific but also market-specific. The intro-
duction of an additional source of heterogeneity affecting quantities but not prices seems
necessary to account for prices and quantities behaving so differently. Or in other words,
heterogeneity on the supply side needs to be supplemented by heterogeneity on the demand
side, and notably by idiosyncratic consumer taste.
These empirical challenges can be tackled by proposing variations of a quasi-linear
model of monopolistic competition with a quadratic sub-utility for the differentiated
good where each variety may be viewed as a different bundle of horizontal and verti-
cal attributes. Vertical attributes, like quality, are assumed to be intrinsic to varieties,
affecting prices similarly in all markets. Horizontal attributes are allowed to be valued
differently across markets. The vertical attributes are captured by a demand-shifting
parameter; the horizontal attributes will be interpreted as measuring taste mismatch
between varieties’ characteristics and consumers’ ideals as it has been developed in in-
5This finding is consistent with the observation of a puzzlingly weak relationship between firms’
productivity and size found by Brooks (2006) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) and with the evidence
of a bias towards the consumption of domestic varieties (Ferreira and Waldfogel, 2013).
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dustrial organization (Anderson et al., 1992). In line with the overwhelming majority of
trade models and empirical evidence, cost heterogeneity is also introduced.
Figure 2.2: Price-quantity rankings within markets, EU car markets
Note: Scatterplot of price against quantity rankings for car types sold in Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy and UK within each market.
Figure 2.3: Price rankings across markets, EU car markets
Note: To the left, price rankings in France, Germany, Italy and UK are plotted against
price rankings in Belgium for car types sold in all these markets simultaneously. To the
right, the same scatterplot is drawn for quantity rankings.
By choosing the quadratic utility model, it is acknowledged that competition effects
are important and that they can differ in geographical markets. Empirical evidence
has shown indeed that absolute price levels can be very different between countries.
Exploiting product-level Hungarian custom data, Gorg et al. (2010) show that even
the same firm-product may be sold at very different prices in different markets. This
suggests the existence of important local market effects, which operate like a market-
specific demand shifter (but which does not affect price rankings). In other words,
markets appear to be segmented, with the intensity of local competition playing a role
as important as individual product characteristics in affecting prices and quantities.
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Table 2.2: Across- and within-market correlations in the European car market for prices and quantities.
corr QrankBE QrankFR QrankDE QrankIT QrankUK
QrankBelgium
QrankFrance 0.8361
QrankGermany 0.7363 0.6308
QrankItaly 0.6111 0.7232 0.495
QrankUK 0.7032 0.7436 0.5639 0.6019
corr QrankBE QrankFR QrankDE QrankIT QrankUK PrankBE PrankFR PrankDE PrankIT PrankUK
PrankBelgium -0.0024
PrankFrance -0.1872 0.9758
PrankGermany 0.1025 0.96 0.9572
PrankItaly -0.2985 0.9783 0.9825 0.9674
PrankUK -0.1453 0.9697 0.9777 0.9582 0.9781
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2.2 Theoretical Background
The previous example and review of findings in the literature illustrate a robust empirical
fact trade economists usually have to struggle with: one source of heterogeneity alone
cannot explain trade patterns within markets and the higher volatility of quantities with
respect to prices variations across markets. Indeed, almost all empirical facts reported
above are usually presented by their authors together with theoretical explanations and
models delivering the desired results. Most of the works reviewed do so by proposing
slight ad hoc departures from Melitz (2003), even as its generality has been increasingly
disputed (Behrens and Murata, 2007; Zhelobodko et al., 2012). In this Chapter, a general
framework is proposed building on a combination of product differentiation, monopolistic
competition and location theories. This Section provides a brief review of these strands
of theory, underlying their common origin and stressing how their paths have often
overlapped in the past and may be currently converging again.
2.2.1 Product differentiation and imperfect competition drifting apart
The idea of product differentiation emerged as a result of the debate on imperfect com-
petition and the need to develop a unified theory allowing for intermediate cases between
perfect competition and pure monopoly (Schumpeter and Nichol, 1934). The abstract
intuitions on the role of differentiation developed by Edgeworth (1925) as a response to
the criticism of Bertrand (1883) on the solution of the duopoly problem proposed by
Cournot (1838), were further developed by Sraffa (1926) and Hotelling (1929) by propos-
ing a conceptual framework in which the horizontal and vertical characteristics (in what
was then defined as the "symbolic space") of a certain product determine the amount of
competitive pressure a good faces and, hence, the price it is able to charge and the portion
of the market that it serves. In particular, Sraffa (1926) recognizes that "the causes of
the preference shown by any group of buyers for a particular firm are of the most diverse
nature", including that "special features of modeling or design have for their principal
purpose that of distinguishing it from the products of other firms" and claims that "when
each of the firms producing a commodity is in such a position the general market for the
commodity is subdivided into a series of distinct markets". Hotelling (1929) notes that
within each of these sub-markets firms are in a quasi-monopolistic position, so that "the
seller sets the price and the buyers the quantities they will buy".
Two strands of literature emerged from these intuitions: one concerned with firms’
location, pricing and differentiation choices, the other focusing on competition, theory
of value and trade. The first, started by Lerner and Singer (1937) and developed by
Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979), analyzes firms’ optimal positioning strategies and checks their stability and prop-
erties, in terms of vertical and horizontal differentiation. The second, inaugurated almost
contemporaneously by Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933), abstracts from actual
positioning of firms along vertical and horizontal dimensions, but incorporates the notion
of imperfect substitutability across goods and varieties to justify differences in pricing
behaviors of firms and in competitive toughness of markets. This strand of literature re-
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ceived great impulse thanks to the technical innovations on demand modeling proposed
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and their application in the context of trade by Krugman
(1980, 1979) to account for the emerging evidence of intra-industry trade collected by
Grubel and Lloyd (1975).
2.2.2 Product differentiation and imperfect competition converging
again
It is actually by integrating the latter class of models with the mechanism proposed
by Hopenhayn (1992) to capture firm and industry productivity dynamics that Melitz
(2003) ideated what is still regarded as one of the reference frameworks for studying firm
heterogeneity and endogenous firm selection processes. An additional technical develop-
ment has been achieved recently, as the quadratic utility function proposed by Ottaviano
et al. (2002) has been embedded in the Melitz (2003) to deliver an analytically solvable
model of firm heterogeneity and selection with non-constant markups and feedback ef-
fects from aggregate market characteristics Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). An alternative
way of achieving non-constant markups and feedback effects followed by many authors is
to introduce quality-adjusted CES demand functions, where quality is generally referred
to as a means of vertical differentiation and acts basically as a demand shifter6. As noted
by Manova and Zhang (2012), in these models product quality enters the utility function
through a quantity-augmenting term and all implications for quality-adjusted prices are
as in Melitz (2003).
However, the reintroduction of idiosyncratic vertical differentiation into the picture
has never been paired with an equal attention towards idiosyncrasies in horizontal differ-
entiation, which is always assumed to be constant across varieties in the same sector and
captured by the elasticity of substitution parameter. The same holds for works based
on quadratic utility functions: Foster et al. (2008) just consider vertical differentiation,
Kneller and Yu (2008) and Antoniades (2008) impose vertical and horizontal differen-
tiation to be captured by the same parameter, thus concealing their individual effects,
Altomonte et al. (2010) allow for variation in differentiation across subsets of varieties,
but keep it constant within each subset. In terms of the present framework, a con-
stant degree of horizontal differentiation means that all the varieties are equidistant from
representative consumer’s tastes, thus muddling up the effects of substitutability and
differentiation. Whereas in the context of CES models this constraint may still appear
technically insurmountable, this is not the case for the Ottaviano et al. (2002) quadratic
utility function, which can be straightforwardly generalized to account for both vertical
and horizontal idiosyncratic differentiation.
A brief review of past attempts to embed vertical and horizontal differentiation into
trade theory may help better illustrate how the framework proposed in this Chapter
relates to previous works. Indeed, in the same years in which Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
and Krugman (1980) proposed their monopolistic competition models where an explicit
6See, for example, Baldwin and Harrigan (2011); Hallak (2004); Johnson (2012); Verhoogen (2012)
and Verhoogen (2008)
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accounting of differentiation was sacrificed in favor of tractability and variable prices and
quantities, a parallel strand of literature focused on horizontal and vertical differentiation
in frameworks where a consumer is called to a fixed quantity of a certain good, choosing
among mutually exclusive varieties (Gabszewicz et al., 1981; Salop, 1979). While ini-
tially more focused on abstract equilibrium properties and characteristics (Gabszewicz
and Thisse, 1980), concerns over empirical relevance grew increasingly important in the
field and finally exploited the intuition of Lancaster (1966) to decompose a good into a
particular set of elemental characteristics to provide some elements of measurability of
differentiation, as for example in Goldberg and Verboven (2001). This allowed recent
empirical papers to follow Berry (1994) in describing demand through a discrete-choice
model combining "horizontal differentiation, in the sense that if the prices of all goods are
equal each will be purchased with positive probability, with vertical differentiation, in sense
that if the prices of all goods are equal higher-quality goods will be purchased with higher
probability" (Verhoogen, 2008). As Khandelwal (2010) notes, this methodology implies
that products with large variation in prices could nonetheless possess little differences in
quality.
Indeed, as long as quantities are held constant, both horizontal and vertical dif-
ferentiations do necessarily affect prices. In the traditional framework in which it has
been studied, then, the main differences between the two kinds of differentiation lies in
whether consumers in the market are unanimous on the desirability of a certain attribute.
In other words, paraphrasing Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012) if the improvement on a
certain product characteristic raises the willingness to pay of all the consumers, this at-
tribute will be considered vertical. If, instead, a certain characteristic is welcomed by
some consumers, but disliked by others, this will affect their willingness to pay in op-
posite ways and will be considered horizontal. This is in stark contrast with the model
presented in this Chapter, where horizontal characteristics of a variety do not affect
the profit maximizing price set by the firm. All the adjustments to differences in the
horizontal dimension are shown to run through differences in quantities sold, which in
this framework are allowed to vary. On the other hand, vertical characteristics in this
framework coincide with the standard interpretation of a parallel demand shifter.
Summing up, by generalizing the utility function proposed by Ottaviano et al. (2002)
a model of monopolistic competition can be obtained where idiosyncratic vertical and
horizontal differentiation can be studied without holding quantities fixed. Thus insights
developed by the literature on differentiation are merged with the empirical relevance of
literature on intra-firm trade and heterogeneous firms. To do so, in this Thesis is based
on a theoretical framework known for its tractability, yielding predictions consistent with
recent empirical evidence and in line with current modeling efforts.
2.3 Chamberlin and Hotelling unified
There are several definitions of vertical and horizontal differentiation, which are (more or
less) equivalent. Ever since Hotelling (1929) and Lancaster (1979), two varieties of the
same good are said to be horizontally differentiated when there is no common ranking
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of these varieties across consumers. In other words, horizontal differentiation reflects
consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes. By contrast, two varieties are vertically differentiated
when all consumers agree on their rankings. Vertical differentiation thus refers to the idea
of quality intrinsic to these varieties (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton,
1983). Such definitions of horizontal and vertical differentiation have been proposed for
indivisible varieties with consumers making mutually exclusive choices. In what follows,
first a standard model of differentiation is presented. Then, it is generalized to allow for
consumers to buy more than one variety and the differentiated good to be divisible.7
2.3.1 The one-variety case
Consider an economy involving one differentiated good and one homogeneous good, which
is used as the numéraire. There is one consumer who is endowed with income y. Consider
one variety s of the differentiated good. The utility from consuming the quantity qs > 0
of this variety and the quantity q0 > 0 of the numéraire is given by
us = αsqs − βs
2
q2s + q0,
where αs and βs are positive constants. The budget constraint is
psqs + q0 = y,
where ps is the price of variety s. Plugging the budget constraint in us and differentiating
with respect to qs yields the inverse demand for variety s:
ps = max {αs − βsqs, 0} . (2.1)
In this expression, ps is the highest price the consumer is willing to pay to acquire the
quantity qs of variety s, i.e. her willingness-to-pay (WTP). When the good is indivisible,
the WTP depends only on α and β. Here, instead, it declines with consumption, following
the decrease in its marginal utility. As long as the WTP for one additional unit of variety s
is positive, a consumer chooses to acquire more of this variety. In contrast, she chooses to
consume more of the numéraire when the WTP is negative. The equilibrium consumption
is obtained when the WTP is equal to zero. The utility us being quasi-linear, the above
expressions do not involve any income effect. However, it is shown in the next Chapter
that quadratic utility models can indirectly capture also the impact of income differences
across markets.
2.3.2 The two-variety case: a spatial interpretation
Consider now the case two varieties, whose degree of substitutability is captured by a
parameter γ > 0. The utility of variety s = 1, 2 is now given by
7Note that this approach, like most models of monopolistic competition, abstracts from the way
product characteristics are chosen by firms. This issue has been tackled in a handful of theoretical
papers (Hallak and Sivadasan, 2009) and analyzed empirically by Verhoogen (2012) and Eckel et al.
(2011).
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us = αsqs − βs
2
q2s −
γ
2
qsqr + q0 (2.2)
where qr is the amount consumed of the other variety.
In this case, αs−γqr/2 is the marginal utility derived from consuming the first unit of
variety s. It varies inversely with the total consumption of the other variety because the
consumer values less variety s when the consumption of its substitute r is larger. Note
that the intercept is positive provided that the desirability of variety s (αs) dominates
the negative impact of the consumption of the other variety, qr, weighted by the degree
of substitutability between the two varieties (γ). As qs increases, the WTP of this variety
decreases and variety s is consumed as long as its WTP is positive.
Repeating the above argument, the WTP of variety s becomes
ps = αs − βsqs − γ
2
qr. (2.3)
Compared to (2.1), the WTP for variety s is shifted downward to account for the
fact that the two varieties are substitutes; the value of the shifter increases with the total
consumption of the other variety and the degree of substitutability.
Following the literature, two varieties are said to be vertically differentiated when
consumers view the vertical characteristics of variety 1 as dominating those of variety 2.
Therefore, it is said that varieties 1 and 2 are vertically differentiated when all consumers’
WTP for the first marginal unit of variety 1 exceeds that of variety 2, i.e. α1 > α2. The
increase of WTP in αs thus implies that this parameter captures the vertical characteris-
tics embodied in the differentiated product. Consequently, it seems natural to interpret
αs as a measure of the quality of variety s. Since the WTP for a variety decreases with
its level of consumption, an alternative definition would be to say that varieties 1 and
2 are vertically differentiated when α1 − β1q > α2 − β2q for all q > 0. However, this
definition overlaps with the definition of the WTP that captures more features than ver-
tical attributes only. In this respect, it can be expected that the WTP of a variety also
depend on its horizontal attributes.
Turning to the interpretation of parameter βs. It is generally recognized that the
best approach to the theory of differentiated markets is the one developed by Hotelling
(1929) and Lancaster (1979) in which products are defined as bundles of characteristics
in a multi-dimensional space. In this respect, one of the major drawbacks encountered in
using aggregate preferences such as the CES and quadratic utility models is that a priori
their main parameters cannot be interpreted within a characteristics space.8 This is
why it is critical to provide an unambiguous interpretation of βs within the Lancasterian
framework, each parameter of the model developed here is given a precise and specific
definition. In addition, the differentiated good being divisible, the interpretation of these
parameters must be independent of the unit in which the good is measured.
8Anderson et al. (1992) have pinned down the Lancasterian foundations of the CES utility. To be
precise, they show that there exists a one-to-one relationship between the elasticity of substitution across
varieties and the distance between these varieties in the characteristics space: the larger the distance
between varieties, the smaller the elasticity of substitution.
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The spatial metaphor involves a continuum of heterogeneous consumers. Whereas in
Hotelling’s model consumers are assumed to make mutually exclusive purchases, in the
verti-zontal model they are allowed to visit several shops. In the spirit of spatial models
of product differentiation, first consumers are assumed to buy one unit of the good in
each shop they visit, an assumption that will be later relaxed.
In Figure 2.4, a spatial setting is depicted in which varieties/shops s = 1 and r = 2
are located at the endpoints of a unit segment, where α1 = α2 = α and β2 = 1− β1 > 0.
Using (2.3), the WTP for, say, variety 1 has an intercept equal to α − γ/2, while β1 is
the distance between shop 1 and consumers, the transport rate being normalized to 1.
The consumer’s WTP for variety 1 equals zero at βmax = α− γ/2.
Figure 2.4: Graphical intuition of the spatial problem
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Treading in Hotelling’s footsteps, it can be said that a consumer located at β1 ∈
[0, βmax] is willing to buy variety 1 when her WTP for one unit of the good from shop
1 is positive, that is, when the distance to this shop is smaller than βmax. Therefore, a
high (low) value of β1 amounts to saying that the consumer is far from (close to) shop
1. As a result, βs in (2.2) may be viewed as a parameter expressing the idiosyncratic
mismatch between the horizontal characteristics of variety s and the consumer’s ideal.
This interpretation of βs is nicely related to the concavity of us. As the mismatch between
variety s and the consumer’s ideal horizontal characteristics βs increases, it is natural to
expect the consumer to reach faster the level of satiation. In other words, if the consumer
prefers vanilla to chocolate as an ice-cream flavor, the utility of an additional chocolate
scoop will decrease faster than that of a vanilla scoop.
Turning to the links between the above spatial setting and a model of monopolistic
competition, when β1 < βmax, the consumer visits at least shop 1. However, as long as
α − γ/2 − β is positive at 1/2, then there is another segment [1 − βmax, βmax] in which
both α− γ/2− β1 and α− γ/2− (1− β1) are positive. Indeed, since consumers have a
love for variety, a consumer located in the vicinity of 1/2 may want to visit both shops.
For this to happen, it should be accounted that the consumer has already acquired one
unit of the good so that the two WTP-lines shift downward by γ/2. Therefore, the
segment over which both shops are actually visited is narrower than [1−βmax, βmax] and
given by [1 − βmax + γ/2, βmax − γ/2]. Consequently, when the consumer is located at
β1 < 1 − βmax − γ/2 she visits shop 1 only, whereas she visits both shops when her
location belongs to [1− βmax + γ/2, βmax − γ/2].
The foregoing argument shows how the spatial model can cope with consumers buying
one or two varieties of the differentiated good. In particular, regardless of her location
β1, any consumer acquires the two varieties when the interval [1−βmax +γ/2, βmax−γ/2]
is wide enough. This will be so if and only if
α− γ > 1.
This condition holds when the desirability of the differentiated good is high, the
substitutability between the two varieties is low, or both.
Conversely, it is readily verified that, regardless of her location, the consumer acquires
a single variety if and only if
1 > 2(α− γ)⇔ γ > α− 1
2
.
In other words, when varieties are very good substitutes, consumers choose to behave
like in the Hotelling model: despite their love for variety, they patronize a single shop
because the utility derived from buying from the second shop is overcome by the cost
of patronizing this shop. In particular, consumers located near the ends of the segment
buy only one variety and consumers located in the central area buy both if and only if
α− γ < 1 < 2(α− γ).
Note that, when α is sufficiently small, a consumer located in the central area does
not shop at all because both her desirability of the differentiated good is low and her
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taste mismatch is high. In the standard Hotelling framework, this corresponds to the
case in which the price of the good plus the transport cost borne by the consumer exceeds
her reservation price.
Summing up, it would be fair to say that the preferences (2.2) encapsulate both
vertical (αs) and horizontal (βs) differentiation features. This specification is also flexible
enough to retain the tractability of the standard quadratic utility model.
2.3.3 A multi-dimensional generalization of the spatial interpretation
In order to adhere as closely as possible to the original description of the Hotelling (1929)
spatial problem, a two-dimensional representation has been initially adopted, with a con-
tinuous segment of consumers and two goods at its extremity. While simple and intuitive,
there are obvious limitations in adopting such a form of representation alone. For ex-
ample, it would be impossible to introduce a third good with horizontal differentiation
equally distant from the other two and one consumer or, more in general, there may be
goods’ location properties and relations which strictly depend on the definition of the
horizontal differentiation space as a simple segment.
Therefore, it is now proposed a slightly more general way of visualizing the spatial
problem that can be described by a quadratic utility function. Horizontal differentiation
is still captured by the parameters β, but this is now defined over two independent
dimensions of differentiation on two axes. In practice, consumers are now located (in
terms of their ideal horizontal variety characteristics) on a continuous plane defined over
the dimensions β′ and β′′. For example, Figure 2.5 describes in three dimensions the
same spatial distribution of consumers and the two goods as in the two-dimensional
Figure 2.4 without substitution effects. For the correspondence between Figures 2.4 and
2.5 to be exact, imagine initially that in Figure 2.5 all consumers are defined by the same
ideal location on β′′ and the only difference is over their β′ position between the two
varieties. In this case, Figures 2.4 would be the equivalent of Figure 2.5 also in terms
of representation. Figure 2.4 can then be seen as a special case of the three-dimensional
representation shown in this subsection, where instead consumers are characterized by
the coordinates (β′1;β′′1 ).
Taking also the substitution effect into account, the three-dimensional representation
of Figure 2.4 is illustrated in Figure 2.6. In fact, also the intuition is exactly the same
as in Figure 2.4. Every consumer that consumes either one of the products see her will-
ingness to pay for the other decrease by the degree of substitution γ times the quantities
consumed, which is for the moment fixed to unity per variety consumed.9
9Remember that in the spatial metaphor adopted here quantities represent te slope of the WTP
function, therefore a visual representation not exploiting the indivisibility assumption would result in
complex and would require additional assumptions on the market structure to determine the quantities
sold of each variety.
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Figure 2.5: Three-dimensional representation of the Hotelling (1929) problem, corre-
sponding to Figure 2.4, without substitution effects
Figure 2.6: Three-dimensional representation of the Hotelling (1929) problem, corre-
sponding to Figure 2.4, with substitution effects
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The most visible difference induced by the introduction of an additional horizontal
dimension of differentiation is that the willingness-to-pay functions are not represented
by a two-dimensional line, but by three-dimensional cones whose base lies on the two-
dimensional horizontal differentiation space and whose height coincides with the value
of the vertical differentiation parameter α (or α − γ if a positive amount of the other
variety is consumed). As in the two-dimensional example, the apex of the cone lies in
correspondence of the coordinates (β′1;β′′1 ) describing consumers whose ideal variety char-
acteristics are identical to the actual characteristics of the variety. This particular shape
is due to the fact consumers whose ideal characteristics coincide with the characteristics
of a variety will have the highest willingness to pay for that particular variety and, as the
characteristics of the variety move further away from the consumers’ ideal, the value at-
tributed by the consumer to one unit of that particular variety decreases until it becomes
null.10 For example, if the ideal horizontal characteristics’ coordinates of consumer 1 are
(β′1;β′′1 ), then her willingness to pay for variety s, ps,1 can be computed as
ps,1 = αs − [(β′1;β′′1 )− (β′s;β′′s )] ⇒ ps,1 = αs −
[(
β′1 − β′s
)2
+
(
β′′1 − β′′s
)2] 12
.
Focusing on one variety, for example, Figure 2.7 shows the willingness to pay for
that particular variety for each consumer in the continuum (represented, for the sake
of illustration, by the gray dots). Therefore, when (β′;β′′) describe both consumer 1’s
ideal and a particular variety location (which can also be seen as ∆β′ = ∆β′′ = 0), then
the willingness to pay for that variety is equal to the quality parameter αs associated
with that variety. As shown in Figure 2.7, a threshold distance in taste mismatch can
be identified beyond which consumers are not interested in purchasing one unit of the
variety s. In other words, some consumers may not be willing to give away any positive
amount of their numéraire to purchase it, even if they recognize the presence of a positive
vertical differentiation.11 Of course, the spatial distribution of those consumers who are
indifferent between buying the variety and holding the numéraire in the two-dimensional
horizontal characteristics space has the shape of a circle in the stylized framework pro-
posed here.
As in the two-dimensional case, the overlap between the willingness-to-pay cones of
two different varieties, when positive, imply a parallel shift downwards for both, propor-
tional to the quantities consumed and the level of substitutability between the different
varieties. In the absence of substitution (i.e., for γ = 0) the two cones would be unaf-
fected, as shown in Figure 2.8.
10For the sake of tractability, in this example it is assumed that all the consumers give exactly the
same weight to the two dimensions of horizontal differentiation in such a way that their taste mismatch
can be measured simply as the distance between each consumer (represented by the gray dot) and the
variety’s characteristics (whose exact position on the β′;β′′ coordinates is just under the tip of the cone).
11As a side note, in an earlier version of this research this behavior of consumers, resulting from the
interaction of vertical and horizontal characteristics, had been described using the only apparently self-
contradictory expression "it’s very good, but I don’t like it", or rather "It’s very good but I don’t buy
it".
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Figure 2.7: Three-dimensional representation of one variety and a continuum of con-
sumers
In the more likely circumstance of a positive degree of substitutability (γ > 0),
instead, the WTP cones would be affected as shown in Figure 2.9. Comparing Figures
2.8 and 2.9 the three cases can be illustrated: the first is of a consumer (Consumer
1) consuming only one variety, with or without substitution effects; the second is the
case of a consumer (Consumer 2) that would consume the two varieties without in the
absence of substitution (Figure 2.8) but consumes only one of the two once substitution
is taken into account (Figure 2.9); the third of a consumer (Consumer 3) purchasing
the two varieties in any case, even in the presence of substitution effects, with the only
difference being that when substitution is included she is willing to pay less for each of
the two varieties, hence the downward shift in the cones’ representation. Notice that,
in standard Industrial Organization location theories, varieties are mutually exclusive,
so that consumers may not end up buying more varieties at the same time, which is
a possibility granted in the framework proposed here. This property turns out to be
rather useful when the indivisibility assumption is relaxed, in order to fully bridge the
gap between location and trade theories.
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Figure 2.8: Three-dimensional representation of two varieties and three consumers with-
out substitution effects
Figure 2.9: Three-dimensional representation of two varieties and three consumers with
substitution effects.
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One of the advantages of this three-dimensional representation is that it clearly high-
lights the interaction between different varieties for each consumer (which can be inter-
preted also as a representative consumer and thus a market). Up to this moment only
examples with two varieties have been proposed, but it is now straightforward to intro-
duce more varieties into the picture and visualize the impact on the willingness to pay for
each variety. To this end, in Figure 2.10 it is shown, with and without substitutability
effect, the case of a consumer (Consumer 4) that consumes three of the five vertically and
horizontally differentiated varieties produced present in the product space. For the sake
of illustration, it can be noted that the two varieties not consumed are the one with the
highest quality α but, given their distance on the horizontal characteristics space from
the ideal of Consumer 4, her willingness to pay for one unit of those particular varieties is
lower than the value of the numéraire which the consumer should use to purchase them.
(a) Without substitution effects (b) With substitution effects
Figure 2.10: Three-dimensional representation of five horizontally and vertically differ-
entiated varieties
Finally, it is possible now to provide some early intuition on some concepts that will
be introduced in the next Chapter of the thesis, where different variations of the quadratic
utility are analyzed. Remembering that at this stage the framework in place still holds the
quantities sold of each variety as indivisible, it is possible to show how a purely horizontal
and purely vertical differentiation problem would be represented à la Hotelling (1929)
in three dimensions. Figure 2.11 shows the three-dimensional representation of pure
horizontal differentiation (αs = α for all consumers) and Figure 2.12 shows the three-
dimensional representation of pure vertical differentiation in the characteristics space
(βs,i = β for all consumers). However, before being ready to apply this framework to
trade, a further step is needed: the relaxation of the indivisibility assumption, whose
consequences are now discussed.
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Figure 2.11: Three-dimensional representation of pure horizontal differentiation
(a) Section of the cone (b) entire cones
Figure 2.12: Three-dimensional representation of pure vertical differentiation
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2.3.4 Relaxing the indivisibility assumption
As stressed in the foregoing, in the product differentiation framework presented up to this
point consumers can only decide whether to buy a fixed quantity of units of the varieties at
hand. The only difference between the varieties bought lied on the consumers’ willingness
to pay for one unit of those varieties. The assumption of indivisibility, used for the sake
of illustration, is from now on relaxed and so consumers are allowed to choose also how
much to buy of each variety. In this way, the framework becomes directly comparable
to existing monopolistic competition trade models and can be directly applied to the
data.12
However, before turning to the divisible case, it is important to understand the im-
plications of holding quantities fixed, as it is an assumption usually exploited in models
such as the discrete choice models whose implications are often overlooked. Indeed, in
the example involving a fixed q¯, the impact of taste (β) and quality (α) on the willingness
to pay, and thus observed prices, may appear similar. A visual intuition is proposed in
Figure 2.13.
(a) Horizontal differentiation (b) Vertical differentiation
Figure 2.13: Indivisibility assumption and product differentiation
Notice that in Figure 2.13 on the vertical axis there is still the willingness to pay, as in
the previous graphs, but on the horizontal axis now are shown the quantities purchased
resulting from the utility system expressed in equation (2.2) yielding a linear demand as
in (2.3). In red are varieties which will not be consumed because one of their units is not
considered worth enough by the consumer i; in black are varieties to which consumer i
attributes a positive value in terms of the numéraire. Horizontal differentiation is then
displayed on the left pane. Changes in βs do not shift the vertical intercept (where
q = 0) but affect the slope of the willingness-to-pay function as qs increases. Vertical
12The assumption of fixed quantities consumed will be exploited in the rest of the Thesis only for
graphical illustration purposes, to represent consumers’ willingness to pay for a particular variety as a
function of its location in a way that follows the representation used in this Chapter.
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differentiation is show instead on the right pane. Here notice that changes in αs are
mapped into parallel shifts in demand. In the next Chapter it will be shown that whereas
the latter affect profit-maximizing prices, the former doesn’t, but then why this is not the
case under the indivisibility assumption? The answer becomes clear by looking at Figure
2.13. When quantities are fixed, indeed, both vertical and horizontal differentiations
have an impact on the willingness to pay of consumers because of the artificial rationing
imposed by a discrete binary choice between buying or not. Therefore, in models of
discrete choice where individual binary choices are aggregated into market statistics it
becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between vertical and horizontal differentiation
by looking at prices and quantities (which is an appealing feature of quadratic utilities
on which the rest of the Thesis relies heavily). To illustrate this point in Figure 2.14
the WTP functions of varieties with different combinations of vertical and horizontal
attributes have been plotted together. It can be noticed that some of these combination
may be associated with the same prices (and, by construction, the same quantities). This
is for example the case of variety (α = 1;β = .5) and variety (α = 1.5;β = 1), represented
by dashed blue linear demand segments, for both of which consumer i is willing to pay
p = .5 to buy q¯ = 1 units, abstracting for simplicity from substitutability effects (which
would in any case just shift the two demands in an identical, parallel way).
Figure 2.14: Vertical and horizontal differentiation and prices under the indivisibility
assumption
However, it is not a priori clear whether a quadratic utility framework is always supe-
rior to a discrete choice framework. There are admittedly certain categories of purchases
for which the indivisibility assumption is extremely reasonable: buying a house, a car, or
any other item whose unit price may represent a significant share of a consumer’s income
are typical examples. A quadratic utility with a clear distinction between horizontal and
vertical features of a product may instead e more reasonable in the context of recurrent
small purchases such as clothes, domestic mechanical appliances, food and so on. In the
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field on Industrial Organization it is commonly accepted that different products and mar-
ket structures require different analytical frameworks; in the field of international trade
it is more common to look for one particular preference and market structure fitting the
data as well as possible. In this Thesis the latter approach is followed and the empirical
Chapters are dedicated to show how well some variations of quadratic utilities perform
in describing trade patterns.
Multiple varieties are now introduced in the picture. Then, in the next Chapter
the different possible variations of the general framework presented in this Chapter are
analyzed in detail.
2.3.5 The multi-variety case
Finally, after having shown the single-variety case and the extension to two varieties
and different dimensions of horizontal differentiation, it is worth turning the attention
towards the multi-variety case, in which consumers are allowed to buy any quantity of
each variety. Notice that it doesn’t matter what are the actual product features are
associated with vertical and horizontal characteristics, as long as all the consumers agree
on desirability of some features and their presence is a variety, determining αs. As
for the horizontal characteristics, they are by definition either not desired by all the
consumers to the same extent or not perceived by all the consumers as being present to
the same extent in a variety, so they are captured by the variety-consumer-specific βs,i.
The parameters αs and βs,i can thus be interpreted as aggregate indices of characteristics
for each variety (in the case of vertical differentiation) and variety-consumer (the multi-
dimensional distance in the characteristics space between the consumer and the variety).
For notational simplicity, the case can be made for one market whose demand side is
represented by a representative consumer indexed by i and consider the standard setting
of monopolistic competition in which the differentiated good is available as a continuum
Si ≡ [0, Ni] of varieties, where Ni is the mass of varieties. The utility derived from the
consumption of variety s is now given by
us,i = αsqs,i − βs,i
2
q2s,i −
γ
2
qs,i
[∫
Si
qr,idr
]
+ q0, (2.4)
where the parameter αs coincides with the vertical axis intercept of the willingness-to-
pay function for variety s and βs,i represents its distance on the horizontal character-
istics space from the consumer, concentrating into one distance index all the possible
dimensions of horizontal differentiation. The parameter γ > 0 captures the degree of
substitutability between variety s and the total consumption of the differentiated good,
Qi (it is reasonable also to assume that γ < βs,i in every market, because γ captures the
discount in utility derived from the consumption of different varieties of the same good
and βs,i the discount derived from the consumption of exactly the same variety of the
same good). In this expression, γ measures the substitutability between variety s and
any other variety r ∈ Si. Consequently, the two-variety willingness-to-pay function in
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equation (2.3) generalizes into
ps,i = αs − βs,iqs,i − γ
2
[∫
Si
qr,idr
]
. (2.5)
Compared to (2.1), the WTP for variety s is shifted downward to account for the fact that
all varieties are substitutes; the value of the shifter increases with the total consumption
of the differentiated good and the substitutability across varieties.
Integrating (2.4) over the set S of varieties consumed, and including an outside good
q0 to act as a numéraire, yields the utility function
Ui =
∫
Si
αsqs,ids−
∫
Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
γ
2
[∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qsqrdsdr
]
+ q0 (2.6)
where αs and βs,i are two positive and continuous functions defined on Si, the former
measuring the intrinsic quality of variety s and the latter capturing the distance between
the consumer’s ideal and variety s. Notice that when all the varieties are defined by
the same quality and taste mismatch, i.e. αs = α and βs,i = β, the equation (2.6)
coincides with the utility function used in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Given the
budget constraint ∫
Si
qs,ips,ids+ q0 = yi,
using (2.5) it can be readily seen that the demand for variety s is given by
qs,i =
αs − ps,i
βs,i
− γ(Ai − Pi)
βs,i(1 + γNi)
(2.7)
where
Ni ≡
∫
Si
dr
βr,i
Ai ≡
∫
Si
αr
βr,i
dr Pi ≡
∫
Si
pr,i
βr,i
dr.
Thus, like in most models of monopolistic competition, the individual demand for a va-
riety (2.7) depends on a few market aggregates, here Ni, Ai and Pi. Using the spatial
interpretation of βs,i given above, it is straightforward that a group of varieties r, char-
acterized by small (large) values of βr,i, have a strong (weak) impact on the demand for
variety s because consumers are (not) willing to buy much of them, as they (dis)like its
horizontal characteristics better than those of r. This explains why βs,i appears in the
denominator of the aggregates Ni, Ai and Pi.
Remark that, for the sake of tractability, the substitutability parameter has been
considered constant across pairs of varieties in this Chapter, how in the next it will also
be allowed to vary to show an additional layer of flexibility that can be added to the
model.
2.4 Alternative approaches in the literature
It should be noticed that the approach presented in this Chapter blurs the boundaries
between unit consumption models and continuous consumption models, extending the
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results from one to the other. This objective is not achieved through the aggregation
of discrete choices of individual consumers, as Anderson et al. (1992) do, but through
the introduction of some degree of substitutability between the different varieties pur-
chased in arbitrary quantities by one representative consumer. A discussion to clarify
the differences between these two approaches is due.
First of all, it should be remembered that the unit consumption model, or the unit
purchase model, are models where each consumer buys only one unit of a variety, which
is characterized by specific "underlying hedonic attributes" (Mussa and Rosen, 1978)
which can be defined over one or more dimensions. For example, Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2012) nest horizontal and vertical differentiation in a Hotelling framework and explore
the properties of the resulting model where consumption is mutually exclusive (as opposed
to the model presented in this Chapter).
Relaxing unit consumption of mutually exclusive goods in such a framework, while
at the same time defining general properties and proving the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium market outcome, has proven an extremely delicate exercise. It has been
undertaken by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003) for substitutes goods and Gabszewicz
et al. (2001) for complementary goods in a Hotelling model with the possibility of joint
purchases, but in order to keep the preference settings general and tractable, the analysis
is restricted to two varieties and unit consumption. Still, even this slight departure
from Mussa and Rosen (1978) "is sufficient to dramatically alter the nature of price
competition" (Gabszewicz et al., 2001).
Relaxing also the unit consumption and the definition of a finite number of varieties,
as is done in this Chapter, makes a general characterization of the equilibrium properties
of the setting in terms of the uniqueness and existence of a spatial equilibrium virtually
impossible because of the multiple degrees of freedom (involving pricing, location and
competitive interactions with the mass of other varieties).13 For this reason, the spatial
metaphor linking the location theory and the continuous consumption model of monop-
olistic competition should not be interpreted as a micro-foundation based on a formal
proof, but rather as an analogy aimed at interpreting the parameters of quadratic prefer-
ences in terms of an exogenous distribution of variety characteristics in the characteristics
space. One way to look at it could be to assume each variety is assigned a random loca-
tion in the characteristics space (determining its α and β in the representative consumer
preferences) and the costs of adjustment are prohibitive.
Along these lines, but with the difference that consumers are assigned an exogenous
location in the characteristics space, Carballo et al. (2013) propose a model where firms
have to adapt their product to produce varieties that match consumer preferences in the
horizontal characteristics space. Since consumers are assumed to purchase only varieties
matching their taste, firms are willing to pay an adaptation cost to serve them. However,
in that framework varieties with different locations in the horizontal characteristics space
do not really compete with each other because non-ideal varieties are ignored by the
13Notice, however, that even the classic Hotelling problem has been shown by d’Aspremont et al. (1979)
not to have a Nash equilibrium solution when selling prices and location are decided simultaneously and
the costs associated with distance are low enough.
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consumer. In fact, varieties with the same horizontal characteristics still compete in a
way inspired by the location theory, à la Salop (1979) with consumers located around a
circle, where each point of the circle indicate a possible variants of the same variety. Still,
this means that the only difference between varieties is the size of the variant circle, which
captures the possibility of differentiation of variants, and all variant in equilibrium enters
symmetrically consumer preferences for a given variety, so the spatial dimension becomes
irrelevant to the definition of the problem. In contrast, in the spatial analogy presented in
this Chapter, consumers are allowed to purchase varieties that do not match their ideal,
but do it a "walking cost" of β which makes their utility function more concave and
their inverse demand function steeper, so they get sooner tired of consuming a variety,
the further it is located from their ideal characteristics. The resulting total bundle
of consumption, depending on individual horizontal and vertical characteristics of the
mass of varieties consumed, has an impact on each variety through the substitutability
parameter, γ.
One additional aspect of the analogy between the location and the trade theories
presented here that deserves some attention is the scalar nature of the parameter β in
quadratic utilities, which in reality derives from a vector in the characteristics space. The
information on the particular space occupied by a variety in the characteristics space is
not currently exploited in existing trade model based quadratic utilities. Concretely, this
means that the substitutability parameter, γ, discounts the entire bundle of consumption,
Q =
∫
r∈S qrdr, independently of its location. This information can be plugged back into
the quadratic utilities (and application of this intuition are shown in the last Chapter of
the Thesis), but the empirical tractability of the resulting model is substantially affected.
Yet, in Chapter 4 it is shown how the vectorial nature of β and its components (potentially
along different dimension of horizontal differentiation) can be taken into account through
a factor analysis performed on a set of varieties. This means that, even if only the scalar
component of the β resulting from the location metaphor is used for the definition of the
consumer problem, it doesn’t exclude the possibility of exploiting its spatial components
in future developments of the theory.
There are, of course, alternative ways proposed in the literature to reconcile the
location theory with non-localized competition mechanisms, even sticking to a unit con-
sumption framework. For example Chen and Riordan (2007) proposes a "spokes model"
where consumers have one favorite variety and have the same distance from all the oth-
ers (having to walk from the tip of a spoke to the center and then back to the tip of
another spoke), but the spatial dimension of the model they propose is very stylized and
homogeneous (for all varieties except the consumer’s favorite).
An alternative way to obtain a functional form describing the aggregate preferences
of the representative consumer as in (2.4), starting from a unit consumption of a set of
consumers would be the following, which is based on the intuition of Anderson et al.
(1992).
Following the idea employed in Carballo et al. (2013), assume in each market i there
is a share φ of consumers that are willing to buy a particular variety s. There is no
heterogeneity in preferences and all the varieties are described by the same α and β in
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every market, so that the only difference between markets is φs,i, i.e. the number of
consumers buy variety s in market i. In this case, the utility derived by each consumer
from the consumption of any variety in any market is
us,i = αqs,i − β
2
q2s,i −
γ
2
qs,i
[∫
R
qrdr
]
+ q0, (2.8)
where the last term represent the entire bundle of consumption of varieties r ∈ R ∈ S,
with S being the total number of varieties in the market. Considering that a share φs,i
of identical consumers buy the variety in each market, the preferences (2.8) can be
aggregated as
us,i ∗ φs,i = (α ∗ φs,i)qs,i − (βs,i ∗ φs,i)
2
q2s,i −
(γ ∗ φs,i)
2
qs,i
[∫
R
qrdr
]
+ q0 ∗ φs,i. (2.9)
Substituting uˆs,i = (us,i ∗ φs,i), αˆs,i = (α ∗ φs,i) , βˆs,i = (β ∗ φs,i), γˆs,i = (γ ∗ φs,i) and
qˆ0 = (q0 ∗ φs,i), then it is possible to rewrite (2.9) as
uˆs,i = αˆs,iqs,i − βˆs,i
2
q2s,i −
γˆs,i
2
qs,i
[∫
R
qrdr
]
+ qˆ0. (2.10)
Comparing the aggregate preferences expressed in (2.10) and in (2.4) there is one
main difference: the parameters α and γ in (2.10) are market-variety-specific because
they incorporate information on the market-variety-specific φs,i. In other words, (2.10)
can be interpreted as resulting from a market-variety-specific demand shock on each
variety, yielding a functional form comparable to the one employed by Kneller and Yu
(2008). From a theoretical point of view, one unfortunate property of this specification
recognized by the authors is that it implies an inverted-U relationship between demand
for a variety and its perceived quality, αˆs,i (i.e. above a certain threshold consumption
levels, qs,i, higher levels of φi,s would be associated with lower demand because of βˆs,i).
One way to overcome this problem would be to have φi,s affecting only αˆs,i and not βˆs,i,
but this would not be consistent with a standard aggregation of consumer utilities.
There is also an argument based on the stylized facts outlined at the beginning of the
Chapter that would tip the balance in favor of the preferences as described in (2.4). In
fact, quantities have been consistently found to be more variable than prices and markups
in existing empirical studies. This argument will be explored in depth in Chapter 4, but
even a cursory look at Figure 2.3 gives an idea of how price rankings correlate almost
perfectly across markets while quantity rankings don’t. The aggregation of individual
utilities resulting (2.10) would not be consistent with the absence of variability in price
rankings across markets, because of the market-variety-specific willingness to pay αˆs,i and
substitutability γˆs,i. However, this preliminary rejection of the model as derived from
the aggregation of individual purchasing choices of unit quantities needs to be confirmed
by a more careful analysis of the data. That will be done in Chapter 4, after having
developed the model presented in this Chapter on the basis of the location theory into a
full-fledged trade model.
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2.5 From location theory to monopolistic competition: as-
sumptions
In the next Chapter, the location model à la Hotelling presented here is turned into
a trade model of monopolistic competition and solved as in a standard Chamberlinian
setting. This approach deserves some discussion on the underlying model assumptions, in
both the spatial setting and the non-spatial problem. In particular, two points are worth
mentioning: the first is the impact of indivisibility in consumption on the interpretation
of the parameters; the second is about the consideration of strategic interaction between
producers.
As for the first point, the interpretation of the parameters is provided in a pure
framework à la Hotelling, where consumers have to walk a certain distance β to reach a
particular variety in the characteristics space in fixed quantities, q¯. The cost associated
with this distance is the purchased quantity, q¯, which means that the larger the quantity
consumer the more costly is to reach varieties that don’t match perfectly consumer’s
taste. When quantities to consume are fixed exogenously in the model, as in the original
Hotelling, the willingness to pay for a given variety is affected by distance β in a way that
is not separable from the intrinsic quality level of the variety, α. For this reason, in unit
consumption models is very difficult to design a way to disentangle empirically vertical
from horizontal differentiation. Relaxing the assumption of fixed quantities, though,
the price elasticity of demand (s,i) resulting from the preferences described in (2.4) is
independent of β:
s,i = − ps,i
αs − ps,i −
∫
Si
qr,idr
.
Therefore, the first difference in assumptions between the location theory and the trade
framework is the constraint on quantities to be consumed. The parameter β is thus
interpreted as horizontal differentiation in the characteristics space in the trade model,
but in practice it captures the convexity of the negative sub-utility derived from the
consumption of a particular, which can be interpreted as an indicator of how quickly
the consumer reaches satiation for a given variety (in terms of the numéraire). This is
consistent with the interpretation given to the parameter β by the interpretation based on
the location theory, because quantities consumed are there interpreted as the transport
cost to reach the variety in the characteristics space. Hence, the more the consumer is
purchasing of a variety that doesn’t match her taste, the faster she reaches satiation.14
However, notwithstanding the coherence between the location-theory and trade-theory
interpretation, it should be kept in mind that formally the β of the two settings are defined
based on different modeling assumptions, which is way rather than a micro-foundation
it would be suitable to describe the relation between the two as an analogy.
The second point, on strategic interactions, is also important in discriminating be-
tween the Chamberlinian framework and location theories. In the latter, competitors
14Needless to say, this distance in the characteristics space does not replace geographic distance in the
trade model (even if geographic distance and taste mismatch are likely to be correlated, as discussed in
the empirical Chapters 4 and 5), which is explicitly accounted for in setting the firms’ pricing strategy.
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are defined as a finite set of agents with whom the producer is supposed to enter into
a sort of strategic interaction, be it in terms of location, or pricing strategy, or quality
differentiation. When this number is assumed so high that each individual competitor is
considered negligible, as in the theory of monopolistic competition, the trade framework
departs significantly from standard location theories à la Mussa and Rosen (1978) and
it poses some problems in finding a spatial equilibrium solution to the resulting model.
While this issue will be better presented in the last Chapter, together with an outline of
a possible solution left for future research, it should be reminded here that the location of
firms is, for the moment, assumed exogenous, as discussed above. In practice, the trade
model that is developed in the next Chapter can be used to identify the distance of each
variety from the consumer in the characteristics space, βs,i, and its quality, αs, but these
two parameters are taken as exogenous draws (consistently with the trade literature)
and not as the result of an optimization process where firms locate in the characteristics
space in a profit-maximizing way.
The discussion on these two points, together with the tradition of using a perfect
competition setting in location theories, show how challenging still is to draw direct
connections between the two frameworks and reducing the discrepancies between models
inspired by Hotelling and Chamberlin, but hopefully it also shows that these differences
can be dealt with in a clear and transparent way by identifying the critical links and
solutions to fix them.
2.6 Concluding remarks
The discussion in this Chapter has shown one possible way of introducing heterogeneity
across varieties on the consumer side of trade models in order to better fit the data.
It has been claimed that it is possible to generalize spatial models à la Hotelling to
develop functional forms that mimic Chamberlinian models of monopolistic competition
while providing a justification for its sources of variability. Rather than providing a
formal micro-foundation of a connection between monopolistic competition and location
theories, this Chapter shows one possible way of generalizing the former into the latter.
The advantage of interpreting monopolistic competition models in terms of location
theory is twofold: the first is to show that fruitful connections can be drawn between the
fields of Industrial Organization and Trade by illustrating that the same functional form
can describe the seemingly unrelated problems of spatial and monopolistic competition
location by just adding or relaxing restrictions on consumer behavior. The second is
that such, by looking at the product characteristics in terms of vertical and horizontal
differentiation, the relations between each pair of varieties can be identified and studied
(which would not be the case in an pure, abstract Chamberlinian differentiation space),
as will be shown in the next Chapter. This new way of looking at "localized competition
problems" in a typically non-localized monopolistic competition setting, paves the way
to a whole new set of interesting research avenues, some of which are discussed in the last
Chapter of this thesis, building upon the trade models presented in the next Chapter.
In particular, in Chapter 3 the insights presented in the Chapter are further developed
82 CHAPTER 2. RE-THINKING PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN TRADE
and combined with supply side heterogeneity to better investigate the most suitable
variations of a quadratic utility to deal with different issue in the trade domain and their
empirical relevance, which is then tested in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3
Quadratic flexibility: some
alternative models
In this Chapter the preference structure presented in Chapter 2 is turned into a full-
fledged trade model. After a brief clarification on the general framework and terminology
adopted, it presents the technical innovations that can be introduced in a standard
quadratic utility model, first presented in isolation and then together, resulting in eight
variations of the model. The properties of each variation are discussed in terms of the
underlying spatial problem described and market outcomes, followed by an illustration
of the properties through simulations, to help intuition. In this way it will be possible to
easily grasp the implications of each change in the original specification and to understand
the role played by each individual source of heterogeneity, alone and combined.
General properties of the framework common to all the variations are then illustrated,
focusing in particular on the implicit functional relation between firms’ profits and con-
sumer surplus in quadratic utilities and on the possibility of accounting explicitly for
income differences in quadratic preference models. This is followed by a summary of all
the properties discussed and a table where all the functional forms are juxtaposed to
clarify the links between sources of heterogeneity and the corresponding properties of
market outcomes.
Finally, a preferred variation, the verti-zontal model, is identified to be taken to the
data in the next Chapters and some propositions on the policy and modeling implications
of the choice are spelled out.
3.1 The general setting and definitions
The two main ingredients of the models presented in this Chapter are product differ-
entiation and monopolistic competition. Given the diversity of contexts in which these
concepts are employed and the slight variations in meaning, an operative definition of
both is due. As for the latter, the exact meaning attributed to monopolistic competition
is that firms in a particular sector are assumed to produce varieties that are not perfectly
fungible and thus enjoy some degree of market power and have the ability to set prices
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to maximize their profits. At the same time, their price setting capacity is constrained
by the presence of other varieties in the market, whose aggregate impact is captured
by market indices. Each variety is assumed to be small enough not to influence market
indices on its own, which is why these are taken as exogenous even though resulting from
the aggregation of endogenous choices.
Turning to product differentiation, clear definitions of horizontal and vertical differ-
entiation until now only exist in discrete choice models with indivisible varieties and
with consumers making mutually exclusive choices, used in Industrial organization (Ti-
role, 1988) and, more recently, in trade (Fajgelbaum et al., 2011; Khandelwal, 2010).
Discrete choice models incorporate both types of differentiation (Anderson et al., 1992),
but don’t allow to distinguish between the two in terms of market outcomes, as discussed
in the previous Chapter. In contrast, a clear distinction between horizontal (taste) and
vertical (quality) differentiation is largely absent in models where consumers display love
for variety and purchase many products in varying quantities. Borrowing the definition
from Industrial Organization (Neven and Thisse, 1990), then, varieties of the same good
are horizontally differentiated when there is no common ranking across consumers when
varieties are equally priced. Horizontal differentiation thus reflects consumers’ tastes
that affect how much firms can sell of each variety. In contrast, varieties are vertically
differentiated when all consumers agree on their ranking, and thus quality affects prices
in all destination countries.
More precisely, the analysis undertaken in the previous Chapter points to the follow-
ing operative definitions of the concept:
Definition 1. Vertical differentiation Two varieties in a market are vertically
differentiated if consumers’ willingness to pay for their first marginal unit is different.
Profit maximizing firms producing superior varieties enjoy higher markups and sales. For
equal marginal costs across firms, superior varieties will be sold at a higher price and,
assuming equal horizontal differentiation, in larger quantities.
Definition 2. Horizontal differentiation Two varieties in a market are hori-
zontally differentiated if, for equal level of vertical differentiation, they are demanded in
different quantities for the same price by different consumers. Assuming equal marginal
costs across firms and equal vertical differentiation across varieties, consumers will face
the same price, but buy different quantities of horizontally differentiated varieties.
For the sake of intuition, the vertical dimension can be thought of as "quality" and
the horizontal dimension as the "taste mismatch" between product characteristics and
the consumers’ ideal. In a linear demand framework, changes in quality imply parallel
shifts in the demand function. Changes in tastes affect only the slope of the demand
function and, thus, have no direct effects on the profit maximizing level of prices.
The focus of this Chapter is on modeling the demand side. In line with intra-industry
trade literature, the supply side is approximated by fixed and variable costs of produc-
tion, the first incurred to enter and stay in the market, the second proportional to the
units produced. The combination of a fixed cost of entry and constant unit costs imply
increasing returns to scale in the production of each particular variety. As usual, the focus
is on one particular good and the consumption choices of a representative consumer over
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the different varieties of that good, abstracting from income effects and normalizing the
utility levels obtained from consumption in terms of a numéraire good. The numéraire
can be interpreted as approximating an outside good used as a reference for value or,
more generally, the expected utility from the consumption of a bundle of goods produced
in all the other sectors of the economy. For this reason it is sometimes referred to as
a "Hicksian Composite Commodity" in the literature (Asplund and Nocke, 2006; Gab-
szewicz et al., 1981; Shaked and Sutton, 1982) and is based on the assumption that the
share of consumer income in the particular sector analyzed is small enough not to affect
consumption in all the other sectors (so the composition of the bundle of consumption
of goods and the utility derived from it) in a noticeable way.
Finally, turning to transport costs, in CES models it is common to assume an ice-
berg type of transport costs à la Samuelson (1952) when delivering a good to a different
market. The most commonly reported reason for this choice is computational simplicity
(Krugman, 1979). In the context of a quadratic utility, though, this argument is not
compelling because linear transport costs can be simply summed to marginal costs of
production, allowing for straightforward multi-country extensions of the model and no
analytical complications. This choice entails two advantages: first, it allows to account
for the fact that production costs and transport costs appear to have a similar weight in
pricing decisions (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004; Holmes and Stevens, 2012; Irarraza-
bal et al., 2010); second, it accommodates the mounting empirical evidence rejecting the
iceberg transport cost hypothesis (Hummels and Skiba, 2004; Martin, 2009). In practice,
that means that throughout the Chapter trade costs can be considered included in the
variety-specific marginal costs cs, which is then replaced with the market-variety specific
cs,i = cs + ti, where ti is the cost of shipping one unit of variety s to country i.
Keeping this in mind and holding the general structure of the model fixed, the com-
bination of different sources of heterogeneity is presented first alone, as building blocks
of the possible model, then combined. Given its pervasive inclusion in virtually every
modern theory of trade since the observations of Bernard et al. (2003) and Doms and
Bartelsman (2000), heterogeneity of marginal costs is assumed throughout the Chap-
ter. In addition, vertical differentiation, horizontal differentiation and varying patterns
of substitution are introduced first alone and then in combination. Presenting them in-
dividually allows the reader to better grasp the role of each source of variability in the
model. Their combination instead shows the high degree of flexibility associated with
this class of utility functions. A brief summary of the properties and functional forms
of the different variations follows their presentation, together with a stylized simulation
intended to provide some intuition on the sources and implications associated with each
variation.
3.2 Overview of the alternative models
First of all, an overview of the different preference structures is proposed, so it will
be easier later on to spot similarities and differences among the models analyzed. In
addition to the standard heterogeneity in productive efficiency, the following sources of
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heterogeneity are considered:
• Model I: Baseline. Heterogeneity in productive efficiency but no heterogeneity in
preference parameters, i.e. constant quality (α), taste mismatch (β) and substi-
tutability (γ),
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0; (3.1)
• Model II: Vertical Differentiation - Heterogeneity in αs,
Ui(s) =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0; (3.2)
• Model III: Horizontal Differentiation - Heterogeneity in βs,i,
Ui(s) = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0; (3.3)
• Model IV: Different substitutability between pair of varieties - Heterogeneity in
γs,i,
Ui(s) = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γs,iqs,iqr,idsdr + q0; (3.4)
• Model V: Vertizontal differentiation - Heterogeneity in αs and βs,i,
Ui(s) =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0; (3.5)
• Model VI: Vertical differentiation with different substitutability - Heterogeneity in
αs and γs,i,
Ui(s) =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γs,iqs,iqr,idsdr + q0; (3.6)
• Model VII: Horizontal differentiation with different substitutability - Heterogeneity
in βs,i and γs,i,
Ui(s) = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γs,iqs,iqr,idsdr + q0; (3.7)
• Model VIII: Verti-zontal differentiation, different substitutability - Heterogeneity
in αs, βs,i and γs,i,
Ui(s) =
∫
s∈Si
αs,iqs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γs,iqs,iqr,idsdr+ q0. (3.8)
3.3. BUILDING BLOCKS: INDIVIDUAL SOURCES OF HETEROGENEITY 87
3.3 Building blocks: individual sources of heterogeneity
Before turning to the main focus of the Chapter, which is demand-side heterogeneity, the
standard Ottaviano et al. (2002) with cost heterogeneity is presented, closely recalling
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and its results. Then, Ottaviano et al. (2002) will be
generalized to embrace pure vertical differentiation, leading to a model equivalent to
Foster et al. (2008). The analysis of pure horizontal follows, shedding new light on the
role of the parameters in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and introducing a new way of
computing market indices. Finally, before interacting the different sources of variability,
the importance of substitutability between varieties and its role in linking individual
characteristics with market indices is discussed.
3.3.1 Model I - Differences in productive efficiency
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), a simplification of the quadratic utility function
proposed by Ottaviano et al. (2002) is used as the baseline framework on which the
model is built. Focusing on a specific sector, the utility derived from the consumption of
a mass of varieties, s, r ∈ Si, for a representative consumer in market i, can be written
as follows:
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2i (s)ds−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0 (3.9)
Subject to the budget constraint
∫
s∈Si qs,ips,ids + q0 = q0 + Yi , which implies that
consumers can use their initial endowment of numéraire or their exogenous income to
buy goods in the differentiated sector. Income effects can thus be put aside, making the
analysis of consumption patterns tractable without compromising generality.
The traditional way of interpreting this function is the following. The parameter
α is the consumer’s preference for any varieties in the differentiated sector in terms
of the numéraire, q0. More precisely, it is the amount of units of numéraire that the
representative consumer would be willing to trade against the first marginal unit of a
particular variety of good in this sector. More concisely: her willingness to pay. The
parameter γ expresses the substitutability between varieties: the higher γ, the closer
substitutes the varieties. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) note that the substitutability
between varieties affect also their demand: increases in α and decreases in γ both shift
out the demand for the differentiated varieties relative to the numéraire. Finally, the
parameter β is traditionally seen as indexing the degree of generic product differentiation
between varieties, a higher β implying higher differentiation.
Thus, two implicit assumptions are made in this first variation. First, all varieties
face the same demand in each country. Second, any particular variety faces the same
demand no matter which country it is sold in. In other words, all varieties enter consumer
preferences symmetrically around the world, which is clearly restrictive.
While this interpretation of the parameters will be later refined, as allowing them to
vary will provide new insights, the results of the model are now presented and interpreted
through the lens of the traditional interpretation.
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Maximizing a quasi-linear utility function with quadratic sub-utility leads to the
following linear inverse demand:
ps,i = α− βqs,i − γQi (3.10)
where Qi is a compact way of writing
∫
s∈Si qs,ids .
This can be inverted and rewritten in terms of structural parameters and market
indices as the following linear market demand:
qs,i =
α− ps,i
β
− γ(αNi − Pi)
β(β + γNi)
(3.11)
where Ni represents the number of varieties present in the market or, to be more precise,
their total mass, and Pi =
∫
s∈Si ps,ids is a simple price index obtained just by summing
up all the prices observed in this sector of the market. Note also that the average price
can be simply computed as pi = Pi/Ni.
Firms exploit their market power on the specific variety they produce and set prices
maximizing their profits subject to this demand function. As usual, firms are assumed
to pay a fixed cost for starting production and a unitary cost of production. As the
fixed cost is sunk, it does not affect directly the pricing strategy of the firms, but only
determine equilibrium entry in the market. As for the unitary costs of production, they
are here assumed to incorporate both production and transport, i.e. cs,i = cs+ts,i, where
cs captures the marginal costs associated with the production of variety s and ts,i the
cost of delivering one unit of variety s to market i. As the only source of heterogeneity
analyzed at this stage is cost heterogeneity, a possible way of visualizing it would be to
imagine a production activity entailing the same marginal costs of production for all the
firms, but different costs of access to the market because of different origins.
The price maximizing the operating profit function Π(s) =
∑
i∈I [ps,i − cs,i]qs,i can
then be written as:
p∗s,i =
αβ + γPi
2(β + γNi)
+
cs,i
2
(3.12)
It is worth noting that the only idiosyncratic variable in the optimal price equation
is cs,i. Firms facing higher marginal costs will charge higher prices. Given the linearity
of demand, firms will pass though exactly half of their costs. Note that this means that
higher prices imply lower markups, besides lower quantities. The combination of these
two effects leads to lower profits. A graphical intuition is provided in figure 3.1.
Taking into account that the average price in the market can be written as
pi =
Pi
Ni
= α
β
2β + γNi
+ ci
(β + γNi)
2β + γNi
(3.13)
where ci = Ci/Ni is the average cost and Ci =
∫
s∈Si cs,ids a simple total cost index,
the profit maximizing price for a variety s in market i can be written as a function of
exogenous variables:
p∗s,i =
cs,i
2
+
αβ + γNi
ci
2
2β + γNi
(3.14)
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Figure 3.1: Cost Heterogeneity
And the corresponding amount of quantities sold to the representative consumer is:
q∗s,i =
1
β
[p∗s,i − cs,i] (3.15)
Therefore, the operating profits generated by a variety s in market i are strictly
related to the efficiency in producing variety s:
pis,i =
1
β
[p∗s,i − cs,i]2 (3.16)
Firms’ expectations on operating profits can then be used as a free entry condition
to determine a cost cutoff and long-run equilibrium mass of varieties in the market.1
Some observations on the results driven by cost heterogeneity are due. Turning to the
role of parameters, it can be easily seen that prices are increasing in both willingness to
pay for goods in the sector, α, average costs, ci, and idiosyncratic costs, cs,i. While the
latter has a negative impact on quantities, though, the first two have not, as they simply
relax price competition and, as can be seen from (3.15), the ratio between markups and
quantities is constant in this version of the model. Toughness of competition in a particu-
lar market is determined by the interaction of mass of firms, substitutability and average
marginal costs of production and delivery. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) assume that
different countries are characterized by the same cost distribution and substitutability
patterns, so these two dimensions collapse to one, market size. However, even without
imposing a particular distribution of parameters, it can be noticed that when N →∞ or
γ →∞ in (3.14) then p∗s,i = cs,i2 + ci2 , which means that no firm can survive if less efficient
than the simple average, but this means that all the firms are progressively driven out of
the market, except the most efficient, which will then price to marginal cost. It is true
that free entry condition ca prevent N to reach that point, but no conditions apply on
the patterns of substitutability γ. It is also interesting to note that, as γ → 0, varieties
approach their pure monopoly price in a context of linear demand: p∗s,i =
cs,i
2 +
α
2 . Ev-
1The additional steps and assumptions needed obtain results in the long run are provided, among
others, by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). and are not analyzed here
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ery competitive environment, from pure monopoly to perfect competition, can then be
captured by this quadratic utility framework through the substitutability parameter.
The quadratic utility function with cost heterogeneity is the variation currently most
used in the literature. By interacting idiosyncratic costs and market indices, for exam-
ple, Mayer et al. (2014) show how multi-product firms change their product range and
product mix as a reaction to differences in competition across market destinations. Also
empirically, many studies rely solely on cost heterogeneity (see, for example Syverson,
2007, 2011).
However, a purely cost-based approach of firm heterogeneity does not provide much
flexibility in terms of variety characteristics. The most evident limits are that high prices
can stem only from high costs, low markups always coincide with low quantities sold,
the ratio between optimal prices and quantities is fixed for all the varieties and, finally,
firms with identical costs have to charge necessarily the same price for their products,
when demand parameters are fixed and constant for all the varieties.
One possible way to reintroduce variety characteristics into the picture, while keeping
a pure cost-heterogeneity framework, is to related the distance from the consumer to
the producer to some adaptation costs, such as in Carballo et al. (2013). However,
this solution does not to break the link between markups and quantities and imposes a
negative relation between sales and prices. These issues are addressed by the departures
from this baseline framework discussed in what follows.
3.3.2 Model II - Pure Vertical Differentiation
The first technical departure from the baseline model is to account for differences across
varieties in the parameter capturing the willingness to pay for the first marginal unit of
that specific variety in the absence of competition, α. An intuitive way to look at it is in
terms of vertical differentiation, or quality, for the sake of conciseness. Differently from
Antoniades (2008), the issue of how quality is obtained, or why it may be differently
distributed across markets is not considered here. Many alternative mechanisms could
be envisaged, ranging from the quality of inputs (Verhoogen, 2012), to local institutions
(Yamawaki, 2004), to specific investments (Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008; Picard, 2013),
but the focus of the model is on the demand side and wants to be as general as possible.
Thus it is just assumed that a variety-specific α(s) is drawn from a known distribution
and is equal across markets, in order to be consistent with the idea of unanimity of
consumers on the appreciation of vertical attributes of a product, and is not assumed to
be related to the marginal costs of production of delivery.2 It may be interpreted simply
as a good idea for a new product, which does not need specific research to be invented,
but just individual ingenuity.
2There are papers such as Picard and Okubo (2012) that assume that α can vary from market to
market, thus behaving like a demand shock in a quality-augmented CES. This possibility is not followed
in this variation to keep the analogy with respect to the location metaphor in which the parameter
α captures the willingness to pay of consumers whose ideal variety coincides with the location of the
variety.
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Taking into account this additional source of heterogeneity, the representative con-
sumer’s utility can be rewritten as follows is taken into account, the baseline model can
be generalized as follows:
Ui =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0 (3.17)
Subject to the same budget constraint as before:
∫
s∈Si qs,ips,ids = q0 + Yi .
This specification is similar to what Foster et al. (2008) propose, with the exception
that they prefer to stick to (3.9) and transform
∫
αqs,ids into
∫
(α + δs,i)qs,ids , where
δs,i is a demand shifter for a particular variety relative to the average level α. This δs,i
may then be seen as capturing both variety-specific attributes over which consumers in
different markets agree and market-variety-specific tastes for the particular attributes of
a certain variety. However, if one is interested in disentangling these two dimensions, it
is necessary to focus at a pure, market-invariant source of vertical differentiation.
The relative inverse demand function change slightly, if compared to (3.10), the only
difference being the variety-specific willingness to pay:
ps,i = αs − βqs,i − γQi (3.18)
The same holds for the demand function:
qs,i =
αs − ps,i
β
− γ(Ai − Pi)
β(β + γNi)
(3.19)
with the only difference that, in addition to the mass of firms Ni and price index
Pi =
∫
s∈Si ps,ids, now a quality index must be introduced Ai =
∫
s∈Si αsds. Note that
this quality index uncovers a relation between idiosyncratic demand and average quality
in the sector that was hidden in (3.11) because of the imposed homogeneity in willingness
to pay across varieties. The intuition behind the negative effect of average quality on the
demand for a specific variety is that, as the competitors’ quality increases, consumers
buy more of their varieties and this maps into tougher indirect competition through the
effect of γQi.
The profit maximizing price can therefore be written as:
p∗s,i =
αs + cs,i
2
− γ(Ai − Pi)
2(β + γNi)
(3.20)
As expected, idiosyncratic and average qualities work in opposite directions in the
definition of equilibrium prices as well. As stressed before, quality behaves as a pure
demand shifter, pushing markups and sales in the same direction. A graphical illustration
of the demand for varieties with different α in the same market is provided in figure 3.2
Thus, the average price in the market can be computed as:
pi =
Pi
Ni
= αi
β
2β + γNi
+ ci
β + γNi
2β + γNi
(3.21)
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Figure 3.2: Vertical Differentiation
where αi = Ai/Ni and ci = Ci/Ni are simple averages of quality and cost parameters
across varieties, total costs being simply Ci =
∫
s∈Si cs,ids.
Substituting it into the optimal price,
p∗s,i =
αs + cs,i
2
− γNi
(
αi−ci
2
)
2β + γNi
(3.22)
Finally, the optimal amount of quantities sold for each variety will be:
q∗s,i =
1
β
[p∗s,i − cs,i] (3.23)
The operating profits generated by a variety s in market i are directly related to the
markups:
pis,i =
1
β
[p∗s,i − cs,i]2 (3.24)
As compared to the baseline model with cost heterogeneity presented earlier, this
extension allows to account for varieties whose high price is not a symptom of high inef-
ficiency, but a consequence of high quality. As opposed to the case of cost heterogeneity
alone, where high prices can be driven only by high costs and entail low markups, the
introduction of vertical differentiation allows to account for higher prices associated with
higher markups and quantities. An interesting new feature emerging from this general-
ization is that market size is not the only source of difference in competitive pressure
between markets, but the average quality of products in that particular market plays a
role as well. What is striking is that average quality also affects the price index in such
a way that high-quality markets show higher prices than the ones with lower average
quality, ceteris paribus. Hence, high quality may turn out to be as important as a trade
barrier as low production costs. This may help solve some puzzles on why some markets
may be so difficult to penetrate for low-cost firms (Yamawaki, 2004).
More formally, this claim can be proven by looking at the price index (3.21) and
profit maximizing price (3.24), noting that ∂pi∂Ni < 0 ,
∂p∗s,i
∂Ni
< 0 and ∂pi∂αi > 0,
∂pi
∂ci
> 0
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,
∂p∗s,i
∂αi
= −∂p
∗
s,i
∂ci
< 0. Thus, while a higher number of competitors is associated with
a lower price index and lower prices for each variety, a higher average quality forces
each firm to charge a lower price, even if aggregate prices are higher. Assuming that,
for whatever reason, products in richer countries are of a higher average quality than
products in developing countries, these features would be consistent with the Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis of higher prices in developed economies and at the same time with
the empirical observation that it is difficult for firms in the developing world to penetrate
and thrive in some developed world markets, even if average prices are higher (Brooks,
2006).
In addition, as shown in Vandenbussche et al. (2013) to compare the evolution of
Chinese and EU exports, a framework with quality differentiation can be exploited to in-
vestigate the presence of quality upgrading at an aggregate level (say, country or country-
sector). Indeed, by assuming that only αs and cs may change over time, the relative
evolution of either one or the other with respect to other countries or country-sectors can
be extracted by analyzing the evolution of quantities and prices. Indeed, while having
the same impact on prices, costs and quality have an opposite effect on quantities sold,
which paves the way to develop an identification strategy. Profit maximizing firms would
in fact charge higher prices if marginal costs increase, but then will sell less. On the
contrary, when higher prices are the result of higher quality, the outward shift in demand
results in higher sales too. Formally,
∂p∗s,i
∂αs
> 0 ;
∂p∗s,i
∂cs,i
> 0 ;
∣∣∣∣∂p∗s,i∂αs
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂p∗s,i∂cs,i
∣∣∣∣ ,
but
∂q∗s,i
∂αs
> 0 ;
∂q∗s,i
∂cs,i
< 0 ;
∣∣∣∣∂q∗s,i∂αs
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂q∗s,i∂cs,i
∣∣∣∣ .
This means that looking at the relative export performance of two countries, say i and
j, in a third market, it can be enough to observe the evolution unit prices and quantities
to make some inference on the relative evolution of quality and costs. Focusing on one
specific product s in a particular period of time t Vandenbussche et al. (2013) show
indeed that
p∗i − p∗j =
(αi + ci)− (αj − cj)
2
,
which means that also the difference over time (∆t,t−1) in the relative price of i and
j is related to the evolution of quality and costs:
∆t,t−1(p∗i − p∗j ) =
∆t,t−1(αi − αj) + ∆t,t−1(ci − cj)
2
.
Similarly for quantities, focusing on one specific product s in a particular period of
time t,
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q∗i − q∗j =
(αi + ci)− (αj − cj)
2β
and
∆t,t−1(q∗i − q∗j ) =
∆t,t−1(αi − αj) + ∆t,t−1(ci − cj)
2β
.
Looking at relative variations over time in prices and quantities, then, the following
theoretical implications on the dominating effects can be drawn for each product s (which
can then be aggregated at an industry or country level):
• If ∆t,t−1(p∗i −p∗j ) > 0 and ∆t,t−1(q∗i −q∗j ) > 0 then country i is improving its quality
vis-à-vis country j relative faster than it is increasing its costs, which means that,
even if both costs and quality are increasing, the former are outgrowing the former;
• If ∆t,t−1(p∗i − p∗j ) > 0 and ∆t,t−1(q∗i − q∗j ) < 0 then country i’s costs are growing
faster than quality improvements, as compared to country j, which causes a loss of
market shares;
• If ∆t,t−1(p∗i − p∗j ) < 0 and ∆t,t−1(q∗i − q∗j ) > 0 then country i’s costs reduction, as
compared to country j are raising i’s market share and lowering its relative sales
price for product s;
• If ∆t,t−1(p∗i − p∗j ) < 0 and ∆t,t−1(q∗i − q∗j ) < 0 then country j is decreasing the
relative quality of its export and thus reducing its markups and market share in
the third market considered.
In Vandenbussche et al. (2013) this methodology is used to document the rise in
Chinese quality of exports vis-à-vis the EU in the US market.3
Turning now to the other structural parameters of (3.22) and (3.22) to see how they
affect market aggregates, it can be noted that ∂pi∂γ < 0 and
∂pi
∂β > 0, while
∂Q
∂γ < 0
and ∂Q∂β < 0. Therefore, while the substitutability parameter γ simply shifts all the
demand functions in a parallel way, the parameter β increases prices but reduces the
quantities sold in the market. As long as β is held constant across markets and varieties,
it may be reasonable to interpret it as indexing the degree of product differentiation as
in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). A higher degree of differentiation would allow firms to
enjoy more market power and then charge higher prices, even if selling less. However,
treating β as an idiosyncratic parameter seems to suggest that the causal direction of
the effect is reversed, going from quantities to prices. For a firm’s competitors, a higher
β is associated with lower quantities sold, this relaxes their indirect competitive pressure
at a rate γ and allows the firm to charge higher prices. When β is forced to be the same
3The analysis focused on one market to be able to exploit the assumption of a market-wide effect
common to European and Chinese exports and, more in general, to avoid that the country composition
of exports may drive part of the results.
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for all the varieties in this framework, though, this very effect applies to all the firms
and brings about the result. Explicitly accounting for horizontal differentiation helps to
make this point more transparent.
In addition, horizontal differentiation allows researchers to tackle an issue not re-
solved by pure vertical differentiation, where the ratio between equilibrium markups and
quantities is constant across varieties and markets. The combination of cost heterogene-
ity and vertical differentiation is indeed able to break the inverse relationship between
markups and prices, but not the constant ratio between markups and quantities. The
implicit restriction that two varieties with equal markups are necessarily sold in exactly
the same quantity is relaxed by introducing horizontal differentiation.
3.3.3 Model III - Pure Horizontal Differentiation
A pure horizontal differentiation framework can be seen as a generalization of the baseline
model in which the parameter β in (3.9) is allowed to vary in each market for each variety.
In the Baseline and the Pure Vertical Differentiation Models, only a set I of homoge-
neous consumers has been considered. This assumption is now relaxed and consumers are
allowed to be heterogeneous. Formally this means that the β-distribution can vary with
i ∈ I. Thus, from this point forward, in the models in which β is indexed by market and
variety identifiers, βs,i, the taste-mismatch associated with a variety is consumer-specific
and reflects the heterogeneity of consumers.
Taste mismatch is thus two-dimensional : it varies across varieties s ∈ S as well as
across consumers i ∈ I. That β(s, i) varies with s means that the same consumer i
has different attitudes toward different varieties (preferences are asymmetric), whereas
β(s, i) varies with i because different consumers have different attitudes toward the same
variety s.
Since the main field of application of this Model is international trade and aggregate
demands stemming from one country are traditionally derived from the maximization of
a representative consumer’s utility, also in this Model consumer heterogeneity is assumed
across countries but not within countries. Although aggregating consumer preferences
within a country is a priori doable, appropriate data is needed. Indeed, if the distribution
of β(s, i) with respect to i were known, it would be possible to aggregate individual de-
mands across consumers living in the same country and capture consumer heterogeneity
within countries. This is exactly what is accomplished in the discrete choice literature
where demand shocks are idiosyncratic to individual consumers, while aggregating de-
mands across individuals yields the market demand when the distribution of shocks is
extreme value.4
An alternative approach is proposed here, which is more in line with the standard
trade literature. In addition, the Model presented here allows for a simple description
of consumers buying a variable number of units of each variety, something which is not
easy to perform with discrete choice models. Note also that using discrete choice models
4Using Hotelling’s spatial metaphor developed in the previous Chapter, the distance β(1, i) between
shop 1 and consumer i’s ideal differs from the distance β(1, j) to consumer j’s ideal.
96 CHAPTER 3. QUADRATIC FLEXIBILITY: SOME ALTERNATIVE MODELS
when preferences across varieties are asymmetric is not an easy task. Most of the existing
theoretical literature developed in industrial organization uses the multinomial logit,
which assumes symmetry. Using the probit with different covariances turns out to be
especially cumbersome, whereas the verti-zontal approach leads to simple and intuitive
results. This is thus a strong comparative advantage of models based on quadratic
preferences with heterogeneous consumers.
The model can be used at different levels of demand aggregation, i.e. a household, a
city, or a country. This makes it a potentially useful tool to address alternative issues, es-
pecially when data are available at a very disaggregated level such as barcode data within
cities (Handbury and Weinstein, 2011). In what follows, a consumer is interpreted as a
country’s representative consumer. To be precise, I = {1, ..., n} can be seen empirically
as the set of destination countries and Si as the set of varieties available in country i,
thus offering new insights into competition effects.
It is worth noticing that the interpretation of β changes substantially when it is
allowed to vary across consumers. Indeed the traditional way of looking at β, since Otta-
viano et al. (2002), has been in terms of generic product differentiation, relaxing indirect
competition between varieties and finally representing the quadratic utility equivalent of
the rate of substitution in CES frameworks. Allowing it to vary, it can be shown that
β does affect the quantities sold of a certain variety in equilibrium, but not its profit
maximizing price. For the sake of concreteness, imagine a good exhibiting the same price
across different markets, say an electronic book on Amazon, or a music piece on a digital
library, its parameter β would capture the different sales for the same variety in differ-
ent markets. Empirically this is usually captured by dummies for cultural, institutional
or linguistic barriers to trade, which are typical controls when testing standard gravity
variables, or simply by unexplained shocks on demand. In this framework, βs,i accounts
explicitly for them and will be referred to as taste mismatch.
There are just a few other works in which βs,i alone are allowed to vary are Parenti
(2010), where the existence of multi-product firms is explained by their possibility of
relaxing competition between the varieties they produce by better differentiating them,
and Altomonte et al. (2010), where a particular sector is divided into different subsets of
varieties, each exhibiting a different subset-specific β, with consumers seeing varieties as
substitutable only within each sector but not across sectors. The analyze the case of two
sub-sectors, a high- and low-differentiation, showing that the latter is less competitive
than the former, exhibiting lower prices and quantities sold. A different strategy is
followed at this stage, which allows varieties to be continuously differentiated on the
horizontal dimension, holding substitutability constant between all pairs of varieties.
Following the intuition of the localized competition literature (Lancaster, 1966), each
variety is assumed to be located in one particular point on a multidimensional charac-
teristics space. Each consumer has a preferred combination of characteristics in every
sector. The parameter βs,i captures the distance between the consumer’s favorite com-
bination of characteristics and the location of variety s in market i. For simplicity, the
L consumers in each market are assumed to share the same horizontal preferences over
product characteristics, a way of looking at that is to imagine that individuals prefer to
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live close with people with similar tastes and preferences or to suppose that β depends
on the specific characteristics of a market, such as climate, language or culture. To see
exactly how horizontal differentiation is modeled within the quadratic utility function,
note that (3.9) is now written as follows:
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2i (s)ds−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0 (3.25)
Subject to the usual budget constraint:
∫
s∈Si qs,ips,ids = q0 + Yi .
This means that the distance from a consumer’s favorite set of characteristics in
market i, βs,i, does not affect the price the willingness to pay for the first marginal unit
of that particular variety due to its vertical attributes, α, but affects the rate of decay of
marginal utility of each additional units of the same variety. In other words, horizontal
differentiation affects the slope of the inverse demand function:
ps,i = α− βs,iqs,i − γQi (3.26)
Note that, holding quantities fixed, horizontal differentiation does affect prices and
provides results consistent with traditional location theories à la Hotelling (1929), which
are based on the assumption that only one unit of product is sold and that product sales
are mutually exclusive. In order to adapt the horizontal differentiation to monopolistic
competition and intra-industry trade, these two assumptions are clearly dispensed with
and the demand for a variety s can be written as:
qs,i =
α− ps,i
βs,i
− γ(αNi − Pi)
βs,i(1 + γNi)
(3.27)
where both the mass of varieties and price index in (3.11) are now replaced by taste-
weighted indices:
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
; Pi =
∫
s∈Si
ps,i
βs,i
ds.
The intuition behind the introduction of these new indices is that, in a framework in
which quantities may vary even if prices don’t, the weight of each variety in determining
effective competition depends on how close it is to the local market tastes, as this directly
influences the amount of sales. In other words, a variety with a high β will be sold in
lower quantities than a low-β competitor and general indices have to take it into account,
implying that the introduction of a very expensive variety in a market will not affect the
price index significantly if nobody is going to buy it.
The problem of profit maximization being unaltered with respect to the previous
cases, the price charged for variety s in market i is described by
p∗s,i =
α+ γPi
2(1 + γNi)
+
cs,i
2
. (3.28)
98 CHAPTER 3. QUADRATIC FLEXIBILITY: SOME ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Note that the only idiosyncratic variable affecting profit maximizing prices is the
marginal cost of production and delivery. The other variables affect all the varieties
in the market symmetrically, with no significant deviations from the baseline case: the
willingness to pay for varieties in the sector, α, and the weighted price index, Pi, both
raise the equilibrium prices charged by firms, whereas product substitutability, γ, and
the weighted mass of competitors, Ni, lower it.
The reason why idiosyncratic demand parameters do not directly affect idiosyncratic
optimal prices is that the market-variety-specific β affects only the slope of the demand
function, thus affecting equilibrium quantities but not prices. A graphical intuition is
provided in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Horizontal Differentiation
The weighted average price, p˜i = Pi/Ni, can be computed as follows:
p˜i = α
1
2 + γNi
+ c˜i
1 + γNi
2 + γNi
(3.29)
where c˜i = Ci/Ni is the weighted average of the weighted cost index Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,i
βs,i
ds,
in which the weighted is again provided by the distance of the relative variety from the
preferred representative consumer’s characteristics, βs,i. It is worth lingering briefly on
the implications of this specification of the price index. Imagine two markets, character-
ized by the same sector-wide willingness to pay and substitutability between varieties,
which are served by firms producing the same varieties at the same marginal cost across
markets. In these two markets, price can be different simply because of tastes. The price
ranking will be the same in the two markets, as idiosyncratic prices depend only on costs,
but the general price index that each variety is facing is weighted by consumer tastes.
Therefore, markets where more productively inefficient varieties are more appreciated,
in terms of horizontal attributes, will be characterized by higher weighted price and cost
indices, which means that firms will face a lower indirect competitive pressure on prices.
In this framework, it is not only productivity distribution that matters, but its interac-
tion with tastes: if a variety is produced in an incredibly efficient way, but nobody likes
it in the market, it is not going to greatly affect market indices and it will not exert much
indirect competitive pressure on alternative varieties.
The weighted price index can then be substituted back into the formula describing
idiosyncratic optimal pricing, leading to the following:
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p∗s,i =
cs,i
2
+
α+ γNi c˜i2
2 + γNi
(3.30)
Which is the horizontally differentiated equivalent of (3.14) and thus, similarly, de-
pends only on market characteristics and individual costs, as horizontal differences will
affect only the relative equilibrium amount of quantities sold:
q∗s,i =
1
βs,i
[p∗s,i − cs,i] (3.31)
And thus the operating profits generated by a variety s in market i are affected by
taste mismatch only through volumes sold:
pis,i =
1
βs,i
[p∗s,i − cs,i]2 (3.32)
The most evident contribution of this generalization of the baseline model is that it
breaks the relation between markups and quantities sold for a certain variety. Products
with equal markups can be sold in different quantities because their marginal contribu-
tion to consumers’ utility decreases in consumption of that specific variety at a different
pace and this is shown to provoke adjustments on quantities rather than prices. The fact
that consumers buy different amounts of a specific variety depending on its β generates
indirectly another source of competitive pressure, as it affects the amount of total con-
sumption of manufactured goods and this, in turn, affect markups of all varieties. The
traditional competitive pressure generated by the mass of firms in the market has then to
be weighted by how much each variety is actually appreciated by consumers. Markets of
the same size with the same number of varieties do not need to be identically competitive
in this variation, even is costs are distributed identically across firms.
Another interesting feature of having the parameter β variety-market specific is that
varieties can observe each other’s performance in difference markets to infer their own
expected performance in terms of sales in new markets. For example, if two varieties can
observe a similar level of markups and sales in one market where they are both present,
one variety can expect to have a similar performance of the other also in markets where
it has not entered yet. This learning process may explain why the simple geographic
proximity to exporters may increase the probability to export, as noted by Mayneris and
Poncet (2011).
However, as in the baseline model, though, this generalization is not able to account
for highly priced goods generating high markups. Hence, in order to achieve variability
in markups and quantities and match empirical evidence, it seems necessary to intro-
duce both horizontal differentiation and vertical differentiation simultaneously, besides
allowing for cost heterogeneity. These are the main ingredients of the model proposed,
but before showing its results, it is worth having a quick glance at how different pat-
terns of substitution across markets can be introduced in the model without changing it
substantially.
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3.3.4 Model IV - Different Substitutability Patterns
After having analyzed how idiosyncratic differences in variety-specific vertical attributes,
α, and market-variety-specific distance horizontal characteristics, whose distance from
the consumers’ ideal is captured by β, it is shown how results would be affected by
allowing for different patterns of substitution. There are two alternative ways of intro-
ducing this source of heterogeneity: it can be through market variation, γi, or through
market-variety variation, γs,i.
The former way is the easiest. Following the suggestion of Hausman (1994) to "divide
products into segments and estimate a model that restricts substitution patterns across
segments but allows flexibility within segments", it can be done in this context by as-
suming no substitutability between varieties of different products, but a constant level
of market-specific substitutability between pairs of varieties of the same product within
a market i, γi. This level can then be allowed to vary across markets and cause even
the same set of varieties in different markets to enjoy different levels of competition (for
example, two brands of beer can be better substitutes in some markets than in others).
A utility function describing this framework is the following:
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2i (s)ds−
γi
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0. (3.33)
Notably this specification is equivalent to (3.9) when focusing on one particular mar-
ket i. The additional information it provides is that the constant rate of substitution
across varieties may differ across markets, determining some variability in toughness of
local competition independent of quality and taste differences. A higher rate of substi-
tution will be associated with a parallel shift in demand, in a similar way as a decrease
in quality (or rather an increase in competitors’ quality).
However, the richest and most interesting way to introduce differences in substi-
tutability patterns is to allow for different rates of substitution between each pair of
varieties, for example through the following specification:
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γsr,iqs,iqr,idsdr + q0, (3.34)
which can be simplified into
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
γs,iqs,iQids+ q0, (3.35)
where, relating substitutability to the distance in terms of horizontal differentiation
between varieties, interpreting the characteristics space as in Lancaster (1966), γs,i can
be seen as an index capturing the extent to which the characteristics of a certain product
s are similar to the ones of other varieties in the market. A convenient way to capture this
concept is through a summation of inverse distances between variety s and the others,
measured in the same way as β:
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γs,i =
∫
r∈Si
1
dsr,i
dr (3.36)
where dsr,i captures the distance in terms of horizontal (or horizontal and vertical)
characteristics between each pair of varieties resulting in an index similar to the effective
number of firms Ni presented in Model III, except that now it is based on the viewpoint
of firm s instead of consumer i.
A further refinement could be to include also additional information on the competi-
tors’ characteristics to account for the fact that more successful competitors may exert
more competitive pressure than the others. Expressing it in terms of the exogenous basic
parameters common to all the models presented here, it could be expressed as follows:
γs,i =
∫
r∈Si
(αr − cr,i)
βr,idsr,i
dr, (3.37)
which states competing varieties with higher quality (αs), lower costs (cs,i), better
match with consumer taste (βs,i) or are closer in the characteristics space (dsr,i) exert
more competitive pressure in terms of an increase value of the substitutability parameter.
The intuition in both cases is that the farther away two varieties are from each other,
the lower indirect competitive pressure they exert on each other. One clear advantage
of this formulation is that it would allow focusing not only on different varieties of
the same good or sector, but to consider each variety in relation with the entire set
of goods in the market. The implications and possible research questions that can arise
from an approach linking the value of substitutability to the localization of firms in the
characteristics space are better developed in Chapter 6, where future avenues of research
are outlined. Indeed, when γs,i is assumed to be constant across varieties, implicitly
a constant rate of substitution is assumed. On the contrary, if γs,i is allowed to vary
with product characteristics. In other words, γs,i may be seen as capturing the extent of
remoteness from competition, in terms of distance and, possibly, in terms of the appeal
of the competitors for consumers.
While intellectually intriguing and theoretically sound, the specification in (3.35)
poses serious empirical challenges because, at least in principle, it requires the measure-
ment of the distance between each pair of varieties and thus some prior knowledge on the
rate of substitution between all the varieties in the market, but as noted by Einav and
Levin (2010), "work on demand modeling has centered on the trade-off between allowing
flexible substitution patterns and the lack of variation in typical data that allows such
substitution patterns to be flexibly identified".
It can be noted that the utility written as in (3.33) has the advantage, as compared to
(3.34) to be directly implementable from an empirical perspective, as it does not imply
variety-specific effects within a market. The main implication would be that exactly
the same group of varieties in different markets may be associated with different levels
of competition just because of market specific effects. More empirically complex would
be to deal with the heterogeneity in substitutability as introduced in (3.34), but on the
other hand it may provide a powerful theoretical tool to deepen the understanding of the
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quadratic utility framework and, as will be further explored in Chapter 6, to endogenize
location or quality choices. Its demand function can be thus written as:
qs,i =
α
β
− γs,i(αNi − Pi)
β(β +Mi)
− ps,i
β
(3.38)
where
Mi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids ; Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds ; Pi =
∫
s∈Si
ps,ids (3.39)
are unweighted indices similar to the ones developed in the context of Model I, with
the only addition of the substitutability index Mi. This demand function yields the
following pricing strategy:
ps,i = α+
γs,i[Pi − αNi]
β +Mi
− βqs,i, (3.40)
which yields, once profit maximization has been taken into account,
ps,i (Pi) =
α+ cs,i
2
− γs,i (αNi − Pi)
2(β +Mi)
, (3.41)
which highlights the complex interactions between each varieties’ distance from the
other varieties, in terms of substitutability, and the market aggregates. In terms of
individual varieties, the impact on demand is not very different from the case of vertical
differentiation, whereas in aggregate the specification is somehow less intuitive than the
vertical differentiation case. The main novelty of the model is indeed the introduction of
the substitutability index in the denominator of the pricing function. It can be interpreted
as stressing the fact that if the competitors of variety s in market i are not too close to
each other, then they will be selling more and thus exert more competitive pressure on
variety s.
It can also be noted the role played by the quality of the particular variety s in market
i in increasing its price, α2 , and the role played by the quality of all the other varieties
in market i in decreasing it, αNi2(β+Mi) , whereas this competition effect is weighted by the
substitutability between that particular variety and the others in the market, γs,i.
Considering that the equilibrium price index in market i is
P ∗i = Ci +
β (αN − Ci)
2β +Mi
, (3.42)
where
Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids, (3.43)
the profit-maximizing price of a variety s in market i can be described as
p∗s,i =
α+ cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(
αNi − Ci
2β +Mi
)
(3.44)
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and the markup
p∗s,i − cs,i =
α− cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(
αNi − Ci
2β +Mi
)
(3.45)
Notice that in this equation only the marginal cost of production and delivery, cs,i,
and the substitutability parameter, γs,i, are market-variety specific. The rest of the
parameters apply to all the varieties in market i.
Equilibrium quantities are as usual
q∗s,i =
(
p∗s,i − cs,i
)
β
(3.46)
and the resulting operating profits are
pis,i =
(
p∗s,i − cs,i
)2
β
. (3.47)
Therefore, in the case of heterogeneity in substitutability alone, the differences be-
tween varieties in markups will result in equal differences in quantities, as in the case of
pure vertical differentiation.
Empirically, it can be difficult to find a proxy for the different levels of substitutability,
but one possible idea is to look for qualitative indicators such as the ones employed by
Hoberg and Phillips (2010), who look at the words that firms use to describe their
products and build indices of proximity based on the similarity of the words used.
3.4 Combining different sources of heterogeneity
The first four models presented show how the quadratic utility framework can be extended
to capture features that may be empirically relevant, depending on the specific markets
and products considered. The sources of heterogeneity surveyed up to this point are now
combined to provide an even higher degree of flexibility in modeling. In particular, all the
possible combinations are considered before identifying one variation as the best suited
to rationalize trade patterns. Considering the trade-off between modeling efficiency and
completeness, the choice will fall on Model V, which is the theoretical background on
which the two following empirical Chapters are based. The more complete combination
of sources of heterogeneity, Model VIII, will only be used in Chapter 6 when describing
promising future avenues of research.
3.4.1 Model V - Verti-zontal differentiation
Being this the specification on which the rest of the Thesis is based, it will be analyzed
a little bit more in detail than the previous ones, but its presentation will follow a
similar structure. Substitutability is assumed to be product-specific and not to vary
from market to market, as is normally the case in all the trade theories based on CES
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utility function. The utility function corresponding to the case in which varieties are
differentiated horizontally and vertically is
Ui =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0, (3.48)
yielding the demand function
qs,i =
αs − ps,i
βs,i
− γ(Ai − Pi)
βs,i(1 + γNi)
(3.49)
where
Ni ≡
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Ai ≡
∫
s∈Si
αs
βs,i
ds Pi ≡
∫
s∈Si
ps,i
βs,i
ds (3.50)
Thus, each variety is weighted by the inverse of its taste mismatch βs,i to determine
the effective mass of varieties, given by N. It is N, and not the unweighted mass of
varieties N , which affects the consumers’ demand for a given variety. Indeed, adding or
deleting varieties with bad taste matches does not affect much the demand for the others,
whereas the opposite holds when the match is good. Note also that the effective mass
of varieties N may be larger or smaller than the unweighted mass of varieties N in the
product market, according to the distribution of taste mismatches. Similarly, the quality
and price of a variety are weighted by the inverse of its taste mismatch to determine
the effective quality index A and the effective price index P. In particular, varieties
displaying the same quality (or price) may have a very different impact on the demand
for other varieties according to their taste mismatches. The aggregate indices in (3.49)
show that taste heterogeneity across varieties affects demand and, therefore, the market
outcome. This shows that preferences (3.48) are asymmetric and capture several of the
main features of the Lancasterian approach to product differentiation, such as different
degrees of substitution between varieties, when varieties are asymmetrically located in
the product characteristics space.
Note also that (3.49) implies that the total mass of varieties consumed is given by
Qi =
Ai − Pi
1 + γNi
. (3.51)
which shows once more how the utility of a variety depends on the distribution of
the taste parameter βs,i) since all the aggregate indices enter into Qi. Incidentally, note
that the definition of Qi corresponds to the second term in the right-hand side of (3.49),
where it is weighted by the ratio γ/βs,i. Thus, the larger Q, the tougher the competition
that each variety s faces and the smaller its demand. For example, competition effects
are stronger whenever the aggregate quality A is higher. As a result, if the aggregate
quality goes up this will reduce the demand for each variety. This may lower the WTP
for a particular variety by so much that the choke price of this variety falls below its
costs, thus driving this variety out of business. This channel of firm-product exit was
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hitherto missing in models where the level of quality was not included in the competition
effects and, therefore, could not affect the exit (or entry) of products.
The above discussion shows that it is possible to introduce asymmetry across varieties
in demand in a very simple way. As will be seen, preferences (3.48) also generate a large
array of new effects. The demand for a variety s now depends on its own horizontal
and vertical attributes as well as on the effective mass of competing varieties (N), the
aggregate effective quality (A) and the effective price index (P). The interplay between
these aggregate indices determine how a particular variety meets the competition.
Standard definitions of horizontal and vertical differentiation exist for indivisible va-
rieties and with consumers making mutually exclusive choices. But these concepts until
now were largely absent in models guiding the majority of empirical works in trade.
Therefore, verti-zontal preferences can be considered particularly useful for those re-
searchers who are interested in measuring and distinguishing horizontal (taste) from
vertical (quality) attributes in trade. In contrast, in the standard quadratic utility, the
common β assigned to all the varieties affects both price and quantity sold of each variety,
which makes it difficult to interpret it as a true parameter of horizontal differentiation.
With the new and richer set of preferences introduced here, that distinction can now be
made more clearly.
The operating profits earned from selling variety s in country i can be written as
follows:
pis,i = (ps,i − cs,i) qs,i.
Remember that markets are assumed to be segmented, so that qi(s) and pi(s) differ
according to the destination country the firm exports its variety to.
As in the previous models, since the variety s is negligible to the market, differenti-
ating pis,i with respect to pi(s) yields:
ps,i(Pi) =
αs + cs,i − γQi(Pi)
2
. (3.52)
The natural interpretation of this expression is that it represents firm s’ best-reply
to the market conditions. These conditions are defined by the aggregate behavior of all
producers, which is summarized here by the price index Pi. The best-reply function is
upward sloping because varieties are substitutable: a rise in the effective price index Pi
relaxes price competition and enables each firm to sell its variety at a higher price. Even
though the price index is endogenous, Pi is accurately treated parametrically because
each variety is negligible to the market.
In contrast, since firms’ quality and location choices are taken exogenously, Ai and
Ni are simply determined by the distributions of quality (αs) and tastes (βs,i) over Si.
In particular, by shifting the best reply downward, a larger effective mass Ni of firms
makes competition tougher and reduces prices. Similarly, when the quality index Ai
rises, each firm faces competing varieties which together represent a higher aggregate
quality, thus making the market penetration of a particular variety harder. Note also
that Ai affects prices positively, even though it affects each individual variety’s price
106 CHAPTER 3. QUADRATIC FLEXIBILITY: SOME ALTERNATIVE MODELS
negatively. This implies that an increase in aggregate quality in a country raises price
levels, but makes it harder for an individual variety to survive. Thus, through market
aggregates, monopolistic competition’s weak interactions, typical of the Chamberlin-like
models, can be reconciled with several of the main features of Hotelling-like models of
product differentiation.
Integrating (3.52) over S shows that the equilibrium price index can be expressed in
terms of three market indices:
P∗i = Ci +
Ai − Ci
2 + γNi
(3.53)
where the cost index is defined as
Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs
βs
ds.
Hence, as in the other market indices, varieties’ costs are weighted by the taste
distribution in the country of destination. The interpretation is that efficiently produced
varieties may have a low impact on the cost index when they have a bad match with
local taste. In sum, each destination country is characterized by a different set of market
aggregates (Ni, Ai, Ci, and Pi), which are all weighted by the destination-specific taste
distribution.
As in the other variations, The market process is described by an aggregative game
involving a continuum of players (the variety suppliers) and a single market aggregate Pi
per destination country. The equilibrium outcome is given by a Nash equilibrium, which
is determined as follows. Plugging (3.53) into (3.52), equilibrium prices of variety s in
country i can be written as
p∗s,i =
αs + cs,i
2
− Ti
(
a˜i − c˜i
2
)
(3.54)
where taste-weighted average quality and cost indices are obtained by dividing cost
and quality indices by the effective number of varieties in the market:
a˜i ≡ Ai/Ni c˜i ≡ Ci/Ni
and where
Ti ≡ γNi
2 + γNi
∈ [0; 1] . (3.55)
Clearly, the equilibrium price of a single variety depends on the market aggregates Ai,
Ci and Ni, which in turn depend on the whole distribution of the taste mismatch param-
eter βi(·) as well as on the cost (c(·)) and quality (α(·)) parameters of the competitors
in country i.
As for the parameter Ti, it reflects the toughness of competition in country i, which
can make the equilibrium price range from perfect competition to pure monopoly. This
is an important additional feature of the preferences presented in this Chapter: it offers
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the possibility of studying different types of market structure in trade models by varying
the toughness of competition. To see this, consider the following example. When γNi
is arbitrarily small, which means that variety s has only poor substitutes in country i,
each variety is supplied at its monopoly price because Ti → 0. On the other hand, when
Ti → 1, country i is crowded by many good substitutes, which means that the market
outcome converges toward perfect competition and only the varieties with the highest
social value will survive, very much as in oligopolistic models of product differentiation
(Shaked and Sutton, 1983).
The benefits of assuming that γ is the same between any pair of varieties are reaped by
capturing the intensity of competition within a particular product and country through
Ti. In addition, the toughness of competition may vary from one country to another
because Ti depends on the effective mass of competing varieties in each country, which
depends itself on the country-specific taste distribution.5
It follows from (3.54) that higher quality results in higher prices, but the opposite
need not hold. Prices can rise for other reasons such as higher costs or lower competition.
This points at the need to complement unit values with cost controls to properly measure
quality at the variety level, which is not always possible without access to additional firm-
level information.
Note also that the first term of (3.54) is variety-specific (the parameters are all indexed
s). These variety-specific determinants of prices and per-capita quantities, such as cost
and quality, do not vary by destination country and influence prices and quantities in a
similar way in all countries. However, the second term in (3.54) is not variety-specific
but depends on destination market aggregates that are identical for all the varieties
(beer) sold in a particular country i. Since these indices are country-specific variables
(all indexed i) we refer to the second term in (3.54) as a market effect.
The (absolute) markup is given by
p∗s,i − cs,i =
αs − cs,i
2
− Ti
(
a˜i − c˜i
2
)
(3.56)
As expected, the markup increases (decreases) with α(s) (c(s, i)). More importantly,
it also increases (decreases) with α¯i (c¯i). Hence, when varieties available in country i
have a high quality (a low cost) and a good match with country i’s consumer tastes, the
price at which variety s can be sold in country i is low. By contrast, when the same
varieties have a bad match, variety s can be sold at a high price. Therefore, quality as
such is not enough for a variety to be successful in a specific country. What (3.56) tells
is that the markup of a specific variety is strongly affected by the way competing varieties
meet consumers’ tastes in country i.
Last, suppose that the average effective quality Ai/Ni increases by ∆ > 0. Then, if
the quality upgrade ∆s of variety s is such that
5This parameter can be nicely related to the existence of different price ranges across sectors observed
by Khandelwal (2010). Noting that each variety is characterized by an idiosyncratic quality and cost
parameter, we can show that, paraphrasing Khandelwal (2010), it is the length of the markup ladder
that varies across sectors in the verti-zontal model: the tougher the competition, the shorter the ladder.
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∆s > Ti∆
its price and markup will increase, even though the quality upgrade ∆s may be lower
than ∆. In contrast, if the quality upgrade of variety s is smaller than Ti∆, then its
markup and price will decrease, even though the quality upgrade ∆s is positive. Thus,
what matters for the "competitiveness" of a firm is its relative quality at the level of the
product market.
Using the properties of linear demand functions, it can be readily verified that the
equilibrium output of each variety is given by
q∗s,i =
1
βs,i
[
αs − cs,i
2
− Ti α¯i − c¯i
2
]
. (3.57)
The first term in parentheses on the right-hand side of (3.57) is variety-specific,
whereas the second term shows that quantities shipped can differ across countries due
to the (beer) market effect that is common to all the varieties (beers) present in country
i. However, the entire expression in brackets is weighted by the taste parameter βs,i,
which is variety- and country-specific turning (3.57) into a non-linear expression. The
equilibrium quantity equation (3.57) can be rewritten as a function of its price:
q∗s,i =
1
βs,i
[
p∗s,i − cs,i
]
. (3.58)
Combining (3.54) and (3.57) also provides a description of the market outcome pre-
dicted by the model in terms of the export price and quantity of a variety shipped by a
firm to country i. The quantity exported q∗i (s) differs depending on the characteristics
of the destination country, which are captured here by a series of market aggregates.
Important to realize is that even when countries are identical in terms of their size and
the number of varieties sold, they can still have very different demand for variety s due
to the taste differences (distribution of βi(s)) in different countries.
Using (3.58) shows that the profits earned on variety s sold in country i are as follows:
pis,i =
1
βs,i
[
p∗s,i − cs,i
]2
. (3.59)
What this expression shows is that a variety can be very successful in a particular
country while doing poorly on another for reasons that are both plausible and easy to pin
down in the model, i.e., the quality of the match with local tastes, consumer idiosyncrasies
across countries, and the toughness of competition within countries. Thus, a firm facing
similar markups in two countries may have different profit levels depending on how much
its product is liked in each country. In the same vein, (3.59) also reveals that a variety
may be sold at a high markup, thus suggesting that its producer has much market power.
However, this variety may generate low profits. As a result, the level of a markup does
not necessarily mean that the corresponding variety is selling well.
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The selection issue in CES-like models requires a fixed costs of exporting. This is
different in quadratic utility models. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) already pointed out
that with firm heterogeneity in cost, selection and zero trade flows may result from a
cost above the choke price in a country. The model introduced here sheds additional
light on entry issues due to the role of taste. The novelty here is that, in addition to low
productivity, low quality and competition effects, exports of a variety may be zero because
of its high taste mismatch in the destination country. A zero trade flow may thus stem
from any of these aforementioned reasons, or combination of them, thus rendering the
identification of individual parameters problematic. This differs from standard models in
which productivity is the main parameter to explain entry into export markets (Helpman
et al., 2008).
The market effect implies that fob prices can differ depending on destination coun-
tries through the β-weighted market aggregates. However, βs,i does not enter the price
equation (3.54) directly, whereas it does enter directly in the equilibrium quantity equa-
tion (3.57).6 This is important for several reasons. First, it offers an opportunity for
the identification of parameters α(s) and βs,i based on the fact that taste affects directly
quantities but not prices. Second, it confirms the interpretation of the parameter βi(s)
as capturing horizontal differentiation. Also, whereas the price equation (3.54) is a linear
and separable equation, the quantity equation (3.57) is not. The reason is that βs,i is
both country- and variety-specific.
It is also interesting to notice how cost, quality and taste interact in determining the
market share of a certain variety, in terms of quantities sold:
qs,i
Qi
=
γ
2βs,i
(
αs − cs,i
a˜i − c˜i
1
Ti − 1
)
.
The relative sales of a particular variety in a market is here shown to depend not only
on the quality and cost of a particular variety with respect to the rest of the market, but
also on variety-specific taste mismatch, βs,i, market specific toughness of competition, Ti,
and product substitutability, γ. Specifically, varieties with higher quality, αs, or lower
costs, cs,i, or a better match with local taste, βs,i, will have higher market shares. The
more so, the lower is the toughness of competition in the market or the higher is product
substitutability.
Note, finally, that the equilibrium price of variety s is independent of βs,i because the
price elasticity itself is independent of this parameter:
s,i = − ps,i
αs − γQi − ps,i .
This expression ranges from 0, when ps = 0, to −∞, when prices equal the intercept
of the inverse demand function, αs−γQi. Note that βs does not affect s,i and, therefore,
has no impact on ps,i. However, the whole β-distribution matters because it influences
6The parameter β does not enter prices because firms in their profit maximization trade-off setting
a higher price when taste is strong and having smaller sales, to setting a price independent of taste but
getting a large market share when taste is strong.
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the equilibrium value of Qi, as shown in (3.51).This shows once more how the variables
of the model can be affected differently by the taste mismatch parameter.
The features of the verti-zontal model V can thus be summarized as follows.
First, equilibrium prices depend on variety-specific cost and quality as well as on
the market-specific degree of competitiveness. Market effects, which can be captured
by taste-weighted price, quality and cost indices as well as by the effective mass of
competitors, vary with the destination country, but are common to all varieties exported
there. Thus, export prices of the same variety across countries only vary through market-
specific effects.
Second, equilibrium quantities (sales) depend on market-specific and variety-specific
tastes. Thus, export quantities of the same variety across countries shows additional
variability, as compared to prices, because of idiosyncratic tastes.
The implications of these properties can be better understood by having a look at
the simulation that follows.
3.4.2 Model VI - Vertical differentiation and substitutability
The first combination considered is the variation of the quadratic utility model with ver-
tical differentiation and different patterns of substitutability. The corresponding utility
function is
Ui =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids− β
2
∫
s∈Si
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γs,iqs,iqr,idsdr + q0 (3.60)
yielding the demand function
qs,i =
αs
β
− γs,i(Ai − Pi)
β(β +Mi)
− ps,i
β
, (3.61)
where
Ai =
∫
s∈Si
αsds ; Mi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids ; Pi =
∫
s∈Si
ps,ids (3.62)
are substitution-weighted indices similar to the ones presented in the context of het-
erogeneity in substitutability and vertical differentiation. This demand results in the
following pricing strategy:
ps,i = αs − γs,i[Ai − Pi]
β +Mi
− βqs,i (3.63)
which, taking marginal costs into account can be rewritten as
ps,i =
αs + cs,i
2
− γs,i(Ai − Pi)
2(β +Mi)
. (3.64)
This result is quite neat, as it clearly shows not only the role played by idiosyncratic
quality and costs, but it also shows how the market aggregates affect any individual
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variety only as far as that variety is a close enough substitute with respect to the the
other varieties in the market. In turn, the degree of substitutability between all the
other pairs of varieties in the market will indirectly affect the other varieties through the
substitution-weighted number of firms Mi.
Noticing that
P ∗i = Ci +
β (Ai − Ci)
2β +Mi
, (3.65)
where
Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids, (3.66)
the profit-maximizing price of a variety s in market i can be written as
p∗s,i =
αs + cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(Ai − Ci)
(2β +Mi)
, (3.67)
where, similarly to the verti-zontal (3.56), the price of variety s depends not only
on its marginal costs and quality, but also on the market aggregate costs and quality.
The only difference is that, in the case of the number of competitors, Mi, the weighting
parameter is the substitutability parameter, γ, instead of the horizontal differentiation
one, β.
Equilibrium markups are then
p∗s,i − cs,i =
αs − cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(Ai − Ci)
(2β +Mi)
(3.68)
and quantities are
q∗s,i =
p∗s,i − cs,i
β
, (3.69)
resulting in operating profits equal to
pi∗s,i =
(
p∗s,i − cs,i
)2
β
(3.70)
It would then be fair to say that this variation of the quadratic utility has a great
potential for development in theoretical modeling and simulations, even if admittedly
it has the important drawback of not being easily identifiable empirically, as the two
parameters, αs and γs,i affect prices and quantities in a similar way. One way to overcome
this obstacle would be to have access to a proxy to infer substitutability without having
to infer it from price and quantities. A notable example in this direction is Hoberg
and Phillips (2010), in which the authors use a text-based analysis of 10-K product
descriptions to examine whether firms that use a more similar language to describe their
products are more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions, possibly to reduce the
competitive effects highlighted in the profit-maximizing pricing function.
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3.4.3 Model VII - Horizontal differentiation and substitutability
Another possible way of combining the heterogeneity in the degree of substitutability
is with the horizontal differentiation parameter. In this case, the corresponding utility
function is
Ui = α
∫
s∈Si
qs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γs,iqs,iqr,idsdr + q0 (3.71)
which yields the demand function
qs,i =
α
βs,i
− γs,i(αNi − Pi)
βs,i(1 + Γi)
− ps,i
βs,i
(3.72)
where
Γi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids
βs,i
; Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
; Pi =
∫
s∈Si
ps,ids
βs,i
(3.73)
are indices weighted by substitution and horizontal differentiation parameters which
capture the idea that each variety in the market has to be weighted at the same time by
its proximity to the consumer ideal and by how many competitors are offering a variety
with similar characteristics.
Remember from equation (3.37) that one reasonable way to determine γs,i is
γs,i =
∫
r∈Si
(α− cr,i)
βr,idsr,i
dr, (3.74)
where dsr,i is the distance in the characteristics space between variety s and r. This
expression implies that the horizontal characteristics of the variety, β, now affect γs,i.
The demand function is associated with the following pricing strategy:
ps,i = α− γs,i[αNi − Pi]
1 + Γi
− βs,iqs,i, (3.75)
yielding to the following optimal pricing
p∗s,i =
α+ cs,i
2
− γs,i(αNi − Pi)
2(1 + Γi)
. (3.76)
Notice that prices in this variation do depend on the horizontal characteristics of the
variety through γs,i.
Like in the previous variations, the price index for market i can be computed as
P∗i = Ci +
αNi − Ci
2 + Γi
, (3.77)
where
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Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids
βs,i
, (3.78)
to get the profit-maximizing price of a variety s in market i, which can be written as
p∗s,i =
α+ cs,i
2
+
γs,i
2
(αNi − Ci)
(2 + Γi)
. (3.79)
The markup associated with this profit-maximizing price is then
p∗s,i − cs,i =
α− cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(αNi − Ci)
(2 + Γi)
. (3.80)
Again, notice that markups of each variety in this variation indirectly depend on β
of the same variety, which was not the case in model III.
The resulting quantities are
q∗s,i =
p∗s,i − cs,i
βs,i
(3.81)
and operating profits
pi∗s,i =
(
p∗s,i − cs,i
)2
βs,i
(3.82)
This variation is promising, at least in theoretical development terms, because it high-
lights a tension between the need for firms to get as close as possible to the consumer,
to reduce their β and sell more of their varieties, but at the same time the threat of
clustering in the same place, as the substitutability parameter γ has a direct negative
impact on their capacity to extract profits from each unit sold. Empirically, it would
be possible to implement a trade model with these two sources of heterogeneity alone,
but the researcher should first be sure that quality heterogeneity can be ruled out be-
cause, as mentioned already above, it would be hard to disentangle higher quality from
lower substitutability in terms of prices and quantities alone, as the two would have sim-
ilar effects on the varieties, unless an external source is used to determine the levels of
substitutability, as discussed for model IV.
3.4.4 Model VIII - Verti-zontal differentiation and substitutability
Finally, the last variation analyzed consists in the adoption combination of all the possible
sources of heterogeneity in a standard quadratic preference framework. The resulting
utility function is
Ui =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
1
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
γs,iqs,iqr,idsdr + q0, (3.83)
whose optimization leads to the demand function:
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qs,i =
αs
βs,i
− γs,i(Ai − Pi)
βs,i(1 + Γi)
− ps,i
βs,i
(3.84)
where
Ai =
∫
s∈Si
αsds
βs,i
, Γi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids
βs,i
, Pi =
∫
s∈Si
ps,ids
βs,i
(3.85)
are again substitution- and horizontal-differentiation weighted indices, as in the pre-
vious cases, with the only difference that in this framework also the distribution of the
quality parameter, α, has to be weighted by the relative position in the horizontal char-
acteristics space of all the varieties to yield the quality index A.
As for the previous models with heterogeneity in substitutability, following equation
(3.37), the parameter γs,i can be measured as
γs,i =
∫
r∈Si
(αr,i − cr,i)
βr,idsr,i
dr, (3.86)
where dsr,i is the distance in the characteristics space between variety s and r.
The pricing strategy pursued by the firms in this context would be
ps,i = αs − γs,i[Ai − Pi]
1 + Γi
− βs,iqs,i (3.87)
corresponding to the following pricing strategy, once marginal costs are taken into
account:
p∗i (s) =
αs
2
− γs,i(Ai − Pi)
2(1 + Γi)
+
cs,i
2
. (3.88)
The price index for market i is
P∗i = Ci +
Ai − Ci
2 + Γi
, (3.89)
where
Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids
βs,i
. (3.90)
The profit-maximizing price of a variety s in market i can then be written as
p∗s,i =
αs + cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(Ai − Ci)
(2 + Γi)
. (3.91)
Notice that the markup function,
p∗s,i − cs,i =
αs − cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(Ai − Ci)
(2 + Γi)
(3.92)
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is also very similar to the verti-zontal markup function in (3.56), where the price of
variety s depends not only on its marginal costs and quality, but also on the market
aggregate costs and quality. In addition, the index capturing the effective number of
firms, Γi, depends on the overall distribution of the substitutability parameter, γs,i, and
taste mismatch with local taste, βs,i.
Quantities are described, as usual, by the relation
q∗s,i =
p∗s,i − cs,i
βs,i
(3.93)
and operating profits as
pi∗s,i =
(
p∗s,i − cs,i
)2
βs,i
(3.94)
As for the verti-zontal variation, or Model V, also here it is interesting to notice how
cost, quality, taste and substitutability interact in determining the market share of a
certain variety, in terms of quantities sold:
qs,i
Qi
=
γs,i
2βs,i
(
αs − cs,i
a˜i − c˜i
1
Ti − 1
)
,
where now
Ti ≡ γs,iNi
2 + Γi
∈ [0; 1] ,
which highlights the role played by substitutability in determining the market shares
of each variety.
The three dimensions of differentiation are here displayed in all their complexity. At
the variety level, firms benefit in terms of pricing capacity from producing high quality
varieties (high αs), being far away from the competition (low γs,i), but at the same
time close to the consumers (low βs,i in order to sell more). However, the fact that
other varieties follow have those characteristics has a negative externality on the demand
for all the other varieties. In this Thesis no direct relation is imposed between the
substitutability parameter and the differentiation parameters, but it may be possible to
imagine that the three dimensions have to be somehow related. For example, if two
varieties are very close to a consumer taste, they are also very likely to be close to each
other in the characteristics space, thus trading off a lower βs,i against a higher γs,i. This
idea is further explored in Chapter 6 when outlining possible future avenues of research.
Finally, as discussed above, it should be noted that this theoretically sophisticated
version of the quadratic utility has the disadvantage of not being easily identifiable in
empirical terms by using standard trade data on prices and quantities. And it is extremely
complicated to find datasets having information on trade, firm characteristics and a
description of product characteristics as precise as the one used by Hoberg and Phillips
(2010), where varieties are described individually, without restricting the sample to the
major US firms.
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3.5 Illustration of market outcomes with simulations
After having presented all the variations, a simulation exercise is proposed here to provide
some intuition on the properties and features discussed in the text. Based on the model
presented in Chapter 1, without any source of heterogeneity except the firms’ location,
Figure 3.4 is used to describe the structure of all the following simulations.
In the table on the left of Figure 3.4, all the preference parameters and market
outcomes are reported, assuming a two-dimensional horizontal differentiation framework
of the kind presented in Chapter 2. First information on the exogenous location of firms
in the characteristics space is provided following the approach of Lancaster (1966), the
X and Y axis thus represent two abstract determinants of horizontal differentiation with
equal weight on the definition of taste mismatch, assuming the representative consumer
located at the origin. Thus in the characteristics the distance from the consumer can be
measured as
d0s,i =
√
X20s,i + Y
2
0s,i
In order to transform this distance into the taste mismatch parameter β, though, a
further consideration is needed. Since the own rate of substitution, for each variety, is
reasonably expected to be higher than the cross rate of substitution, the parameter β
should take into account on the overall rate of substitution in the market, γ. Therefore,
β0s,i = d0s,i + γ
where an arbitrary (or estimated) value is attributed to γ when substitutability is not
determined endogenously (as, for example, in Models IV, VI, VII, VIII). This value is
assumed higher than unity (the value of the numéraire) to ensure more substitutability
between varieties of the same good than with outside goods. The value used in the
simulations is 1.2, but the qualitative results are robust to any other value: the only
difference would concern the price and quantity distributions affecting all the varieties,
which would be shifted by the same amount. In the models where the distance from the
consumer is the same for all the varieties, the coordinates of each variety are chosen in
such a way to yield the same value, 5, resulting in β = 6.2.
As for the other parameters, in the models without quality differentiation (Models I,
III, IV, VII) variety-specific quality parameters are attributed the value α = 10. Costs,
while assumed market-variety specific in the text, are held constant in the simulations
to show the impact of preference parameters to their full extent, cs,i = c. The only
exception is the baseline model I, which is characterized only by cost heterogeneity.
These are all the primitives of the simulation. Summing them up, they consist in: the
variety’s location in the characteristics space, X and Y , measuring the distance of each
variety from the representative consumer, located in (0;0); the substitutability between
pairs of varieties, γ; the variety-specific quality parameter αs; the market-variety specific
taste mismatch βs,i; the productive efficiency c.
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Description of the simulation Tables
These primitives map into different market indices in each simulation. The ones reported
in the Tables are the effective number of firms Ni, the cost index Ci, the quality index Ai
and the substitutability index Γi. Since these indices are in some models just a sum of the
market parameters but in most of them a weighted sum of parameters where each terms is
divided by the corresponding taste mismatch parameter, for comparability the weighted
sum is reported in all the Tables (i.e., all the indices are calculated as shown in Model
8, implicitly considering all the other models as special cases where some parameters are
held fixed).
After market indices, the price components are shown. In quadratic utilities equi-
librium prices can always be divided into a variety-specific component and a market
component, affecting all the varieties in the same way and capturing competition effects.
These two components are reported separately.
Then, the standard variety-specific market outcomes are reported: prices; markups;
quantities; operating profits. Aggregate market outcomes ensue: the price index; total
quantities sold; total operating profits generated in the market. Notice that the price
index is again computed as in Model 8, i.e. discounting each price by the corresponding
taste mismatch. Quantities are instead reported as the simple sum of quantities sold,
as there is no quantity index in the model built similarly to the other indices (i.e.,
discounting the terms by the taste mismatch value). The same holds for total operating
profits.
Finally, some interesting additional statistics are proposed, such as markups as a per-
centage of marginal costs of production (to show that they are not fixed in the quadratic
utility framework) and the quantity and profit shares.
Description of the simulation Graphs
Turning to the three graphs to the right of Figure 3.4, they represent visually the infor-
mation provided in the table, which makes it then easily comparable across models.
On the top right, the varieties’ location in the horizontal characteristics space is rep-
resented, where the representative consumer is located in (0;0) and (X;Y ) axes reflect
the (β1;β2) characteristics space described in Chapter 2. It is important to remember
that a visual representation as in Chapter 2 requires the same assumptions used in the
context of location theory, and in particular the constraint on fixed quantities discussed
in 2.3.4. In addition, information is provided on the relative value of marginal costs, rep-
resented through the size of the inner circles, and the relative value of quality, represented
through the size of the outer circles. In this way almost all the primitive values of the
simulation can be represented in one graph (with the only exception of substitutability,
which requires a separate representation device when made endogenous).
The size of the circles is proportional to the values of αs and c. The perimeter of the
outer circle (α) can be interpreted as the locus of consumers who would be indifferent
between buying a fixed mount q¯ of variety s in exchange for a unit of the numéraire and
keeping the numéraire, in the absence of substitution effects (i.e., assuming γQ = 0).
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Notice that in the examples the representative consumer is unique and located in (0;0),
so the locus of indifferent consumers refers only to potential consumers described in terms
of the location of their ideal characteristics in the (X;Y) space. Notice also that consumer
(0;0) is not forced to consume q¯ units of the varieties, i.e. she will buy also the varieties
whose outer circle does not include (0;0) but in smaller quantities than the q¯ used for
the illustration.
As for costs, represented in the inner circle (c), there is no similar interpretation in
terms of consumers’ location, but its size follows the proportion between c and α for each
variety. The difference between the radius of the outer circle and the radius of the inner
circle is therefore an indication of the level of markups, which are equal to 1/2 of the
distance between quality and cost, net of competition effects (i.e., when γQ = 0)
The second graph on the right shows the absolute value of markups, quantities sold
and operating profits for each variety. The relative share of profits (outer pie) and
quantities (inner pie) are then shown on the bottom right graph.
Simulation of market outcomes - Model I (cost heterogeneity)
The properties of Model I are exemplified in the corresponding simulation shown in
Figure 3.5. As compared to Figure 3.4, the only difference is that marginal costs of
production are now assumed different for each variety, as easily visible from the inner
circle differences in the top-right graph. In terms of market outcomes, the first difference
that can be spotted is that, comparing any pair of varieties, say s and r, and looking at
their cost difference,
∆cs,i,cr,i = cs,i − cr,i,
it can be observed that the corresponding absolute value of price and markup differences
of the same pair of varieties is equal to half of the absolute value of ∆cs,i,cr,i . Defining
∆ps,i,pr,i = ps,i − pr,i ; ∆(p−c)s,i,(p−c)r,i = (ps,i − cs,i)− (pr,i − cr,i),
it can be noted indeed that∣∣∆ps,i,pr,i∣∣ = ∣∣∣∆(p−c)s,i,(p−c)r,i∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∆cs,i,cr,i2
∣∣∣∣ ,
with the important difference that markups will be higher for the most efficiently pro-
duced variety and prices lower by the same amount. This result highlights the notion that
only half of the marginal costs are passed-through to the final consumers in a quadratic
utility framework. Another notable property of Model I can also be easily seen in Figure
3.5. Relative markup, quantity and profit levels keep the same ranking across varieties.
In other words, the variety with the lowest level of markups is also the one with the
lowest sales and profits and so on.
Still, the fact that ranks are kept doesn’t imply that changes are proportional. Indeed,
from the bottom-right graph it can be noticed that profit shares are more concentrated
than quantity shares, i.e varieties that enjoy a larger share of quantities sold are associated
with a more than proportional share of profits and vice versa for varieties sold less.
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This is due to the fact that higher markups and quantities sold reinforce each other in
determining profitability.
Simulation of market outcomes - Model II (α heterogeneity)
Figure 3.6 simulates market outcomes under the assumptions of Model II. The values
of α have been attributed randomly with the only aim of illustrating the properties of
the model. It can be noticed that there is a certain degree of symmetry between the
properties of Models I and II. In particular, defining
∆αs,i,αr,i = αs − αr,
it is again true, as for Model I, that∣∣∆ps,i,pr,i∣∣ = ∣∣∣∆(p−c)s,i,(p−c)r,i∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∆αs,i,αr,i2
∣∣∣∣ ,
as can be observed by comparing any pair of varieties in the simulation.
The main difference is that now also the signs of the price and markup differences are
equal, reflecting the fact that firms charge consumers half of the additional utility that
the higher quality of their varieties implies for the consumers.
Notice also that, similarly to Model I, markups and quantities reinforce each other
in determining the profit levels, as can be again seen from the bottom-right graph.
Simulation of market outcomes - Model III (β heterogeneity)
The simulation shown in Figure 3.7 differs substantially from the previous ones in three
important aspects. First, differently from the previous simulations, varieties are now
scattered in the space without any particular order, resulting in different distances from
the consumer. This results in each variety having a different distance from the consumer
and from the other varieties. Second, since varieties are differentiated only horizontally,
markups and prices turn out to be exactly the same for all. Third, since markups are
constant but quantities sold are not, profit and quantity shares coincide, i.e. there the
profit magnification effect seen in Models I and II.
The first aspect can be seen from the top-right graph in Figure 3.7, where circles
have all the same size because of the assumed homogeneity in costs and quality across
varieties. The second feature can be observed from the middle graph on the left, where
identical markups across varieties are associated with different quantity and operating
profit levels, which notably keep the same proportions across varieties. This last feature
is made even more evident in the bottom-right graph, where each variety is shown to
have a different share of total market profits, but profit and quantity shares coincide,
which is a feature observed only in Model 3.
Simulation of market outcomes - Model IV (γ heterogeneity)
The simulation exercise associated with Model IV has an additional layer of complexity
if compared with the previous ones. Qualities, costs and location on the characteristics
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space are assumed constant across varieties, so that no heterogeneity is visible on the
top-right graph of Figure 3.8, yet the other two graphs on the right show that variation
in substitutability causes a great extent of variability in market outcomes.
Normally the heterogeneity in γ should be associated with other sources of hetero-
geneity in the spatial configuration of the market, in the characteristics space, to justify
the different levels of substitutability as discussed in Section 3.3.4. To illustrate the
theoretical case of heterogeneity in γ alone, here values are assigned randomly. As a
consequence, given the constant distance of varieties from the consumer in the charac-
teristics space and the definition of β as the sum of substitutability and distance from
the consumer for this simulation, also the β in the Table ends up being affected.7
The reason for the random assignment of values for β is that, given the absence of any
other source of heterogeneity, the formulas proposed in (3.36) and (3.37) would yield the
same value for each variety. This is shown in Figure 3.9, where the two tables indicate the
steps to follow to determine the value of parameter γs,i in its weighted and unweighted
versions. First, a matrix of bilateral distances is measured, as shown on the left table for
weighted and unweighted distances; then, all the elements of the matrices are inverted;
finally, the rows are summed for each variety to represent the imputed distance of each
variety from the competition in the market, displayed in the last two rows of the table
to the right and in the graphs at the bottom.
As in the previous model simulations, it can be noticed that ranks in markups, quan-
tities and operating profits are constant across varieties in the sense that the ranking of
varieties in terms for one characteristic is equal to the ranking for the others. At the
same time, also in this case as in Model I and II profit shares are more concentrated than
quantity shares because of markups and quantities being both affected similarly by γs,i.
7Distance from the consumer could be altered to keep β constant, but that would not qualitatively
change the outcomes of the example, which is meant to be just an illustration.
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Simulation of market outcomes - Model V (α, β heterogeneity)
The simulation of market outcomes corresponding to Model V are shown in Figure 3.10.
By looking at the graph on the top right, it can be observed that this simulation combines
the location of varieties in the characteristics space of Model III (Figure 3.7) and the
quality levels assigned to varieties in Model II (Figure 3.6).
While tractable, Model V is shown in the simulation to be able to accommodate
complex market outcomes. For example, comparing the varieties produced by Firm 2
and Firm 8, it can be noticed that markups, prices and quantities don’t display the same
ranking. Firm 8 produces a variety of a much higher quality than all the others and
therefore, given the constant distribution of costs, has higher markups and prices than
any other firm. Still, it is not the variety selling the most. Firm 2’s characteristics are
indeed closer to the consumer’s ideal and the lower βs,i associated with this low taste
mismatch makes the variety produced by Firm 2 the most sold in the market.
This can be easily seen from the bottom-right graph, showing quantities (inner circle)
and profits (outer circle) as shares of market total. Firm 2 sells indeed more than Firm
8, even if the profit share of the latter is slightly higher than the former.
Still, the ranking of quantities in not completely independent of the ranking of
markups. As can be seen from (3.58), markups still play a fundamental role in determin-
ing quantities sold. As shown in next chapter, this feature matches quite neatly some
basic trade patterns observed in the data, besides being consistent with the empirical
evidence found in the literature and reported in Chapter 2.
Comparing Model V with the previous ones, it can thus be noted that it manages to
break the constant ranking of profits, markups and quantities sold displayed in Model
II with only quality heterogeneity (or in the baseline model with cost heterogeneity, the
only difference being that prices and markups move in opposite directions), but it also
manages to break the perfect correspondence between profit shares and quantity shares
observed in Model III, which is also a convenient feature when dealing with real data.
Simulation of market outcomes - Model VI (α, γ heterogeneity)
The simulation of Model VI shown in Figure 3.11 combines the sources of heterogeneity
used in Model II (Figure 3.6) and Model IV (Figure 3.8). Varieties are thus equidistant
from the consumers’ ideal, as shown in the top-right graph, but the different quality
levels alter the substitution patterns in ways that generate results which would not be
possible with the previous models presented.
To see the most interesting result of the combination of quality and substitution
heterogeneity, focus on two specific varieties: the one produced by Firm 1 and Firm 7.
The two are characterized by exactly the same distance from the consumer and the same
quality level, so in any model of non-localized competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
they would be associated with the same prices, markups and quantities sold. But it is
not the case in the simulation presented here.
Even if they share one closest neighbor, Firm 6, they differ in the characteristics of
the other closest neighbor, which is Firm 8 in the case of Firm 7 and Firm 2 in the
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case of Firm 1. Even though these two firms have the same distance from the consumer
(i.e., the sameβ) and the same distance vis-à-vis the two Firms 7 and 2, they have one
important difference: their quality level. Firm 8 displays a higher quality than Firm 2
and therefore the competitive pressure exerted on Firm 7 by Firm 8 is stronger than the
impact of Firm 2 on Firm 1.
The specific impact on the overall substitution level of each bilateral relation can be
seen from Figure 3.12. Browsing the determinants of the substitution parameter for Firm
1 and Firm 7 it is possible to see the higher impact of their closest neighbors. So it can
be noticed that Firm 6 does indeed cause the same erosion of margins to Firms 1 and
7 in both the weighted and the unweighted distance matrices. The same is not true for
the impact of Firm 8 on Firm 7 and of Firm 2 to Firm 1. They are the same in the case
of the unweighted matrix, i.e. when quality and the other variety characteristics are not
factorized in the measurement, but they differ when the quality difference is taken into
account. The weighted distance of Firm 8 from Firm 7 is indeed 1.7, which compares
with a distance of 2.1 of Firm 1 from Firm 2. Notice that the weighted distance matrix
is asymmetric. For example, since Firms 2 and 7 have the same quality, their weight on
their neighbors is the same (3.8 in both the case of Firm 2 for Firm 1 and of Firm 7 for
Firm 8).
In the graphs at the bottom of Figure 3.12, the difference between the weighted and
the unweighted substitutability parameter is displayed in bar (to the left) and on the
characteristics space, to the right, where the size of the circle indicates the competitive
pressure implied by the variety’s location.
Going back to Figure 3.11, the impact on quantities and profits is very similar to
Model II with quality heterogeneity alone. The impact of substitutability in this sim-
ulation is quite marginal, also because all the varieties have the same distance from
each other (which is relaxed, for example, in Model VIII). However, the impact of sub-
stitutability also depends on the calibration choices and all the other parameters, so
it is impossible to say a priori whether heterogeneity in substitutability implies only a
second-order effect on market outcomes.
Finally, remark that Model VI can merge nicely the insights of localized competition à
la Salop (1979) without limiting the impact to the closest neighbors alone, but extending
it to the entire universe of firms in the market, which is rather a feature of non-localized
competition.
Simulation of market outcomes - Model VII (β, γ heterogeneity)
The simulation of Model VII in Figure 3.13 has a few distinguishing features as opposed
to the previous ones, and notably on Model III (Figure 3.7) and Model IV (Figure 3.8)
based on the same sources of heterogeneity not combined.
First of all, it should be noticed that the combination of horizontal differentiation
and location-driven substitutability patterns generate endogenously a difference in prices,
which was not present in Model III and was artificially introduced in model IV by as-
signing different substitutability parameters to the varieties even is the absence of any
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other source of heterogeneity would have meant the same value for the parameter in for
all the varieties (see Figure 3.9, for example).
This feature has relevant implications. Even in a market where there is no scope for
vertical differentiation and where each firm would sell at the same price in a situation
of pure monopoly (i.e. even when all the firms have the same costs and quality), prices
may differ because of a firm specific competitive pressure exerted by the market. This
concept mixes the insights of localized and non-localized competition in an innovative
way, resulting in results that would not be easy to obtain without making ad hoc as-
sumptions on the interaction between one particular variety and one market. This is
because in models of non-localized competition all the firms must be treated symmetri-
cally and in models of localized competition firms are not affected by market aggregates
but just by their neighbors behavior (which in the monopolistic competition assumption
is considered irrelevant, even if for the sake of illustration in the simulations the market
is populated by only 8 firms, which should rather be considered classes of firms).
In terms of market outcomes, results are similar to the verti-zontal model V, with
the taste mismatch parameter being able to change the quantity ranking as opposed to
the markup ranking. It may thus be more interesting to focus on the definition of the
variety-specific substitution parameter in this context, show nin Figure 3.14. Here indeed
both the weighted and unweighted matrices display variety-level variability because of
the different location of firms in the characteristics space.
Remember that the unweighted matrix only takes into account the distance between
each pair of varieties as in equation (3.36), so that being in a crowded spot, as for example
Firm 2 is, causes the utility derived from the variety to be discounted the most because
of the presence of the neighbors. In terms of unweighted substitutability, thus, Firm 2
would be the one suffering the most, as shown in the graphs at the bottom of Figure
3.14, followed by Firms 1 and 7, which are also quite central.
The interactions are more complex in the case of the weighted distance matrix, as
shown in the formula in equation (3.37). Because the weight of each variety on the others
depends on their characteristics, the most central varieties exert more pressure on the
other than before. For example, Firm 2, which under the unweighted setting was suffering
from being very central in the characteristics space, now exerts such a high competitive
pressure on Firm 1 as to make it the one with the highest substitutability parameter
in the market (1.59 for Firm 1 against 1.57 for Firm 2). Also other pairs of varieties
change their relative ranking moving from the unweighted to the weighted measure as
for example Firm 8 and 3 (the former going from 0.89 to 1.24 and the latter from 0.92
to 1.17).
A legitimate question would then be how to decide which measure of substitutability
is more appropriate. The choice throughout the simulations has been to use the weighted
index, as it conveys more information on the spatial distribution of the market partici-
pants and on their characteristics. In addition, it has the appealing feature of yielding
a "localized corrective" (γs,i) to non-localized aggregate indices (the market specific de-
terminants of Qi), so that the description of the market is always objective, even if the
impact of market indices on each specific variety is subjective, in the sense that it will
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depend on its location in the characteristics space.
Simulation of market outcomes - Model VIII (α, β, γ heterogeneity)
The last simulation exercise involves all the sources of demand heterogeneity explored in
the previous models. Their interaction generates complex patterns in terms of market
outcomes and provides a great deal of flexibility in modeling market structures.
From the top-right graph in Figure 3.15 it can be noticed indeed that varieties are
located in the horizontal characteristics space as in Models III, V and VII. At the same
time, the distribution of quality follows the allocation chosen for Models II, V and VI.
Finally, substitutability parameters are allowed to vary as in Models IV, VI and VII.
It is worth noting that most of the features that can be observed in terms of market
outcomes (markups, quantities and profits) have already been observed in the previous
simulations, so that it may be said that the advantage of Model VIII lies not much
in its capacity to suit empirical observations (as probably more parsimonious models,
such as the verti-zontal, may suffice), but rather to provide a full characterization of a
virtual economy which may be useful to study theoretical properties. For example, in
Chapter 6 it will be illustrated how Model VIII may be fruitfully used to study the issue
of endogenous location of new entrants in a rich yet tractable way.
Also the definition of the substitutability parameter in Figure 3.16 recalls closely the
simulation of Model VII in Figure 3.14 (see, for example, the value of the substitutability
parameter for the Firms 1 and 2), with the only difference that now also quality levels are
included in the definition of the weighted distance matrix resulting, for example, in an
even tougher competitive environment for Firm 1, suffering from both the proximity of
Firm 1 to consumer’s taste and from its high quality. Of course, the unweighted distance
matrix shows exactly the same values as Model VII (as it would do for Model III and
V, since it only depends on the location of firms), which can also be considered a point
in favor of the weighted distance, even though there is undoubtedly a certain degree of
arbitrariness in the definition of what should determine the weight.
Summing up, Model VIII may represent an upper bound on the modeling flexibility
that can be introduced in a quadratic utility framework keeping it tractable. However,
the additional richness of the framework should be traded off against the parsimony of
the alternative models. A summary of the models and their properties follow to help the
reader make up her mind depending on the specific empirical need she is faced with.
3.5.
ILLU
ST
R
A
T
IO
N
O
F
M
A
R
K
E
T
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
W
IT
H
SIM
U
LA
T
IO
N
S
131Figure 3.10: Simulation with model 5 (verti-zontal): heterogeneous quality and taste mismatch
132
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
3.
Q
U
A
D
R
A
T
IC
F
LE
X
IB
ILIT
Y
:SO
M
E
A
LT
E
R
N
A
T
IV
E
M
O
D
E
LSFigure 3.11: Simulation with model 6: heterogeneous quality and substitutability
3.5.
ILLU
ST
R
A
T
IO
N
O
F
M
A
R
K
E
T
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
W
IT
H
SIM
U
LA
T
IO
N
S
133Figure 3.12: Idiosyncratic substitutability parameter in model 6
134
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
3.
Q
U
A
D
R
A
T
IC
F
LE
X
IB
ILIT
Y
:SO
M
E
A
LT
E
R
N
A
T
IV
E
M
O
D
E
LSFigure 3.13: Simulation with model 7: heterogeneous taste mismatch and substitutability
3.5.
ILLU
ST
R
A
T
IO
N
O
F
M
A
R
K
E
T
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
W
IT
H
SIM
U
LA
T
IO
N
S
135Figure 3.14: Idiosyncratic substitutability parameter in model 7
136
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
3.
Q
U
A
D
R
A
T
IC
F
LE
X
IB
ILIT
Y
:SO
M
E
A
LT
E
R
N
A
T
IV
E
M
O
D
E
LSFigure 3.15: Simulation with model 8: heterogeneous quality, taste mismatch and substitutability
3.5.
ILLU
ST
R
A
T
IO
N
O
F
M
A
R
K
E
T
O
U
T
C
O
M
E
S
W
IT
H
SIM
U
LA
T
IO
N
S
137Figure 3.16: Idiosyncratic substitutability parameter in model 8
138 CHAPTER 3. QUADRATIC FLEXIBILITY: SOME ALTERNATIVE MODELS
3.6 Summary of variations’ functional forms and properties
Up to this point, the different variations of a standard quadratic utility and their indi-
vidual properties have been presented in isolation, not allowing for an easy comparison
across model and for a clear definition of the trade-offs involved. This Section is therefore
meant to fill this gap by comparing the different models and show the main differences
and commonalities. In particular, Table 3.1 displays all the equilibrium markup formu-
las together with the corresponding equilibrium quantities and profits. Table 3.2 instead
focuses on the variety-specific and market-specific components of the equilibrium price
functions, highlighting the main empirical properties of each model.
Starting from Table 3.1, it can be noticed that markup functions can be rearranged
into a comparable format for all the specifications. In every model, in fact, equilibrium
markups result from the difference between two terms: the positive "variety-specific social
value" term represented by the difference between the quality of the variety produced and
its cost and the negative "market-aggregate social value" term representing the difference
between the average quality and cost of the market competitors, weighted by the degree
of substitution between variety s and the rest of the varieties on the market. The three
sources of demand variability analyzed in this Chapter (besides cost heterogeneity) play
a different role in determining markups. The quality parameter of variety s increases its
markup, but the quality of market competitors decrease it. When α does not vary across
varieties the interaction with the substitution parameter disappears (see equation (3.12))
and a common increase in quality in the market is associated with a common increase
in markups. To the contrary, when αs is allowed to vary across varieties one variety’s
quality has to be discounted against market (weighted) average quality to determine the
overall effect on markups.
As for the horizontal differentiation parameter, βs,i, when constant across varieties it
implies a common discounting of market aggregates by entering into the denominator of
the second market-specific term of the markup equations. In other words, the invariant
parameter β indicates how close are all the varieties to the consumer and hence to each
other. The impact of β on markups hence depends on the strength of the parameters
determining the toughness of competition in the market, and notably on the substitution
parameter γ. When competition is tougher, varieties enjoy higher markups by staying
further away from the consumer but also further away from each other, and vice versa.
When βs,i is allowed to vary across varieties instead, the dynamics are more complex.
First of all, markups of each variety are unaffected by its distance from the consumer, i.e.
βs,i does not enter into the markup equation of variety s. Only the overall distribution
of βs,i matters in determining the toughness of competition and thus markups. However
this is not true of operating profits, since the equilibrium amount of quantities sold of
variety s is indeed affected by βs,i (which is why it affects market aggregates).
Finally, the substitutability parameter plays a subtler role than the other two demand
parameters in that it only enters in the market-specific term of the markup function and
its role is basically to determine to which extent market indices affect individual varieties.
If γ is common across varieties then it just captures the general degree of substitutability
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between pairs of varieties within a market. When γs,i is instead market-variety specific
it determines to which extent the individual variety s is affected by market aggregates.
Notice that, however, also the distribution of γs,i is relevant when it is market specific,
because it indirectly affects the quantities that will be sold of each variety and so it plays
a similar role to the distribution of βs,i in determining what in the case of βs,i is called
the "effective number of competitors", but it can also be referred to as the "weighted
number of competitors".
Turning to Table 3.2, before describing the properties of each model, it is worth
looking at the column on equilibrium price functions, whose elements have been split
into variety-specific sources of price variation (the first term) and market-specific sources
of variation (the second term or, alternatively, the part of the equation within square
brackets). This distinction highlights the role played by quality differences (possibly
along cost differences) in generating within-market variability in prices across varieties.
It also shows how market aggregates affect prices in the different models and notably it
underlines the role played by the substitution parameter γ in translating market indices
into price effects, which are common to all the varieties when γ is not allowed to vary and
are variety-specific for idiosyncratic γs,i. Of course, when γs,i is market-variety specific,
the distinction between market-wide effects on prices and variety-specific component is
less clear-cut, but it has been classified as a market-wide effect in this case under the
implicit assumption that γs,i is constant over time and are market indices instead which
are expected to vary, so that variability in market indices does cause individual prices to
vary, even if the extent of the change is determined by the value of γs,i.
As for the selection of which variation of a quadratic utility to employ in a particular
situation, three main properties have been included in the table to help the reader make a
data driven choice. In other words, depending on the observed outcomes in the market to
study, different variations of the quadratic utility may be more or less suitable. Starting
from the general principle that empirical models should be as parsimonious as possible
and that any additional source of variability should be justified by a specific need, the
desired properties of the model to use can be decided as follows.8
The first element to consider is whether the variability of prices and quantities across
markets (or equivalently the variability of prices and profits across market) is similar. If
this is the case, there is no need of include a market-variety-specific parameter of hori-
zontal differentiation such as βs,i. In fact, in the absence of this source of differentiation
higher prices can be driven either by higher costs (in which case quantities sold will be
lower) or by higher quality (in which case quantities sold and markups will be higher),
resulting in a similar level of variation (unless a relation is assumed between costs and
quality across markets, which is also a possibility explored in some papers, especially
considering the cost of inputs). To the contrary, if quantities are observed to vary sys-
tematically more than prices, there may be the need to introduce a source of quantity
variation as in Models III, V, VII and VIII, where this role is played by βs,i. The exact
determination of a threshold above which the difference in variability between prices and
8Notice that in this Section only quadratic utilities are compared. In Chapter 4, a particular variation
of the quadratic utility, the verti-zontal, is instead compared with alternative modeling frameworks.
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quantities can be ascribed to the characteristics of the market rather than measurement
error is an empirical question which should be tackled on a case-by-case basis.
The second feature that can be readily verified using firm-level data is whether within
the destination markets a strong correlation is observed between prices and quantities. If
no quality differences are present in the market and all the heterogeneity in prices is driven
by productive efficiency, then quantities sold (or market shares) of the varieties should
be systematically negatively associated with higher prices. Similarly, in the absence of
differences in productive efficiency, including quality differences the relation should be
equally strong, with the only difference that higher prices will be associated with more
quantities sold. If this is not the case in the data, then it may be necessary to consider
the possibility of adding both cost heterogeneity and a quality shifter, such as αs, to
break the relation between prices and quantities within each market (such as Models II,
V, VI, VIII). In alternative, a combination of cost or quality heterogeneity and horizontal
differentiation can also obtain the same result (therefore also Models III and VII may
work). In practice, only models based on productive efficiency differences alone (Model
I) or models with productive efficiency and substitutability differences (Model IV) would
be excluded.
Finally, having information on marginal costs of production and prices, it would
be possible to observe whether markups and prices are strongly related. If that is the
case, the alternative of using models with one source of price heterogeneity (costs or
quality) and horizontal differentiation (Models III and VII) would not suffice anymore,
leaving only Models II, V, VI, VIII as viable alternatives. Notice that, in the absence
of variability in horizontal differentiation (βs,i), markups and quantities are perfectly
correlated, so that some inference of markup variability can be made even in the absence
of direct information on production costs
A rigorous analysis based on firm-product-destination data on Belgian exports is
undertaken in Chapter 4. However, up to this point it can already be noted that the
empirical observations found in the literature about price and quantity variation across
and within markets and the preliminary analysis of the European car market (which is
also deepened in the next Chapter) suggest that the most suitable variation to study
international trade patterns is likely to be the one respecting the three properties re-
ported in Table 3.2, which leaves Models V and VIII as the preferred choices. However,
appealing to the principle of parsimony, the model with the smallest number of sources
of heterogeneity needed to accommodate the observed patterns is selected to be taken
to the data. Therefore the preferred Model for the empirical analysis of trade when the
whole manufacturing is considered in the rest of the Thesis is Model V, the verti-zontal
model. It will guide all the analyses in Chapter 4 and 5 and will only be altered in
the final Chapter, where future avenues of research are spelled out exploiting further
alterations to the quadratic utility and the monopolistic competition framework.
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Table 3.1: Summary of model variations’ functional forms
Equilibrium markups Quantities Profits Notes
Model I p∗s,i − cs,i = α−cs,i2 − α−ci2
(
γNi
2β+γNi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
β pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
β Ni =
∫
s∈Si ds
(cs,i) ci = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si cs,ids
Ni =
∫
s∈Si ds
Model II p∗s,i − cs,i = αs−cs,i2 − αi−ci2
(
γNi
2β+γNi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
β pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
β ci =
1
Ni
∫
s∈Si cs,ids
(cs,i,αs) αi = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si αsds
Model III p∗s,i − cs,i = α−cs,i2 − α−c˜i2
(
γNi
2+γNi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
βs,i
pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
βs,i
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
cs,i,βs,i c˜i = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si
cs,i
βs,i
ds
Ni =
∫
s∈Si ds
Model IV p∗s,i − cs,i = α−cs,i2 − α−ci2
(
γs,iNi
2β+Mi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
β pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
β Mi =
∫
s∈Si γs,ids
( cs,i,γs,i) ci = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si cs,ids
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Model V p∗s,i − cs,i = αs−cs,i2 − α˜i−c˜i2
(
γNi
2+γNi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
βs,i
pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
βs,i
c˜i =
1
Ni
∫
s∈Si
cs,i
βs,i
ds
(cs,i,αs,βs,i) α˜i = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si
αsds
βs,i
Mi =
∫
s∈Si γs,ids
Model VI p∗s,i − cs,i = αs−cs,i2 − αi−ci2
(
γs,iNi
2β+Mi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
β pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
β ci =
1
Ni
∫
s∈Si cs,ids
(cs,i,αs,γs,i) αi = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si αsds
Γi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids
βs,i
Model VII p∗s,i − cs,i = α−cs,i2 − α−c˜i2
(
γs,iNi
2+Γi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
βs,i
pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
βs,i
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
(cs,i,βs,i,γs,i ) c˜i = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids
βs,i
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Model VIII p∗s,i − cs,i = αs−cs,i2 − α˜i−c˜i2
(
γs,iNi
2+Γi
)
qs,i =
p∗s,i−cs,i
βs,i
pis,i =
(p∗s,i−cs,i)
2
βs,i
Γi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids
βs,i
(cs,i,αs,βs,i,γs,i) c˜i = 1Ni
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids
βs,i
α˜i =
1
Γi
∫
s∈Si
αsds
βs,i
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Table 3.2: Summary of model variations’ properties
Across markets Within markets Markups and
Equilibrium prices Notes variability variation of ps,i prices almost
of ps,i 6= qs,i almost ⊥ qs,i unrelated
Model I p∗s,i =
cs,i
2 +
[
α
2 − γ2 (αNi−Ci)(2β+γNi)
]
Ni =
∫
s∈Si ds N N N
(cs,i) Ci =
∫
s∈Si cs,ids
Ni =
∫
s∈Si ds
Model II p∗s,i =
αs+cs,i
2 − γ2 (Ai−Ci)(2β+γNi) Ci =
∫
s∈Si cs,ids N Y Y
(cs,i,αs) Ai =
∫
s∈Si αsds
Model III p∗s,i =
cs,i
2 +
[
α
2 − γ2 (αNi−Ci)(2+γNi)
]
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Y Y N
cs,i,βs,i Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,i
βs,i
ds
Ni =
∫
s∈Si ds
Model IV p∗s,i =
cs,i
2 +
[
α
2 −
γs,i
2
(αNi−Ci)
(2β+Mi)
]
Mi =
∫
s∈Si γs,ids N N N
( cs,i,γs,i) Ci =
∫
s∈Si cs,ids
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Model V p∗s =
αs+cs,i
2 − γ2 (Ai−Ci)(2+γNi) Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,i
βs,i
ds Y Y Y
(cs,i,αs,βs,i) Ai =
∫
s∈Si
αsds
βs,i
Mi =
∫
s∈Si γs,ids
Model VI p∗s,i =
αs+cs,i
2 −
γs,i
2
(Ai−Ci)
(2β+Mi)
Ci =
∫
s∈Si cs,ids N Y Y
(cs,i,αs,γs,i) Ai =
∫
s∈Si αsds
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Model VII p∗s,i =
cs,i
2 +
[
α
2 −
γs,i
2
(αNi−Ci)
(2+Γi)
]
Γi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids
βs,i
Y Y N
(cs,i,βs,i,γs,i ) Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids
βs,i
Γi =
∫
s∈Si
γs,ids
βs,i
Model VIII p∗s,i =
αs+cs,i
2 −
γs,i
2
(Ai−Ci)
(2+Γi)
Ci =
∫
s∈Si
cs,ids
βs,i
Y Y Y
(cs,i,αs,βs,i,γs,i) Ai =
∫
s∈Si
αsds
βs,i
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Features of the verti-zontal model
The adoption of the verti-zontal model results in a number of appealing features, which
have been mentioned in the foregoing but are now summed up.
First, it captures horizontal differentiation through one single parameter that varies
across varieties and consumers for which an interpretation is proposed that goes back
to spatial models of product differentiation à la Hotelling (1929), affecting demand and
sales asymmetrically.
Second, it allows for the separate identification of horizontal and vertical differentia-
tion in a particular sense: the consumer-specific parameter of horizontal differentiation
only affects equilibrium quantities but not prices. Thus, horizontal differentiation can
be separated from vertical differentiation at the firm-product-country level and can em-
pirically be distinguished by any researcher with access to data on firm characteristics.
Horizontal differentiation in CES models cannot explain variation in sales for the same
firm-product across countries because the elasticity of substitution is constant across va-
rieties. To remedy for this, one can introduce a firm-product specific demand shock per
country that accounts for sales variation of the same firm-product across countries with-
out affecting prices. Horizontal differentiation between products is then the combination
of a constant parameter of substitution and a variable shock at the firm-product level.
Because the parameter of substitution also enters the price equation, a clear separation
of horizontal and vertical differentiation is difficult to attain with the CES and quality
differences between varieties can be confounded with taste differences.
Third, asymmetric preferences in quadratic utility also result in a rich set of country-
specific competition effects. With symmetric preferences, competition effects are a sole
function of the number of firms in the destination country, which depends on market size.
Allowing for asymmetric preferences generates competition effects that also depend on the
quality of the varieties on offer in the destination country and their interaction with local
tastes. In addition, allowing for consumer heterogeneity across countries implies that two
countries of similar size and GDP can still be subject to varying levels of competition.
Even when the quality on offer in these two countries is the same, competition effects can
differ because in one country high quality varieties meet better local tastes. Allowing for
asymmetric preferences in quality and taste across varieties and taste heterogeneity across
countries also generates market structures ranging from monopoly to perfect competition.
This is shown in its market aggregates, which together capture the extent of country-
specific competition effects.
3.6.1 Parameter identification
As mentioned above, an interesting feature of the verti-zontal model is that it can be
used to address many specific empirical questions because its parameters are easily iden-
tifiable. However, for this to be possible, not just information on quantities and prices
is required, but also on costs (or markups), which is not often readily available. Its par-
ticular functional form allows researchers to directly measure quality differences between
varieties (firm-products or export-products) and taste mismatch at the market-variety
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level. In addition, it can be used to estimate the absolute level of quality (i.e. the
vertical-axis intercept of the inverse demand function in the absence of competition) and
the degree of substitutability between varieties.
The parameter capturing taste mismatch, βs,i, is the most easily identifiable. It
can be interpreted as the distance in the horizontal characteristics space between the
consumer i’s ideal combination of product attributes and the actual characteristics of a
particular variety s, as discussed above. To determine its value, equation (3.57) can be
rewritten to show that it is equal to the ratio between each variety’s markups and its
quantities sold, at any given point in time, t:
βs,i,t =
p∗s,i,t − cs,t
q∗s,i,t
(3.95)
As for the parameter capturing intrinsic quality, αs, it can be either measured in rel-
ative terms or estimated in absolute terms, together with the substitutability parameter
γs. Notice that αs is the value in terms of numéraire attributed by all consumers to the
vertical characteristics of a particular variety s. In relative terms, quality differentials
between any couple of varieties (say, αs and αr) can be readily obtained by exploiting the
property that relative prices of different varieties in a market depend only on differences
in costs and quality (as shown in equation (5.9)):
∆αsr,t = αs,t − αr,t = 2(p∗s,i,t − p∗r,i,t)− (cs,t − cr,t) (3.96)
Measuring the distance between the quality of all the varieties, αs, t, and the quality
of the worst variety, α0,t, one can identify the relative quality distribution of the varieties
present in a market at time t and eventually normalize it to have an idea of the relative
distribution of varieties’ quality in a market. This means that no additional information
or indirect estimation methodology is needed to capture the relative quality of each
variety in a market.
However, it is empirically possible to go beyond relative quality and identify absolute
level of quality, defined independently of other varieties’ quality. As can be observed from
equation (3.53), aggregate quality and cost levels positively affects the price index. But
one can see from equation (3.52) that a quality-driven increase in prices will have very
different implications as compared to a cost-driven price increase in terms of markups.
Specifically, a market where prices increase because a range of firms upgrade the quality
of their products becomes more competitive, thus reducing the markup of the firms that
keep the quality of their products unchanged. The opposite would happen in the case of
a cost-driven price rise. Thus, in order to assess the performance of a firm it is important
to be able to disentangle quality from costs in its price setting. Absolute levels of quality
can be estimated following a procedure that exploits the time dimension of the data, such
as variety-level prices and costs as well as total sales of a certain product in a market
(i.e., Qi).9 To this end, equation (3.52) can be rewritten as:
9To this end, information on the total quantities consumed of a certain good, Qi, is needed. For
example, this information can be obtained by merging trade datasets, such as UN COMTRADE or
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p∗s,t(Qi,t) =
αs,t + cs,t − γQi,t
2
. (3.97)
where t denotes the time dimension. This can be further seen as:
2p∗s,t − cs,t = αs − γQi,t. (3.98)
Note that the left-hand side of the equation consists of observables, i.e. time-varying
variety-specific prices and costs. On the right-hand side, however, neither αs nor γ
are directly observable. But holding the substitution parameter fixed over time and
maintaining that the worst-quality variety, s = 0, is worth always the same amount of
the numéraire, γˆ can be estimated through a simple regression analysis. By regressing
the left-hand side of (3.98) for this worst-quality variety on Qi, a value is obtained for the
substitution parameter, γ, as the coefficient associated with Qi and α0 as the constant
of the regression.10 Notice that the identity of the worst variety can be determined from
equation (3.96).
Plugging then back γˆ into equation (3.97), since all the other variables are now
observed or identified, one can determine the absolute quality levels for all the varieties
of a particular product at a particular time and have all the parameters of the model
empirically identified.
As long as individual prices, quantities and costs (or markups) can be observed or
estimated, all the idiosyncratic and market variables can be fully identified and be used
to address empirical questions on quality upgrading or cost increases.
3.7 Verti-zontal differentiation: some properties and propo-
sitions
After having identified Model V (the verti-zontal model) as the variation displaying the
most interesting properties for the empirical analysis, a few propositions follow on the
implications of policy shocks on market indices and firm performance. In this way it
will be possible to verify whether the implications of the model differ substantially from
alternative models or from empirical observations in the literature. Roughly speaking,
these propositions can thus be interpreted as a reality check on the model.
As usual in the trade literature, the policy shock analyzed is a process of trade liber-
alization. The propositions thus concern the verti-zontal model predictions on markets’
characteristics and firms’ performance. The simplifying assumptions of segmented mar-
kets and marginal costs independent of the scale of production imply that each variety
Eurostat COMEXT, which capture total imports of a good in a market, with production datasets such
as Eurostat PRODCOM, which reports total consumption in a market.
10The interpretation of such a parameter as constant over time amounts to considering the numéraire
as a Hicksian composite good representing a bundle of all the other goods purchased by the consumer
and allowing that the evolution of the worst variety’s quality of a particular good follows the evolution of
quality of the economy at large, as captured by the Hicksian composite good and implicitly normalized
to 1 in the numéraire (or linked to income levels, as stressed in Section 3.7.4).
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in each market can be analyzed in isolation, i.e. independently of what happens in the
other markets. In addition, firms are assumed to produce only one product, but the
analysis would not be altered by assuming multi-product firms given the assumption of
market irrelevance of each variety (which means that market indices cannot be distorted
by behaving strategically).
In this framework, trade liberalization just amounts to altering the distribution of
the varieties’ supply and demand parameters, as captured by market indices. In the first
three propositions, the impact of changes in trade policy on market indices is described.
Then, in the following three propositions, the implications of these changes on firms’
performance are analyzed.
3.7.1 Propositions on trade and market indices
It is commonly understood that, as larger markets are ceteris paribus associated with
tougher competition and lower prices, opening up to trade and increasing the mass of
varieties available in a certain market is likely to yield the same effects11. Theoreti-
cally, this view is confirmed by all the models employing homogeneously differentiated
quadratic utility functions and by quality-augmented CES models (Verhoogen, 2012).
The verti-zontal model does not contend this claim, but it qualifies it in order to account
for the empirically weak relation between prices and market size documented in Chapter
2.
The first observation that can be made by looking at equation (3.53) is that an
increase in the mass of firms, Ni, holding everything else fixed, is indeed expected to lead
to a decrease in prices. This confirms that the common result, also shown in the baseline
Model in equation (3.13) and in the models with vertical or horizontal differentiations,
as shown in equations (3.21) and (3.29). Therefore, if two countries, identical in terms
of cost and quality distribution across varieties in their markets, start to trade with
each other, abstracting from the moment from trade costs, prices in the two markets are
expected to decrease.12 This leads to the first proposition.
Proposition 1. Holding weighted average cost and quality indices constant, an
increase in the effective mass of firms in a market is associated with lower weighted
average prices. This market-size effect is equivalent to an increase in the degree of
substitutability between varieties.
More interesting results may emerge when the varieties produced by the two countries
are asymmetric, though. Imagine the same two identical countries starting to trade with
each other, but suppose that shipping the goods from one market to the other implies high
linear transport costs. As profit-maximizing firms don’t distinguish between production
and delivery when maximizing profits, but simply look at their total marginal costs,
imported varieties in the two countries will be more costly than the same varieties in
11With the notable exception of Zhelobodko et al. (2012) who show that this result depends on the
consumers’ attitude towards product variety as consumption levels increase, captured by the concavity
of their utility, which can be interpreted as a measure of relative love for variety.
12Note that two countries are considered for the sake of exposition, but the quadratic utility framework
allows for a straightforward generalization to a multi-country setting, at least in the in the short run.
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their domestic markets. This raises the weighted cost index, Ci, and eventually the
weighted price index, Pi, abstracting in the short run from entry and exit and assuming
for the moment that all the varieties in the two economies can be profitably sold in the
two markets. The two offsetting effects can be seen from equation (3.53), where is evident
that Ni and c˜i work in opposite directions.
In general, however, weighted average costs need not increase when opening to trade,
even if imported good will have to incur transport costs, as the two countries may have
very different distributions of marginal costs because of, say, different infrastructural
development, factor costs or labor productivities. In a similar fashion, if the two countries
have a different distribution of αs, the weighted average quality index, α˜i, may increase
or decrease in the two countries, offsetting or reinforcing the effect of Ni.
Proposition 2. As formerly separated markets integrate, the price-abating effect of
a larger market size may be reinforced or offset by changes in weighted average cost or
quality indices in the different markets, higher quality and higher costs being associated
with higher prices.
An insightful way of looking at (3.53) is to rewrite it in terms of what can be defined
as the aggregate markup, Pi − Ci, proportional to the total mass of operating profits
generated in the sector, or to its total value added:
Pi − Ci = Ai − Ci
2 + γiNi
=
Φi
2 + γiNi
, (3.99)
where Φi can be interpreted as an index of social value associated with the entire
production of varieties s ∈ S in market i.
In weighted average terms, it can be rewritten as
p˜i − c˜i = α˜i − c˜i
2 + γiNi
=
φ˜i
2 + γiNi
, (3.100)
where φ˜i can is the weighted average equivalent of Φi, so it can be seen as the weighted
average social value associated with the varieties available in market i.
Besides showing the role of substitutability in determining profits, equation (3.100)
shows that quality and effective mass of competing varieties keep on offsetting each other
even when aggregate markups are considered instead of prices. This is no longer true of
costs, though.
Proposition 3. As formerly separated markets integrate, the markup-abating effect
of a larger market size may be reinforced or offset by changes in weighted average cost or
quality indices in the different markets, higher quality and lower costs being associated
with higher markups.
Note that the free-trade market indices resulting from the integration of two previ-
ously separated markets may not lie in the space between the two autarkic indices, as the
impact of costs and quality is always weighted by the taste mismatch in the local market,
βs,i. Thus, a mass of varieties characterized by a very inefficient productive process and
sold in small quantities at home, can still match the tastes of some export markets in
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such a successful way as to and end up playing an important role in their weighted cost
indices.
The empirical weakness of the link between market size and prices may then be
caused by the fact that these potential offsetting effects have not been controlled for
(Gorg et al., 2010; Martin, 2009). A corollary of this interaction is that importing high
quantities (Ni) of low-quality varieties (α˜i) from markets where marginal costs are lower
(c˜i) does not necessarily imply that weighted average prices will be higher and, hence,
competition tougher. This demand-side explanation can be added to the supply-side
motivations provided by Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) in explaining why EU anti-
dumping protection may have actually hurt the most productive domestic firms, which
were likely to produce higher-quality varieties than the imported ones in their narrowly
defined sector. This consideration highlights the relation between market indices and
firm performance and introduces the more careful analysis of their interactions presented
in the next section.
3.7.2 Propositions on trade and firm performance
In the framework proposed, the best way to study firm performance is to look at the
profit-maximizing price charged for the varieties it produces. As the firm-level variation
in operating profits has been shown to depend only on markups and taste, with the latter
just shifting quantities, attention can be drawn on how market indices affect prices. Even
assuming negligible trade costs, the same variety s with marginal cost of production c(s)
can be associated with different profit maximizing prices in different markets, i, because
of differences in competitive environment. The price and quality of each variety in the
market is compared by consumers to their experience of alternative varieties in the same
market and this constrains the pricing strategy of the firm. This can be clearly seen by
rewriting the equilibrium price equation (3.52) in terms of markups and rearranging:
p∗s,i − cs,i =
αs − cs,i
2 + γiNi
+
γiNi
[
αs−α˜i
2 −
cs,i−c˜i
2
]
2 + γiNi
. (3.101)
Rewriting the social value associated with variety s in market i as φs,i = αs − cs,i, it
can be expressed more compactly as
p∗s,i − cs,i =
φs,i + γiNi
[
φs,i−φ˜i
2
]
2 + γiNi
(3.102)
Note that, when taste and quality parameters are equal across varieties, all the terms
of comparison between individual varieties and market weighted averages cancel out and
the equilibrium price function collapses to the baseline Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model
of cost heterogeneity reported in equation (3.14). If also marginal costs are assumed
constant across varieties, it collapses to a Ottaviano et al. (2002).
When Ni → 0 or γi → 0, firms behave like pure monopolists and choose prices only
as a function of their quality and marginal costs, the effect of their distance from the
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average costs and quality being irrelevant for them. The opposite is true when Ni →∞
or γi →∞, as in this case the absolute values of idiosyncratic cost and quality parameters
cease to have any relevance and all that matters becomes the distance from the weighted
average. As noted in the discussion following equation (3.55), at the limit this leads to
the distribution of productivity indices collapsing to the highest value, as all the varieties
below average would generate negative operating profits. This confirms the claim that
tougher competition, whether in the form of higher substitutability between varieties or
larger mass of competitors, strengthens the process of selection of the most productive
firms, in terms of consumers’ willingness to pay for their products or technical efficiency.
Proposition 4. As competition becomes more intense, because of a larger mass of
firms or a greater degree of substitutability between varieties, firms’ pricing behavior
depends more on aggregate behavior, as captured by market indices. Looking at the two
extremes, when competition is negligible (γ → 0 or N→ 0), firms only according to the
absolute value of their idiosyncratic characteristics; when competition is intense (γ →∞
or N → ∞), firms’ markups depend only on their characteristics relative to the market
weighted averages.
Finally, it can be noted that, even for given levels of substitutability and effective mass
of firms, markets are likely to differ in their cost and quality indices, implying different
markups in different markets for the same variety. Firms operating in tougher markets
may expect to sell profitably their varieties in market with weaker competition, higher
marginal costs or lower quality. Given the multi-dimensional nature of heterogeneity
in firms characteristics, then, high-quality, high-cost markets can generate the same
operating profits as low-quality, low-cost ones. This may explain why some markets are
extremely difficult to enter, as Yamawaki (2004) notes in the case of Japanese domestic
manufacturing market, notwithstanding high prices of domestically produced varieties.
This view seems to empirically confirmed by Fontagné et al. (2008), who note that
"international specialization in terms of quality within industries and product categories
plays an important role in the dynamics of North-South competition". And also Schott
(2004, 2008) observes that the relevant difference in trade composition across countries
seems to lie in quality levels within sectors rather than in specialization in specific sectors.
Proposition 5. Besides the competitive pressure exerted by the effective number
of firms and substitutability, toughness of competition in a market depends on the costs
and quality of the varieties serving it. High quality of domestic varieties may be a barrier
to entry as important as low costs.
No relation is imposed between costs and quality, even if it would be reasonable to
imagine a positive relation between the two. Verhoogen (2012), for example, looking at
input and output prices of Colombian manufacturing plants, shows that higher cost inputs
are systematically associated with higher quality outputs. To this end an "elasticity of
quality to cost" is proposed by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) in a CES utility model
and adapted by Kneller and Yu (2008) to the context of quadratic utility. Alternatively,
Antoniades (2008) introduces a more general structure of fixed and marginal costs of
producing quality, treating physical production and quality production as independent
processes.
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Note also that tastes may play a role in determining profitability, but in this frame-
work they enter the picture only in determining the actual quantities supplied to the
market, not directly affecting prices and markups. Therefore, the relevance of their role
in regulating entry and exit depends on the specific characteristics of the model: if fixed
costs are paid only once to enter a particular market and then never again, tastes are
irrelevant as negative operating profits would be the only reason to exit; if fixed costs
are to be paid regularly by firms to stay in a market, then not only operating profits but
also total profits matter, this making taste-mismatch-driven differences in quantities an
additional concern for firms.
Proposition 6. Taste mismatch doesn’t affect the sign of operating profits, but
influence their magnitude, thus determining their capacity to cover fixed costs of entry
and stay in a market.
Thus, differences in tastes across markets, besides helping explain the lack of empiri-
cal robustness in the relation between firm size and export status (Hallak and Sivadasan,
2009), may be used to make sense of the "temporary trade" patterns identified by Békés
and Murakozy (2012) using detailed country-product transaction level data on Hun-
garian exports and gradual export behavior discovered by Eaton et al. (2007) through
transactions-level customs data from Colombia and Albornoz et al. (2012) using census
firm-level data on Argentinean manufacturing export.
Indeed, looking at it through the lens of the model presented in the previous section,
firms may be assumed to know the quality of their products and their costs of production
and they can also be expected to know market indices in all the other potential export
markets, for example by looking at the prices of competing varieties present in their own
market and in the other ones. This means that firms have no uncertainty over the profit
maximizing price to charge in a different market and they do know if this is going to cover
marginal costs of production and delivery. What they do not probably know, though,
even when they realize that they can obtain positive markups and generate positive
operating profits, is the magnitude of these profits and whether they will cover the fixed
costs of entry and stay in the market. These depend, in fact, on the actual quantities
sold, which are a function of local tastes and can be discovered only by actually entering
the market.
Temporary trade can then be explained by firms discovering the βs,i of their variety
s in market i, as this affects operating profits in equation (3.59), even as it leaves equi-
librium prices in equation (3.52) unaffected. A graphical intuition of the problem can be
obtained by looking at figure 3.3, noting that βs,i determines the slope of the demand
function in such a way that the same equilibrium price can be associated with different
quantities sold, hence different operating profits.
3.7.3 Profit functions and consumer surplus
Common to the verti-zontal model and the other the models based on quadratic pref-
erences, there is an interesting property linking firms’ operating profits and consumer
surplus which can be proofed both geometrically and algebraically: consumer surplus
derived from the consumption of variety s is just half of the operating profits accruing
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to firms. In other words, since profits can be written as
pis,i =
1
βs,i
(p∗s,i − cs,i)2,
consumer surplus can be easily measured just as
Ws,i =
1
2βs,i
(p∗s,i − cs,i)2.
This relation between profits and consumer surplus also contributes to explain why
the first derivative of consumer surplus with respect to price is equal to the additive
inverse of quantities, as shown in (1.14).
Graphically, the intuition is provided in Figure 3.17. Notice that it has been shown in
(3.12) that equilibrium prices p∗ are equal to the average between the marginal costs of
production and delivery cs,i and the intercept of the inverse demand function αs − γQi.
This means that the height of the rectangle describing profits is equal to the height of
the triangle capturing the consumer surplus obtained from the consumption of variety s,
i.e. p∗s,i− cs,i = α− γQi− p∗s,i. At the same time, also the bases of the rectangle and the
triangle coincide. Therefore, (p∗s,i − cs)q∗s,i =
(αs−γQi−p∗s,i)q∗s,i
2 , or also Ws,i =
pis,i
2 .
Figure 3.17: Visual representation of firm’s profits, consumers’ surplus and deadweight
loss associated with the sales of variety s in market i.
A more formal proof, based on the geometric properties of the linear demand function
associated with the quadratic utility, can be obtained noticing that the area between the
inverse demand function and the equilibrium prices in 3.17 can be written as
Ws =
∫ q∗s,i
0
ps,i − p∗s,idq.
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However, given the linearity of demand, Ws can be measured simply as the area of
the triangle whose base and height are respectively q∗s,i and αs − γQi − p∗s,i. Noticing
that
p∗s,i =
αs − γQi
2
+
c
2
and
q∗s,i =
αs − γQi
2βs,i
+
cs,i
2βs,i
,
consumer surplus can be calculated as
Ws =
1
2
(
αs − γQi
2βs,i
+
cs,i
2βs,i
)(
αs − γQi − αs − γQi
2
+
cs,i
2
)
=
=
1
2βs,i
(
αs − γQi − cs,i
2
)2
=
1
2β
(
p∗s,i − cs,i
)2
,
which again proves that
Ws,i =
pis,i
2
.
Notice that this correspondence between profits and consumer surplus can also be
used to avoid the cumbersome calculations needed to derive the indirect utility function
as in equation (1.13), which otherwise would have to be calculated analytically from the
utility function (1.1), plugging in quantities as in 1.3 and following these steps:
Wi = α
∫
s∈Si
(
αβ + γPi
β(β + γNi)
− ps
β
)
ds− β
2
∫
s∈Si
(
αβ + γPi
β(β + γNi)
− ps
β
)2
ds+
−γ
2
[∫
s∈Si
(
αβ + γPi
β(β + γNi)
− ps
β
)
ds
]2
−
∫
s∈Si
[
ps
(
αβ + γPi
β(β + γNi)
− ps
β
)]
ds+ q0 + Yi
⇒ Wi = α
(
αNi
β + γNi
+
γNiPi
β(β + γNi)
− Pi
β
)
ds+
−β
2
∫
s∈Si
[(
α
β + γNi
)2
+
(
ps
β
)2]
ds+
−β
2
∫
s∈Si
[(
γPi
β(β + γNi)
)2
− 2αps
β(β + γNi)
+
2αγPi
β(β + γNi)2
− 2γPips
β2(β + γNi)
]
ds+
−γ
2
[∫
s∈Si
(
α
β + γNi
− ps
β
+
γPi
β(β + γNi)
)
ds
]2
+
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−
∫
s∈Si
[(
αps
β + γN
− p
2
s
β
+
γpsPi
β(β + γNi)
)]
ds+ q0 + Yi
⇒ Wi = α
2Ni
β + γNi
+
αγNiPi
β(β + γNi)
− αPi
β
− α
2βNi
2(β + γNi)2
−
∫
s∈Si p
2
sds
2β
− Niγ
2P 2i
2β(β + γNi)2
+
+
αβPi
β(β + γNi)
− αβγNPi
β(β + γNi)2
+
γP 2i
β(β + γNi)
− α
2γN2i
2(β + γNi)2
− γP
2
i
2β2
− γ
3N2i P
2
i
2β2(β + γNi)2
+
αγNiPi
β(β + γNi)
+
Niγ
2P 2i
β2(β + γNi)
− αγ
2N2i Pi
β(β + γNi)2
− αβPi
β(β + γNi)
+
∫
s∈Si p
2
sds
β
− γP
2
i
β(β + γNi)
+q0+Yi
⇒ Wi = 2α
2βNi + 2α
2γN2i − α2βNi − α2γN2i
2(β + γNi)2
+
∫
s∈Si p
2
sds
2β
+
+Pi
(
2αβγNi + 2αγ
2N2i − αβ2 − αγ2N2i − 2αβγNi − αβγNi − αγ2N2i
β(β + γNi)2
)
+
+P 2i
(−βγ2Ni − β2γ − γ3N2i − 2βγ2Ni − γ3N2i + 2βγ2Ni + 2γ3N2i
2β2(β + γNi)2
)
+ q0 + Yi
W ∗i =
α2Ni
2(β + γNi)
+
∫
s∈Ni p
2
s,ids
2β
− α
β + γNi
Pi − γ
2β(β + γNi)
P 2i + Yi + q0.
Notice that the indirect utility function, expressed in this way, is still dependent
on parameters not directly observable. Hence, besides the computational advantage,
the use of profits for the measurement of welfare also allows economists to deal with
directly observable variables. Of course, this relation between profits and welfare should
be understood with caution because it stems directly from the monopolistic competition
assumptions and cannot be extended to other market structures. To make an example,
if profits in a market increase because of an oligopoly becoming a duopoly or a pure
monopoly, in that case profits and consumer welfare would move in opposite directions,
as well known in the field of Industrial Organization.
Finally, one last remark is due, concerning Figure 3.17 on the dead-weight loss. First
of all, it may be easily proved that it is of the same magnitude as consumer surplus.
Indeed, plugging p = c in the demand function (3.11), it can be seen that
qs,i,p=c =
αs − γQi
βs,i
+
cs,i
βs,i
=
q∗s,i
2
and therefore q∗s,i = qs,i,p=c − q∗s,i, but since also αs − γQi − p∗s,i = p∗s,i − c, it turns
out that the consumer surplus triangle and the dead-weight loss triangle have the same
base and height and hence the same area.
This means that an outward shift of the demand function (say because of an increase
in quality αs) or an increase in efficiency (i.e., a reduction in cs,i) is also going to in-
crease the dead-weight loss, together with firm’s profits and consumers’ welfare. In other
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words, as long as varieties are differentiated, the market power associated with each va-
riety implies that half of the entire total potential gains obtained from any productive
advancement is reaped by firms, one quarter is translated into higher consumer surplus
and one quarter is lost. Taking it with a grain of salt, quadratic utilities may provide an
easy way to perform some sort of welfare accounting.
3.7.4 How income matters
Finally, before turning to the empirical part pf the Thesis, it is worth discussing another
feature of the verti-zontal model which is common to the other quadratic utility models
presented. It may have been noted that consumer income has never been mentioned, as
it is known not to have an impact on the demand for the differentiated good in models
based on quadratic preferences. In other words, it is as if income does not matter.
Yet, it is reasonable to expect that it matters, i.e. consumers with different incomes
may have a different willingness to pay for the same variety (Markusen, 2013). When
the product under consideration accounts for a small share of their total consumption
and the numéraire is interpreted as a Hicksian composite good representing a bundle
of all the other products, this effect may be captured by slightly altering consumer i’s
utility function. Specifically, in (2.6) q0 can be replaced by q0,i = δiq0, where δi > 0
measures consumer i’s marginal utility of income. Because this typically decreases with
the consumer’s income, consumers can be ranked in decreasing order of income, and thus
δ1 < δ2 < ... < δn where δ1 = 1 and q0,1 = q0 by normalization.
Consumer i’s inverse demand for variety s becomes
pi(s) = max
{
α(s)− βi(s)q(s)− γQi/2
δi
, 0
}
where pi(s) is expressed in terms of the numéraire of the richest consumer: the lower
δi, the more the inverse demand is shifted upward. Thus, the impact of income on
demand can be indirectly captured. In addition, though it is convenient not to assume
any a priori relation between the quality of variety s, α(s), and its taste mismatch with
a particular destination market, βi(s), the relation between these parameters may be
correlated with income or other related variables, as discussed by Gabszewicz and Thisse
(1979) and recently investigated empirically by Martin and Mayneris (2013). Hence it
can be shown that quasi-linear models can deal with income differences across countries
, even though it is more difficult to deal with income inequality within countries, even if
Latzer and Mayneris (2012) show that it may be a promising field of research. Still, to
work with a representative consumer model seems a reasonable assumption in view of the
current data availability. Most available trade data, however, only have one observation
per firm-product-country which does not allow analysis of consumer differences within
countries.
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3.8 Concluding remarks
This Chapter has investigated all the possible variations of a standard quadratic utility
framework on the demand side. Out of the eight models resulting from the introduction
of heterogeneity in the three terms composing it, one preferred functional form, called
verti-zontal to stress the combined presence of vertical and horizontal elements of differ-
entiation, is identified and is carried over to the next empirical Chapters to see if it is
rejected by the data.
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Part II
Taking verti-zontal linearity to the
data
157

Chapter 4
Micro-level evidence of
verti-zontality
After the verti-zontal has been identified in Chapter 3 as being the most promising
variation, also based on the stylized facts in the literature reported in Chapter 2, it is
now in this Chapter that the tests and empirical exercises are concentrated. First, the
empirical implications of the model will be explained in terms of what should be observed
in price and quantity patterns taking the model at face value.
Then, a second look is given at the European car market data used in Chapter 2 to
exploit the information it provides on the European destination markets covered and on
individual product characteristics through an exploratory factor analysis.
Finally, the focus is shifted to a much more comprehensive firm-level dataset covering
almost the entire universe of the Belgian exporters to the rest of the world for formal
tests of the theory following two different methodologies, the first one subdividing the
entire sample into homogeneous groups to study the systematic presence of patterns in
the different groups; the second one using the entire sample and then testing the pre-
dictions of the verti-zontal model against the expected results under alternative models
of monopolistic competition. The first methodology aims at confirming the robustness
of the empirical regularities that motivated the structure of the model in the previous
Chapters; the second methodology tests explicitly the verti-zontal model and explains
why existing trade models would not be consistent with the results.
4.1 Distinguishing variety and market-variety effects
One of the key features of the verti-zontal model (Model V in the previous Chapter)
is that it is possible to separate variety- and market-specific effects in the equilibrium
pricing equation, as can be seen for example from Table 3.1. As shown in the previous
chapter, competition effects in a market effects shift the demand for all the varieties
downwards by the same amount, so that price rankings are kept constant across markets
even if the absolute level of prices can be different. The same is not true of quantities,
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as variety-specific horizontal characteristics of a certain variety are perceived differently
in the different markets, resulting in a market-variety-specific quantity shifter.
To give some intuition on the empirical implications of these features, in Figure 4.1
five markets are shown where three varieties of the same product are met with different
competition effects in each market. For the sake of illustration, the horizontal and vertical
axes are shifted upwards or downwards depending on the level of market competition. So
that the third market (the one in the middle) displays the lowest level of competition (the
three varieties have the highest absolute price level) and the second market from the right
the highest (in the sense that it is associated with the lowest absolute price level). Notice
also from Figure 4.1 that no clear trend in the quantity rankings across market can be
expected, consistently with the analysis in Chapter 3. In other words, the three varieties
in the five markets stylized in Figure 4.1 display a constant ranking across markets (due
to variety-specific "quality" and marginal costs of production, assuming equal transport
costs for the same products exported from the same country), but not necessarily the
same ranking in quantities because of market-variety-specific taste differences.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the empirical implications of the verti-zontal model.
A further implication of the verti-zontal feature of having a parallel demand shift
for all the varieties in a market is that knowing the marginal costs of production and
delivery cs,i and the prices ps,i it is possible to draw the distribution of the quality-minus-
market-effects variable αs − γQi. Assuming equal transport costs across markets, since
quality αs and marginal costs of production cs are variety specific, the only driver of
price differences across markets is the competition level γQi. However, since γQi affects
all the varieties in the same way, the price distribution for the same set of varieties is
expected to have the same shape, the only difference being that the absolute levels may
differ in different markets. Figure 4.2 provides some intuition on this point.
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Figure 4.2: Boxplot of differences between car prices and market average in each market.
4.1.1 A second look at the car market data: the price distribution
How different are actual price data from the verti-zontal predictions outlined in Figures
4.1 and 4.2? A preliminary answer can be provided by looking again at the EU car
market data used in Chapter 2. Figure 4.3, for example, shows a box plot of the simple
price distribution of the 72 varieties of cars sold in the 5 markets in 1999.
Already in Figure 4.3 it is possible to spot some regularity in prices, with medians
very close to each other and comparable ranges of values. However, to make the point on
the shape of the distribution even clearer, in Figure 4.4 is presented a box plot is provided
where is shown the difference between each variety’s price and the market average price.
The great similarity between the series’ median value, the 25th percentiles, the 75th
percentiles and even the outliers indicate that, net of a parallel shift, prices’ distribution
for the same varieties appear to be very similar across countries, leaving little room for
market-variety-specific variation in prices.
Figure 4.3: Boxplot of car prices in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and UK.
However, the presence (or absence) of market-variety-specific elements in price setting
can also be indirectly inferred by looking at the difference between a variety’s price in
one market and it’s average price in the different markets (or, equivalently, its price in a
reference market). In the absence of any market-variety-specific effect, all the varieties in
one market should have exactly the same distance from the average, positive or negative
depending on the levels of competition. In the case of the car market, in Figure 4.5 are
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Figure 4.4: Boxplot of differences between car prices and market average in each market.
shown box plots of this statistics. It can be noted that not all the varieties have the same
value, as a pure "verti-zontal world" would have displayed, but it should remembered
that in the datasets there are some cars which are produced and sold in the same market
and others that are shipped abroad, which are likely not to respect the assumption of
equal transport costs across markets. This and others issues are addressed in the next
Section of the Chapter by using a different dataset where the exporting country is held
fixed. For the moment, it is enough to notice that the differences across varieties in
Figure 4.5 are quite small (less than 1/3 of the median price in each market), so even
if the data is not perfectly reproducing the expected patterns it does not imply a prima
facie rejection of the model.
Figure 4.5: Boxplot of differences between car prices in each market and the average of
the same variety across markets.
4.1. DISTINGUISHING VARIETY AND MARKET-VARIETY EFFECTS 163
4.1.2 Giving a face to the parameters: an exploratory factor analysis
Before turning to the Belgian exporters’ dataset, though, there is some additional infor-
mation that can be extracted from the EU car market data, exploiting the presence in
the dataset of variety characteristics such as engine attributes (horsepower), dimensions
(e.g., weight; length; width; height) and performance variables.
The theoretical discussion on the quadratic utilities and the verti-zontal model in
particular did not enter into the details of what exactly is a vertical and what a horizontal
attribute. Consistently with the patterns identified in the literature reviewed in Chapter
2, it separates market-variety-specific attributes affecting quantities and variety-specific
attributes affecting lso prices, but it does not speculate further on the nature of these
attributes.
To fill this gap, an exploratory factor analysis on the EU car market data can help in
providing a preliminary indication on whether such distinction between attributes exists
and whether prices and quantities are influenced by different sets of product character-
istics. In the car market dataset, for each variety, information is available on engine
attributes (cylinders, horsepower), dimensions (weight, length, width, height), perfor-
mance variables (liters/km, speed) and some additional features such as the number of
doors and places in the car and, finally, whether the car model is produced in the same
country where it is sold.
In Tables 4.2 to 4.9 a factor analysis is presented on all these variables, including the
price (normalized to SDRs, the supplementary foreign exchange reserve assets defined
and maintained by the International Monetary Fund, which is a convenient reference
currency especially in the earlier years of the sample) and quantities sold in per capita
terms in the 5 markets. Remember that summary statistics on the sample are in Table
4.1.
For robustness, factor analysis includes first (Table 4.2 to Table 4.5) the sample used
in Chapter 2, which considers only year 1999, shown in 2.1 to be the year with the highest
overlap in sales to different markets. Then (Table 4.6 to Table 4.9) it covers the 30 years
of the entire sample with qualitatively similar results.
First of all, some summary statistics on the sample are shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics on the European car market dataset.
European car market summary statistics
Entire sample Year=1999; varieties in 5 markets
Observations 11,543 360
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
Real Price 8354.0 5541.5 830.7 49380.6 12725.5 6328.1 5123.8 46259.7
Q per capita 4.1E-04 6.5E-04 4.4E-06 7.6E-03 4.4E-04 5.5E-04 9.3E-06 3.8E-03
Cylinders 1462.07 479.88 425 4520 1494.44 370.74 796 2771
Horsepower 57.14 23.89 13 169.5 66.41 23.16 33 142
Weight 978.94 225.41 520 1910 1109.13 215.42 725 1650
Length 415.84 44.39 250 506 421.54 40.33 349.5 503.5
Width 164.38 9.62 122 188 169.99 6.91 149.5 188
Liters/km 8.18 1.72 4 18.6 8.60 1.44 6.17 12.83
Speed 159.91 23.80 95 247 177.39 21.02 142 236
Domestic prod. 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.14 0.34 0 1
Height 140.44 4.62 117.5 173.5 142.52 4.31 133 161
Doors 3.65 0.90 2 5 3.82 0.79 2 5
Places 4.87 0.38 2 7 4.93 0.29 2 5
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Turning to the factor analysis, in the two samples considered, the four sets of Tables
are organized in the same way. First, in Table 4.2 and Table 4.6, is shown the resid-
ual variability explained by each additional factor in a preliminary principal-component
factor analysis with unrotated factors. In these Tables, column (1) just lists the factors
in decreasing order of importance (so that the first factor account for as much of the
variation as possible and each following one for less than the previous); the column (2)
captures the total variance accounted by each factor; column (3) shows the difference
between each eigenvalue and the next; column (4) indicates the relative weight of each
factor in the overall variance and column (5) just computes the cumulative amount of
variance explained by adding the corresponding additional factor.
Then Tables 4.3 and 4.7 show the correlations (or factor loadings, as they can be
seen as the "weight" of each variable in the corresponding factor) between the variables
and the factors retained from the previous step in columns (1) and (2) and the amount
of unique variance (in the sense that it is not share with the other variables) of each
variable in column (3).1
Factors are then rotated in Tables 4.4 and 4.8 to get orthogonal factors (uncor-
related with each other), which reduces the possibility that the same variable appear
associated with the same factor (phenomenon known as "multiple loadings"). this is a
common procedure in standard principal-components analyses, even if in case analyzed
here (the verti-zontal model) the assumption of orthogonality of the factors associated
with prices and quantities is less necessary since the variety-specific characteristics (ver-
tical attributes and costs of production) are assumed to affect not only prices but also
quantities sold. Columns (1) to (5) in these tables have to be read exactly like those in
Tables 4.2 and 4.6.
Finally, Tables 4.5 and 4.9 are the equivalent of Tables 4.3 and 4.7 for rotated factors
and their Columns have a similar interpretation, the only difference being that results
now are based on orthogonal factors.
As for the interpretation of the results, notice first of all that in both in Table 4.2
and Table 4.6 the first factor has a very high proportion of variance explained (more
than 50%) and a high eigenvalue (above 7). Notice that since the sum of all eigenvalues
coincides with the total number of variables, roughly speaking it can be claimed that
Factor 1 captures the variance of 7 of the variables analyzed.
Turning to Tables 4.3 and 4.7 the reason for the high eigenvalue becomes clear. The
first factor is indeed highly associated with prices and with a series of variables which
can be seen as vertical attribute (cylinders; horsepower; weight; length; width; liters/km;
speed). Admittedly, this factor is also associated with negative quantities sold, which
from the perspective of the verti-zontal model would mean that the cost of producing this
"quality attributes" appear to be higher than the monetary benefit in terms of consumers’
willingness to pay, even if it should be noted that in (3.52) and (3.56) there is an evident
negative externality for the competitors from a group of firms investing in quality, as they
1In this analysis the number of factor is constrained to a maximum of 2, but robustness checks on
the outcomes adding additional factors have been run and the results are qualitatively unchanged, i.e.
the new factors just correlate with some individual variables and do not affect much the previous ones.
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will increase the markets’ aggregate and average quality index, respectively Ai and a˜i. As
for the second factor, it appears to be defined mainly by the domestic production of the
variety, consistently with the common empirical observation of a sizeable domestic market
effect (Brooks, 2003; Chung and Song, 2008; Ferreira and Waldfogel, 2013; Goldberg and
Verboven, 2005). Looking at the results with rotated factors on both the entire sample
and on the 1999 data, there is little change in results. Again, one factor is associated
with prices and reasonable quality indicators and the other only with quantities, having
no correlation with prices.
A possible interpretation of this factor analysis is that the first factor would indeed
capture the impact of the variety specific factors in the verti-zontal model, i.e. αs and cs,
whereas the second factor captures the taste mismatch parameter βs,i, affecting quantities
sold but not prices. Clearly there are some caveats on these results, the most important
being that it is impossible to observe costs directly in this dataset and even is cs is
constant across markets, the costs of production and delivery cs,i are very likely to be
different. Similarly, it can be noted that domestically produced cars may also be shipped
at a lower cost, so that the lack of effect on prices may mean that domestic consumers
are also willing to pay a higher markup on locally produced cars in such a way that
a lower cs,i and a higher αs,i result in no price effect. This alternative explanation
would indeed contradict the verti-zontal hypothesis of no market-variety specific effects
of quality valuation. Therefore the results should be seen as a strict test of the model
and should interpreted with a pinch of salt and just be seen as a way to look at the data
future works, possibly on more complete datasets displaying more information on both
the producer of the varieties (similarly to the Belgian exporters’ dataset showed in the
next section) and the destination markets (as in the car market dataset).
However, the main contribution of this analysis is to give a preliminary idea of a
methodology that can be used to map the verti-zontal model parameters into observed
characteristics. The verti-zontal αs and βs,i could indeed be seen as underlying factors
capturing different attributes of a variety. This would then further contribute to bridge
the distance between IO and Trade models of product differentiation.
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Table 4.2: Residual variability explained by each additional factor in a principal-
component factor analysis on the balanced cross-section of European car market,
year=1999
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 360
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 2
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 25
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Factor 1 7.19592 5.57468 0.5535 0.5535
Factor 2 1.62124 0.38386 0.1247 0.6782
Factor 3 1.23738 0.23002 0.0952 0.7734
Factor 4 1.00736 0.34947 0.0775 0.8509
Factor 5 0.65789 0.28144 0.0506 0.9015
Factor 6 0.37646 0.1166 0.029 0.9305
Factor 7 0.25985 0.05136 0.02 0.9505
Factor 8 0.20849 0.08133 0.016 0.9665
Factor 9 0.12716 0.02165 0.0098 0.9763
Factor 10 0.10551 0.00727 0.0081 0.9844
Factor 11 0.09824 0.01307 0.0076 0.992
Factor 12 0.08517 0.06584 0.0066 0.9985
Factor 13 0.01933 . 0.0015 1
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(78) = 5207.20 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table 4.3: Factor analysis on car characteristics in the European car market with unro-
tated factor loadings, year=1999.
Unrotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real Price 0.896 0.0457 0.195
Q per capita -0.2441 0.8357 0.242
Cylinders 0.9491 0.0142 0.0991
Horsepower 0.9659 -0.019 0.0667
Weight 0.9135 0.0664 0.161
Length 0.9418 0.049 0.1106
Width 0.9071 0.1448 0.1561
Liters/km 0.9075 -0.0263 0.1757
Speed 0.9729 0.0324 0.0524
Domestic prod. 0.0007 0.8208 0.3263
Height -0.0244 -0.2661 0.9286
Doors 0.3199 -0.3657 0.7639
Places 0.2866 0.1116 0.9054
Table 4.4: Residual variability explained by each additional factor in a principal-
component factor analysis on the balanced cross-section of European car market rotating
the factor loads for uncorrelated factors, year=1999.
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 350
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 2
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off) Number of params = 27
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Factor 1 7.15529 5.49343 0.5504 0.5504
Factor 2 1.66186 . 0.1278 0.6782
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(78) = 5207.20 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table 4.5: Factor analysis on car characteristics in the European car market with rotated
factor loadings, year=1999.
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real Price 0.8967 -0.031 0.195
Q per capita -0.1719 0.8535 0.242
Cylinders 0.9468 -0.0669 0.0991
Horsepower 0.9608 -0.1014 0.0667
Weight 0.9159 -0.0118 0.161
Length 0.9426 -0.0315 0.1106
Width 0.9162 0.0668 0.1561
Liters/km 0.9019 -0.1037 0.1757
Speed 0.9721 -0.0508 0.0524
Domestic prod. 0.0708 0.8177 0.3263
Height -0.0471 -0.263 0.9286
Doors 0.2876 -0.3917 0.7639
Places 0.2951 0.0867 0.9054
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Table 4.6: Residual variability explained by each additional factor in a principal-
component factor analysis on the balanced cross-section of European car market. Entire
sample.
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 11,543
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 2
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 25
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Factor 1 6.61287 5.08943 0.5087 0.5087
Factor 2 1.52344 0.27445 0.1172 0.6259
Factor 3 1.24899 0.30536 0.0961 0.7219
Factor 4 0.94363 0.0772 0.0726 0.7945
Factor 5 0.86643 0.26299 0.0666 0.8612
Factor 6 0.60343 0.18272 0.0464 0.9076
Factor 7 0.42072 0.12902 0.0324 0.94
Factor 8 0.2917 0.12843 0.0224 0.9624
Factor 9 0.16327 0.04193 0.0126 0.975
Factor 10 0.12134 0.02422 0.0093 0.9843
Factor 11 0.09713 0.0278 0.0075 0.9918
Factor 12 0.06932 0.0316 0.0053 0.9971
Factor 13 0.03772 . 0.0029 1
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(78) = 1.4e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.000
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Table 4.7: Factor analysis on car characteristics in the European car market with unro-
tated factor loadings. Entire sample.
Unrotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real Price 0.7585 -0.0229 0.4242
Q per capita -0.2277 0.8497 0.2262
Cylinders 0.9217 -0.0023 0.1505
Horsepower 0.9408 -0.0552 0.1118
Weight 0.9622 0.0484 0.0717
Length 0.9136 0.0723 0.16
Width 0.8957 0.1243 0.1823
Liters/km 0.6785 0.0083 0.5396
Speed 0.8999 -0.032 0.1891
Domestic prod. -0.0414 0.8502 0.2755
Height 0.1516 0.0699 0.9721
Doors 0.4346 -0.0188 0.8108
Places 0.4522 0.2139 0.7498
Table 4.8: Residual variability explained by each additional factor in a principal-
component factor analysis on the balanced cross-section of European car market rotating
the factor loads for uncorrelated factors. Entire sample.
Factor analysis/correlation Number of obs = 11,543
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 2
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off) Number of params = 25
Factor Variance Difference Proportion Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Factor 1 6.58486 5.03341 0.5065 0.5065
Factor 2 1.55146 . 0.1193 0.6259
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(78) = 5207.20 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table 4.9: Factor analysis on car characteristics in the European car market with rotated
factor loadings. Entire sample.
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real Price 0.7547 -0.0791 0.4242
Q per capita -0.1641 0.8642 0.2262
Cylinders 0.919 -0.0706 0.1505
Horsepower 0.9341 -0.1248 0.1118
Weight 0.9632 -0.0231 0.0717
Length 0.9165 0.0044 0.16
Width 0.9024 0.0575 0.1823
Liters/km 0.6772 -0.042 0.5396
Speed 0.8951 -0.0986 0.1891
Domestic prod. 0.0218 0.8509 0.2755
Height 0.1564 0.0584 0.9721
Doors 0.432 -0.051 0.8108
Places 0.4668 0.1798 0.7498
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4.2 Empirical analysis: the NBB data
The aim of this Section is to confront the verti-zontal model with more comprehensive
micro-level dataset than the one on the European car market. To this end, a unique
dataset on Belgian exporters is used, similar to the one in Bernard et al. (2012), to
undertake two different kinds of analysis. The first one, more general in nature, consists
in splitting the overall sample into a high number of homogeneous, balanced subsamples
to document the systematically higher variability of quantities across markets than prices.
It is not a direct test of the verti-zontal model, but it is a preliminary test on the properties
of trade patterns observed in the data (prices and quantities), to see if they are consistent
with the implications of the model, as summarized in Table 4.10, based on the equilibrium
prices and quantities obtained in expressions (3.54) and (3.57). The second analysis goes
one step further and aims at testing the empirical relevance of the verti-zontal model
against competing theories using dummy regressions based on the entire sample.
Table 4.10: Observables and structural variables, for a variety s in destination market i.
Observables Sources of Heterogeneity Relevant parameters
Pricess,i Qualitys ; Costs pi,s(αs; cs;MarketEffectsi)
Quantitiess,i Qualitys ; Costs ; Tastei,s qi,s(αs; cs;MarketEffectsi;βi,s)
The data is composed of fob (free on board) export prices and quantities by destina-
tion country. Prices (unit values) and quantities of the same varieties are thus comparable
across and within destination markets. The Belgian export data are obtained from the
National Bank of Belgium’s Trade Database and are a cross-section of the entire popu-
lation of recorded annualized trade flows at the firm level by product and destination.
Exactly which trade flows are recorded (i.e. whether firms are required to report their
trade transactions) depends on their value and destination. For extra-EU trade (trade
partner outside the EU borders), all transactions with a minimum value of 1,000 euros
or weight of more than 1,000 kg have to be reported. For intra-EU trade (trade partner
inside the EU borders), firms are only required to report their export flows if their total
annual intra-EU export value is higher than 250,000 euros. The products are recorded
at 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN8) level.2 In most cases, CN8 output is measured
in weight (kilograms), but, for a smaller set of products, quantities are also expressed in
units (liters, bottles, pairs etc.).3
Due to its hierarchical nature, CN8 products can also be classified as products at
2The CN classification is equal to the HS classification at the 6 digit levels.
3Measurement error that can plague quantity measurement should be lower when output is measured
in units be it that the number of observations is much lower. For this purpose results are reported for
both units and weights.
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more aggregate levels. For firms with primary activity in manufacturing, the data in-
cludes more than 5,000 exporters and over 7,000 different CN8 products, exported to 220
countries, for a total of more than 200,000 observations. It covers cross-sectional man-
ufacturing export data for the year 2005 for which both values and quantities exported
are reported. No information on other firm-characteristics is provided.
With the data at hand it is possible to combine a product category at 8-digit level
(CN8) with a firm identifier such that beers can be distinguished from one another by
the firm they are exported by. These firm-product combinations are allowed to enter
consumer preferences differently. Even with this very detailed product classifications,
one limitation is that it cannot be excluded that there may still be heterogeneity within
the 8-digit product category that cannot be observed (e.g., specific brands, distribution
channels, and so on). While most 8-digit products have a precise description, for some
products this is less the case. But what is important to keep in mind is that, by linking
the product to a firm, consumer preferences are now allowed to differ between the various
firm-product combinations available in the country. In what follows, a variety as a firm-
product combination is defined. Each product is now defined at the CN8 level and
is considered as a separate product market within which it is possible to analyze the
determinants of export prices and quantities across destinations for varieties shipped
from Belgium.
To deal with outliers, the raw data on unit values and quantities has been dropped at
the 1% extremes of the distribution. The only data restrictions imposed are that, first,
each firm faces some competition in their own CN8 product in a particular destination
country and, second, that a variety is exported to more than one country. In practice, it
is imposed that a minimum of two firm-CN8 products be present in the same destination
and a minimum of two export markets for each variety. In this way, the variety- and
market-variety-specific effects can be identified in the regressions. While results are
not very sensitive to an increase in the number of competing varieties per destination
country, with each additional variety required to be present in a market, the number of
observations for the regression falls substantially. Table 4.11 shows how the restricted
sample compares to the full sample for both weights and units.
4.3 Analyzing variability in market-product subsamples
In the first analysis, based on the full sample of the Belgian exporters’ data, the main
aim is to identify general trade patterns independently of a theoretical rationalization.
In particular, the focus is on price and quantity variability across markets. To this end,
the empirical strategy consists first in identifying "balanced cross sections", i.e. product-
market combinations in which all the varieties are present in all the markets considered
and, within each market, the exact same set of varieties is present. In this way, different
markets become comparable in term of rankings of prices and quantities and it will be
possible to see if price ranking are found to be more stable across markets than quantity
rankings.
The definition of the subsamples is explained in the next subsection and then the
4.3. ANALYZING VARIABILITY IN MARKET-PRODUCT SUBSAMPLES 175
Table 4.11: The full and restricted data sample of Belgian firm-product-country exports.
WEIGHT UNITS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Restricted sample Full sample Restricted sample
Observations 239,127 111,876 52,227 20,929
Firms 5,386 3,528 2,521 1,067
CN2 Products 95 89 56 46
CN4 Products 1,159 755 315 182
CN6 Products 4,122 1,999 1,161 494
CN8 Products 7,051 2,691 1,922 604
Firm-CN2 Combinations 20,358 8,835 4,844 1,748
Firm-CN4 Combinations 36,709 13,333 7,000 2,320
Firm-CN6 Combinations 50,234 17,759 10,243 3,454
Firm-CN8 Combinations 62,355 19,612 12,842 3,703
Destinations 220 139 206 108
CN2-Destination Combinations 8,283 3,646 3,236 1,214
CN4-Destination Combinations 38,924 13,089 9,404 2,544
CN6-Destination Combinations 78,997 23,738 19,500 4,908
CN8-Destination Combinations 107,681 28,343 26,538 5,548
Trade volume (bill. euros) 88.10 27.02 23.91 8.78
Destinations per firm-CN8:
Mean 3.84 5.71 4.07 5.65
Median 1 3 1 4
Min 1 1 1 1
Max 160 67 118 60
Firms per CN8-destination:
Mean 2.22 3.95 1.97 3.77
Median 1 3 1 3
Min 1 2 1 2
Max 235 192 113 76
Notes:"Raw data on unit values and quantities is used dropping outliers at the 1% of the distribution.
To be able to identify a variety-specific and a market-specific effect in the regressions, in the restricted
sample a minimum number of two markets for each firm-CN8 product and a minimum of two firms for
each country-CN8 market is imposed."
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results of rank correlations are illustrated, followed by an example using Belgian chocolate
exports. Afterwards, actual correlations are tested to check whether rank correlation
results are confirmed. The analysis is further developed in the next section, where the
verti-zontal model is tested with dummy regressions of price and quantities on variety,
product and market dummies.
4.3.1 Definition of the subsamples
In what follows, a variety s is defined as a firm-CN8 combination, where CN8 is the most
detailed product-level classification available. When the CN8 is used as product defini-
tion, the product-market is narrowly defined and each firm is associated with a different
variety. While the definition of a variety does not change throughout the analysis, the
definition of a product and the size of the product-market Si is allowed to change.
When selecting a product-market, the level of product aggregation must be traded off
against the number of varieties, which falls dramatically as the product-market narrows.
For this reason, the analysis is repeated for the four levels of aggregation, the CN8,
CN6, CN4 and CN2. In a more aggregated product classification, a product will then be
defined as a collection of varieties (firm-CN8) sharing the same CN code. More broadly
defined product-markets will have a higher number of varieties, but the varieties included
will be poorer substitutes and, therefore, the assumption of symmetry in substitutability
becomes more stringent.4
Product and market selections are performed separately. Their combination then
determines the product-market samples on which price and quantity comparisons will be
conducted in the ensuing analysis.
Product selection. For each level of product aggregation, only products which are
sold in a sufficiently large number of varieties and markets can be considered in order to
ensure that there are enough varieties in enough markets to be compared. To this end,
only the five products supplied in the highest number of varieties are considered, for each
level of aggregation. The products yielding the highest number of varieties are listed in
Table 4.12 with corresponding CN codes and descriptions.
Market selection. Since the analysis focuses on price and quantity variations across
destination markets, another trade-off involves the number of countries to consider. Since
the focus is on price and quantity differences across markets, a sufficient number of mar-
kets has to be selected. However, a sufficient number of varieties should be simultane-
ously sold in all the markets for the ranking comparison to be meaningful. The trade-off
arises because the number of varieties simultaneously present in all markets drops sig-
nificantly with each additional destination market. Since there is no clear-cut rule to
settle this issue, a data driven approach is followed. First, the sample of possible desti-
nations is restricted to the countries importing the highest number of Belgian varieties
(firm-products), resulting in a threshold to at least 5,000 varieties. This results in 12
4The verti-zontal model assumes that product-markets are characterized by the same pattern of
substitutability, γ. Note that constant patterns of substitutability between varieties within a product
category, or even the entire economy, is the standard assumption virtually all empirical trade models,
be they based on CES or linear quadratic utility functions.
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destination markets, which are listed in Table 4.13. Next, all the possible market combi-
nations are considered in order to find how many varieties are exported simultaneously
to N = 2, 3, ..., 12 countries and, for each value of N the best N-market combination is
identified in terms of the number of varieties observed. In the first column of Table 4.13,
the number of varieties shipped to each of these 12 markets is reported. The second
column gives the total number of varieties sold simultaneously in each best N-market
combination, which is obtained by adding the corresponding country to all the countries
listed in the previous rows.5 Thus, for example, at the bottom of the second column can
be seen the number of varieties present in all markets, which is close to 400.
Product-market samples. The intersection of all the best N-market combinations
with the 20 products (i.e., five products for each of the four levels of aggregation) leads
to 220 potential data samples. Since some samples are very small, having just 2 or 3
varieties, a further restriction is imposed: in order to permit a meaningful rank correlation
analysis between markets, only samples with more than 10 varieties are considered. This
results in 171 samples. Across these samples, Table 4.14 provides the effective number of
varieties used in the analysis for each level of aggregation (rows) and each best N-country
combination (columns).
Figure 4.6: Graphic illustration of Table 4.13.
Note: Light gray bars represent varieties shipped from Belgium to the destination mar-
ket on the horizontal axis. The dark gray bars represent the number of varieties shipped
simultaneously to the specific destination market on the horizontal and to all the desti-
nation markets to its left, which correspond always with the best N-country combination.
5As it turns out, the best N-market combinations happen to be always a sub-group of the (N+1)-
market combinations, so that they can be displayed in this order.
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Table 4.12: Product codes considered for each level of product disaggregation.
“Top 5” Combined Nomenclature product codes
CN2 Short description CN4 Short description CN6 Short description CN8 Short description
84 Machinery and 1806 Chocolate and food 180690 Chocolate products 39269099 Other articles of plastics
mechanical appliances preparations with cocoa
39 Plastics and 3926 Other articles of plastics 170490 Sugar confectionery 18069019 Chocolate pralines
articles thereof not containing cocoa not containing alcohol
85 Electrical machinery 0710 Frozen vegetables 220300 Beer (malt) 21069098 Food preparations
and equipment
73 Articles of iron 9403 Furniture and parts 210690 Food preparations 57033019 Polypropylene carpets
or steel thereof and floor coverings
Optical, measuring, Printed matter, including Bottled beer
90 precision, medical, 4911 printed pictures and 071080 Frozen vegetables 22030001 made from malt
surgical instruments photographs
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Table 4.13: Varieties by destination markets and destination-market combinations.
Varieties exported to Varieties shipped
Markets this particular to this market
destination market and all the previous
France 24,612 24,612
Netherlands 24,183 13,608
Germany 17,911 9,347
UK 11,956 6,367
Spain 8,799 4,419
Italy 8,869 3,572
Denmark 5,540 2,519
Sweden 5,530 2,047
Poland 6,227 1,498
Switzerland 5,732 966
U.S. 6,592 649
Luxembourg 10,317 393
Note: In the first column is reported the number of varieties exported
to each destination market. In the second column only varieties that
are present simultaneously also in all the destination markets listed in
the previous rows are counted.
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Table 4.14: Varieties considered in each intersection of best N-market combination and level of product disaggregation.
Number of Best N-country combinations
varieties
considered
N=2 N=3 N=4 N=5 N=6 N=7 N=8 N=9 N=10 N=11 N=12
top 5 CN8 275 221 174 139 117 93 66 24 15 12 11
top 5 CN6 333 263 215 174 130 100 72 10 0 0 0
top 5 CN4 818 604 464 339 250 174 134 83 41 24 22
top 5 CN2 3674 2591 1835 1352 1123 811 698 535 358 259 135
Entire
Manufaturing 12981 8908 6040 4166 3361 2362 1908 1407 893 599 355
(weight)
Entire
Manufacturing 2831 1913 1306 879 701 502 412 311 212 146 81
(units)
Note: Each intersection is composed of 5 samples at most, but there could be less, as samples are
considered valid for the analysis when they are composed of at least 10 varieties. On the last two rows,
all the varieties are reported for which quantities are reported shipped in Kilograms (weight) or other
units of measure (units).
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4.3.2 Looking at prices and quantities in subsamples: rank correlations
First of all, rank correlations of prices and quantities within and across markets are ana-
lyzed. The use of rank correlations allows for the identification of general features of the
data, even in the context of non-linear or non-additive demand functions. Put differently,
by considering rank correlations a less strict interpretation of the theory is imposed, valid
for a wider set of functional forms.
Price-quantity ranking correlations within markets. Similarly to what has
been shown on the European car dataset, it is first verified whether rankings of prices
and quantities within the same market are significantly correlated. In a model where only
quality or only cost efficiency matters, they should be. If at least both elements are at
play, then the relationship should be generally weak or insignificant, with the exception of
sectors in which there is not much scope for quality or productive differences. Spearman
and a Kendall rank correlations are calculated on the samples resulting from the market
and product selection. 6 Results are given in Table 4.15, reported by product-market
aggregation and number of countries included in the analysis. In particular it is shown
how many times the price-quantity correlation within markets is not significantly different
from 0 at a 5% level of confidence.
Interestingly, results vary a lot depending on the level of aggregation and N-market
combination selected. Overall, for the entire sample, the data reject a significant correla-
tion of prices and quantities within markets in about 1/3 of the times. Evaluated in the
narrowest product definition, the CN8 level, the rejection rate of a significant correlation
is much higher and lies between 76% and 78% of the cases, depending on the statistic
used. These results seem to confirm the notion that any theory should at least involve
two sources of heterogeneity to explain the pattern of prices and quantities observed in
the data. This is most evident in narrowly defined product-markets.
Turning to statistics for quantity rank correlations and price rank correlations across
markets, results are reported in Table 4.16 in a similar format as in table 4.15. It can be
noted that quantity rank correlations between markets are quite often not significantly
different from 0, at a 5% level. At the narrowest product-level which is the CN8, the
quantity correlations are not significantly different from zero in about 60% of the cases.
In table 4.17, the corresponding results are shown for price rankings between markets.
It is striking how lower the rejection rates are for prices as compared to quantities. The
Spearman rank statistic, considers prices to be significantly correlated in 98% of cases,
while the corresponding value for the Kendall Tau statistic is about 97%. Put differently,
both measures of rank correlations estimate price correlations not to be correlated in only
2 to 3% of the cases.
6The difference between these two approached to rank correlation is that, whereas the Spearman rank
correlation transforms actual values into their relative rank and then compute a standard correlation,
the Kendall tau rank correlation measures the frequency of concordant pairs, i.e. observations whose
rank coincides.
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Table 4.15: Rejection rates for within-market rank correlations.
Spearman and Kendall Tau rank correlation: Rejection of significance for price-quantity correlations within markets
Spearman 35.3%
All samples Kendall 37.6%
Samples (171)
By level of CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
product Spearman 76.3% 25.7% 48.9% 1.8%
aggregation: Kendall 78.9% 34.3% 48.9% 1.8%
Samples (38) (35) (45) (53)
By best 12 Mkts 11 Mkts 10 Mkts 9 Mkts 8 Mkts 7 Mkts 6 Mkts 5 Mkts 4 Mkts 3 Mkts 2 Mkts
N-market Spearman 50.0% 37.5% 44.4% 54.5% 47.1% 55.0% 40.0% 35.0% 25.0% 15.0% 15.0%
combinations: Kendall 50.0% 37.5% 44.4% 54.5% 52.9% 60.0% 40.0% 35.0% 30.0% 20.0% 15.0%
Samples (6) (8) (9) (11) (17) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20)
Note: Percentages of samples not significantly correlated at a 5% level are reported by product aggregation and market combination.
The number of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, looking at Spearman rank correlations at a CN8 level of product
aggregation, 76.3% of the 38 samples considered are not significantly different from 0.
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Table 4.16: Rejection rates for between-market quantity rank correlations.
Spearman and Kendall Tau rank correlation: Rejection of significance for quantity correlations between markets
Spearman 19.1%
All samples Kendall 19.7%
Samples (171)
By level of CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
product Spearman 60.5% 8.6% 15.6% 0.0%
aggregation: Kendall 60.5% 11.4% 15.6% 0.0%
Samples (38) (35) (45) (53)
By best 12 Mkts 11 Mkts 10 Mkts 9 Mkts 8 Mkts 7 Mkts 6 Mkts 5 Mkts 4 Mkts 3 Mkts 2 Mkts
N-market Spearman 50.0% 37.5% 22.2% 18.2% 29.4% 25.0% 20.0% 15.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0%
combinations: Kendall 50.0% 37.5% 22.2% 18.2% 29.4% 30.0% 20.0% 15.0% 15.0% 10.0% 5.0%
Samples (6) (8) (9) (11) (17) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20)
Note: Percentages of samples not significantly correlated at a 5% level are reported by product aggregation and market combination. The
number of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, looking at both Spearman and Kendall rank correlations at a CN8 level
of product aggregation, 60.5% of the 38 samples considered are not significantly different from 0.
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Table 4.17: Rejection rates for between-market price rank correlations.
Spearman and Kendall Tau rank correlation: Rejection of significance for price correlations between markets
Spearman 2.9%
All samples Kendall 3.5%
Samples (171)
By level of CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
product Spearman 5.3% 2.9% 4.4% 0.0%
aggregation: Kendall 10.5% 2.9% 2.2% 0.0%
Samples (38) (35) (45) (53)
By best 12 Mkts 11 Mkts 10 Mkts 9 Mkts 8 Mkts 7 Mkts 6 Mkts 5 Mkts 4 Mkts 3 Mkts 2 Mkts
N-market Spearman 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 18.2% 11.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
combinations: Kendall 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 18.2% 11.8% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 0.0%
Samples (6) (8) (9) (11) (17) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20)
Note: Percentages of samples not significantly correlated at a 5% level are reported by product aggregation and market combination.
The number of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, looking at Spearman rank correlations at a CN8 level of product
aggregation, 5.3% of the 38 samples considered are not significantly different from 0.
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Price and quantity rank correlations across markets. The results on rank
correlations across markets can used to judge whether models with only two sources of
heterogeneity (normally cost and quality) can perform as well as the verti-zontal model
in describing the data. In fact, if rank correlations are systematically lower for quantities
than for prices, then cost and quality variability alone are not sufficient to explain the
data patterns. The introduction of a third source of variability affecting quantities but
not prices would be necessary in that case.
An illustrative example: chocolate products. To illustrate how ranks are com-
pared across markets, an example follows on a product frequently exported from Belgium
and included in the data: chocolates. At the CN8 level, Belgian chocolates fall under
the category "Chocolate products not containing alcohol". For the sake of illustration,
results are shown based on the combination of 3 markets yielding the highest overlap
of exported varieties: Germany, France and the Netherlands, resulting in 34 different
varieties exported. The values of the pairwise ranking correlations are provided in the
top panel of Table 4.18 and visualized in Figure 4.7. It can be noted that price rank cor-
relations (corr(pp)) are systematically higher than quantity rank correlations (corr(qq))
which suggests that the relative price ranking across the three destination markets is
more regular than the quantity ranking. This is true not only for the average correla-
tions across country pairs, but for any country pair correlation, even when CN6 and CN4
definitions of chocolate products are used, which are reported in the middle and bottom
panel of Table 4.18 respectively. The visual representation of ranks provided for the car
market in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 can be repeated for the chocolates markets. In Figure 4.8
is shown the scatterplot of price against quantity rankings within the three destination
markets and and in Figure 4.9 the scatterplot of price rankings between markets to the
left and quantity rankings to the right. These scatterplots recall what has already been
seen for the European car market in Chapter 2.
Figure 4.7: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.18.
Note: Square dots indicate bilateral price rank correlations, triangle dots indicate quan-
tity correlations for chocolate products at CN8, CN6 and CN4 level of product aggre-
gation. The horizontal line segments refer to average rank correlations across the three
country pairs: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.
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Table 4.18: Spearman rank correlations for chocolate products.
CN8 - 18069019 Chocolate products
(Best 3 markets) not contanining alcohol
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market pairs Average FR-NL FR-DE NL-DE
Rank Corr(pp) 71.35% 69.38% 66.81% 77.85%
Rank Corr(qq) 56.01% 44.17% 56.17% 67.70%
Varieties 34 34 34 34
CN6 - 180690 Chocolate products
(Best 3 markets)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market pairs Average FR-NL FR-DE NL-DE
Rank Corr(pp) 80.99% 78.79% 80.85% 83.32%
Rank Corr(qq) 60.67% 56.25% 59.09% 66.67%
Varieties 94 94 94 94
CN4 - 1806 Chocolate and other food
(Best 3 markets) preparations containing cocoa
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market pairs Average FR-NL FR-DE NL-DE
Rank Corr(pp) 83.84% 82.56% 84.77% 84.18%
Rank Corr(qq) 65.52% 64.47% 61.95% 70.15%
Varieties 150 150 150 150
Note: Spearman rank correlations for prices and quantities
between markets are reported for the product codes involving
chocolate present in the “top 5” product list, considering the
“best 3 destination markets” .
4.3. ANALYZING VARIABILITY IN MARKET-PRODUCT SUBSAMPLES 187
Figure 4.8: Price-quantity rankings within markets, Belgian chocolates markets
Note: Scatterplot of price against quantity rankings for varieties of the product "Choco-
lates not containing alcohol" (CN8 18069019) within each of the three main destination
markets: France, Netherlands and Germany.
Figure 4.9: Price rankings across markets, Belgian chocolates markets
Note:To the left, a scatterplot of price rankings in the Netherlands and Germany against
price rankings in France for varieties of the product "Chocolates not containing alcohol"
(CN8 18069019) is shown. To the right, the same scatterplot is drawn for quantity
rankings.
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The general case. While the chocolate example reported the correlation coefficients
for 3 chocolate-related samples, the same analysis can be repeated for the remaining 168
samples in the data and, for robustness, for the whole manufacturing. In order to give the
reader a sense of the pattern that emerges from all the pairwise correlations considered,
averages are reported.7 So for reporting purposes the pairwise coefficients arising from
comparing rankings in any two destination markets are averaged at the sample level and
then these sample coefficients are further averaged by the level of product-aggregation
and market-combination. When turning to the whole manufacturing, on the other hand,
all the varieties are considered together and, thus, there is only one correlation coefficient.
Tables 4.19 and 4.20 report average Spearman and Kendall correlation coefficients and
show that average price rank correlations between markets are systematically higher than
average quantity rank correlations. This holds irrespective of the number of varieties
included (column dimension) and the number of markets considered (row dimension).
The difference is of about 15 percentage points and relatively similar across the samples.
As a robustness check, the same rank correlation analysis can be repeated considering
the entire manufacturing sector in the different country combinations. Table 4.21 shows
that when doing so previous results are even stronger, i.e. high price correlation but low
quantity correlation between markets.
As noted before, these results do not appear consistent with a combination of two
most commonly adopted sources of heterogeneity, be they both variety- or market-variety
specific. Price correlations between markets are high, suggesting that quality and/or
productive efficiency are intrinsic and not market-specific. Yet, quantity correlations
are lower, indicating that an additional source of heterogeneity must be envisaged at a
market-variety level.
The coefficients reported in Table 4.19 are averaged by best N-market combinations
and level of disaggregation and plotted in Figure 4.10. The simple average by product
is instead shown in Figure 4.11. The square dots show average price rank correlations
for the considered samples, while triangle dots show quantity rank correlations. In the
two graphs, these averages are additionally averaged by level of product disaggregation
(CN2, CN4, CN6 and CN8), which is represented through the solid line for prices and
the dashed line for quantities. It can be observed that price correlations consistently lie
well above quantity correlations, especially at narrowest levels of product definitions.
These results support the idea that a third source of heterogeneity needs to be taken
into account when dealing with micro-level trade data. Ideally, this third source should
affect only quantities sold in different markets, or at least should affect quantities to
a larger extent than prices. A nice feature of the verti-zontal model of monopolistic
competition is that it manages to reconcile all these needs at once, through the interaction
of standard weak interactions, typical of this kind of model, with vertical and horizontal
dimensions of differentiation.
7When 3 markets are considered, for example, 3 pairwise market correlations for prices and 3 for
quantities are obtained; when 4 markets are considered, the coefficients are 6, and so on up to 12
markets, at which point 66 bilateral correlations are obtained.
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Table 4.19: Between-market Spearman price and quantity rank correlations.
Spearman Average of CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
Rank averages (Average (Average (Average (Average
correlations of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average of p 75.29% 70.17% 73.36% 74.90% 81.25%
Averages q 61.38% 50.36% 56.99% 60.66% 75.79%
2-market p 73.55% 64.16% 78.67% 76.14% 75.24%
combination q 58.51% 49.38% 54.43% 60.83% 69.42%
3-market p 76.05% 68.00% 80.48% 76.69% 79.00%
combination q 61.13% 51.43% 60.37% 59.13% 73.59%
4-market p 76.25% 68.52% 79.68% 76.10% 80.70%
combination q 61.49% 48.71% 62.40% 59.09% 75.77%
5-market p 75.71% 70.96% 76.41% 75.09% 80.40%
combination q 60.09% 41.99% 63.64% 57.32% 77.41%
6-market p 74.93% 69.45% 75.50% 73.71% 81.05%
combination q 62.12% 41.45% 65.28% 62.72% 79.02%
7-market p 74.85% 68.25% 74.22% 74.46% 82.46%
combination q 61.19% 36.00% 63.62% 63.83% 81.33%
8-market p 73.56% 65.02% 75.91% 70.46% 82.86%
combination q 65.13% 50.61% 63.64% 65.43% 80.83%
9-market p 66.92% 72.10% 45.99% 66.50% 83.09%
combination q 55.69% 60.42% 22.53% 59.58% 80.22%
10-market p 76.01% 72.36% 71.03% 84.64%
combination q 65.76% 57.43% 63.56% 76.28%
11-market p 81.71% 78.73% 82.76% 83.63%
combination q 63.45% 56.81% 59.38% 74.17%
12-market p 78.68% 74.37% 80.96% 80.69%
combination q 60.59% 59.72% 56.43% 65.61%
Note: Between-market Spearman price and quantity rank correlations are reported
for the varieties present in Table 4.14. Coefficients are averaged across the num-
ber of samples present per intersection of best N-market combination and product
disaggregation.
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Figure 4.10: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.19, by number of
markets.
Note: Square dots indicate average price rank correlations by best N-market combination across
product codes, triangle dots indicate the same for quantity rank correlations. The horizontal line
segments refer to average rank correlations across best N-market combinations by level of product
disaggregation: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.
Figure 4.11: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.19, by product codes.
Note: Square dots indicate average price rank correlations by product code across best N-market
combinations, triangle dots indicate the same for quantity rank correlations. The horizontal line
segments refer to average rank correlations across product codes by level of product disaggrega-
tion: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.
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Table 4.20: Between-market Kendall price and quantity rank correlations.
Kendall Average of CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
Rank averages (Average (Average (Average (Average
correlations of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average of p 59.38% 54.51% 58.09% 59.30% 65.60%
Averages q 46.05% 37.92% 42.40% 45.45% 58.44%
2-market p 57.27% 49.65% 61.65% 59.09% 58.68%
combination q 42.51% 35.39% 39.25% 43.68% 51.72%
3-market p 59.48% 51.83% 63.42% 60.04% 62.61%
combination q 44.91% 36.80% 44.22% 43.07% 55.56%
4-market p 59.97% 52.57% 63.30% 59.58% 64.42%
combination q 45.57% 35.45% 46.17% 42.80% 57.85%
5-market p 59.74% 55.15% 60.45% 59.01% 64.37%
combination q 44.85% 30.93% 47.20% 41.96% 59.32%
6-market p 59.23% 54.01% 59.88% 58.10% 64.92%
combination q 46.92% 31.16% 49.19% 46.38% 60.96%
7-market p 59.40% 53.03% 59.15% 59.05% 66.38%
combination q 46.86% 27.32% 48.14% 48.24% 63.74%
8-market p 58.51% 50.86% 60.82% 55.15% 67.20%
combination q 50.09% 38.85% 48.75% 49.35% 63.40%
9-market p 52.88% 55.35% 36.05% 52.25% 67.85%
combination q 42.33% 45.27% 16.30% 44.88% 62.88%
10-market p 60.60% 55.64% 56.14% 70.01%
combination q 51.30% 44.44% 49.80% 59.66%
11-market p 66.40% 62.31% 67.48% 69.40%
combination q 49.50% 44.46% 46.00% 58.04%
12-market p 63.80% 59.17% 66.45% 65.78%
combination q 46.87% 47.05% 43.83% 49.72%
Note: Between-market Kendall price and quantity rank correlations are reported
for the varieties present in Table 4.14. Coefficients are averaged across the num-
ber of samples present per intersection of best N-market combination and product
disaggregation.
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Table 4.21: Between-market price and quantity correlations, whole manufacturing.
Volumes expressed in Units Volumes expressed in Weight
Rank correlations Spearman Kendall Spearman Kendall
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average of Price 95.65% 84.85% 92.93% 79.56%
Averages Quantity 77.66% 59.29% 79.50% 60.91%
2-market Price 95.10% 83.98% 91.46% 77.43%
combination Quantity 75.64% 56.71% 74.62% 55.73%
3-market Price 95.49% 84.83% 92.40% 78.93%
combination Quantity 76.78% 58.09% 77.29% 58.53%
4-market Price 95.64% 85.19% 93.17% 79.81%
combination Quantity 78.11% 59.46% 78.38% 59.68%
5-market Price 95.86% 85.66% 93.45% 80.26%
combination Quantity 79.41% 60.75% 80.05% 61.37%
6-market Price 96.14% 85.89% 93.46% 80.43%
combination Quantity 78.86% 60.58% 81.39% 62.86%
7-market Price 96.12% 85.85% 93.32% 80.21%
combination Quantity 78.62% 60.33% 82.07% 63.63%
8-market Price 95.91% 85.22% 93.16% 80.03%
combination Quantity 77.91% 59.59% 82.41% 63.95%
9-market Price 95.87% 84.97% 93.21% 80.04%
combination Quantity 76.38% 58.05% 82.33% 63.73%
10-market Price 95.67% 84.73% 93.95% 81.13%
combination Quantity 76.80% 58.85% 80.65% 62.01%
11-market Price 95.60% 84.17% 92.34% 78.71%
combination Quantity 77.42% 59.28% 77.97% 59.51%
12-market Price 94.71% 82.91% 92.32% 78.17%
combination Quantity 78.32% 60.50% 77.38% 58.97%
Note: Between-market Kendall and Spearman price and quantity rank correlations are reported for
the whole manufacturing in each best N-market combination. Correlations are computed separately
for varieties whose quantities are reported in weigh and varieties whose quantities are reported in
units.
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4.3.3 Simple correlations on subsamples
A general feature of quadratic utility functions is that they generate extremely tractable
demand functions. Whereas this represents a clear advantage in terms of theoretical
developments, it may pose some problems when confronted with real data, as it imposes
a linear demand on the data. A legitimate concern may then arise on how restrictive this
assumption is.
This issue is explored more in detail in the following Section with dummy regressions,
but a preliminary answer can be obtained by repeating the rank correlation analysis
looking at simple correlations instead of rankings. If simple correlations on prices and
quantities are found to be similar to rank correlations, this suggests that the assumption
of linear demand is not very restrictive. To see this, consider the case where demand is
non-linear. If the rankings of prices show a strong positive correlation, this may just imply
that prices are monotonic (not necessary linear) in quality, marginal costs of production
and local market characteristics. But when the absolute value of prices shows a similar
positive correlation, it must be the case that a linear structure is a good approximation
and that local market effects are shifting the demand for all the varieties in a parallel
way.
In Table 4.22 correlation coefficients are shown for actual prices and quantities across
markets, which can be usefully compared to the results in Table 4.19 where Spearman
rank correlations have been displayed.
The average difference between price and quantity correlations across destination
markets when using actual values (column 1) is surprisingly similar to the rank cor-
relations, ranging from 15% to more than 25% depending on the sample considered.
Correlations lose however, some of their strength due to the possible presence of outliers,
different transport costs across markets and any other possible measurement error whose
importance was reduced through the use of rankings. This is shown in Figure 4.12 and
4.13, which have mirror Figures 4.10 and 4.11, when actual values are considered instead
of rankings. Again it can be noted that average price correlations (square dots) are much
higher than average quantity correlations (triangle dots) independent of the product ag-
gregation and independent of the number of destination markets that are included in the
sample.
These results suggest that prices across markets depend on some variety-specific char-
acteristics which have a similar impact across markets, while quantities sold appear to
be affected by something else. In the verti-zontal model, this something else is cap-
tured by market-variety specific differences in the liking by consumers of a set of product
characteristics. It is also worth noting that if destination market-specific factors, such
as institutions or market size, affected Belgian exports in a similar fashion, this would
not affect correlation coefficients within a product category. This point is further devel-
oped in the next step of the exploratory analysis, where it is shown that variety- and
market-dummies capture the variability of prices across markets much better than for
quantities.
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Table 4.22: Between-market price and quantity correlations.
Average CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
Between-market of (Average (Average (Average (Average
correlations averages of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average of p 71.55% 74.31% 74.36% 70.98% 66.20%
Averages q 56.35% 52.39% 50.43% 57.32% 61.87%
2-market p 57.56% 51.58% 68.90% 59.22% 50.55%
combination q 46.94% 40.78% 51.49% 34.97% 60.51%
3-market p 70.88% 70.31% 81.28% 70.48% 61.47%
combination q 49.19% 37.76% 50.82% 41.36% 66.83%
4-market p 73.34% 73.49% 80.13% 72.15% 67.59%
combination q 50.22% 41.21% 49.78% 43.06% 66.81%
5-market p 73.51% 78.03% 78.59% 68.53% 68.89%
combination q 51.80% 40.85% 53.94% 50.52% 61.91%
6-market p 72.26% 74.60% 74.88% 67.80% 71.75%
combination q 54.61% 43.06% 54.19% 57.77% 63.40%
7-market p 73.72% 75.32% 78.78% 70.81% 69.97%
combination q 55.52% 42.97% 51.12% 62.62% 65.36%
8-market p 73.63% 74.15% 82.19% 67.09% 71.09%
combination q 61.52% 62.62% 51.13% 66.64% 65.68%
9-market p 65.06% 78.74% 50.15% 62.47% 68.89%
combination q 61.42% 78.32% 41.01% 64.56% 61.78%
10-market p 75.52% 83.09% 74.30% 69.18%
combination q 68.08% 72.10% 71.45% 60.70%
11-market p 75.90% 78.52% 83.61% 65.57%
combination q 62.34% 58.32% 68.40% 60.30%
12-market p 75.71% 79.57% 84.38% 63.20%
combination q 58.26% 58.34% 69.12% 47.33%
Note: Between-market price and quantity correlations are reported for the varieties
present in Table 4.14. Coefficients are averaged across the number of samples present per
intersection of best N-market combination and product disaggregation.
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Figure 4.12: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.22, by number of
markets.
Note: Square dots indicate average actual price correlations by best N-market combination
across product codes, triangle dots indicate the same for quantity correlations. The horizontal
line segments refer to average correlations across best N-market combinations by level of product
disaggregation: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.
Figure 4.13: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.22, by product codes.
Note: Square dots indicate average actual price correlations by product code across best N-
market combinations, triangle dots indicate the same for quantity correlations. The horizontal
line segments refer to average correlations across product codes by level of product disaggregation:
the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.
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4.4 Testing the verti-zontal model on Belgian export data
After having shown some systematic patterns in the different subsamples, the focus is
now shifted towards a more formal test of the verti-zontal model against alternative
models. To this end, the regression analysis performed on the subsamples is further
refined and applied to the entire sample of Belgian exporters. However, since it is still
necessary to have some variability across markets and varieties, the analysis is based
on the restricted sample shown in Table 4.11, even if results are robust to the inclusion
of the entire sample (the only difference is that the results on the variability captured
by the dummy regressions are biased upwards by the presence of many dummies being
associated with single data points).
In this Section, the following two propositions stemming from the verti-zontal model
as presented in the previous chapter are directly tested:
Proposition I: Equilibrium export prices depend on variety-specific cost and quality
and on the market-specific degree of competitiveness. Market effects, which can be
captured by taste-weighted price, quality and cost indices as well as by the effective
mass of competitors, vary with the destination country, but are common to all varieties
exported there. Thus, export prices of the same variety across countries only vary through
market-specific effects. This can be seen from equation (3.54):
p∗s,i =
αs + cs,i
2
− Ti
(
a˜i − c˜i
2
)
;
Proposition II: Equilibrium export quantities (sales) depend on market-specific and
variety-specific tastes. Thus, export quantities of the same variety across countries shows
additional variability, as compared to prices, because of idiosyncratic tastes. Based on
the these propositions, one would expect the combination of variety characteristics and
country characteristics to be important and to give a high goodness-of-fit for prices, but
a much lower goodness-of-fit for quantities (sales). This is what is explored in the next
section. This can be seen from equation (3.57).
q∗s,i =
1
βs,i
[
αs − cs,i
2
− Ti α¯i − c¯i
2
]
.
It should be remarked that the analysis is based on exports from one country, Belgium,
to other countries, so if transport costs vary by country or by country-product, identifying
the destinaton market (country or country-product) by i, it can be written that ts,i = ti,
and thus in the analysis are simply captured by destination dummies. this can be seen
by rewriting equation (3.54) incuding transport costs,
p∗s,i =
αs + cs,i
2
−
(
Ti a˜i − c˜i
2
− ti
2
)
. (4.1)
Similary, equation (3.57) turns into
q∗s,i =
1
βs,i
[
αs − cs
2
−
(
Ti α¯i − c¯i
2
+
ti
2
)]
. (4.2)
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4.4.1 Goodness-of-fit test
Equations (3.54) and (3.57) show that equilibrium prices and quantities consist of a first
term, which is determined by firm-product level cost (c) and quality (α), and a second
term, which depends on destination country specific variables (indexed by i). Thus,
variety-specific variation (cost and quality) can be captured empirically by firm-product
fixed effects, and local competition effects in the destination can be captured by country-
product fixed effects.
The following empirical specification where individual firm-product prices (ys,i = ps,i)
and quantities (ys,i = qs,i) are regressed on on variety and destination dummies allows
for an easy way to discriminate between the verti-zontal and the other models:
ys,i = δ0 + δ1Firm_Products + δ2Country_Producti + s,i (4.3)
In the regressions alternatively price (ps,i) and quantity (qs,i) level data are used as
dependent variables.
The equilibrium price equation (3.54) implies that firm-product quality and cost affect
prices in a similar and linear way. So, even without identifying quality and without
disentangling quality and cost, a simple OLS regression of export prices on firm-product
dummies is expected to capture this variation and to explain an important part of the
price data. Since cost and quality are variety-specific, firm-product dummies should
account for that.
According to the verti-zontal model, the other determinants of export prices are all
country effects indexed by i in (3.54). These country effects affect all varieties (firm-
CN8) competing in the same country-product in the same way and also enter the price
equation in a linear way. Since trade data holds information on destinations, country
effects can be approximated through country-product dummies. Based on the theory,
the joint inclusion of firm-product and country-product dummies is expected to yield a
good fit in a regression on individual firm-product prices.
In the verti-zontal model, the same set of variables is expected to perform less well in
explaining variation of quantities across countries. In addition to quality, taste differences
between consumers also matter. This is expected to result in a very different fit between
price and quantity regressions where quantities are expected to have a consistently lower
R2.
The reason is that quantities are not just a function of firm-product cost and quality
and country-level competition effects, but are also determined by idiosyncratic taste βs,i
that makes the quantity equation (3.57) a non-linear one.
Prices and quantities are not log-linearized in (4.3), as for example Bastos and Silva
(2010) or Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) do. That is because, by using the raw data for unit
values and output, a stricter test is imposed to the model because the linearity of demand
is one of the specific implications of the verti-zontal model and it is what distinguishes
the price from the quantity regressions in (4.3). Furthermore, taking logs would have
been useful if the focus had been on interpreting the specific regression coefficients, but
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this is not the aim here. Instead the focus is on the value of the R2 as a measure of the
goodness-of-fit in the regressions
As shown in the regressions, the systematically lower R2 for quantities than for prices
in almost every product, industry and destination considered, is suggestive that quan-
tities do not depend on the same fundamentals as prices. Based on the theory, taste
heterogeneity can be considered to be the underlying reason.
Unfortunately, a formal test on the significance of differences in R2 does not exist.
Therefore, complementary to a goodness-of-fit test, also a correlation test is presented.
Propositions I and II can also be formulated in terms of price and quantity correlations
across countries. The advantage of using correlations is that a formal test statistic exist
to test the prediction of weaker quantity the price correlations across countries. While
the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the verti-zontal model, this should not be seen
as conclusive evidence that "taste" is the only missing source of variation.
4.4.2 Predictions from the verti-zontal and other models
What is expected to be the goodness-of-fit of an empirical approximation of both the
price and quantity equation in (4.3) estimated on cross-sectional data? And how do the
predictions under verti-zontal preferences differ from other models?
First of all, consider the case of a standard CES model where productivity is the only
source of heterogeneity, as in Melitz (2003). In such a model, prices are expected to differ
between varieties but not for the same variety across countries. Under a standard CES,
fob export prices are the same independently of the destination to which the products
are shipped. Therefore, one would expect a variety-fixed effect, which accounts for cost
heterogeneity across firms, to capture all the variation in prices.
This also applies to a CES model with consumer taste draws, as in Bernard et al.
(2011). A CES model with taste draws by variety-country and a discrete choice model
with a different taste distribution per destination country are closest to the verti-zontal
model in rationalizing the stronger quantity variability that is found in empirical ob-
servations. However, they cannot explain the patterns of price and quantity variation
described below. A CES model with taste draws would predict that export prices do not
vary by destination country, while the data clearly shows they do. In a discrete choice
model, a stronger taste for a product would also result in a higher price for that product,
which would result in strong price volatility and would render the goodness-of-fit of (4.3)
for prices as low as for quantities, which is not what is observed in the data.
Thus, based on a standard CES model (with or without taste draws), one would
not expect additional variability in fob prices to come from country-fixed effects or,
alternatively, from more narrowly defined country-product fixed effects.
For quantities, a standard CES model assigns a role to country effects, driven by
income differences across countries. Country fixed effects would also explain some of the
variation in quantities. Thus, in a CES model we would expect country dummies to raise
the goodness-of-fit in the quantity regressions, but not in the price regression. In other
words, a CES model would predict a higher goodness-of-fit for quantities, but this is not
what is observed in the data.
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In a CES model augmented with quality, as in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), the
variety-fixed effect would now account for both productivity and quality differences be-
tween firm-products. While with variety-FE it is not possible to separate cost from
quality heterogeneity, it is possible to distinguish the type of quality differentiation that
firms are making. If firms ship the same quality to all destination countries, then the
variety-fixed effect would take up all the variation in prices. In such a world, adding
country-fixed effects to the regression would yield no additional explanatory power for
prices, while it would for quantities, as in the standard CES. But should firms ship a
different quality of the same variety to different countries, this would correspond to a
parallel demand shifter that varies by country. In such a model, one would expect this
quality variation to be absorbed by country-fixed effects both for prices and quantities.
Country-fixed effects in the quantity regression would additionally also absorb income
differences between countries.
Thus, based on a CES model, irrespective of whether quality is intrinsic to a variety or
depends on the destination country, one would not expect a lower goodness-of-fit of (4.3)
in the quantity regression compared to the price regression. Thus, the prediction from a
CES model is quite different from Proposition I derived from the verti-zontal model. The
only exception would be represented by a quality-augmented CES with linear transport
costs as discussed in Crozet et al. (2012) where, as shown by Martin (2010), profit-
maximizing fob export prices do change with the level of transport costs (as opposed to
iceberg transport costs, which do not affect prices). This means that the variety dummy
would capture the part of variability induced by intrinsic product quality differences and
the destination dummy would capture the market-specific variability induced by linear
transport costs. On top of that, market characteristics in the importing country would
increase variability in quantities, thus producing a pattern similar to the verti-zontal.
In order to rule out this alternative explanation, at the end of the Chapter the role of
distance is explicitly taken into account, showing that distance does have an impact on
prices (as predicted also by the verti-zontal model), but its contribution in explaining
overall price and quantity variability is insignificant, which would not be consistent with
a model in which transport costs represent the only source of fob price variability across
markets.
What about a standard quadratic utility, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)? In such
a model, both the equilibrium prices and quantities are a linear combination of a variety-
specific effect and a country-effect. The variety effect captures heterogeneity in costs
across firm-products, while a country-effect captures competition effects that vary by
destination country. Based on a standard quadratic utility, price and quantity variation
should both be equally well explained by a combination of variety-(firm-product) fixed
effects and country-fixed effects. Thus, in contrast to the verti-zontal model, a standard
quadratic utility would predict both price and quantity dummy regressions on variety
and country fixed effects to give an equally high goodness-of-fit measured by the R2.
A quadratic utility model augmented with quality would give a similar prediction as
a standard quadratic utility model. Quality acts as a parallel demand shifter between
varieties and possibly even within varieties across countries. But this should not alter the
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equality in goodness-of-fit between a price and a quantity dummy regression.8 Therefore,
even in a quadratic utility model with quality differentiation, the expectation would
continue to be of an equally good fit for price and quantity dummy regressions on variety
and country fixed effects.
Thus, the verti-zontal model is the only model that predicts a systematically lower
R2 in quantity regressions than in price regressions when variety and destination effects
are accounted for.
Under verti-zontal preferences, equilibrium quantities are determined by a non-linear
combination of variety- and country-variety-specific variables. This non-linearity in out-
put is driven by the presence of variety-country specific taste, which can be seen from
(3.57). However, the equilibrium price equation is linear, with the taste parameter not
entering directly, thus leaving all the variability to be explained by variety characteristics
and country characteristics. Therefore, to capture the variation in firm-product-country
prices (unit values) with a linear combination of variety-and country fixed effects is ex-
pected to yield a high goodness-of-fit in the price equation. In contrast, trying to fit a
linear model on a combination of variables that are expected to behave in a non-linear
way, as in the case of firm-product-country quantities, is expected to yield a much lower
goodness-of-fit. This result is not affected by selection issues because variety characteris-
tics are intrinsic to each variety in every destination market while country characteristics
affect all the varieties present in a particular country in a symmetric way.9 A simple test
where we approximate firm-product variation and country-product variation through a
set of dummies for each provides an easy and direct way of discriminating between all
the models discussed above.
Before discussing the results of the specification (4.3), first is considered the within
data variation explained by firm, product and country-level effects alone. The highly
disaggregate nature of the trade data at the 8-digit CN level allows for the examination
of the heterogeneity of within-firm, within firm-product and within country-product unit
values and output across countries and to compare results to earlier findings in the
literature.
4.4.3 Results
Heterogeneity across firms, products and countries
In the dataset quantities are expressed in weight (kilograms) or alternatively in units
(pairs, liters, and so on). The results for quantities expressed in units are less likely to be
plagued by measurement error and as such they can be regarded as a robustness check.
But first the results are discussed for products whose quantities are given in weights for
8In a standard quadratic utility, quantities are given by (p − c)/β, but since β is now a constant it
should not affect the R2, so we would expect an equally good fit in the quantity regression as in the
price regression.
9A selection model cannot be run, like a Heckman two-stage model, because the second stage does
not allow for a meaningful measure of the goodness-of-fit which is the measure needed to compare the
variability explained in the price and quantity regressions. But in the theory it is shown that the results
do not depend on selection issues.
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which many more observations are available. The results on the two samples are shown
in Table 4.23.
In column 1 firm-fixed effects (FE) are included to see how much data variation in
prices and quantities is explained by firm heterogeneity. Including firm-FE is equivalent
to assuming that there is only one source of heterogeneity in the data and it works at
the firm level, for example when cost and quality differences are small between products
of the same firm but are significant between products of different firms. The results in
column (1) do not confirm this assumption. The inclusion of firm-FE alone explains
about a third (38%) of the variation in prices. This finding is comparable to Munch and
Nguyen (2014) and others.10 But while previous studies looked at sales variation, we
separate price from quantity variation. For quantities, firm-specific effects explain much
less of the variation. Only 16% to 19% are explained depending on whether output is
measured as "quantity per capita of the destination country" or "quantity per dollar of
GDP of the destination country." The variation that firm-FE explain of simple quantities
is 17% and lies between the other two output measures.
What about product-FE? In other words, how much of the variation in firm-product-
country prices is driven by the type of product. Product-FE (columns 2 to 5) in the
weight regressions, explain about 30% of price variability, but this varies substantially
with the level of detail at which a product is defined. At the most disaggregate level
(CN2-FE) of a product definition products explain 18% of price variation and about
4% of quantity variation. At the most detailed product definition (CN8-FE), products
explains 40% of price variation and about 12− 15% of quantity variation, depending on
how quantities are reported.
Clearly, for a given product, export unit values exhibit substantial variation. But the
remaining variability is large and either comes from different firm-level costs and quality
or from different destination countries served by the firms selling the same product.
With country-product FE, the explained variability for quantities is substantially
higher (columns 6 to 9). For weights (Table 2), at the most detailed product-level
(country-CN8), 55% of export price variability and 32% to 48% of quantity variability
are explained. The R2 for price and quantities in general are closer together when
country-product fixed effects are considered. This is not a surprise and is consistent
with both the verti-zontal and CES models. In the verti-zontal model country-product
dummies which capture destination country-effects affect both prices and quantities. But
country-product effects, at least in part, also capture taste heterogeneity since taste varies
across countries. Taste is inherently non-linear, therefore it is reasonable to expect the
country-dummies, which are parallel shifters, to capture quantity variation only in part.
This is especially true when "quantities per dollar of GDP of the destination country" are
considered, where the dependent variable output is divided by a country-specific variable.
With firm-product FE as the sole regressors (columns 10 to 13), the variability ex-
10Munch and Nguyen (2014) find that firm-specific effects explain 31% of unconditional export sales
variation of Danish firms. Eaton et al. (2011) France finds that variation of sales conditional upon entry
explains 39% of variation. Lawless and Whelan (2008) for Irish firms find firm-specific effects to account
for 41% of firm destination sales variation.
202 CHAPTER 4. MICRO-LEVEL EVIDENCE OF VERTI-ZONTALITY
plained is also high compared to firm-level FE. This supports the assumptions that most
variation in quality and unit cost was at firm-product level. This assumption allows mak-
ing predictions independent of the single- or multi-product nature of firms. Empirically,
however, that assumption needs to be verified. At the most detailed level (firm-CN8), the
explained price variability of observations in weight is now about 67%, while for quanti-
ties, the explained variability with the inclusion of firm-product FE explains about 33%,
depending on how quantities are measured. Thus, the inclusion of a firm-product FE
explains much more variability in both the price and quantity regressions than either
firm- FE or product-FE. This justifies a theoretical approach that allows demand to vary
by firm-product rather than by firm or by product only.11
Turning to products whose quantities are expressed in units, in the bottom of Table
4.23 it can be noticed that all FE explain more of the variation in the data, but it should
be kept in mind that the number of observations and varieties in units are much lower, as
shown in Table 1. For prices, all types of FE give a higher fit in the regressions with units
than with weights. But more importantly, the difference in R2 between the price and the
quantity regression is consistently present with a lower R2 in the quantity regressions.
For observations in units, which are arguably less subject to measurement error than
weights, the difference of goodness-of-fit between prices and quantity regressions is even
larger.
Single-attribute models, like the one in Table 4.23, leave a substantial amount of
variability unexplained, as also pointed out by Hallak and Sivadasan (2013). However,
unreported F-tests turn out to be significant for all the single-attribute models in Table
4.23. This suggests that firm-product and country-product are both important regressors
to include since each of them explains a significant part of the variation in the firm-
product-country data. The F-tests for the price regressions are always substantially
higher than those for quantities, which is suggestive that the linear functional form that
imposed by including the dummies is more suited to explain prices than quantities.12
11Munch and Nguyen (2014) using Danish export data also point out that the firm-product dimension
is important to explain data variation.
12For brevity, the F-tests are not reported but are available upon request.
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Table 4.23: Single-attribute Models and Goodness-of-fit for Pooled Observations in Weight and Units.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p;
y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q
Firm FE YES
Product(CN2) FE YES
Product(CN4) FE YES
Product(CN6) FE YES
Product(CN8) FE YES
Country-CN2 FE YES
Country-CN4 FE YES
Country-CN6 FE YES
Country-CN8 FE YES
Firm-CN2 FE YES
Firm-CN4 FE YES
Firm-CN6 FE YES
Firm-CN8 FE YES
Weight
Price reg. R2 38.3% 18.5% 33.4% 37.9% 40.0% 23.6% 45.7% 52.7% 55.6% 53.2% 62.9% 66.5% 67.9%
Quantity reg. R2 17.4% 4.2% 8.8% 11.2% 12.6% 9.1% 19.6% 28.1% 32.6% 22.0% 26.2% 30.1% 32.5%
Q.perCapita reg.R2 16.6% 4.2% 8.8% 10.9% 12.5% 14.2% 26.5% 34.9% 39.3% 21.7% 25.6% 29.1% 31.8%
Q.perGDP reg.R2 18.9% 4.4% 11.3% 13.5% 15.6% 25.1% 38.6% 46.0% 48.9% 24.9% 28.8% 31.9% 34.3%
Units
Price reg. R2 70.3% 37.1% 70.9% 76.5% 81.3% 43.5% 79.7% 84.8% 86.7% 81.1% 86.1% 89.9% 91.8%
Quantity reg. R2 18.1% 5.1% 7.7% 10.2% 11.3% 12.9% 20.0% 28.0% 32.8% 20.8% 23.5% 26.3% 28.7%
Q.perCapita reg.R2 20.3% 6.6% 9.6% 11.7% 12.6% 20.2% 30.4% 37.1% 40.4% 23.5% 25.9% 28.7% 30.1%
Q.perGDP reg.R2 20.1% 6.8% 10.9% 13.9% 14.8% 34.8% 42.3% 50.3% 52.1% 23.1% 25.8% 30.1% 30.7%
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1. Quantities expressed in weight (kilograms)
or units (liters, bottles, pairs etc).
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However, from the single-attribute models in Table 4.23, it is impossible to know how
important firm-product FE versus country-product FE are in explaining data variability
since a comparison of R2 across different models is not meaningful.13 Firm-product
and country-product FE models both result in a high R2, especially with observations
in units. The relative role of firm-product FE and country-product FE, when included
jointly in the regression, can be determined through a variance decomposition analysis.
At the same time, it can also be used to discriminate quadratic utility models from
CES models. Quadratic utility models predict that country effects are an important
determinant of prices, while CES type of models see no role for country-effects to explain
prices.
In the ANOVA Table 4.24, a combined attribute model of firm-CN8 and country-CN8
is considered. The ANOVA decomposition verifies whether a combined model is justified.
Since the inclusion of firm-CN8 FE involves a larger number of dummies (degrees of
freedom) than in the case of country-CN8 dummies, one may wrongly conclude that
firm-product FE explain more of the data variation. The ANOVA analysis takes this
different number of dummies into account such that it is possible to get a better idea
about the relative importance of each regressor.
The results in the top panel of Table 4.24 show the results for the price regressions
and the bottom panel for the quantity regressions. The Mean Sum of Squares (MS) is
reported, which is the outcome of dividing the Partial Sum of Squares of each regressor
(not shown for brevity) by its degrees of freedom from the regressions. As such the
MS gives the explanatory power of each regressor per degree of freedom. Measured
this way, firm-CN8 FE and country-CN8 FE account for a relatively even part of the
variation explained, be it that the relative importance of the regressors alternates between
specifications. In the quantity regressions, the importance of variety- versus country-
FE is about even, while in the price regressions, the country-FE appear to be more
important per degree of freedom. This issue is not explored further because the relative
importance of variety- versus country-specific effects is beyond this thesis’ objectives.
More importantly, the ANOVA analysis confirms that the inclusion of both variety-effects
and country-effects seem warranted explaining price and quantity variation.14
13Only when the regressors are orthogonal and completely uncorrelated the increase in the R2 indicates
what the contribution of each regressor is, but this is unlikely here.
14Munch and Nguyen (2012) argue that an ANOVA analysis in an unbalanced dataset may bias results,
which means one cannot draw too strong conclusions on the relative importance of variety-versus country-
effects, other than that both seem needed.
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Table 4.24: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in dummy regressions.
(1)
Price Regression
y = p
Mean Sum of Squares
weight units
Firm-CN8 FE 14,510 3,285,966
Country-CN8 FE 7,401 923,217
Quantity Regression
y = q
Mean Sum of Squares
Firm-CN8 FE 4.1216e+11 1.1867e+11
Country-CN8 FE 3.0467e+11 1.0277e+11
Notes: The results in this table are based on
the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for
quantities expressed in weight and units. The
results refer to the dummy regressions including
firm-CN8 and country-CN8 FE.
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Combining variety and country dummies
The results associated with the single-attribute models in Table 4.23 suggest that firm-
product and country-product dummies in isolation are relevant regressors. The variance
decomposition in Table 4.24 suggests that the combination of the two is necessary to
explain the data variability.
The results of combining variety and country dummies to explain price and quantity
variation are shown more systematically and for different product-level definitions in
Table 4.25. In this Table the results are shown of regressions where data is pooled over
all product categories, essentially assuming a single market in which all goods compete
and insert firm-product and country-product dummies. The definition of a product-
market is progressively narrowed from firm-CN2 to firm-CN8.
Independently of the product-market definition, it can be seen that the variability
explained in the price regression is always higher than in the quantity regressions. In the
weights regressions, the difference between price and quantity regressions’ R2 is about
20% to 40%, while for the units’ regressions in the bottom panel the difference is closer to
around 40%. In the units’ regressions, the variation in the quantity regression explained
is typically less than half of what is explained by the same two sets of dummies in the
price equation. It is worth noting that the finer the firm-product and country-product
definition, the better the goodness-of-fit for both the price and quantity regressions. But
this can be attributed to the fact that more dummies also imply less residual degrees of
freedom in the regression which tends to raise the R2.
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Table 4.25: Goodness-of-fit of the verti-zontal model for Weight and Units.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
Firm-CN2 FE YES
Firm-CN4 FE YES
Firm-CN6 FE YES
Firm-CN8 FE YES
Country-CN2 FE YES
Country-CN4 FE YES
Country-CN6 FE YES
Country-CN8 FE YES
weight units weight units weight units weight units
Price regression R2 55.7% 83.1% 70.9% 91.2% 76.9% 95.1% 79.1% 96.0%
Quantity regression R2 28.6% 31.3% 40.3% 39.7% 50.7% 48.9% 56.7% 54.8%
Q per capita regression R2 31.6% 36.7% 43.5% 46.6% 53.4% 54.6% 59.1% 58.5%
Q per GDP regression R2 39.6% 44.5% 51.7% 52.5% 60.0% 62.9% 63.7% 64.7%
Number of observations 111876 20929 111876 20929 111876 20929 111876 20929
Number of dummies 12482 2963 26423 4865 41498 8363 47956 9252
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for
quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles, pairs etc).
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Two important insights emerge from the combined-attribute models in Table 4.25.
First, while price variability is pretty much pinned down by a combination of variety and
country dummies, quantity variability is less so. This is in sharp contrast to models that
predict that prices and quantities should be perfectly correlated as they are supposedly
determined by the same sources of variability, as in the standard quadratic utility setting.
In addition it is in contrast with models predicting that destination-specific character-
istics are the only additional source of variability when moving from prices to quantity
equations, such as the CES. But the data seem to suggest that different sources of vari-
ability are at work, being destination-variety specific and affecting quantities rather than
prices. Second, the empirical results show that the linear functional form that we im-
posed in (4.3) gives a good fit for prices but a consistently lower fit for quantities. This
is in line with what one would expect since the verti-zontal theory suggests that a linear
form applies to prices but not to quantities which are inherently non-linear.
Regressions by products and industries
Pooling all the data amounts to considering the product market as one integrated market
which may hide heterogeneity between industries. For this reason in Table 4.26 results
on the specification (4.3) are reported for product-level regressions.
Based on the results thus far one can say that including both variety- and country-FE
at the most detailed product (CN8) level is the specification that works most against the
verti-zontal model’s results since the price and quantity regressions for this most detailed
definition of a product market lie closest to each other. Therefore this specification is
used to give the data most chance to reject the theory.
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Table 4.26: Product-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit for Weight and Units.
(1) (2) (3)
Weighted averages How often Number of
price R2>quantity R2 products
weight units weight units weight units
by CN2
Price R2 65.3% 74.0% . . 89 46
Quantity R2 36.3% 36.9% 93.3% 82.6% 89 46
Q per capita R2 37.5% 40.6% 87.6% 84.8% 89 46
Q per GDP R2 42.4% 44.7% 84.3% 80.4% 89 46
by CN4
Price R2 65.4% 69.5% . . 740 178
Quantity R2 39.4% 41.4% 83.2% 79.8% 740 178
Q per capita R2 42.5% 45.8% 81.8% 78.7% 740 178
Q per GDP R2 46.2% 49.6% 78.5% 78.7% 740 178
by CN6
Price R2 65.7% 71.4% . . 1,930 482
Quantity R2 44.3% 47.7% 77.5% 78.6% 1,930 482
Q per capita R2 48.7% 51.3% 75.2% 75.9% 1,930 482
Q per GDP R2 51.5% 55.2% 73.4% 74.1% 1,930 482
by CN8
Price R2 66.4% 71.4% . . 2,541 589
Quantity R2 46.5% 49.9% 77.2% 78.6% 2,541 589
Q per capita R2 50.6% 53.2% 74.9% 76.2% 2,541 589
Q per GDP R2 53.1% 56.5% 72.6% 74.4% 2,541 589
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described
in Table 1, for quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles,
pairs etc). The only additional restriction, per CN product, is that the number of
regressors for each type of dummy is lower than the number of observations to ensure
some variability in the sample. The regressors included are firm-CN8 and country-
CN FE, for the different CN product categories. For each CN product category,
averages of all the CN products are weighted by their number of observations.
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In Table 4.26, first re considered all firm-CN8 varieties belonging to the same CN2
and exported to the same country to be in competition with each other in every country
they are exported to. Put differently, CN2 is considered at the beginning as the relevant
product market where all goods are substitute products. This results in about 90 different
CN2 product markets for weights and about 45 different CN2 industries for units. For
each of these industries separate regressions are run of price and output on variety- and
country-product FE.15
Column 1 of Table 4.26 reports the weighted average R2 across all CN2 industries
which is 65% for prices and about 36% for simple quantities. The corresponding numbers
for the units’ regressions is an average R2 of 74% for prices and around 37% for simple
quantities regressions.16 Column 2 shows the percentage of times that the goodness-of-fit
in the price regressions exceeds that of the quantity regressions, which is around 93% for
weight and 82% for units’ regressions when considering simple quantities. The definition
of a relevant product market is then narrowed from CN4, CN6 to CN8. Even in the
most narrow product market definition, where 1,701 separate regressions are considered
for each of the CN8 industries (weights), the weighted average R2 for prices is 66% and
for simple quantities is 46%. Column (3) shows that in 77% of the 1,701 regressions
run, the goodness-of-fit in the price regression is strictly higher than that of the simple
quantity regressions. Results are qualitatively the same when considering varieties in
units. Results do not differ much when we measure output in a different way, although
R2 tend to go up slightly when considering quantity per capita or quantity per dollar of
GDP.
Regressions at product-level thus confirm that prediction that a linear model like the
one in (4.3) appears to have less predictive power in quantity regressions. While this
holds for the large majority of products considered, from column (3) in Table 4.26 it is
clear that there are instances where there is not always a positive difference between price
and quantity R2. The theory does not rule out the existence of products where taste
differences are not very important or where business-to-business sales are more relevant
than business-to-consumer.17 Put differently, in the case of intermediate products the
cost-minimizing combination of inputs in production functions may differ from the utility-
maximizing consumption bundle of consumers. The model is more likely to explain price
and quantity variation of final consumption goods than of intermediate goods.
To have a first indication for which industries taste differences seem to matter less,
in Table 4.27 industry-level regressions are reported, where CN2 products are grouped
by the sections to which they belong in the RAMON Eurostat classification.
15In the product-level regressions the country-product is defined at country-CN2 in the CN2 regres-
sions, at country-CN4 in the CN regressions and so forth.
16For each CN product category averages are weighted by the number of observations, but results are
very similar for weighted and simple averages.
17Similar R2 in prices and quantities could point at the absence of taste heterogeneity.
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Table 4.27: Industry-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit for Weight and Units.
Exports in weight Exports in units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2 of R2 of Obs. # R2 of R2 of Obs. #
INDUSTRIES price quantity (model price quantity (model
(CN2 product codes) regr. regr. degrees of regr. regr. degrees of
freedom) freedom)
Agriculture 81.5% 35.5% 6,821 . . .
CN2 codes 1 to 15 (1,420) .
Food, beverages 78.9% 33.6% 11,625 62.0% 44.4% 1,204
CN2 codes 16 to 24 (2,047) (271)
Minerals, chemicals 76.8% 37.1% 16,277 36.2% 55.5% 344
CN2 codes 25 to 38 (2,649) (129)
Plastics and rubber 56.7% 34.3% 16,641 65.1% 36.2% 583
CN2 codes 39 and 40 (2,760) (183)
Leather, skins, wood 78.5% 42.3% 2,353 91.6% 34.3% 1,220
CN2 codes 41 to 46 (562) (299)
Articles of paper 50.4% 37.5% 5,843 83.3% 59.8% 16
CN2 codes 47 to 49 (1,257) (12)
Textile articles 86.9% 35.8% 13,544 89.0% 26.8% 12,276
CN2 codes 50 to 63 (2,679) (2,165)
Footwear, accessories 73.3% 48.1% 322 71.1% 35.5% 356
CN2 codes 64 to 67 (97) (106)
Construction materials 75.5% 45.9% 2,757 76.8% 42.8% 1,114
CN2 codes 68 to 70 (612) (245)
Base metals, jewelry 75.5% 40.6% 10,859 77.3% 32.5% 274
CN2 codes 71 to 83 (2,395) (88)
Mechanical appliances 59.4% 29.0% 17,672 85.4% 38.1% 2,884
CN2 codes 84 and 85 (3,369) (731)
Transport equipment 75.8% 40.2% 2,160 95.3% 52.8% 330
CN2 codes 86 to 89 (492) (129)
Precision instruments 62.7% 30.9% 2,128 86.8% 36.9% 550
CN2 codes 90 to 93 (498) (169)
Furniture and toys 68.6% 27.1% 5,162 69.1% 27.0% 299
CN2 codes 94 to 96 (980) (85)
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for
quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles, pairs etc). As regressors
firm-CN8 and country-industry FE are included. The industry "Agriculture" has been dropped
from the sample because it had only 4 observations and the same number of dummies.
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For the fourteen so-obtained industries, the regressions for weights do not reject the
verti-zontal model. The R2 for prices is typically 20% to 30% higher than for quantities.
Only for exports in units for "Minerals and Chemicals" the quantity regression shows a
stronger goodness-of-fit. This may suggest that taste effects are not important in this
industry or that "Minerals and Chemicals" is more of a business-to-business industry for
which the model may not apply.
More detailed industry studies will likely reveal where taste heterogeneity is strong
and where it is not or where other factors are at play. In any case, all the evidence pre-
sented above seems to suggest that in the large majority of products and industries, taste
heterogeneity matters since that is today the only model which can explain consistently
lower R2 of specification (4.3) in quantity regressions than in price regressions.
4.4.4 Robustness check I: dummy regressions on subsamples
A dummy regression as specified in (4.3) can also be performed on the 171 subsamples
presented in the previous Section. Noting that the unit of observation is always an
individual variety, defined by the combination of a firm and a CN8 product code in a
particular destination market, the results are summarized in Table 4.28.
The price regressions have all an R2 of between 60 to 70%, which is systematically
higher than the one associated with quantity regressions. Looking at the top row, column
(1), it can be seen that the average of the averages across all samples displays a difference
of 20% in the captured variability between price and quantity regressions. Browsing Table
4.28, it can be noted that this difference is always present, no matter which product-
market definition or market combination is used. This consistently higher goodness-of-fit
for price as opposed to quantity regressions can be interpreted as the effect on quantities
of different tastes in different markets.
The differences in goodness-of-fit are also displayed in Figure 4.15 and 4.16, where
the square dots should now be read as average R2 resulting from the price regressions and
the triangle dots are the R2 from the quantity regressions. The horizontal line segments
indicate the average R2 by level of product aggregation, while the individual dots show
the averages by number of markets considered for each level of product aggregation. The
solid line shows average prices while the dashed line shows average quantities in different
samples. It can be noted that the OLS fit is systematically better in the price regressions
that in the quantity regressions.
On the same regressions, the functional form assumed in the theory is tested using a
RAMSEY test (Ramsey, 1969), which also indicate the presence of an omitted variable
bias. The RESET test is performed for each of the actual samples on which regressions
are run. Table 4.29 shows how many times the RESET test is passed. The results are
strikingly different for price and quantity regressions. The top row shows that the price
regression passes the Ramsey test in 63.7% of the samples, while the comparable number
of the quantity regression is 21.1%. The way to interpret this is that the high R2 for the
price regression suggests it has a reasonable functional form and no important variables
seem to be omitted. The opposite is true of quantity regressions, which again supports the
idea that a market-specific taste parameter is missing in the regression and/or structural
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parameters affecting equilibrium quantities do so in a non-linear way.
The rest of Table 4.29 disaggregates this result by levels of product aggregation
and best-N market combinations. The difference between price regressions and quantity
regressions is again striking, especially at the narrowest levels of product aggregation and
for an intermediate number of destination markets. For example, when 7 markets are
considered, only 1 quantity regression out of 20 passes the RESET test, whereas 18 out
of 20 do so for the price regressions on dummies.
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Table 4.28: R2 associated with prices and quantities regressed on dummies.
Average CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
R-squared in of (Average (Average (Average (Average
regressions on dummies averages of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5) of Top 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Average of Price 70.96% 73.42% 77.86% 70.80% 65.46%
Averages Quantity 50.69% 48.65% 53.91% 49.97% 53.12%
2-market Price 77.05% 75.46% 81.12% 77.15% 74.48%
combination Quantity 69.51% 68.66% 72.71% 65.45% 71.23%
3-market Price 78.15% 77.26% 86.03% 77.95% 71.37%
combination Quantity 61.41% 54.61% 64.31% 58.77% 67.93%
4-market Price 76.74% 78.20% 83.34% 76.90% 68.51%
combination Quantity 54.79% 47.50% 55.26% 52.78% 63.61%
5-market Price 75.11% 80.84% 81.58% 69.17% 68.85%
combination Quantity 51.65% 47.82% 53.73% 47.52% 57.51%
6-market Price 71.92% 72.77% 72.76% 68.58% 73.59%
combination Quantity 49.77% 45.45% 50.31% 47.34% 55.96%
7-market Price 73.81% 76.40% 79.14% 68.87% 70.85%
combination Quantity 46.08% 41.91% 46.84% 43.66% 51.92%
8-market Price 73.65% 76.23% 83.37% 63.45% 71.55%
combination Quantity 46.66% 42.48% 44.45% 49.09% 50.64%
9-market Price 61.29% 73.11% 55.52% 58.28% 58.25%
combination Quantity 47.74% 50.66% 43.66% 49.45% 47.21%
10-market Price 64.65% 69.86% 65.17% 58.93%
combination Quantity 45.08% 47.66% 43.32% 44.28%
11-market Price 66.27% 64.55% 76.84% 57.43%
combination Quantity 44.60% 45.15% 47.70% 40.96%
12-market Price 61.88% 62.99% 76.41% 46.24%
combination Quantity 40.30% 43.26% 44.60% 33.05%
Note: This table reports R2 associated with OLS regressions of prices and quantities on dummies
for the varieties present in Table 4.14. Coefficients are averaged across the number of samples
present per intersection of best N-market combination and product disaggregation.
4.4. TESTING THE VERTI-ZONTAL MODEL ON BELGIAN EXPORT DATA 215
Figure 4.14: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.28, by number of
markets aggregating all the levels of product classification.
Note: Square dots indicate averages of the average R2 for regressions of prices on dum-
mies by level of product disaggregation, triangle dots indicate the same for regressions
of quantities on dummies. The segment around square and triangle dots indicate the
minimum and the maximum average R2 by level of product disaggregation.
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Figure 4.15: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.28, by number of
markets.
Note: Square dots indicate average R2 for regressions of prices on dummies by best N-market
combination across product codes, triangle dots indicate the same for regressions of quantities on
dummies. The horizontal line segments refer to average R2 across best N-market combinations
by level of product disaggregation: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.
Figure 4.16: Visual representation of the results reported in Table 4.28, by product codes.
Note: Square dots indicate average R2 for regressions of prices on dummies by product code
across best N-market combinations, triangle dots indicate the same for regressions of quantities
on dummies. The horizontal line segments refer to average R2 across product codes by level of
product disaggregation: the solid one refers to prices, the dashed one to quantities.
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Table 4.29: Success rates in tests for omitted variables in the regressions on dummies run for Table 4.28.
Share of samples passing the regression specification error test (RESET ) for omitted variables.
Price 63.7%
All samples Quantity 21.1%
Samples (171)
CN8 CN6 CN4 CN2
By level of Price 67.5% 74.2% 64.4% 62.5%
product Quantity 28.8% 30.4% 17.6% 11.3%
disaggregation: Samples (38) (35) (45) (53)
12 Mkts 11 Mkts 10 Mkts 9 Mkts 8 Mkts 7 Mkts 6 Mkts 5 Mkts 4 Mkts 3 Mkts 2 Mkts
By best Price 16.7% 37.5% 55.6% 54.5% 76.5% 90.0% 75.0% 65.0% 80.0% 90.0% 80.0%
N-market Quantity 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 15.0% 15.0% 20.0% 45.0% 60.0%
combinations: Samples (6) (8) (9) (11) (17) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20) (20)
Note: Percentages of samples passing the RESET test for omitted variables are reported by product disaggregation and market combination. The number
of samples considered is reported in brackets. For example, at a CN8 level product disaggregation, 63.7% of the 38 samples considered passed the test when
prices were regressed on dummies, but only 21.1% passed the test when quantities regressions were considered.
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4.4.5 Robustness check II: correlations and remote destinations
A legitimate concern is whether the results are driven by the fact that the most important
trading partners for Belgium are European, which may have a dampening effect on price
differences. If the high goodness-of-fit in the price regressions is the result of arbitrage
or lack of border controls, this could drive the results. Therefore, as a consistency check,
we investigate whether this trade orientation towards European destinations may have
affected the results.
It can be done so by looking at a set of heterogeneous and remote countries (Aus-
tralia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Turkey, and US)18 together
with the three main trading partners of Belgium (France, Netherlands and Germany).
For these countries, pairwise bilateral correlations re considered for each country-pair of
Belgian export prices and quantities shipped. An advantage of using correlations is that
differences can be statistically tested for. But for pairwise correlations to be meaningful,
we exclude zero trade flows here and only consider those varieties that are present in all
countries. This results in a balanced panel of 87 varieties and 1,044 observations.19
These pairwise correlations all lie around 90%, which is the average of all the bilateral
price rank correlations considered and is indicated by the solid line at the top of Figure
4.17. Proposition I, which predicts that the price rankings of varieties within destination
countries will not be affected by country effects, is confirmed by the high price correlation
found. Therefore, one would expect stable price rankings amongst a set of varieties
exported even when the destination countries are remote and heterogeneous compared
to the country of origin.
In contrast, the bilateral quantity ranking correlations given by the triangle dots in
Figure 4.17, can be as low as 50% as indicated by the dashed horizontal line segment. The
four most correlated country pairs in terms of quantity ranks correspond to the three EU
member states considered (France, Netherlands and Germany) and Turkey, a candidate
EU member country. Of all the countries included, the ones with the highest pairwise
quantity rank correlations are the three European countries. This can clearly be seen
from Figure 4.17 where EU countries are circled. Figure 4.17 thus suggests that taste
differences are smallest in the three EU countries included, which seems quite plausible
given their proximity. All the quantity correlations are lower than price correlations in a
statistically significant way at a 1% confidence level.
The evidence in Figure 4.17 casts further doubt on measurement error in quantities
as an alternative explanation for the findings. Measurement error would result in random
variability in quantities, but Figure 4.17 clearly shows that quantity variation is lower
in nearby countries. This makes an explanation like taste more plausible as a source of
quantity variation than measurement error, although one cannot exclude the possibility
18The criteria for choosing these countries included a maximum distance from Belgium, including as
many different continents as possible and conditioning on the fact that countries received the same set
of varieties exported from Belgium.
19The lower quantity correlations, which is found in this balanced sample, are in line with the goodness-
of-fit results obtained on the unbalanced sample in the previous section. This confirms that selection
issues are not driving the results.
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Figure 4.17: Farmarkets
that measurement error would increase with distance from Belgium which would raise the
variance of quantities for far away countries. Provided measurement error is not driving
results, Figure 4.17 also suggests that taste and distance to destination may be highly
correlated, which raises some doubts on the correct specification of many gravity models
where distance typically features as the prominent explanation explaining bilateral trade
flows but which may in part capture taste effects that run along similar dimensions. This
is another reason why future research should be focusing on separating taste effects in
trade from other potential explanations at work.
4.4.6 Robustness check III: what is the role of distance?
As discussed earlier in this Section, there is only one class of models which would be as
consistent with the evidence presented as the verti-zontal: a quality-augmented CES à
la Crozet et al. (2012) with linear transport costs. As noted by Martin (2010), in such
model the variety-specific component of price variability would be combined with the
variability induced by the linear transport costs.
This mechanism can be directly tested by adding a proxy for trade costs in the dummy
regressions summarized in Table 4.23. Since there is no dataset available with precise
and comparable information on trade costs, the proxy typically used in the literature is
distance, as reported for example in the CEPII’ GeoDist database (Mayer and Zignago,
2011). There are different ways in which distance can be measured, considering the
distance between the capitals or the biggest cities, or with more sophisticated techniques,
as the one used to produce the variable distw in the GeoDist database, which calculates
the distance between two countries based on bilateral distances between the biggest
cities of those two countries, weighting them by the relative population of the cities in
the corresponding countries. This is the variable used for this exercise, but since all the
distance measures are very correlated, the results are robust to alternative indicators.
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In order to account for the impact of distance, the dummy regression in (4.3) is
slightly adapted as
ys,i = δ0 + δ1Firm_Products + δ2Country_Producti + δ3Distance+ s,i. (4.4)
The results of (4.4) are reported in Tables 4.30 (for weight) and 4.31 (for units),
where columns are numbered in accordance to Table 4.23. Of course, since the data
used is cross-sectional, in the regressions with country-fixed effects the distance regressor
has to be dropped for multicollinearity, so columns (6) to (9) have to be dropped. The
variability captured by the specification in (4.4) is so similar to the specification in (4.3)
that in order to highlight the few differences, in Tables 4.30 and 4.31 results are reported
in bold when they are 0.2% points higher than in Table 4.23 and, even so, they are never
higher than 0.9% points from the corresponding regression without distance. It can be
noted that changes in the variability capture in prices are never perceptible, i.e. they are
smaller than the 0.1% level of precision at which results are reported. This is striking,
because the country-product dummies in Table 4.23 captured between 23.6% and 55.6%
of the price variation and in Table 4.25, when country-product dummies are added to
variety dummies, the additional explanatory power increases by more than 10% of the
total variability for CN6 and CN8 products. This seems to suggest that the part of
destination-market specific variability explained by transport costs (as approximated by
distance, which can be admittedly an imprecise proxy) is negligible and surely cannot be
the only source of price variation across markets as implied by Crozet et al. (2012).
In line with the prediction of the verti-zontal model and with the empirical observation
of Martin (2012), though, the coefficient for the impact of distance on prices is positive
and significant in almost all cases, with a loss of statistical significance only when units
are considered, in particular in the presence of firm-product dummies. The statistical
significance of distance can be reconciled with the economic insignificance in terms of
variability explained by looking at the magnitude of the coefficient. Noting that distance
is expressed in kilometers and prices are unit values of shipments, the coefficients in
Table 4.30 say that every 1000 kilometers prices per 100 kilograms increase by 1 euro.
Considering that the average distance from Belgium in the sample is 2500 kilometers
(the maximum is 18,525 for New Zealand) and the average price per 100 kilograms is 286
euros, the impact would on average be very small, in fact below 1%. When considering
units, the numbers are even more impressive, considering that the average price per
unit is 5,223 euros and the coefficients for distance, when significant, are around 0.015
euros/kilometer.
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Table 4.30: Single-attribute Models and Goodness-of-fit for Pooled Observations in Weight as shown in Table 4.23, with
the introduction of distance as a regressor.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (10) (11) (12) (13)
y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p;
y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q
Firm FE YES
Product(CN2) FE YES
Product(CN4) FE YES
Product(CN6) FE YES
Product(CN8) FE YES
Firm-CN2 FE YES
Firm-CN4 FE YES
Firm-CN6 FE YES
Firm-CN8 FE YES
Price reg. R2 38.3% 18.8% 33.5% 38.0% 40.0% 53.3% 62.9% 66.5% 67.9%
Quantity reg. R2 17.6% 4.2% 8.9% 11.4% 12.8% 22.3% 26.5% 30.5% 32.9%
Q.perCapita reg.R2 16.8% 4.4% 9.0% 11.1% 12.7% 22.1% 26.1% 29.7% 32.4%
Q.perGDP reg.R2 18.9% 4.6% 11.3% 13.5% 15.6% 24.9% 28.9% 32.0% 34.5%
Distance coeff., price reg. 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
T-statistic (16.40) (21.59) (16.89) (15.18) (14.58) (15.05) (12.49) (11.76) (11.20)
Distance coeff., quantity reg. -5.779 -2.977 -4.329 -4.776 -5.191 -7.498 -8.578 -9.131 -9.720
T-statistic (-15.96) (-8.30) (-11.96) (-13.04) (-14.11) (-20.00) (-22.32) (-23.36) (-24.83)
Notes: This Table reproduces Table 4.23 with the only addition of distance from Belgium as a regressor. The results in this
table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1. Quantities expressed in weight (kilograms). All coefficients
for the distance regressor are significant at the 1% confidence level.
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Table 4.31: Single-attribute Models and Goodness-of-fit for Pooled Observations in Units as shown n Table 4.23, with the
introduction of distance as a regressor.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (10) (11) (12) (13)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
Firm FE YES
Product(CN2) FE YES
Product(CN4) FE YES
Product(CN6) FE YES
Product(CN8) FE YES
Firm-CN2 FE YES
Firm-CN4 FE YES
Firm-CN6 FE YES
Firm-CN8 FE YES
Price reg. R2 70.3% 37.1% 70.9% 76.5% 81.3% 81.1% 86.1% 89.9% 91.8%
Quantity reg. R2 18.6% 5.2% 7.9% 10.5% 11.6% 21.3% 24.2% 27.0% 29.4%
Q.perCapita reg.R2 20.8% 6.7% 9.9% 12.1% 13.0% 24.2% 26.6% 29.6% 31.0%
Q.perGDP reg.R2 20.2% 6.8% 10.9% 13.9% 14.9% 23.2% 26.1% 30.5% 31.1%
Dist. coeff., price reg. 0.018 0.000 0.015 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
T-statistic (2.48)** (0.00) (2.25)** (1.56) (2.01)** (0.63) (0.59) (0.63) (0.52)
Dist. coeff., quantity reg. -4.399 -2.162 -2.967 -3.685 -3.639 -4.983 -5.487 -5.914 -5.828
T-statistic (-10.47)*** (-5.22)*** (-7.06)*** (-8.66)*** (-8.52 )*** (-11.66)*** (-12.74)*** (-13.27)*** (-13.13)***
Notes: This Table reproduces Table 4.23 with the only addition of distance from Belgium as a regressor. The results in this table are based on the
restricted sample as described in Table 1. Quantities expressed in units (liters, bottles, pairs etc). Significance of the distance coefficients is reported
at 10% (*), 10% (**) and 1% (***) level.
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The role of distance in explaining variability is stronger for quantities, which could
capture an additional taste effect due, for example, to the positive correlation between
the taste-mismatch parameter β and the remoteness of the producer from the consumer
of a certain variety. In other words, the physical distance may be related to the distance
in the characteristics space.
This observation leads to the definition of another possible channel to explain the
positive relation between prices and distance, which can reinforce the standard channel
linked to part of the higher marginal costs of production (and delivery) passed-through
to the final consumers typical of quadratic utilities (where half of the transport costs
are charged to consumers) and of models based on CES functions with linear transport
costs (Martin, 2010). In addition to this effect, the verti-zontal model allows also for the
inclusion of a price effect due to the competitive interaction with substitutable varieties.
Indeed, the strength of the destination-market component of the linear demand resulting
from the quadratic utility is proportional to the level of competition between varieties of
the same good, shifting both prices and markups in the same direction (as opposed to
the pass-through effect in a quadratic utility framework, where prices and markups are
pushed in opposite directions by trade costs).
In the verti-zontal model, and more generally in models based on quadratic utilities,
the substitutability between one variety all all the other varieties in market i is captured
by γQi, with Qi =
∫
Si
qr,idr , hence, if one particular variety competes with varieties
produced in nearby markets (say, European exporters in the case of Belgium or France)
and all exporters have to face a similar degree of taste mismatch due to distance, the price
premium experienced by each exporter can be explained by the lower Qi due to a higher
βr,i of all the competitors. To make a concrete example, if French wines compete with
Italian and Spanish wines in Asian markets, then part of the price premium observed by
Crozet et al. (2012) can be explained by a lower γQi as compared to closer European
markets in which the same competing varieties are sold in higher quantities. It should
however be kept in mind that this explanation may hold for Belgium and other European
countries, because of their geographical location next to producers of competing varieties,
but not necessarily for other countries. It would be interesting to test this hypothesis
looking at the impact of distance on export prices of non-European countries in markets
with strong European competition. For example, it could be analyzed how South African
or Australian wines’ prices and markups evolve with distance, when datasets comparable
to the one used by Crozet et al. (2012) will be available in these countries.
A final remark on the relation between distance and the variability of prices and
quantities concerns the level of aggregation at which a market can be considered relevant
to measure competition between varieties. Table 4.32 reproduces Tables 4.30 and 4.31
by considering only importer-country dummies, which is the level at which variability
in distance can be measured, but which also captures other features as the wealth of
the destination country, the strength of its currency, it openness to trade and so on.
It is remarkable how small is the impact of the destination country in explaining price
variability (a feature that is confirmed also in the next Chapter) and, considering that
distance is only one of the characteristics captured by a country dummy, it becomes clear
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why the inclusion of distance in the dummy regressions doesn’t affect the overall variabil-
ity explained by the dummy regressions. It also implies that producers of varieties, when
setting their prices in the different markets, may not really be influenced by overall coun-
try characteristics, but rather by the country-product-specific competitive conditions,
since country-product dummies alone ranged between 23.6% and 55.6% in Table 4.25.
Notice that country-CN2 dummy does not really add much precision to the definition of
a market: the manufacturing sector is divided into 97 products, with precision instru-
ments and mechanical appliances clustered into two or three product categories. Still,
moving from a pure market dummy to a market-CN2 increases the variability captured
by more than 20% of the overall variability, and so on as the product definition becomes
more disaggregate, with gains in variability explained leveling off between CN6 and CN8
levels.
Table 4.32: Goodness-of-fit for Pooled Observations with destination-country dummy
alone, in Weight and Units.
weight units
y = p, q y = p, q
Country FE YES YES
Price reg. R2 1.2% 1.3%
Quantity reg. R2 1.6% 1.6%
Q.perCapita reg.R2 4.0% 4.1%
Q.perGDP reg.R2 8.8% 19.4%
Notes: The results in this table are based
on the restricted sample as described in Ta-
ble 1. Quantities expressed in weight (kilo-
grams) and in units (liters, bottles, pairs
etc).
The main point is thus that distance, as any other country-level variable, doesn’t
seem fit to explain price variability, which should be rather related to country-product
characteristics. The verti-zontal model provides a straightforward and intuitive way of
relating country-product characteristics to the pricing strategy of each variety through
the competition effects, as captured by γQi. Therefore, any alternative explanation of this
variability made in terms of linear transport costs in an augmented-CES setting should
first show that these costs display significant country-product-pair variability, which may
require better data than currently available on transport costs in international shipments.
4.4.7 Robustness check IV: using logarithms instead of raw values
Finally, one last robustness check concerns the use of raw values instead of logarithms in
Tables 4.23, 4.24, 4.25, 4.26, 4.27, which is more arguably more common in the literature
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but less appropriate in the context of the empirical validation of the verti-zontal model.
In fact, the choice of using raw values has been based the need to test not only the general
patterns of price and quantity variability in the data, but also whether the imposition of
a functional form as rigid as the quadratic utility may have been rejected by the data.
In addition, logarithms have the clear advantage to provide researchers with an intuitive
interpretation of the coefficients resulting of their regressions, but in the case of the
empirical test undertaken in this Chapter there have been no coefficients to estimate or
to interpret.
However, as a robustness check and as a way to compare the results with existing
research and future studies using different datasets, here follow Tables 4.33, 4.34, 4.35,
4.36, 4.37, with regressions performed on the logarithm of the prices and quantities. It
can be noted that the results are qualitatively equivalent to the Tables presented earlier,
the only difference being that the levels of captured variability are all shifted upwards.
What is more relevant for the analysis of trade patterns, though, is that the difference
between the price variability captured by the dummies and the quantity variability is
comfortably wide, which is still the case.
The increase in variability across the board may be explained by the presence of
outliers (whose importance is reduced after the transformation) since the data cleaning
procedure has been very parsimonious not to risk losing information. In fact, only the
1% tails of the price and quantity distributions have been cut in the restricted sample,
but in such a large dataset that may have left some outliers in. For example, consid-
ering prices (measures as unit values, in euros per 100 kilograms of product shipped),
their raw values after the data cleaning range from 0.16 to 1245.3, with average 33.75
and standard deviation 91.14. When prices are taken in logarithms, they range from
-1.81 to 7.13, with average 2.13 and standard deviation 1.62, so that dummy regressions
may artificially capture higher variability because of a reduced variation of the data. As
a matter of fact, it should be noticed that single-attribute dummy regressions in 4.33
capture substantially more variability than Table 4.23, even if there is no theoretical
reason for this discrepancy (since each dummy is just capturing a different level of prices
or quantities). The comparison between Tables in logarithms and raw values may this
suggest that single-attribute models tested only using data in logarithms, when not jus-
tified by the underlying theory, may overestimate the explanatory power of the empirical
implementation.
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Table 4.33: Single-attribute Models and Goodness-of-fit for Pooled Observations in Weight and Units. Prices and quantities
in logs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p;
y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = p, q
Firm FE YES
Product(CN2) FE YES
Product(CN4) FE YES
Product(CN6) FE YES
Product(CN8) FE YES
Country-CN2 FE YES
Country-CN4 FE YES
Country-CN6 FE YES
Country-CN8 FE YES
Firm-CN2 FE YES
Firm-CN4 FE YES
Firm-CN6 FE YES
Firm-CN8 FE YES
Weight
Price reg. R2 65.3% 48.6% 65.5% 70.0% 71.6% 52.4% 70.2% 75.4% 77.2% 81.2% 86.8% 89.1% 89.9%
Quantity reg. R2 40.8% 16.9% 28.9% 33.7% 35.7% 23.4% 38.5% 46.6% 49.9% 54.8% 62.1% 66.5% 68.4%
Q.perCapita reg.R2 38.3% 17.0% 27.9% 32.6% 34.7% 29.8% 43.6% 51.0% 54.1% 52.9% 60.3% 64.8% 66.8%
Q.perGDP reg.R2 40.3% 17.2% 29.5% 34.7% 37.1% 32.2% 45.6% 52.7% 55.7% 55.8% 63.7% 68.5% 70.7%
Units
Price reg. R2 78.2% 63.4% 78.1% 82.7% 83.7% 67.6% 81.7% 86.3% 87.2% 89.6% 92.8% 94.3% 95.0%
Quantity reg. R2 51.2% 28.1% 34.6% 38.9% 40.2% 35.9% 45.0% 53.7% 55.9% 58.1% 61.0% 65.9% 66.8%
Q.perCapita reg.R2 50.4% 27.0% 33.5% 38.4% 39.8% 42.4% 50.6% 58.3% 60.3% 57.6% 60.6% 65.7% 66.7%
Q.perGDP reg.R2 53.7% 28.8% 36.4% 41.9% 43.4% 46.3% 53.9% 61.2% 63.0% 61.0% 64.1% 69.4% 70.4%
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1. Quantities expressed in weight (kilograms)
or units (liters, bottles, pairs etc). Prices and quantities are in logs.
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Table 4.34: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in dummy regressions. Prices and quantities
are in logs.
(1)
Price Regression
y = p
Mean Sum of Squares
weight units
Firm-CN8 FE 5.165 4.396
Country-CN8 FE 1.860 1.434
Quantity Regression
y = q
Mean Sum of Squares
Firm-CN8 FE 41.485 27.538
Country-CN8 FE 17.420 16.916
Notes: The results in this table are based
on the restricted sample as described in Table
1, for quantities expressed in weight and units.
The results refer to the dummy regressions in-
cluding firm-CN8 and country-CN8 FE. Prices
and quantities are in logs.
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Table 4.35: Goodness-of-fit of the verti-zontal model for Weight and Units. Prices and
quantities are in logs.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
Firm-CN2 FE YES
Firm-CN4 FE YES
Firm-CN6 FE YES
Firm-CN8 FE YES
Country-CN2 FE YES
Country-CN4 FE YES
Country-CN6 FE YES
Country-CN8 FE YES
weight units weight units weight units weight units
Price regression R2 82.1% 90.8% 88.8% 94.3% 91.9% 96.2% 93.0% 96.9%
Quantity regr. R2 59.8% 65.4% 70.8% 71.2% 78.2% 80.2% 81.5% 82.0%
Q per capita regr. R2 63.2% 68.9% 73.2% 74.1% 80.1% 82.2% 83.0% 83.8%
Q per GDP regr. R2 64.5% 71.0% 74.1% 75.8% 80.7% 83.4% 83.6% 84.9%
Number of obs. 111876 20929 111876 20929 111876 20929 111876 20929
Number of dummies 12482 2963 26423 4865 41498 8363 47956 9252
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for
quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles, pairs etc). Prices and quantities
are in logs.
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Table 4.36: Product-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit for Weight and Units. Prices
and quantities are in logs.
(1) (2) (3)
Weighted averages How often Number of
price R2>quantity R2 products
weight units weight units weight units
by CN2 89 46
Price R2 85.6% 88.5% . .
Quantity R2 77.1% 74.1% 90.9% 77.8%
Q per capita R2 79.1% 77.2% 84.1% 80.0%
Q per GDP R2 79.7% 78.3% 84.1% 75.6%
by CN4 740 178
Price R2 79.3% 82.7% . .
Quantity R2 73.2% 71.5% 66.4% 71.3%
Q per capita R2 75.9% 75.0% 60.4% 68.5%
Q per GDP R2 76.1% 75.7% 60.0% 65.2%
by CN6 1,930 482
Price R2 75.3% 78.9% . .
Quantity R2 70.8% 69.1% 59.4% 67.7%
Q per capita R2 73.7% 72.6% 53.8% 61.9%
Q per GDP R2 73.7% 72.9% 53.9% 61.9%
by CN8 2,541 589
Price R2 73.5% 77.4% . .
Quantity R2 69.7% 68.4% 58.9% 66.8%
Q per capita R2 72.7% 71.9% 53.0% 61.2%
Q per GDP R2 72.5% 72.1% 53.4% 62.1%
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described
in Table 1, for quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles,
pairs etc). The only additional restriction, per CN product, is that the number of
regressors for ech type of dummy is lower than the number of observations to ensure
some variability in the sample. The regressors included are firm-CN8 and country-
CN FE, for the different CN product categories. For each CN product category,
averages of all the CN products are weighted by their number of observations.
Prices and quantities are in logs.
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Table 4.37: Industry-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit for Weight and Units. Prices
and quantities are in logs.
Exports in weight Exports in units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
R2 of R2 of Obs. # R2 of R2 of Obs. #
INDUSTRIES price quantity (model price quantity (model
(CN2 product codes) regr. regr. degrees of regr. regr. degrees of
freedom) freedom)
Agriculture 92.1% 63.9% 6821 . . .
CN2 codes 1 to 15 (1420) .
Food, beverages 91.2% 65.5% 11625 94.4% 62.6% 1204
CN2 codes 16 to 24 (2047) (271)
Minerals, chemicals 87.8% 68.9% 16277 72.2% 73.3% 344
CN2 codes 25 to 38 (2649) (129)
Plastics and rubber 82.8% 73.6% 16641 94.3% 77.5% 583
CN2 codes 39 and 40 (2760) (183)
Leather, skins, wood 96.0% 81.9% 2353 95.0% 68.7% 1220
CN2 codes 41 to 46 (562) (299)
Articles of paper 76.5% 70.4% 5843 87.9% 76.2% 16
CN2 codes 47 to 49 (1257) (12)
Textile articles 91.0% 70.1% 13544 91.5% 67.3% 12276
CN2 codes 50 to 63 (2679) (2165)
Footwear, accessories 87.7% 70.3% 322 86.4% 66.7% 356
CN2 codes 64 to 67 (97) (106)
Construction materials 92.7% 79.4% 2757 94.5% 73.4% 1114
CN2 codes 68 to 70 (612) (245)
Base metals, jewelry 88.2% 80.4% 10859 92.9% 61.5% 274
CN2 codes 71 to 83 (2395) (88)
Mechanical appliances 72.5% 68.8% 17672 92.8% 73.5% 2884
CN2 codes 84 and 85 (3369) (731)
Transport equipment 80.4% 69.1% 2160 97.6% 79.8% 330
CN2 codes 86 to 89 (492) (129)
Precision instruments 71.0% 66.2% 2128 89.0% 75.2% 550
CN2 codes 90 to 93 (498) (169)
Furniture and toys 84.4% 68.0% 5162 90.7% 72.5% 299
CN2 codes 94 to 96 (980) (85)
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 1, for
quantities expressed in weight (kilograms) and units (liters, bottles, pairs etc). As regressors
firm-CN8 and country-industry FE are included. The industry "Agriculture" has been dropped
from the sample because it had only 4 observations and the same number of dummies. Prices
and quantities are in logs.
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4.5 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter the verti-zontal model presented in Chapter 3 has been shown to be
congruent with the empirical observations based on two different datasets, one of which
with an exceptional coverage of exporters, destinations and products. The model seems
to be robust enough to perform well under quite general market and product definitions.
This is reassuring and, while it leaves room for further tests on different contexts and
data, it may justify the use of the verti-zontal model to study trade patterns and market
competitiveness. To confirm this intuition, in the next Chapter the relevance of the
model in a macro context is tested and it is shown how it can be used to undertake
analyses at the country-sector level, which of course requires more assumptions in order
to compensate the lower amount of detail of the information available.
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Chapter 5
From micro to macro: evidence and
applications
After having analyzed the theoretical and empirical validity of the verti-zontal model on
micro data in the previous Chapters, this Chapter starts by testing whether the micro
analysis undertaken so far can be extended to a macro context. In the previous Chapter
it has been shown that the linearity of demand implied by the use of quadratic preferences
is not rejected by the data at any level of product aggregation when varieties are defined
as firm-product combinations, but this does not necessarily imply that the analysis can
be extended to country-products, hence the tests. After the tests, the Chapter shows how
the verti-zontal model can be applied to aggregate trade data as a way to extract infor-
mation which may be relevant for policy purposes. Defining varieties as exporter-product
combinations, the same methodology used to determine quality and taste mismatch of
firm-product combinations can indeed be adopted to derive macroeconomic indicators of
competitiveness at the sector-country level.
This Chapter is based on a Chapter of the DG ECFIN’s European Economy Oc-
casional Paper "EU Balance-of-Payment assistance for Latvia. Foundations of success"
(Di Comite et al., 2012) and Economic Paper "Measuring quality and non-cost competi-
tiveness at the country-sector level" (Comite, 2012), but extends them in two important
directions, first, by testing explicitly for the validity of the macro adaptation of the verti-
zontal approach and, second, by narrowing substantially the product definition from 97
CN2 products to more than 10.000 CN8 products.
5.1 Verti-zontal evidence in a macro context
Since the analysis of the verti-zontal model presented in the previous Chapter was based
on a firm-level data, it may be argued that, a priori, there is no reason to believe that it
can be automatically extended to the macro context. For this reason, this Section tests
whether the assumptions and the structural form employed in the verti-zontal model
are rejected when using aggregate trade data. For robustness, two different approaches
are employed: one looking only at Belgian exports (as in the previous Chapter) and
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the other using a cross section of EU28 country-product exports. The two datasets
are obtained from Eurostat’s COMEXT, with export data classified in terms of the
Combined Nomenclature system employed also in the previous Chapter. In the first
case, only Belgian CN8 exports are considered, in the second case the CN8 exports from
the 28 members of the European Union. The key difference between the two methods
consists in the definition of product categories. Whereas varieties are always interpreted
as country-CN8 product combinations, product categories are defined as higher levels
of aggregation in the case of Belgian exports (i.e., product codes in terms of 6 digits,
CN6, 4 digits, CN4, and 2 digits, CN2) and simply as CN8 products in the case of
EU28 country-product exports. The reason for the different definitions is that the unit
of analysis (the variety) in the Belgian exports dataset is a Belgian-CN8 export, so
that the smallest category which can be used to aggregate varieties is Belgium-CN6,
followed by Belgium-CN4 and Belgium CN2. This is not the case for the EU28 cross-
section dataset, where the unit of analysis is a exporter-CN8-importer combination, so
that the product category can be defined as the CN8 product, whose varieties are the
corresponding exporter-CN8 combinations, resulting in a maximum of 28 varieties per
product. Higher levels of product aggregation (CN6, CN4 and CN2) are considered for
robustness, keeping the definition of a variety constant (as an exporter-CN8).
To give some concrete examples, consider the CN8 code 90041010, used to identify
the product "Sunglasses with optically worked lenses". In the EU28 cross-section, this
is also a product category, Belgian 90041010 and French 90041010 being different va-
rieties of it. In the Belgian exports dataset, instead, of the CN code 90041010 alone
would be a variety and the product categories would be Belgian "Sunglasses" (CN6 code
900410), "Spectacles, goggles and the like" (CN4 code 9004) and "Optical, photographic,
cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and ap-
paratus" (CN2 code 90). It should be remembered from the previous Chapters that the
definition of a product is relevant because the substitution effects described in the verti-
zontal model involve only varieties of the same product, the rest of the economy being
captured by the numéraire. Therefore, the higher the level of aggregation, the looser
the relation between the varieties included in it and less acceptable the technical model
assumption of equal substitution patterns between varieties of the same product (which
is common to virtually all trade models).
On the one hand, the analysis on Belgian exports has the disadvantage of using less
narrow product categories but the advantage of fixing the exporter’s location, obviat-
ing the concerns about institutional differences across exporting countries (think, for
example, of strategic transfer pricing for particular products) or varying transport costs
across varieties. On the other hand, the EU28 cross-section approach offers the benefit
of having varieties differing only by their place of production, keeping the same physical
and functional characteristics, but the disadvantage of not being able to account for the
differences in transport costs or any other source of country-pair heterogeneity at the
product level. Depending on which concern is deemed more compelling, one approach
may be preferred over the other. In this Section it is shown that the two approaches
yields very similar qualitative results and point in the direction of a confirmation of the
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possibility of adopting a quadratic utility framework with variety-specific markup shifter
and market-variety-specific quantity shifter.
5.1.1 Data used for macro validation of the verti-zontal model
All the data required for the exercise can be found on the Eurostat COMEXT database,
searching for CN8 exports from the 28 European Union member states to any other
country of the world. The firm-level analysis in the previous Chapter has been performed
on a cross-section of Belgian firms based on 2005 data, therefore the same year has been
selected for the macro validation. In addition, the year 2005 has the advantage to be
one of the first years in which extensive information on all the EU28 member states is
available on COMEXT.1 Similarly to what has been done in the micro-level analysis, the
sample needs some data cleaning before performing the analysis. First of all, because of
the sheer size of the dataset (composed of 2,772,102 data points collected from 28 different
statistics offices), there may be encoding mistakes that result in abnormal observations.
These outliers are dealt with by cutting the top and bottom 1% of the price and quantity
distributions. In addition, given that the exercise requires some variability across markets
for each variety and across varieties for each market, the sample has to be restricted to
varieties present in more than one market and markets being served by more than one
variety. A market is here defined as country-product combination, where products are
defined slightly differently in the two dataset, as explained above.
The effects of these restrictions on the final sample are shown in Table 5.1, which can
be compared to Table 4.11 where the micro-data sample features are displayed. Column
1 of Table 5.1 shows the Belgian CN8 exports dataset; column 2 described the same
sample after the restrictions on outliers and number of market and varieties; column 3
shows entire EU28 cross-section dataset; column 4 is its corresponding restricted sample.
1Most of the countries display accurate CN8 trade statistics starting from 2002, but Poland, Malta
and Slovakia start from 2004.
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Table 5.1: The full and restricted data sample of Belgian firm-product-country exports.
Belgian CN8 exports EU28 cross-section
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Restricted Full sample Restricted
Observations 177,230 60,401 2,772,102 2,139,445
Exporters 1 1 28 28
CN2 Products 96 89 96 96
CN4 Products 1,221 668 1,244 1,219
CN6 Products 4,932 1,471 5,221 4,957
CN8 Products 8,958 4,619 10,054 9,043
Exporter-CN2 Combinations 96 89 2,664 2,576
Exporter-CN4 Combinations 1,221 668 29,991 25,101
Exporter-CN6 Combinations 4,932 1,471 108,674 84,356
Exporter-CN8 Combinations 8,958 4,619 184,461 134,619
Destinations 185 167 186 185
Importer-CN2 Combinations 10,013 4,590 16,016 12,325
Importer-CN4 Combinations 57,231 14,667 145,713 95,097
Importer-CN6 Combinations 132,589 22,914 461,150 283,516
Importer-CN8 Combinations 177,230 60,401 727,814 425,736
Trade volume (bill. euros) 249 67.5 2,992 1,647
Destinations per variety:
Mean 19.78 13.08 15.03 15.89
Median 12 8 6 8
Min 1 1 1 1
Max 147 107 179 158
Varieties per CN8-destination:
Mean 3.81 5.03
Median 2 4
Min 1 2
Max 28 27
Varieties per CN6-destination:
Mean 1.34 2.64 6.01 7.55
Median 1 2 3 5
Min 1 2 1 2
Max 34 30 352 280
Varieties per CN4-destination:
Mean 3.10 4.12 19.02 22.50
Median 2 2 6 9
Min 1 2 1 2
Max 75 68 848 763
Varieties per CN2-destination:
Mean 17.70 13.16 173.08 173.59
Median 6 5 36 37
Min 1 2 1 2
Max 779 468 11,317 10,133
Notes:"In the restricted samples, the bottom and top 1% of the price and quantity
distributions are dropped. In addition, a minimum number of two markets per variety
and of two varieties per market is imposed. Varieties are defined as exporter-CN8 com-
binations; markets are defined as importer-CN8 combinations in the EU28 cross-section
and as importer-CN6 combinations for Belgian CN8 exports."
5.1. VERTI-ZONTAL EVIDENCE IN A MACRO CONTEXT 237
5.1.2 Empirical specifications
As for the micro-level exercise of the previous Chapter, equations (3.54) and (3.57) are
used to run a goodness-of-fit test. The equations describing market outcomes in the
verti-zontal are reported here with a slightly different notation to account for both the
country where the variety s is produced, o, and the country where it is sold, i. Keeping
trade costs implicit, equilibrium prices can thus be rewritten as
p∗s,oi =
αs,o + cs,oi
2
− Ti
(
a˜i − c˜i
2
)
or, writing trade costs explicitly, equilibrium prices become
p∗s,oi =
αs,o + cs,o
2
−
(
Ti a˜i − c˜i
2
− toi
2
)
. (5.1)
The corresponding quantities with implicit trade costs can be thus written as
q∗s,oi =
1
βs,oi
[
αs,o − cs,oi
2
− Ti α¯i − c¯i
2
]
or, with explicit trade costs, as
q∗s,oi =
1
βs,oi
[
αs,o − cs,o
2
−
(
Ti α¯i − c¯i
2
+
toi
2
)]
. (5.2)
The equations show that equilibrium prices and quantities can be seen as consisting
of a first term, which is determined by firm-product level marginal cost (cs,o) and quality
(αs,o) in the country of origin, and a second term which depends on destination market
specific variables (indexed by i). Variety-specific variation (cost and quality) can then be
captured empirically by firm-product fixed effects, while local competition effects in the
destination market can be captured by country-product fixed effects. On top of these two
sources of variability, the quantity equation alone is characterized also a variety-country-
pair-specific source of variability, which is what distinguishes the verti-zontal model from
the existing workhorse trade models and is thus the object of the current analysis.
The empirical specification follows closely the micro-level exercise presented in the
previous Chapter, with prices (ys,oi = ps,oi) and quantities (ys,oi = qs,oi) of varieties being
regressed on a variety and a destination set of dummies. Notice that instead of the firm-
product dummies used in the firm-level analysis, in a macroeconomic environment the
producers are identified by the origin of the trade flow (the exporting country), following
the standard Armington (1969) assumption used in macro trade models. As for the
destination markets, both in the micro and the macro context, their are represented by
the country of destination of the trade flow, taking into account that imported varieties
compete with each other within specific product categories defined at different CN levels.
Hence, varieties are exporter-CN8 product combinations whereas markets are importer-
CN product combinations:
ys,oi = δ0 + δ1V arietys,o + δ2Importer_Producti + s,oi (5.3)
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In the regressions alternatively price and quantity level data are used as dependent
variables, ys,oi = ps,oi, qs,oi.
It should be remembered that one of the key results of the verti-zontal model is that
the set of dummies in (5.3) should perform better in explaining prices than quantities
because exporter-product dummies account for variety-specific cost and quality determi-
nants of prices whereas destination market-specific dummies capture all the characteris-
tics of the importer shifting demand for all the varieties sold in the market. Quantities
should instead be explained less well by this specification because variety-market-specific
effects are not included out, but according to the model they should play an important
role in determining total sales, without affecting prices. This is expected to determine a
consistently lower R2 for quantity dummy regressions also in a macro context.
When one country of origin for the exports is considered, such as in the micro-level
analysis of the previous Chapter or the analysis of this Chapter based on the Belgian
exports, the specification in (5.3) can implicitly account for trade costs through the
destination market dummies, but in the case of multiple exporters (or to test explicitly
the role of transport costs in explaining part of the variability), the specification in (5.3)
can be adapted as follows, using distance as a proxy for trade costs:
ys,oi = δ0 + δ1V arietys,o + δ2Importer_Producti + δ3Distanceoi + s,oi. (5.4)
As in the previous Chapter, distance is included both as a robustness check of the
model (where prices are expected to be positively correlated with transport costs) and as a
test of the validity of alternative models to the verti-zontal that would explain variability
in first-on-board (fob) prices across destination markets only in terms of transport costs,
such as the model based on CES preferences with linear transport costs discussed by
Crozet et al. (2012) and Martin (2010).
5.1.3 Empirical results based on the aggregate Belgian export data
Following the structure of the previous Chapter’s test based on micro-level Belgian ex-
ports data, the analysis proceeds as follows. First individual country, product and variety
dummies are included alone in the dummy regression. Then the relative importance of
variety and market effects is investigated through an ANOVA analysis. Finally, the two
set of dummies (with and without distance regressors) are included, first on the entire
sample, then product by product and in the end by splitting the sample into industries.
The analysis is performed on the Belgian export and then on the EU28 cross section,
comparing the results on the two datasets for each table.
Heterogeneity across firms, products and markets
Before discussing the results of the specification (5.3), in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 is first re-
ported the variation explained by exporter, product, importer and market (i.e., importer
product) effects alone, with and without distance. Quantities are expressed in kilograms
and are considered in raw total terms, in per capita terms and in terms of units of GDP.
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While Table 5.2 presents results on aggregate Belgian export data, Tables 5.3 and 5.4
are based on the E28 cross section, the first without the effect of distance and the second
including distance as a regressor. Of course, exporter effects cannot be included in Table
5.2 where only Belgian exports are considered, and similarly distance cannot be intro-
duced in the dummy regressions on Belgian export data when destination and market
dummies are included because of collinearity (columns 9 to 12). Thus distance in Table
5.2 is included only with variety dummies, i.e. in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8.
The simplified empirical specifications for these tests can be written as
ys,oi = δ0 + δ1IndividualSourceOfV ariability + s,oi,
where IndividualSourceOfV ariability is without subscript because it can be at the
product (s), variety (s, o) or market level (i). When also distance is included, it can
instead be written as
ys,oi = δ0 + δ1IndividualSourceOfV ariability + δ3Distanceoi + s,oi.
Consistently with Martin (2012), distance is found to affect prices in a positive and
significant way in the three Tables, yet its impact on the total price variability explained
is so small that cannot be seen at the level of precision reported in Table 5.2 and in Tables
5.3 and 5.4 it is never higher than 0.2% or 0.3% of total variability. This is in line with
the results presented in the previous Chapter and would not be consistent with models
where the only source of fob price variability across markets is due to differences in linear
transport costs. In the case of the verti-zontal model, transport costs are just one of
the possible sources of variability (the others being variety-specific cost and quality and
destination market-specific competition), so the little amount of variability explained by
distance is less of a concern. The quantity variability explained increases slightly more
than price variability with the inclusion of distance in the three Tables, which is consistent
with the idea of taste mismatch being somehow related to the physical proximity between
the place of production and consumption of a certain product.
As for the other results of Table 5.2, it can be noticed that they are in line with
the results of the previous Chapter on the firm level and point in the direction of a
high amount of price variability explained by both variety specific dummies and market
specific dummies, systematically higher than the quantity variability explained (with
the exception of the case in which only importer’s fixed effects are considered, where
price variability is almost completely left unexplained by the regression). Indeed, in
columns 1 to 8 product fixed effects are shown to explain between 22.6% and 60.8%
of price variability, increasing in the level of disaggregation of the product definition.
The quantity variation explained is instead much lower, ranging from 2.8% to 27.7%
considering quantities, quantities per capita and quantities per unit of GDP, indicating
a much larger dispersion of quantities across varieties within the same product category
than prices.
Similarly, importer-product fixed effects are shown in columns 9 to 12, approximating
not only the destination market effects in (5.1) but also part of the taste effects, β, for
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Belgian exported products (because the exporting country is fixed in Table 5.2). Hence,
it can be noted that the explained variability for quantities is substantially higher than
in the previous columns, ranging from 4.6% to 56.4% at the most detailed product-level
(importer-CN8) considering quantities per unit of GDP. The R2 for price regressions is
still higher than for quantity regressions, but they are closer to each other when importer-
product fixed effects are considered as opposed to when only products or varieties are
considered.
Turning to the EU28 cross section in Tables 5.3 without distance and 5.4 with dis-
tance, it can be noted that the results are qualitatively the same. In columns 1 and
2 exporter-fixed effects and importer-fixed effects alone are included to see how much
data variation in prices and quantities is explained by exporting-country characteristics.
Including only exporter-FE or importer-FE is equivalent to assuming that there is only
one source of heterogeneity in the data and it works at the country level (as, for exam-
ple, the level of GDP or the exchange rate). The results in columns 1 and 2 show that
exporters’ or importers’ characteristics play almost no role in explaining the variation in
prices and quantities, as the explain less than 2% of the total variation in prices and an
even lower amount of variation in quantities when transport costs are not included.2 This
finding suggests that it would not be correct to consider countries as big multi-product
firms with a similar level of efficiency (say, because of technology) across the different
products, at least as long as EU member states are considered (this finding may not
be automatically extended to datasets with developed and developing countries, where
there may arguably be at least an exporter effect on prices). This result may also appear
counterintuitive in that it is common to think that macroeconomic characteristics of a
country such as its institutions, laws, regulations, openness to trade among others may
affect its trade performance, but this notion seems to be rejected by the observation of
the variability captured by country dummies, both as far as importers and exporters are
concerned. One important caveat is that this methodology implicitly looks only at the
intensive margin (i.e., how much of a given CN8 product is exported or imported by a
country) and hence it does not rule out adjustments on the extensive margin (i.e., that
a given country exports or imports a higher number of CN8 products) because of spe-
cific country characteristics, which may be an important source of heterogeneity between
countries in terms of overall trade performance.3
As for the product fixed effects, at different level of aggregation, in columns 3 to 6
they are shown to explain between 20.9% and 43.4% of price variability in Table 5.3 and
between 21.2% and 43.5% in Table 5.4, increasing in the level of disaggregation of the
product definition. The quantity variation explained is instead much lower, ranging from
3.1% to 11.6% considering quantities, quantities per capita and quantities per unit of
2Interestingly, when no product or variety dummies are included, the inclusion of transport costs
substantially increases the amount of variability captured in terms of quantities, even if not in terms of
prices.
3For example, in 2005 Belgium exported 6,574 different CN8 products to the rest of the world.
Portugal, with a similar population, exported only 4,195 CN8 products and Sweden, with a similar GDP
in 2005 exported 5,430 CN8 products. This suggests that even if country differences in terms of intensive
margins are not significant, there is still room for large differences on the extensive margin.
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GDP with and without distance, indicating a much larger dispersion of quantities across
varieties within the same product category than prices. This result suggests a very low
level of fob price equalization in international trade and confirms the need to focus of
models of international trade with imperfect competition and imperfect substitutability
between varieties of the same product.
Combining the information on exporters and product categories, exporter-product
fixed effect are considered in columns 7 to 10, capturing the variety effect at the exporter-
CN8 level. The price variation captured is higher than for product dummies alone and
ranges from 24.8% to 57.5% in Table 5.3 with almost no increase due to the inclusion
of distance regressors, again increasing the disaggregation of product definition. The
quantity variation explained ranges instead from 4.1% to 21.2%, with a slightly higher
impact of distance. These numbers show that, differently from exporter fixed effects,
exporter-product fixed effects have a substantial explanatory power, which is comparable
and even more pronounced than firm effects found in the previous Chapter on micro-level
export data and in the literature (Eaton et al., 2011; Lawless and Whelan, 2008; Munch
and Nguyen, 2014). In fact, in the firm-level analysis, firm-level fixed effects explained
38.3% of the price variation of Belgian exporters and slightly less than 20% of variation
for quantities per unit of GDP.
Therefore, at the product level, institutional, technological or other country-product
specific features of the exporters do seem to play an important role in determining prices
and quantities traded, to an extent similar to firm-level effects in a micro-level dataset.
It still captures less variability than the firm-product fixed effects used in the previous
Chapter in the micro-level context, but it could be expected that higher levels of aggre-
gation imply a lower capacity to fit the data. It is reassuring to find such a similarity
in the behavior of firm-product fixed effects in a firm-level dataset and exporter-product
fixed effects in a country-product-level dataset because it suggests that the assumption
of variety-specific quality and cost parameters holds at different levels of aggregation.
Finally, importer-product fixed effects are shown in columns 11 to 14, approximating
the market effects. The price variability explained is surprisingly similar to the exporter-
product fixed effects at the same level of product definition. This is not true of quantity
variability, though, which is substantially higher than in the previous columns, ranging
from 9.6% to 41.0% at the most detailed product-level (importer-CN8) considering quan-
tities per unit of GDP and the impact of distance. The R2 for price and quantities in
general are closer to each other when importer-product fixed effects are considered. This
is not a surprise and is consistent with both the verti-zontal and CES models. Remember
indeed that in the verti-zontal model country-product dummies which capture destina-
tion country-effects affect both prices and quantities. But country-product effects, at
least in part, also capture part of the taste heterogeneity since taste varies across coun-
tries. Notice that unreported F-tests turn out to be significant for all the single-attribute
models considered also in the macro context, as they were in the previous Chapter, so
models not including one of these sources of heterogeneity may be not using all the in-
formation contained in the data. To test this intuition explicitly, however, the different
sources of heterogeneity have to be introduced together, as shown in what follows.
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Table 5.2: Single-attribute Models and Goodness-of-fit for Belgian exports, with and without distance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
CN2 Product FE YES YES
CN4 Product FE YES YES
CN6 Product FE YES YES
CN8 Product FE YES YES
Importer FE YES
Importer-CN2 FE YES
Importer-CN4 FE YES
Importer-CN6 FE YES
Goodness of fit
Price reg. R2 22.6% 22.6% 39.2% 39.2% 47.8% 47.8% 60.8% 60.8% 1.2% 29.2% 56.6% 68.6%
Quantity reg. R2 2.8% 3.5% 7.2% 7.9% 10.5% 11.3% 20.4% 21.3% 4.6% 16.7% 37.1% 52.1%
Q.per Capita reg.R2 3.9% 3.9% 8.7% 8.7% 12.1% 12.1% 21.6% 21.6% 6.5% 18.6% 38.9% 52.0%
Q.per GDP reg.R2 6.0% 6.0% 13.7% 13.7% 17.9% 17.9% 27.7% 27.7% 10.0% 30.1% 47.8% 56.4%
Distance coefficients
In price reg. 0.016 0.007 0.010 0.012
T-statistic (2.8) (1.4) (2.0) (2.6)
*** ** ***
In quantity reg. -0.680 -0.743 -0.789 -0.858
T-statistic (20.5) (22.1) (23.2) (25.6)
*** *** *** ***
In Q.per Capita reg. -2.8e-08 -3.2e-08 -3.4Ee-08 -3.7e-08
T-statistic (-29.6) (-32.7) (-34.2) (-38.3)
*** *** *** ***
In Q.per GDP reg. 5.5e-14 -2.24e-13 -4.0e-13 -6.3e-13
T-statistic (1.1) (4.5) (8.0) (12.9)
*** *** ***
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 5.1. Quantities are expressed in weight (kilograms).
Significance of the distance coefficients is reported at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level.
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Table 5.3: Single-attribute Models and Goodness-of-fit for EU28 cross section.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p;
y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q
Exporter FE YES
Importer FE YES
CN2 Product FE YES
CN4 Product FE YES
CN6 Product FE YES
CN8 Product FE YES
Exporter-CN2 FE YES
Exporter-CN4 FE YES
Exporter-CN6 FE YES
Exporter-CN8 FE YES
Importer-CN2 FE YES
Importer-CN4 FE YES
Importer-CN6 FE YES
Importer-CN8 FE YES
Goodness of fit
Price reg. R2 1.5% 1.2% 20.9% 34.7% 40.5% 43.4% 24.8% 41.8% 52.0% 57.5% 23.6% 40.4% 50.8% 56.5%
Quantity reg. R2 0.3% 0.4% 3.2% 5.9% 7.7% 8.9% 4.5% 9.4% 14.1% 17.5% 9.5% 16.3% 24.2% 30.6%
Q.per Capita reg.R2 0.3% 0.6% 3.1% 5.5% 7.2% 8.5% 4.1% 8.6% 13.0% 16.6% 11.8% 19.7% 28.2% 35.1%
Q.per GDP reg.R2 0.3% 0.7% 3.1% 6.9% 9.4% 11.3% 4.5% 10.9% 16.7% 21.2% 14.0% 25.1% 34.7% 41.2%
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 5.1. Quantities are expressed in weight (kilograms).
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Table 5.4: Single-attribute Models and Goodness-of-fit for EU28 cross section, accounting for distance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p; y = p;
y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q y = q
Exporter FE YES
Importer FE YES
CN2 Product FE YES
CN4 Product FE YES
CN6 Product FE YES
CN8 Product FE YES
Exporter-CN2 FE YES
Exporter-CN4 FE YES
Exporter-CN6 FE YES
Exporter-CN8 FE YES
Importer-CN2 FE YES
Importer-CN4 FE YES
Importer-CN6 FE YES
Importer-CN8 FE YES
Goodness of fit
Price reg. R2 1.8% 1.3% 21.2% 34.8% 40.7% 43.5% 24.9% 41.8% 52.1% 57.6% 23.6% 40.4% 50.9% 56.5%
Quantity reg. R2 0.9% 4.4% 3.7% 6.4% 8.2% 9.5% 5.1% 10.1% 14.9% 18.4% 9.7 % 16.6% 24.5% 31.0%
Q.per Capita reg.R2 1.5% 6.2% 4.1% 6.5% 8.3% 9.7% 5.3% 9.9% 14.5% 18.2% 12.0% 20.0% 28.5% 35.4%
Q.per GDP reg.R2 0.5% 7.3% 3.3% 7.1% 9.7% 11.6% 4.7% 11.2% 17.1% 21.8% 14.2% 25.3% 34.9% 41.4%
Distance coefficients
In price reg. 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12
T-statistic (68.2) (30.8) (74.7) (69.5) (66.7) (68.0) (54.4) (51.1) (50.5) (53.9) (26.7) (22.7) (21.9) (22.5)
In quantity reg. -0.13 -0.51 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.50 -0.55 -0.61 -0.68
T-statistic (99.5) (61.4) (89.2) (89.0) (92.2) (96.5) (101.0) (108.8) (120.2) (130.6) (60.1) (64.8) (70.2) (76.4)
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 5.1. Quantities are expressed in weight (kilograms). All
coefficients for the distance regressor are significant at the 1% confidence level. Coefficients on the distance regressors for quantities per capita and
quantity per GDP are also all negative and significant. They are available under request.
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ANOVA analysis
The single-attribute models in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show that variety (or exporter-
product) and market fixed effects yield a high R2, especially with observations at the CN6
or CN8 level of product aggregation, but it is impossible to know the relative importance
of each in explaining data variability by simply comparing R2 across different models.4
The relative importance of each type of fixed effect, when also the other is included, can
be determined through a variance decomposition analysis (ANOVA), which can also be
useful to discriminate between quadratic utility and CES models since quadratic utility
models predict that country effects are an important determinant of prices while CES
type of models see no role for country-effects to explain price variability.
The ANOVA analysis on Belgian aggregate export data and on the EU28 cross section
are reported, respectively, in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. For Belgian exports, in Table 5.5
a combined attribute model of Belgian-CN8 varieties and different market definitions,
ranging from entire countries (column 1) to country-CN6 products (colum 4). Again,
distance cannot be included in Table 5.5 because of collinearity with the destination
dummies. For the cross section of EU28 exports, the ANOVA analysis can be richer,
including the impact of distance and of different levels of product definition also in the
definition of a variety. Thus, different combined attribute models of exporter-products
(as varieties) and importer-product (as destination markets) are considered at different
levels of product definition, from exporter and importer fixed effects alone (column 1) to
exporter-CN8 and importer-CN8 fixed effects with the inclusion of distance (column 10).
The Tables report then mean sum of squares (MS) associated with each type of
regressor (the dummies and the distance) because the number of dummies associated
with variety and market fixed effect is very different in the different specifications, so one
may wrongly conclude that one type of fixed effects is more important than the other
in explaining total variation simply because of a higher number of dummies associated
with it. Indeed, the Mean Sum of Squares (MS) is the outcome of dividing the Partial
Sum of Squares of each regressor by its degrees of freedom from the regressions, so it can
be seen as giving the explanatory power of each regressor per degree of freedom.
The different specifications explored in the columns of the Tables 5.5 and 5.6 tell a
consistent story. At any level of product or market aggregation, the ANOVA decom-
position suggests that variety and market effects are of similar importance in capturing
variability, so that the use of a combined model is justified. As in the previous Chapter’s
ANOVA analysis, the importance of variety and market fixed effects is about even in
the quantity regressions, while variety fixed effect appear more important than market
fixed effects in the price regressions, per degree of freedom. The inclusion of distance in
Table 5.6 doesn’t change substantially the results, but it soaks up some of the variability
explained by both variety and market effects in terms of both prices and quantities.
Therefore, the ANOVA analysis confirms that variety and market effects should be
included simultaneously to explain price and quantity variation and, in addition, trade
4Only when the regressors are orthogonal and completely uncorrelated the increase in the R2 indicates
what the contribution of each regressor is, but this is unlikely here, if only because they capture more
than 50% of variability at the CN8 product level.
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models should account for the impact of transport costs on fob price variability.
Table 5.5: Analysis of Variance in dummy regressions for Belgian exports.
Mean Sum of Squares in price regressions
(y = p)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variety FE 6.12e+07 3.35e+07 3.03e+07 3.04e+07
Importer FE 6.38e+06
Importer-CN2 FE 6.53e+06
Importer-CN4 FE 8.48e+06
Importer-CN6 FE 8.35e+06
Mean Sum of Squares in quantity regressions
(y = q)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variety FE 3.47e+09 3.57e+09 2.49e+09 2.50e+09
Importer FE 6.74e+09
Importer-CN2 FE 2.47e+09
Importer-CN4 FE 2.82e+09
Importer-CN6 FE 2.66e+09
Notes: The results in this table are based on the full sample as
described in Table 5.1, with the bottom and top 1% of the price and
quantity distributions dropped and imposing a minimum number of
five markets per variety and of five varieties per market for compu-
tational reasons. The results refer to dummy regressions, with and
without distance regressors, on unit values and quantities expressed
in kilograms.
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Table 5.6: Analysis of Variance in dummy regressions on the EU28 cross section, with and without distance regressors.
Mean Sum of Squares in price regressions
(y = p)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Exporter FE 5.27e+08 5.20e+08
Exporter-CN2 FE 9.70e+07 9.62e+07
Exporter-CN4 FE 5.30e+07 5.28e+07
Exporter-CN6 FE 4.07e+07 4.06e+07
Exporter-CN8 FE 3.84e+07 3.83e+07
Importer FE 1.11e+08 9.31e+07
Importer-CN2 FE 3.11e+07 3.04e+07
Importer-CN4 FE 2.00e+07 1.97e+07
Importer-CN6 FE 1.62e+07 1.60e+07
Importer-CN8 FE 1.55e+07 1.53e+07
Distance 6.12e+08 6.33e+08 6.38e+08 6.71e+08 6.79e+08
Mean Sum of Squares in quantity regressions
(y = q)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Exporter FE 1.23e+10 1.22e+10
Exporter-CN2 FE 1.13e+09 1.14e+09
Exporter-CN4 FE 5.82e+08 5.91e+08
Exporter-CN6 FE 4.45e+08 4.52e+08
Exporter-CN8 FE 4.25e+08 4.31e+08
Importer FE 3.84e+09 4.22e+09
Importer-CN2 FE 6.49e+08 7.13e+08
Importer-CN4 FE 3.98e+08 4.31e+08
Importer-CN6 FE 3.33e+08 3.59e+08
Importer-CN8 FE 3.24e+08 3.48e+08
Distance 6.35e+10 7.76e+10 8.60e+10 8.72e+10 8.71e+10
Notes: The results in this table are based on the full sample as described in Table 5.1, with the bottom and top 1% of the price and quantity
distributions dropped and imposing a minimum of fifteen markets per variety and fifteen varieties per market for computational reasons. The
results refer to dummy regressions, with and without distance regressors, on unit values and quantities expressed in kilograms.
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Combining variety and market dummies
While the results on single-attribute models in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 suggest that variety
and market dummies in isolation are relevant, the variance decomposition in Tables 5.5
and 5.6 suggest that the two set of dummies should be included together to explain
price and quantity variability. Also distance (approximating transport costs) shows a
high level of variability captured per exogenous variable used (in fact, for distance, the
partial SS and the MSS coincide and are almost constant across specifications because
only one regressor is used) as compared to the individual contribution of each one of
the large set of variety and market dummies employed in the regressions, which explains
why the coefficients for distance are always statistically significant even though the total
variability explained by the model is virtually unaffected by the inclusion of distance.
The results associated with their combinations are reported in Tables 5.7 for Belgian
aggregate exports and 5.8 for the EU28 cross section, for different levels of product defini-
tion. In Table 5.7 product definition ranges from CN2 (column 1) to CN8 (column 4). In
Table 5.8 also importer and exporter fixed effects are included, and the results associated
with each level of product definition are shown with and without the effect of distance.
Notice that the number of dummies used in the CN8 level of product definition is par-
ticularly high (more than 543,000), which required the use of the estimation procedure
proposed by Guimares and Portugal (2010) to estimate models with high-dimensional
fixed effects.5
Independently of the product-market definition, it can be seen that in both Tables
the variability explained by the dummy regressions on prices is always higher than by
the same regressions on quantities. The only exception is the inclusion of importer and
exporter fixed effects alone, which are again shown to capture almost no variability on
prices and slightly more variability in quantities even when they are considered together.
Considering all the regressions, the difference between price and quantity regressions’
R2 is never smaller than 12.1% of total variability and can be as high as 34.2%. These
figures may provide an indication as to how much variability could be captured by the
taste mismatch variable, the parameter β in the verti-zontal model, which is defined at the
variety-market level. As for the inclusion of distance, it is again shown to be insignificant
in terms of total price variability explained but statistically significant in terms of its
marginal impact on prices, consistently with the single-attribute models tested earlier.
It also has a slightly stronger impact on quantities, which can be attributed to taste
differences, as discussed earlier.
It should be noticed that the price and quantity variability captured by the dummy
regressions on the Belgian aggregate exports dataset is higher than the variability cap-
tured by the same regressions on the EU28 cross section. One possible reason is the
number of dummies over the total number of observations, which are almost 50% at the
CN8 product level for Belgian aggregate exports and slightly more than 25% at the CN8
product level for the EU28 cross section. Another possible reason is that there may be
5In contrast, for the ANOVA analysis the sample had to be restricted by raising the number of
markets served by each variety and varieties present in each market to reduce the number of fixed effects
to be included for computational reasons.
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country-pair or product-country-pair specific demand shifters (such as a common border,
a common language or a common legal system in the case of country pairs and common
product market regulation in the case of product-countries pairs) that are implicitly
captured when the exporting country is fixed and are lost when different exporters and
importers are pooled. Notice, however, that these demand shifters should not be related
to distance or transport costs, because otherwise the inclusion of the distance regressor
in Table 5.4 should have reduced the gap.
As in the micro-level analysis in the previous Chapter, two important insights emerge
from the regressions on the combined-attribute models. The first is that a large part of
the overall price variability is captured by a combination of variety and market dummies,
which is less the case for quantity variability. The total variability captured by the firm-
level analysis was higher indeed, but the difference can be attributed to the higher level
of aggregation of the unit of analysis for aggregate trade data. It is worth remembering
that this result is in sharp contrast with models that predict that prices and quantities
should be perfectly correlated because they depend on the same sources of variability. In
addition it is in contrast with models predicting no variability across markets in fob prices
and that marker-specific characteristics only affect quantity variability, as the standard
CES-based models. Second, the empirical results suggest the linearity of demand does a
good job in fitting price variability but performs consistently worse in fitting quantities.
This is in line with what one would expect from the quadratic preferences employed in
the verti-zontal model.
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Table 5.7: Goodness-of-fit of the verti-zontal model for Belgian exports.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
CN2 Product FE YES
CN4 Product FE YES
CN6 Product FE YES
CN8 Product FE YES
Importer-CN2 FE YES
Importer-CN4 FE YES
Importer-CN6 FE YES
Importer-CN8 FE YES
Goodness of fit
Price regression R2 61.1% 65.0% 74.6% 80.0%
Quantity regression R2 26.9% 36.9% 53.6% 63.5%
Q per capita regression R2 31.1% 40.7% 55.3% 64.2%
Q per GDP regression R2 28.2% 40.2% 50.5% 56.4%
Number of dummies 4,825 9,263 19,466 27,905
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as
described in Table 5.1. Quantities are expressed in kilograms. The total
number of observations is 61,377.
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Table 5.8: Goodness-of-fit of the verti-zontal model in the EU28 cross section, with and without distance regressor.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q y = p, q
Exporter FE YES YES
Exporter-CN2 FE YES YES
Exporter-CN4 FE YES YES
Exporter-CN6 FE YES YES
Exporter-CN8 FE YES YES
Importer FE YES YES
Importer-CN2 FE YES YES
Importer-CN4 FE YES YES
Importer-CN6 FE YES YES
Importer-CN8 FE YES YES
Goodness of fit
Price regression R2 2.5% 2.5% 27.1% 27.1% 46.8% 46.8% 61.0% 61.0% 68.9% 68.9%
Quantity regression R2 4.7% 5.0% 11.3% 11.6% 20.9% 21.4% 33.0% 33.6% 43.0% 44.0%
Q per capita regression R2 6.2% 6.5% 12.9% 13.2% 23.0% 23.5% 34.5% 35.2% 44.2% 45.1%
Q per GDP regression R2 7.2% 7.4% 14.8% 15.0% 27.5% 27.8% 39.4% 39.8% 48.0% 48.4%
Number of dummies 210 210 14,724 14,670 117,934 117,799 358,541 358,353 543,417 543,203
Distance coefficients
In price reg. 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.14
T-statistic (20.0) (13.2) (13.8) (19.2) (24.2)
In quantity reg. -0.78 -0.87 -1.09 -1.38 -1.67
T-statistic (69.8) (78.4) (97.2) (118.7) (141.6)
In Q.per Capita reg. -5.3e-08 -5.9e-08 -7.1e-08 -8.7e-08 -1.0e-07
T-statistic (84.0) (94.0) (113.2) (134.0) (155.9)
In Q.per GDP reg. -3.1e-12 -3.5e-12 -4.1e-12 -5.0e-12 -5.8e-12
T-statistic (64.2) (71.9) (87.1) (101.8) (116.6)
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as described in Table 5.1. Some observations are lost when distance
is included as a regressor because of missing data: they are 2,100,204 in the regressions without distance and 2,099,676 when distance
is included. Quantities are expressed in kilograms. All coefficients for the distance regressor are significant at the 1% confidence level.
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Regressions by products and industries
The results reported in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 are obtained by using the entire samples with all
the data pooled. This procedure may hide some differences across products or industries.
To tackle this issue, the results on product-by-product dummy regressions are shown in
Table 5.9 for Belgian aggregate exports and Table 5.10 for the EU28 cross section. In
practice, this amounts to restrict the sample to one particular product, defined at the
CN8, CN6, CN4 or CN2 level and then regress the restricted sample on the variety and
market dummies as in specification (5.3).
While varieties are always defined as an exporter-CN8, the definition of the relevant
destination market varies in the two Tables and within the Tables as follows. For Belgian
aggregate exports, Table 5.9 uses two possible definitions of markets, one including only
the importer country dummy, which is equivalent to consider as a destination market
the importer-CN product under consideration (CN2, CN4 and CN6); the alternative is
to consider a relevant destination market the importer-CN6 combination, even when the
sample in divided into CN2 and CN4 products. This latter approach amounts to assuming
that CN8 Belgian exports compete (i.e. have a positive degree of substitutability) with
the other Belgian CN8 products only within the same CN6 product category. The former
approach, instead, amounts to assuming that Belgian CN8 exports compete with the
other Belgian CN8 products within the same CN2 category or CN4 category. Since in
this thesis the issue of the right size of the relevant market is not addressed explicitly,
the results are presented for all of them to show how robust is the theory to the choice
of the relevant markets to consider.
For the EU28 cross section of exports, in Table 5.10, the definition of markets is
similar, but it exploits the additional sample variability granted the presence of multiple
exporters to define destination markets more narrowly. Therefore, while the first of the
two alternative destination market definitions is simply the importer country, as in Table
5.9, the second definition of a destination market is the importer-CN8 combination. This
amounts to assume that the 28 varieties of one CN8 products exported from the 28
member states compete only within their product category, the substitution effects vis-
à-vis the rest of the economy being captured by the numéraire affecting all the products
in a similar way. Since the most detailed product levels (CN6 for the aggregate Belgian
exports and CN8 for the cross section) are the ones where the variability captured in
quantity and price regressions is the closest, they are also the ones that are most likely
to reject the model and thus represent the strictest test that can be performed.
After running the regressions on varieties and markets as defined above, the summary
statistics of their results are reported in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. In column 1 is reported the
weighted average R2 across all CN products considered, where the weight is determined
by the number of observations. In column 2 is displayed how many times the R2 for price
regressions is higher than for quantity regressions over the number of regressions run. In
column 3 is reported the number of products considered. For each column, in the two
Tables, results are reported first using the narrowest destination market definition and
then using only the importer country dummy.
In Table 5.9, in the first pane first are considered all the varieties belonging to the
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same CN2, which results in 89 different CN2 products. For each of these products a
separate regression is run on prices and quantities with variety and market fixed effects.
The weighted average R2 associated with regressions on prices is confirmed to be higher
than the corresponding R2 for regressions on quantities, for the two different definitions of
destination markets. It can be noticed that moving from an importer-CN2 to an importer-
CN6 market definition the average price and quantity variability captured increases by
around 20% of total variability for prices and even more for quantities. Column 2 shows
the percentage of times that the goodness-of-fit in the price regressions exceeds that of
the quantity regressions, which ranges from 68.5% to 78.7%.
The following two panes describe results for products defined at the CN4 and CN6
level, which are associated with a higher R2 in both prices and quantities, with the
goodness-of-fit of quantity regressions closing the gap with the price regressions but never
reaching it in average terms. In the last one, it can be noted that quantity regressions
capture almost as much variability as price regressions in Table 5.9. This proximity may
suggest that there is little room left for the additional source of variability assumed in
the verti-zontal model, the variety-market specific, β. Still, it should be noticed that,
when the sample is divided into CN6 products in the Belgian aggregate export dataset,
all the resulting CN8 varieties competing within the product category are produced in
the same country (Belgium) and shipped to the same destination, the corresponding
importer-CN6 combination, so it may be argued that a good part the differences in
taste mismatch between varieties may be captured by the market dummies. In fact,
the difference between the variability captured in price and quantity variations at the
narrowest level of market definition is higher in Table 5.10, where different exporters and
importers are considered (thus leaving the exporter-product-importer market source of
variability out of the regression).
Comparing Table 5.9 and Table 5.10, the goodness-of-fit is lower for all the regressions
in the latter than in the former, as found also in the previous Tables. However, the results
are qualitatively the same for the different levels of product aggregation and for different
market definitions. Looking at column 2, it can be spotted indeed that dummy regressions
on prices capture more variability than quantity regressions the large majority of times,
from 59.9% of the times when quantities per capita are considered at the CN8 product
level definition to 95.8% of the times when quantities per unit of GDP are considered at
the CN2 product level.6
Regressions at product-level thus confirm that prediction that a linear model ap-
pears to have less predictive power in quantity regressions, possibly because of a variety-
destination market source of variability. As remarked in the previous Chapter, the
product-by-product analysis shows that there are instances where it is not the case,
as there can be products where taste differences are not very important across markets
or where business-to-business sales are more important than business-to-consumer.7 The
6Results including distance are not reported here because they do not affect the results significantly.
7For example, as noted in the previous Chapter, in the case of intermediate products the cost-
minimizing combination of inputs in production functions may differ from the utility-maximizing con-
sumption bundle of consumers. The model is more likely to explain price and quantity variation of final
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parameter for taste heterogeneity may indeed not vary across varieties for particular
products, which would explain the similarity of R2 for prices and quantities.
Table 5.9: Product-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit for Belgian exports.
(1) (2) (3)
Weighted R2 for Number
averages Price >Quantity of
products
Market dummy: land-CN6 land land-CN6 land
by CN2 89
Price R2 70.9% 51.1% . .
Quantity R2 59.2% 30.0% 71.9% 78.7%
Q per capita R2 62.0% 35.5% 70.8% 76.4%
Q per GDP R2 64.2% 41.1% 68.5% 68.5%
by CN4 668
Price R2 63.8% 55.0% . .
Quantity R2 55.7% 43.7% 61.0% 63.7%
Q per capita R2 58.3% 47.5% 59.4% 60.9%
Q per GDP R2 58.5% 49.4% 59.7% 59.1%
by CN6 1471
Price R2 78.8% .
Quantity R2 73.4% 56.1%
Q per capita R2 77.0% 52.1%
Q per GDP R2 76.3% 54.3%
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as
described in Table 5.1, with quantities expressed in weight (kilograms).
The only additional restriction, per CN product, is that the number of
regressors for each type of dummy be lower than the number of observations
to ensure some variability in the sample. The regressors included are firm-
CN8 and importer in the columns "land" and importer-CN6 in the columns
"land-CN6", for the different CN product categories. For each CN product
category, averages of all the CN products are weighted by their number of
observations.
consumption goods than of intermediate goods.
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Table 5.10: Product-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit in the EU28 cross section.
(1) (2) (3)
Weighted R2 for Number
averages Price >Quantity of
products
Market dummy: land-CN8 land land-CN8 land
by CN2 97
Price R2 55.3% 41.5% . .
Quantity R2 38.0% 21.7% 88.5% 90.6%
Q per capita R2 40.6% 21.8% 83.3% 93.8%
Q per GDP R2 38.0% 19.6% 93.8% 95.8%
by CN4 1219
Price R2 46.6% 34.5% . .
Quantity R2 35.2% 23.6% 78.7% 78.5%
Q per capita R2 38.4% 25.3% 68.5% 69.2%
Q per GDP R2 34.8% 22.8% 82.5% 79.9%
by CN6 4957
Price R2 54.6% 47.6% . .
Quantity R2 44.0% 37.8% 75.4% 75.0%
Q per capita R2 49.0% 42.3% 62.5% 62.1%
Q per GDP R2 42.5% 36.8% 79.3% 77.8%
by CN8 9043
Price R2 63.6% .
Quantity R2 53.4% 73.3%
Q per capita R2 60.0% 59.9%
Q per GDP R2 50.6% 79.7%
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted sample as
described in Table 5.1, with quantities expressed in weight (kilograms).
The only additional restriction, per CN product, is that the number of
regressors for each type of dummy be lower than the number of observations
to ensure some variability in the sample. The regressors included are firm-
CN8 and importer in the columns "land" and importer-CN8 in the columns
"land-CN8", for the different CN product categories. For each CN product
category, averages of all the CN products are weighted by their number of
observations.
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In addition to subdividing the entire samples by products, as done in Tables 5.9 and
5.10, it may be also interesting to split the sample according to an aggregate industry
classification to see whether in some industries taste may matter less. Ths is done in
Table 5.11 for Belgian aggregate exports and Table 5.12 for the EU28 cross section, with
CN2 products grouped by the sections to which they belong in the RAMON Eurostat
classification.
The approach is the same described above for Tables 5.9 and 5.10, i.e. after having
selected only the observations falling within a particular industry, the specification (5.3)
is used to regress prices and quantities on variety and market dummies.8
For the EU28 cross section, Table 5.12 shows that the results expected from the verti-
zontal model are confirmed in all the fourteen industries, where R2 for prices is on average
28% higher than for quantities, ranging from the 7.7% of the "Articles of paper" industry
to the 40.4% of the "Leather, skins, wood" industry. Yet, there are some exceptions when
Belgian exports alone are considered in Table 5.11. The industry "Food and beverages",
for example, has a very low level of price variability explained by the set of dummies
(just 22.36%), which is lower than the low quantity variability explained (27.95%). Also
in the "Plastics and rubber" industry the goodness-of-fit of price regressions is not much
higher than quantity regressions, being only 3% higher. Overall, however, the average
difference of variability captured by price and quantity regressions is 17%, which is still
comfortably high in terms of rejection of the theory. The low or negative differences in
specific sectors may indicate industries where taste effects are not important, but more
detailed industry-specific studies are needed to understand what drives the results.
Summing up, the division of the full sample in products and industries confirms the
fitness of the verti-zontal to deal with trade data, also at the aggregate level. The results
presented in the Chapter are indeed very similar to the results obtained using firm-level
exports in the previous Chapter. This confirmation can thus justify the use of the model
to obtain indicators on country-products using aggregate data.
8Also in this case, the inclusion of transport costs does not affect the results significantly, so the tables
with distance regressors are not presented for compactness
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Table 5.11: Industry-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit for the Belgian exports.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INDUSTRIES
(corresponding R2 of R2 of Number # Model
CN2 product codes) price quantity of degrees of
regression regression Observations freedom
Agriculture 45.16% 36.83% 6,343 998
CN2 codes 1 to 15
Food, beverages 22.36% 27.95% 6,578 700
CN2 codes 16 to 24
Minerals, chemicals 56.08% 31.95% 9,039 752
CN2 codes 25 to 38
Plastics and rubber 36.26% 33.23% 4,989 338
CN2 codes 39 and 40
Leather, skins, wood 65.25% 35.68% 1,929 260
CN2 codes 41 to 46
Articles of paper 42.17% 34.22% 1,871 223
CN2 codes 47 to 49
Textile articles 47.84% 30.19% 5,849 625
CN2 codes 50 to 63
Footwear, accessories 53.97% 41.73% 422 116
CN2 codes 64 to 67
Construction materials 40.98% 30.08% 2,255 263
CN2 codes 68 to 70
Base metals, jewelry 63.11% 31.85% 8,371 698
CN2 codes 71 to 83
Mechanical appliances 47.72% 22.55% 18,234 1,179
CN2 codes 84 and 85
Transport equipment 53.02% 25.71% 3,211 311
CN2 codes 86 to 89
Precision instruments 48.88% 18.79% 2,593 305
CN2 codes 90 to 93
Furniture and toys 47.01% 26.26% 3,055 278
CN2 codes 94 to 96
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted version of the Belgian
CN8 exports sample, as described in Table 5.1. Exporter-CN8 and importer-CN8
dummies are used as regressors.
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Table 5.12: Industry-level Regressions and Goodness-of-fit for EU28 cross section.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INDUSTRIES
(corresponding R2 of R2 of Number # Model
CN2 product codes) price quantity of degrees of
regression regression Observations freedom
Agriculture 53.03% 25.04% 136,838 15,554
CN2 codes 1 to 15
Food, beverages 49.49% 21.67% 134,802 10,192
CN2 codes 16 to 24
Minerals, chemicals 55.39% 26.04% 248,344 16,133
CN2 codes 25 to 38
Plastics and rubber 37.16% 24.19% 143,318 7,091
CN2 codes 39 and 40
Leather, skins, wood 64.23% 23.72% 60,938 5,063
CN2 codes 41 to 46
Articles of paper 34.11% 26.37% 75,430 4,281
CN2 codes 47 to 49
Textile articles 53.53% 19.94% 241,444 20,047
CN2 codes 50 to 63
Footwear, accessories 44.68% 15.76% 26,516 2,170
CN2 codes 64 to 67
Construction materials 51.46% 23.93% 75,124 4,717
CN2 codes 68 to 70
Base metals, jewelry 59.07% 26.61% 271,735 17,578
CN2 codes 71 to 83
Mechanical appliances 50.59% 18.41% 525,082 28,369
CN2 codes 84 and 85
Transport equipment 58.22% 22.64% 75,642 4,611
CN2 codes 86 to 89
Precision instruments 51.09% 14.47% 72,367 5,168
CN2 codes 90 to 93
Furniture and toys 46.59% 19.20% 97,889 5,107
CN2 codes 94 to 96
Notes: The results in this table are based on the restricted version of the EU28
cross-section sample, as described in Table 5.1. Exporter-CN8 and importer-CN8
dummies are used as regressors.
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5.2 From micro to macro: building indices at a country-
product level
After having shown that the verti-zontal model can be fruitfully employed in a macro
context in this section it is explained how the model can be used to obtain macroe-
conomic indicators of competitiveness at the country-product level. The identification
procedure highlighted in this Chapter can contribute to the ongoing debate on macroe-
conomic imbalances and external competitiveness by suggesting a set of indicators of
export capability at a country-product level which can be used to complement the ex-
isting toolkit of instruments based mostly on unit labor costs and relative price levels.
Information on the capacity of a country’s exporters to compete abroad can be extracted
by combining trade and macroeconomic data. In particular, two independent compo-
nents of demand for a particular variety (country-product combination) can be iden-
tified: markups-shifting quality and sales-boosting non-cost competitiveness. Together
with cost efficiency and information on foreign prices and consumption levels, these addi-
tional indicators can foster our understanding of the determinants of a country’s external
position, thus providing better guidance for policymaking. Remember indeed that ex-
porter and importer dummies in Table 5.3 are shown not to capture any significant level
of price or quantity variability in trade data. This means that country-level analysis
cannot say much about the intensive margin of trade at the product level and need to
be complemented by a country-product analysis.
5.2.1 Why adding the verti-zontal model to the toolkit?
A key factor in assessing the sustainability of a country’s external position is its capacity
to finance the purchase of imported goods and services through its exports, to keep the
current account in balance. This is why an increasing amount of attention and effort is
being given to the definition of suitable indicators of external competitiveness which can
be used to identify potential imbalances or dangerous long-term trends. The external
position of a country is affected by several factors, stemming from both the demand
and the supply side of the economy, the latter being typically associated with export
performance and the former with import growth. This Section shows how the verti-
zontal model can be used to extract information on the willingness to pay of consumers
and on the exporters’ capacity to sell at a country-product level.
There are currently few alternatives available to researchers for identifying the drivers
of external competitiveness and they are mostly based on productive efficiency and rel-
ative price levels, thus drawing all the attention towards these two dimensions of com-
petitiveness. In contrast, a methodology is proposed here to use aggregate trade and
macroeconomic data to extract information on the evolution of what will be referred
to as quality and non-cost competitiveness of EU Member States’ exports. The term
"quality" captures the characteristics of exported products that affect markups and sales
positively, as in the micro context, whereas "non-cost competitiveness" captures the char-
acteristics of an exported product that affect sales but not equilibrium markups or prices,
260 CHAPTER 5. FROM MICRO TO MACRO: EVIDENCE AND APPLICATIONS
similarly to taste mismatch in the micro context. For example, it may thought of as the
result of the development of distribution networks, consumer awareness or a process of
gradual demand build-up (Foster et al., 2012), but it may also depend on the number
of buyers in the destination markets (Carballo et al., 2013) or institutional characteris-
tics such as liberalization in the service sector or openness to trade, as suggested by the
Product Market Review 2010-2011 (European Commission, 2011).9 In order to identify
these two elements, a particular demand structure is assumed, which has the advantage
of being at the same time flexible, tractable and fully identifiable.
Quality and taste in the macro trade literature
As seen in the previous Chapters, there are many alternative models of international
trade currently available to researchers, but only few of them can actually be used to
identify asymmetric product characteristics. In general terms, the issue of how to account
for differences across product characteristics such as quality can be meaningfully dealt
with only in specific theoretical frameworks allowing for product differentiation and for
consumers appreciating variety.10 This requirement restricts the menu of available models
to the so-called New Trade Theory, pioneered by Krugman (1980, 1979) on the basis
of the model outlined by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The New Trade Theory recently
received new impulse and became the workhorse of research in International Economics
following the discovery of significant heterogeneity across firms in terms of economic
performances (Bernard et al., 2003) and pricing behavior (Manova and Zhang, 2012). In
fact, these findings have contributed to the development of several alternative theories
of monopolistic competition, in which firms are assumed to exert the market power of a
monopolist on the particular variety they produce, but are constrained by the presence
of other firms in the market selling imperfectly substitutable varieties. In addition, these
varieties are typically assumed to be so many that each one alone cannot influence market
aggregates (such as the general price levels) and, therefore, firms take market conditions
as given and do not try to set prices strategically or to collude with other firms to extract
more profits from consumers.
Like in the micro environment analyzed in the previous Chapters, the main differences
between existing macro models of trade lie in the particular demand structure used
to describe consumer behavior. The most popular alternatives are based on constant
elasticity of substitution (CES), translog, and quadratic utilities.11 Whereas all of them
9In the Product Market Review 2010-2011 the exact term used to describe the quantity variation not
explained by differences in prices is "non-price competitiveness". The term has not been used as such in
this context because the estimation methodology is different and using the same term to describe related
yet different concepts might confuse the reader.
10These two conditions are needed In order to avoid "corner solutions" in which all the consumers buy
the same amount of all the available varieties (in the case of lack of differentiation) or they all consume
only one particular variety and ignore the others (in the case of lack of love for variety).
11A recent paper discussing the different frameworks and their differences in expected outcomes is
Feenstra and Weinstein (2010). Note also that an analysis of the properties of CES functions can be
found in Zhelobodko et al. (2012).
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rely on product differentiation in a monopolistic competition setting,12 their functional
forms differ in such a way that each model allows for different identification strategies
and interpretation of structural parameters. In particular, frameworks based on CES
utility functions, such as Melitz (2003), Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) or Feenstra and
Romalis (2012), are to be preferred when the focus is on income effects and elasticities
of substitution. Instead, when the interest of the researcher revolves around individual
product characteristics such as quality or non-cost competitiveness, then discrete choice
models yielding translog preferences and quadratic utilities provide the most appropriate
setting. However, the latter have the additional advantage of being analytically tractable
when variety characteristics are defined over a continuum and of allowing for asymmetric
preferences. This is not the case for discrete choice models, which normally need to be
defined over a small finite set of types to be solved and are characterized by symmetric
varieties (Anderson et al., 1992).
Bank of Latvia’s Benkovskis and Rimgailaite (2011) andWoerz and Benkovskis (2012)
have recently shown how to measure the evolution of quality-adjusted relative export
prices in a CES framework, building on a methodology incrementally developed by Feen-
stra (1994), Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). These studies
show that even if export prices increased, quality-adjusted relative export prices in Latvia
and the other new EU member states decreased significantly between 1999 and 2009, re-
sulting therefore in no loss of competitiveness. Higher export prices, therefore, seemed
to signal a shift towards higher quality production, rather than a loss of competitiveness.
Similarly, Feenstra and Romalis (2012) use an adapted quality-augmented CES utility
function in order to obtain non-homotheticity in income and provide quality-adjusted
price indexes for imports and exports for virtually every country of the world, but in
these models varieties are characterized by only one possible source of differentiation,
incurring the problems discussed in the previous Chapter as a motivation for the devel-
opment of the verti-zontal model.
In order to obtain a better characterization of product differentiation, a new method-
ology is illustrated here to adapt the non-homothetic quadratic utility framework pre-
sented in the previous Chapters to an aggregate macro context. Just like the firm-level
studies reviewed in Chapter 2 have shown that cost heterogeneity or demand shifters
alone (such as quality) do not suffice to explain trade patterns, because they leave a
large amount of unexplained variability in quantities sold, the same issue has been ob-
served also on intra-EU trade data, leading to the definition of the concept of "non-price
competitiveness" as an additional source of competitiveness for Member States (Euro-
pean Commission, 2011). To make sense in a rigorous way of this additional source
of variation affecting quantities but not prices, the verti-zontal model is used, where
demand-shifting vertical differentiation is related to quality of country-product exports,
whereas slope-changing horizontal differentiation can be linked to what is here referred
12This term emphasizes the fact that firms are assumed to be negligible in size and to take market
characteristics as given (i.e. they don’t internalize the impact of their individual decision on aggregates)
even if they enjoy the market power of a monopolist on the particular variety that they supply. This
modeling approach has been pioneered by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and popularized by Krugman (1980).
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Figure 5.1: Scheme of quality and non-cost competitiveness identification strategy.
to as "non-cost competitiveness". This term has been used, rather than "non-price com-
petitiveness", to underline its exogenous nature in this framework, as opposed to prices
which are determined endogenously.
In order to be able to decompose changes in export performance into a "quality"
and "non-cost competitiveness" component, the quadratic utility framework has to be
adapted to deal with sector- rather than firm-level data. The advantage of such approach
is that it allows varieties to be asymmetric along different dimensions, all of which can be
identified in every period. To this end, some assumptions are needed both on the behavior
of consumers, whose preferences must fit into a simple quadratic utility function, and on
the productive capacity of firms, which are assumed to have access to the same technology
within a country, not to be capacity constrained and to use only labor to adapt the scale
of production.
The main intuition behind the approach proposed is that by observing costs, prices
and quantities sold over time it is possible to estimate key demand parameters for each
variety in the market and to distinguish between idiosyncratic and market-wide determi-
nants of market outcomes. In particular, taking labor costs as exogenously given, overall
demand effects can be determined and aggregate market effects can be disentangled from
variety-specific demand effects. In turn, variety-specific demand effects can be split into
quality (price-shifting vertical differentiation) and non-cost competitiveness (quantity-
shifting horizontal differentiation). More details are provided in the next section. A
graphic illustration of the identification procedure is shown in Figure 5.1. A more formal
description of the model follows in the next section.
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5.2.2 Adapting the verti-zontal model to an aggregate macro context
The identification strategy is based on the verti-zontal model, where varieties are defined
as country-product combinations, which can be thought of as the combination of four
components:
• A positive demand shifter capturing the willingness to pay of a consumer for the
first unit consumed of a given variety of a certain type of differentiated good;
• A negative quadratic term capturing the decrease in marginal utility provided by
the consumption of other units of the same variety;
• A negative quadratic term capturing the decrease in marginal utility provided by
the consumption of a positive amount of any variety of the same class of goods;
• A numéraire capturing the marginal utility provided by an external good, which
can be also interpreted as a Hicksian composite good representing the entire bundle
of consumption of the representative consumer considered.
In order to have a simple model of monopolistic competition with variable elasticity
of substitution, non-constant markups and asymmetric varieties vertically and horizon-
tally differentiated, these four elements can be formalized in the following representative
consumer’s utility, considering a particular variety s ∈ S of a certain product consumed
in a market i. Following the characterization of Model V:
Ui(s) =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
γ
2
[∫
s∈Si
qs,ids
]2
+ q0, (5.5)
where the total mass of varieties s present in market i is expressed as Si. Notice that
The expression "mass of varieties" is typically used in the micro literature on monopolistic
competition literature to stress the assumption that each individual variety is too small
to affect market aggregates and thus has to take price, quality and cost indices in market
i as given. It can be remarked that even in the context of macro data, where countries are
observed but not individual firms, the assumption can still hold as long as firms within
a country cannot coordinate their pricing behavior (or, alternatively, be big enough
to represent a significant share of a country’s export), so that even large countries cn
reasonably considered as made up of many price-taking firms.
The demand for a variety s, given a standard budget constraint
∫
s∈Si ps,iqs,ids+ q0 =
yi where yi is the consumer’s income, can be written again as:
qs,i =
αs − ps,i
βs,i
− γ(Ai − Pi)
βs,i(1 + γNi)
(5.6)
where Ni, Ai and Pi are market aggregates expressing effective number of competitors,
quality and price levels in market i, as obtained by weighting respectively the number of
firms, their quality levels and prices by each variety’s own non-cost competitiveness index
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in such a way that each variety marginally affects market aggregates, proportionally to
expected consumers’ purchases in market i , 1/βs,i :
Ni ≡
∫
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Ai ≡
∫
s∈Si
αs
βs,i
dr Pi ≡
∫
s∈Si
ps,i
βs,i
dr. (5.7)
Operating profits for variety s in market i, Πs,i, can be measured as the product of
markups on each unit sold, ps,i − cs, and quantities sold, qs,i:
Πs,i = (ps,i − cs)qs,i (5.8)
and the combined optimization problems of firms and consumers yields the following
equilibrium prices and quantities:
p∗s,i =
αs + cs
2
− γQi
2
; (5.9)
q∗s,i =
1
βs,i
(
αs − cs
2
− γQi
2
)
. (5.10)
Notice that the treatment of the variable γQi is very delicate in an aggregate macro
context. In fact, in the model γγQi captures the extent of competition between one
variety and the mass of varieties consumed by the representative consumer. In other
words, it captures the idea that the consumption of other varieties of the same good
decreases consumers’ willingness to pay for variety s. However, when the variety is an
aggregate capturing a country’s exports of a product and the competing varieties are all
the imports from the rest of the world of the same product, then aggregate values may
hide a lot of heterogeneity across consumers and varieties. This caveat applies to any
trade model using aggregate data, but it is worth keeping in mind that the precision of
the identification procedure is also affected by the level of aggregation of the analysis.
Parameter identification: quality and non-cost competitiveness
The price and quantity equations outlined above are the key to identify the vertical and
horizontal differentiation parameters αs and βs,i, which correspond, respectively, to an
index of quality and an index of non-cost competitiveness. These results are convenient
in that variety-specific and market-variety-specific structural variables are neatly split
and allow for a direct identification. Notice that equilibrium prices depend not only on
each variety’s intrinsic quality, αs, and marginal costs of production, cs, but also on
the total consumption of the differentiated good in the market i, Qi, weighted by its
degree of substitutability across different varieties, γ. Equilibrium quantities depend,
in addition, to the non-cost competitiveness parameter 1/βs,i, which can therefore be
directly measured as
βs,i =
p∗s,i − cs
q∗s,i
, (5.11)
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where higher levels of β are associated with a lower sales, for a given level of markups,
since it translates the taste mismatch parameter in the micro context.
As for quality, it can be measured both in relative or absolute terms. Relative quality
differences can be directly measured as the difference between a country’s αs and a
benchmark, say αr, comparing the prices and marginal costs of production of the two
varieties sold in the same market. From the difference between p∗s,i and p
∗
r,i stems indeed:
αs − αr = 2(p∗s,i − p∗r,i)− (cs − cr) (5.12)
which can be rewritten as:
∆αs−r = 2∆p∗s−r,i −∆cs−r (5.13)
A visual representation of the inverse linear demands ps,i = αs − βs,iqs,i − γQi and
pr,i = αr − βr,iqr,i − γQi and the role of each parameter is shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Visual representation of the inverse demand function and role of each param-
eter in the model.
However, the relative quality difference between varieties s and r, ∆αs−r, provides
only the difference in terms of numéraire between the price at which the first marginal
unit of variety s and the first marginal unit of variety r would be sold in each market,
but the difference between two quality levels does not say much about the absolute
quality levels of the two varieties and, in addition, it does not provide information on
how big is that difference, as compared to the quality level of the two varieties. To
this end, it is necessary to estimate the values of αs and αr in absolute terms, which
requires, as a preliminary step, the estimation of the substitutability parameter γ. This
step leverages two additional assumptions: the first is that the degree of substitutability
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between different varieties of the same product does not vary over time, which is rather
reasonable over short periods of time and well defined product categories; the second
assumption is that the value of the variety with the worst quality in the market, say
α0 , is worth the same amount of numéraire in every period, which amounts to assume
that the quality improvement over time of the worst-quality variety in the market follows
the general quality improvement in the economy at large. Under these assumptions, it
suffices to run a simple time-series regression of [2p∗0,i − c0] on [Qi] to estimate γˆ at a
product level. Plugging then γˆ into the price equation p∗s,i, αˆs can be estimated for all
the varieties. As an alternative, the constant of the time series regression can be used
as the quality level of the worst-quality variety, αˆ0 , and the others can be measured as
αˆs = αˆ0 + ∆αs−0 , reminding that ∆αs−0 = 2∆p∗s−0,i −∆cs−0.
5.2.3 Empirical implementation
To operationalize the identification strategy described above, a preliminary step is to
define what a variety is in the context of a macroeconomic analysis with aggregate data.
The ideal field of application of the theories of monopolistic competition is the firm-
or plant-level in differentiated consumer-goods sectors, as it would better match the as-
sumption of a similar demand structure for the different varieties and of a multitude of
small-sized competitors. Unfortunately, micro-level data is still scarce in many coun-
tries and where available it can be expensive, difficult to compare across countries or
incomplete (as it may be based on survey filled by firms on a voluntary basis, yielding
possible selection problems). The alternative, which has been proven at the beginning of
this Chapter to be empirically viable, is to turn to more aggregate trade datasets such
as Eurostat COMEXT, a free, complete and rich dataset on EU exports built following
homogeneous data collection and reporting guidelines across Member States. In such a
context, a variety s is defined as a country-product combination. As for the definition of
a product, different levels of aggregation are available. In the Combined Nomenclature
framework, for example, 4 levels of aggregation are available, ranging from CN2, where all
the goods are split into 98 2-digits product categories, to CN8, which comprises around
10.000 8-digits product codes, with the intermediate levels of CN4 and CN6. Results are
illustrated here following the most disaggregate product level, the CN8.13
As discussed above, the second relevant issue to consider is the definition of a market
i in which the total consumption of a product is calculated as Qi and where the different
varieties compete with a pairwise degree of substitutability γ. Ideally, in the case in which
varieties are identified with country-product pairs, the market i would be a third country
in which all the different varieties compete on a leveled ground facing similar barriers
to entry and transport costs.14 In the case of EU28 Member States, for example, this
market could be the US, but unfortunately many Member States export fewer product
13The results of a previous exercise with a CN2 product classification on the same type of data, see
Comite (2012).
14The advantage of having the different varieties facing market-specific costs of shipment is that it
leaves variety-specific or market-variety-specific differences in parameters as the only source of variability
across varieties’ performance in a destination market.
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categories to the US than to other Member States, which means that choosing the US (or
other non-EU countries) as the relevant market for the analysis would cause a significant
loss of information on varieties that could otherwise be considered. For this reason, a
possible alternative would be to consider the entire EU28 as the relevant market i, basing
the analysis on intra-EU28 exports of each Member State. Whereas this choice may have
fewer implications for very small Member States, it can be slightly more delicate for
countries representing a high share of the total EU28 market, which could influence it
because of their size. However it should be kept in mind that, even if aggregate country-
product level trade data is used, exports of a country are normally the sum of many
individual exporters,15 each having a negligible impact on market aggregates, so that the
basic assumptions of the monopolistic competition framework (notably, that individual
price makers cannot affect market aggregates strategically with their behavior) are not
violated in substance. Furthermore, focusing on intra-EU28 trade flows has the advantage
of being able to extract additional comparable information on export and import markets
and have better estimates on the expected consumption of a particular product, or Qi in
the model.
The methodology presented here can then be properly used to assess quality and non-
cost competitiveness of the EU Member States. After having defined a variety s (say,
country-CN8 product) and market i (say, the EU internal market), it can be useful to
define some relevant benchmarks. The natural choice would be to use the minimum and
the maximum level reached by each parameter and then normalize all the values between
0 and 1. In addition, in the case of EU countries it may be interesting to compare each
country with the EU28 average, to see whether a process of convergence is on track.
Three benchmarks are therefore identified: s = 0 for the worst variety, s = max for
the best, s = EU28 for the EU28 average.16 Thus, the normalization of the quality
parameter between 0 and 1 can be:
αs,norm =
αs − α0
αmax − α0 (5.14)
and the normalization in terms of EU average, considering the baseline EU levels
equal to 100:
αs,normEU28 =
αs
αEU28
∗ 100 (5.15)
The procedure can be followed for the normalization of the other parameters.
15A notable exception is represented by sectors that are highly regulated or highly concentrated. These
would be indeed better described by an oligopolistic rather than a monopolistic competition framework,
but it would be impossible or arbitrary to treat each product category differently and then aggregate
results over the entire economy.
16Note that the market subscript i can be omitted, since all the results refer to shipments to the same
export destination (the rest of the EU), so that the subscript EU28 can be used to identify the EU28
average variety without creating confusion.
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Data requirements
In terms of data requirements, the model is rather parsimonious. All the necessary
information can be retrieved from two freely accessible sources: Eurostat COMEXT for
the trade flows; and DG ECFIN’s AMECO for the additional macroeconomic information
needed to build the indices.
More precisely, in terms of trade data (COMEXT), all that is needed is the following:
• Exports from the 28 EU Member States to the rest of the EU in values at the CN8
level of disaggregation (billion euros);
• Exports from the 28 EU Member States to the rest of the EU in volumes at the
CN8 level of disaggregation (100 Kg);
• Total intra-EU28 imports in values;
• Total EU28 imports from extra-EU countries in values.
As for the additional macro data (AMECO), this is the list of variables needed:
• Importer’s total consumption at current prices (AMECO code: UCNT).
• Total consumption’s price deflator for the EU28 (AMECO code: PCNT)
• Compensation of employees by main branch of the economy (NACE rev.1 ISIC
categories):
– Total economy (AMECO code: UWCD);
– Agriculture, forestry and fishing (ISIC: A, B) (AMECO code: UWC1);
– Industry, including energy (ISIC: C, D, E) (AMECO code: UWC2);
– Services (ISIC: G to P) (AMECO code: UWC5);
– Manufacturing (ISIC: D) (AMECO code: UWCM).
• Gross Value Added by main branch of the economy (NACE rev.1 ISIC categories)
at current prices:
– Total economy (UVG0)
– Agriculture, forestry and fishery products (ISIC: A, B) (AMECO code: UVG1)
– Industry, including energy (ISIC: C, D, E) (AMECO code: UVG2)
– Services (ISIC: G to P) (AMECO code: UVG5)
– Manufacturing (ISIC: D) (AMECO code: UVGM)
• Adjusted wage share in the manufacturing industry (compensation per employee
as percentage of nominal gross value added per person employed. AMECO code:
ALCM);
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An intermediate step: building trade and macro variables
Starting from these variables, it is possible to build all the others and estimate the
parameters associated with each country-product in each period. The first step is to
construct the additional trade and macro variables that will be needed for the
estimation. These are:
• Export prices, or ps in the model, which can roughly be computed as the unit
values (values/volumes) of the exports associated with each product category, in
euros/Kg. The measure is clearly an approximation, as many different prices and
products can be grouped together within a product category, but it is the best that
can be done with aggregate data;
• Unit labor cost (ULC) at a product level, which is the ratio of labor costs over value
added at a product level. There are two alternative ways of building this variable:
– Either the adjusted wage share in the manufacturing industry can be extended
to all the products exported by a country in a homogeneous way;
– Or it can be computed at a main-economic-branch level by dividing the com-
pensation of employees at current prices by the gross value added produced
by the branch at current prices. The 10,000 CN8 products can be allocated
to the different branches of activity based on their corresponding CN2 prod-
uct categories by looking at the correspondence with each branch, as shown
in the appendix. This alternative measure has the advantage of being more
product-specific, but the disadvantage of displaying negative markups (higher
labor costs than value added) for some country-products, especially in transi-
tion economies.
• Physical unit labor cost (PULC), or cs in the model, which captures the marginal
costs of producing a physical unit of the exported good and can be obtained,
with some caution, by attributing a share of costs equal to the ULC to the values
exported of each product. It should be kept in mind, however, that ULC are
measured in terms of value added, whereas trade data captures the total revenues
earned from the export of a product. This is equivalent to assuming that subsidies,
direct taxes on products and intermediate consumption at a product level cancel
out, in such a way that gross value added and total revenues coincide. Admittedly,
this may not be the best option for all the products considered, as in some of
them total revenues may be significantly larger than value added, but the first-best
alternative would be to have information on value added at a product level, which
is not possible since the narrowest level of aggregation of value added is at the
branch level;
• Product consumption in the import market, which is the data equivalent of Qi in
the model, capturing the amount consumed of all the varieties of a certain product.
The main issue is that this information is not always available, especially for more
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disaggregate levels of product definition. To tackle this issue, quantities can be
inferred by combining the data on aggregate consumption with trade data, which
should provide an indication of the particular tastes of a market. In particular,
the share of each product in total imports can be assumed to reflect the share of
consumption of a particular product in total consumption (which is however an
approximation, since trade data often covers only trade in goods, whereas total
consumption also includes services). In addition, it could be argued that also the
exports of a country can provide some information of local tastes, at least as far
as differentiated manufactured goods are concerned. Therefore, in the examples
provided here total consumption of a particular product is obtained as the average
of import share and export share of that product, multiplied by total consumption.
Then, to convert this value into quantities, it is divided by the average price of the
intra-EU exports. Notice that this is again an approximation as well, but will not
affect substantially the relative performance of each variety because it will applied
uniformly to the entire product category;
• Deflated prices and parameters. Since the evolution of prices in the importing
market can unduly affect the estimated parameters and attribute to changes in
varieties’ parameters what is in reality an overall market development, export prices
can be deflated by the price deflator of consumption as a robustness check. However,
this correction will not affect the relative performance of each variety but just their
absolute level and may be relevant only when longitudinal indicators are considered;
• Varieties’ market shares are not needed for the estimation of the parameters, but
can represent a useful consistency check of the results of the model. Market shares
are in fact affected by both quality and non-cost competitiveness, which implies
that in case of divergent trends, they can help assess what is the overall impact on
countries’ competitiveness.
Parameter identification
Following the empirical strategy illustrated in Section 5.2.2, the variables presented above
can then be used to estimate the key demand parameters of the model as follows:
• Non-cost competitiveness, βs,i, can be immediately measured by dividing quantities
shipped by the difference between export prices and physical unit labor costs. A
way to interpret this parameter is that it measures the amount of goods that a
country is able to export for a given (profit maximizing) level of markups. The
advantage of this concept is that it can be seen as capturing all the characteristics
of a variety that affect its sales but not the price consumers will be willing to pay
for it (a typical example being the size of the distribution network or consumers’
awareness of a product due to, say, gradual demand build-up over time);
• The degree of substitutability between varieties of the same product, the parameter
γ, cannot be measured directly but must be estimated. To this end, as explained
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in the previous section, it is possible to run a time-series regression with dependent
variable [2p∗0,i − c0] as a dependent variable and [Qi] as a regressor. The export
price and PULC subscripts indicate that only the lowest-quality variety in the
EU28 market must be considered. To identify it, it suffices to look at the lowest
inverse-demand intercept (IDI) in the dataset, IDI0 = α0 − γQi (see Figure 5.2),
which is indeed equal to 2ps,i − cs for the variety s = 0. The coefficient associated
with the regressor can then be used as the product-level estimate of the degree of
substitutability between varieties. The intuition is that since the term γQi enters
symmetrically in all the varieties pricing decisions, it is enough to see how the
inverse-demand intercept of the lowest-quality variety (or another chosen variety)
changes in reaction to changes in the total amount of other varieties consumed to
have an estimate of the parameter γ;
• The quality levels of the lowest-quality variety, α0, can also be retrieved from the
same regression as its time-invariant constant under the assumption previously
discussed that the willingness to pay for the first marginal unit of the lowest-quality
variety is constant over time in terms of the numéraire, which in turn captures the
marginal utility of consumption of any other good in the economy;
• The quality levels of all the other varieties, αs, can be computed starting from
α0 and noticing that differences in quality levels across varieties are measured as
∆αs−r = 2∆p∗s−r,i −∆cs−r. This measure of quality can be seen as the potential
intercept of the inverse demand function in the absence of competition (i.e. when
γQi = 0), which would be the highest price a consumer would be willing to pay to
buy a positive amount of the variety s, even if this amount cannot be observed in
the market because it would not maximize the operating profits of the firm/country
producing that particular variety.
In terms of units of measurement, the quality index, αs, unit values, p(s, i), and
physical unit labor costs (PULC), cs, are expressed in /Kg ; the degree of pairwise
substitutability, γ, and the parameter for non-cost competitiveness, βs,i, are expressed in
/Kg2; the price deflator, market shares and the unit labor costs (ULC) are unit-less.
Even though the three structural parameters of the model provide valuable informa-
tion on the characteristics of the varieties exported, they cannot be immediately used
in absolute terms for policy advice. To that end, it is necessary to relate country per-
formances to a benchmark which can be of a cross-sectional or longitudinal nature, the
former using other countries or group of countries in the same period of time and the
latter following the performance of the same country over time.
An example of how the parameter identification methodology can be used to assess
the competitiveness of a country is provided in the next section, based on the Latvian
experience. The case of Latvia will be used throughout the Section to illustrate the em-
pirical implementation of the estimation strategy presented above. This choice of country
is mainly motivated by the fact that the idea of translating the micro-level methodology
presented above into a macro setting has been first explored in the preparatory work of
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Di Comite et al. (2012), but in fact the country is an ideal candidate for the purpose, as
it experienced a sustained medium- and long-term trend of convergence vis-à-vis EU28
levels in most of its parameters, but at the same time it shows a lot of short-term volatil-
ity as it experienced a deep Balance-of-Payment crisis followed by a very quick recovery
during the decade analyzed. For the sake of comparison, aggregate results for the other
EU Member States are then shown in the annex.
5.2.4 Estimating quality and non-cost competitiveness in Latvia
The identification strategy presented above can be used to estimate each variety’s pa-
rameters in every period of analysis (here years are used, but trade data is available
also monthly). Such information can be aggregated further to provide information on
the overall country developments. In the context of CN8 trade data, each country ex-
ports thousands of CN8 products, for which demand parameters can be identified.17 The
country-product values can then be averaged, weighting each product by its relative ex-
port share in the country, and the resulting information can be used to have an idea of
the overall quality and non-cost competitiveness of the exporter’s tradable sector. An
alternative, quicker way of having aggregate results is to use the product category called
"total", which in COMEXT corresponds to the sum of all the manufacturing export
products in values and quantities, but raw totals implicitly assign a higher weight to
heavier products, which is not necessarily the most meaningful weighting choice.
Indeed, the comparison between export-value-weighted parameters (called wavrg in
the figures) and parameters associated with the unweighted aggregate category (referred
to as total) can be used to assess how the most important trade products fare in com-
parison with the overall economy. Furthermore, weighted averages allow for a more
meaningful comparison between countries, or between a country and a relevant group of
countries, say the EU28. Indeed, quality and non-cost competitiveness can be compared
product by product and then aggregated at a country level, getting rid in this way of bi-
ases linked to exporters’ product specialization. In other words, if each country performs
very well in the products that it exports the most, then theoretically every country can
perform very well in the indicators aggregated in this way, meaning that an increase in
competitiveness for some countries does not necessarily imply a decrease in other coun-
tries by the construction of index, which is a nice feature when comparing countries with
very different productive specialization patterns.
The trends are generally similar in the two approaches, but the absolute level may
vary substantially, as can be seen from Figure 5.3 where unweighted totals and weighted
averages are shown for PULC, export prices and the quality index. It is worth stressing
that the differences in the evolution of the two series (apart from measurement errors)
are explained by changes in the export composition. For example, when the relative
importance of higher-value products increases as a share of total exports, the weighted-
average quality index increases more than the unweighted one. Thus, comparing the
17The overall number of CN8 products in the EU28 ranges between 10,326 in 2003 and 9,229 in 2011,
but in Latvia they range from 2,202 in 2006 to 3,859 in 2012.
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two series can provide useful information on the resource reallocation undergoing in the
economy. In fact, changes in the differences between the two series indicate how products
with highest export shares are faring as compared to the rest of the export sector. Given
this additional information content, they are presented together in the rest of the analysis.
The relative indicators of competitiveness that can be produced based on these indices
are organized as follows: first, pure cross-sectional indicators are presented, based on
sample maxima and minima and on EU28 as a benchmark; then, longitudinal ones; and
finally, a mixed approach is proposed.18
Figure 5.3: Physical unit labor costs (PULC), quality and export prices of Latvian exports,
raw parameters.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext and AMECO data. Note: "wavrg"
parameters are corrected for Latvian product specialization by measuring them at a product
level and then aggregating them by weighting each product by its share in Latvian exports (in
values). "Total" parameters are computed using the category "total" as an individual product.
5.2.5 Cross-sectional indicators
The first class of indicators that can be built through the methodology presented here
consists of cross-sectional indicators comparing the performance of different varieties
within the same market, in this case the EU internal market. Since different CN8 products
can be very different from each other in terms of average structural parameters (costs,
prices, quality and units sold), they could not be meaningfully aggregated in terms of
raw values. To give a concrete example, in 2004 the cheapest Latvian CN8 export was
the code 25210000 representing "limestone flux; limestone and other calcareous stone",
which was sold at 1.07 euros per 100Kg; the most expensive product was the CN8 code
90013000 representing "Contact lenses", which was sold at 144,641 euros per 100Kg.
Aggregating this two product in raw value into one index would then have little sense.
18The variable list, summary statistics and full dataset are available on request.
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However, they can be aggregated in terms of normalized values. Attributing a value of 0
to the lowest-scoring variety for each parameter and 1 to the highest-scoring variety, the
normalized values of each of the CN8 products can be weighted by relative importance
of each product in terms of exported values. This procedure would yield an indicator
that signals how well a country performs in the products that it exports the most, as
compared to the EU28 competitors. This implies that two countries with exactly the
same parameters can be associated with a different overall indicator because of differences
in their export structure, the indicator being tilted in favor of the country with better
performances in its most sold products.
Results for the Latvian exports are shown in Figure 5.4, considering PULC, export
prices and quality indices. They are displayed on a 0-to-1 scale because these are the
upper and the lower bound of the index. As far as the unweighted totals are concerned,
it can be noted that Latvia lies on the lower bound in all the years except 2006 and 2007,
when another Member State (Croatia) takes its place. This means that out of the 28
exporters of the sample Latvia is the one with the lowest levels for the three parameters
in the total category. Yet, since Latvian product parameters are not the lowest ranked for
all the CN8 products, its position improves when weighted averages of the normalized
values of all the products are considered. In particular, it can be noticed that in the
last decade the normalized weighted average quality index more than doubled, while
the PULC in 2011 are almost back to the levels of 1999, after having spiked during the
overheating high-inflation years of 2007 and 2008. This observation suggests that Latvian
exporters managed to keep production costs low while at the same time improving the
quality of their output, resulting in higher markups.
Figure 5.4: Physical unit labor costs (PULC), quality and export prices of Latvian exports,
0-to-1 scale.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext and AMECO data. Note: "wavrg"
parameters are corrected for Latvian product specialization by measuring them at a product
level and then aggregating them weighting each product by its share in Latvian exports (in
values). "Total" parameters are computed using the category "total" as an individual product.
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5.2.6 Normalization to EU28=100
As an alternative to a cross-sectional normalization based on the moving minimum and
maximum values of EU competitors, a fixed benchmark can be used to track the evolution
of Member States’ figures and put them into context. This approach has the advantage
of being more robust to outliers because the minima and the maxima in the sample can
be driven by exceptional circumstances or temporary shocks. On the other hand, the
disadvantage is that by using this approach alone it is impossible to distinguish between
changes in the numerator (the Member State) and changes in the denominator (the
benchmark). The latter has thus to be chosen carefully and should be meaningful. A
natural candidate to be used as a benchmark is the aggregate EU28 average, which can
be thought of as one of the exporting countries in the sample, keeping in mind that while
prices, costs and the quality index will be EU averages, the non-cost competitiveness
parameter will by construction be rather the sum of EU Member States (since total
quantities sold will be divided by the average markup).
As an example, in Figure 5.5 total and wavrg quality indices, export prices and
physical unit labor costs for Latvia are compared to the EU28 averages (setting EU28=1).
Figure 5.5: Evolution of ULC, quality and export prices of Latvian exports as compared
to the EU average, EU28=100.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext data. Note: "wavrg" parameters are
corrected for Latvian product specialization by measuring them at a product level and then
aggregating them by weighting each product by its share in Latvian exports (in values). "Total"
parameters are computed using the category "total" as an individual product.
Again, it can be noticed that weighted averages parameters are higher than un-
weighted totals and in this case provide a more realistic assessment of the country’s
performance. As for the latter, since Latvia is still specialized in low-value added prod-
ucts, average export prices and production costs would appear to be just 20 to 30% of
EU average in 2013. However, this extreme result is nuanced when weighted averages
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are considered, as taking product specialization into account leads to a more credible rel-
ative position in terms of prices (90%) and PULC (70%), resulting in a higher weighted
average quality index then the EU benchmark. This somehow surprising result arises
from the fact that each product is compared one-by-one to the benchmark, assigning
a weight to each according to the economic structure of the country considered, which
means that on the CN8 products that Latvia exports the most, it does not differ much
from EU averages. Another way of looking at the weighted average indices is to imagine
that, if the benchmark had exactly the same production structure of the Latvia, it would
coincide with the total indicator, which is instead very far away in reality because of the
different export structure of the EU28 and Latvia, even if the gap is slowly decreasing
over time.
The same exercise is repeated for the indicator of non-cost competitiveness in Figure
5.6, where unweighted total and the weighted averages are considered, both in comparison
to the EU28 (on the left-hand side, EU28=100) aggregate and on a 0-to-1 scale (on the
right-hand side), based on the maximum and minimum value among EU competitors.
Figure 5.6: Evolution of non-cost competitiveness of Latvian exports as compared to EU,
EU28=100.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext data. Note: "wavrg" parameters are
corrected for Latvian product specialization by measuring them at a product level and then
aggregating them by weighting each product by its share in Latvian exports (in values). "Total"
parameters are computed using the category "total" as an individual product.
As mentioned above, when dealing with non-cost competitiveness in the way it is
computed in this framework (as the quantities sold for a given level of difference between
prices and costs) one has to keep in mind that country aggregates, such as the EU28, are
expected to have higher absolute levels because aggregate prices, costs and quality for
the EU28 are the equivalent of averages whereas aggregate quantities are sums. However,
even when considering individual competitors such as the 0-to-1 scale, it is very likely
that country size matters; For example, Germany as a whole can export more than Latvia
also because more firms are involved in export activities due to a larger internal market
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in Germany that results more efficient firms (either for competition and selection or for
the scale of production) that can enter export markets more easily. Therefore, it should
not come as a surprise that the absolute level of Latvian non-cost competitiveness is so
low as compared to the EU28 aggregate and EU Member States’ maximum, both in the
unweighted totals and in the weighted averages, whose values are respectively 3% and
7% of EU28 in 2013, as shown in Figure 5.6. Notice, however, that in the 0-to-1 scale
(solid lines, right-hand side axis) Latvia does not perform too badly, in terms of weighted
averages it is at exactly in the middle between the minimum and the maximum value,
even though in total terms it is just at 10% because of it export structure.
Latvian non-cost competitiveness seems to be on a downward trend in the last decade,
but it should be noticed that the non-cost competitiveness indicator should not be con-
sidered in isolation, as it just captures the ability to sell a variety for a given level of
prices and costs, but not the profitability of each unit sold, which is instead better cap-
tured by the quality and PULC indicator in Figure 5.5. Remember that Latvian quality
and cost indicators improved over the last decade, therefore the overall effect on total
exports and market shares is ex ante uncertain, in this case, and can only be assessed by
looking at it explicitly. This is done in Figure 5.7, where it is shown that both intra-EU
and global market shares increased almost constantly over time and more than doubled
in ten years, so that it can be claimed that the quality upgrade and cost containment
effects outweighed the effect of a slightly decreasing capacity to sell at a given markup
level.
Figure 5.7: Evolution of market shares of Latvian intra-EU exports as compared to total
intra-EU exports.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext data. Note: EU28 average values=100.
"Wavrg" parameters are corrected for Latvian product specialization by measuring them at
a product level and then aggregating them by weighting each product by its share in Latvian
exports (in values). "Total" parameters are computed using the category "total" as an individual
product.
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5.2.7 Longitudinal indicators
An alternative way to use the countries’ structural parameters is to track their evolution
over time in absolute terms. One of the advantages of this approach is that it does
not rely on a benchmark and thus the resulting indicator only captures the evolution
of a given parameter. The disadvantage is that it does not provide much information
on whether the country is keeping up with international developments or it is losing
competitiveness in relative terms. The way a longitudinal indicator is usually built is
by setting the reference year equal to 100 and then normalizing the subsequent years
in terms of the reference. In addition, it may be worth deflating export prices by the
consumption price deflator of the importer in order to get rid of changes in price levels
due to general price effects rather than changes in the underlying parameters.19 This was
not necessary for the cross sectional indices, as all the varieties were evaluated in terms
of the same numéraire, but it does matter when the comparison is over time. In practice,
however, the price deflation only results in a downward shift of the quality index induced
by the difference between export prices as they appear in the dataset and deflated export
prices, but the impact of the correction seems to be minor in the EU sample used here.
Figure 5.8: Evolution of Latvian PULC, export price, quality index and non-cost compet-
itiveness as compared to 1999 levels.
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext data. Note: Latvian parameter values
in 2004=100. "Wavrg" parameters are corrected for Latvian product specialization by measuring
them at a product level and then aggregating them by weighting each product by its share in
Latvian exports (in values). "Total" parameters are computed using the category "total" as an
individual product.
19In terms of the model, the consumption price deflator would capture the evolution of the numéraire,
q0, as it represents the evolution of prices of a composite bundle of all the goods in the economy at the
EU28 level.
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Illustrating the case of Latvia, Figure 5.8 sets 2004 as the references year (values in
2004=100) illustrates the longitudinal evolution of the cost, price, quality and non-cost
competitiveness indicators, which follow closely the cross sectional indicators, suggesting
that the EU28 can indeed be considered a good benchmark for future analyses. The
main value added of this class of indicators, as compared to the previous, is that they
can tell whether some parameters increased more than others in absolute terms and not
compared to a benchmark. For example in 2007, Figure 5.8 shows that the cumulative
increase Latvian PULC over time was higher than export prices and quality, but Figure
5.5 would not show it so clearly, as in the same period PULCs appear to have similarly
increased in several EU countries.
However, there is a main caveat to keep in mind when using longitudinal indicators
alone: idiosyncratic features, such as the exchange rates with main trading partners or
global features, such as the world price levels of a particular type of goods, can drive some
of the results. In order to overcome this potential problem, the next class of indicators
is presented.
5.2.8 Cross-sectional longitudinal indicators
The cross sectional and longitudinal approaches can be merged in order to obtain an
indicator that tracks the relative cumulative evolution of certain parameter vis-à-vis a
benchmark. Using again EU28 as the relevant reference point, Figure 5.9 shows how
the distance between Latvian and EU28 parameters changes over time. To build these
indicators, first a cross sectional analysis has to be undertaken, defining the relative
parameter values of the Member State as compared to the EU28, which can be set again
equal to 100, as in Figure 5.5. The proposed cross-sectional longitudinal indicator is then
just the difference between the relative value of a Member State’s parameter in 2004 and
its relative value in the following (and previous) years. For example, if the relative
weighted average quality index of Latvian products is 97.7% of the EU28 level in 2002
and 106.7% in 2013, the value of the cross-sectional longitudinal indicator in 2013 will be
9, as is actually shown in Figure 5.10(b). This kind of analysis can provide interesting
insights. For instance, focusing on the pane in which Latvian weighted average results
are displayed, it is striking how in 2013 the physical unit labor costs differentials with
respect to the EU28 have come back to the levels of 2002/2003 whereas the quality index
improved by almost 10 percentage points. In addition, it can be noted that this indicator
has the advantage of not being subject to changes in valuation given, for example, by
exchange rate volatility of trade partners.
This cross-sectional longitudinal indicator can be used to obtain a yearly value for
cumulative changes with respect to a reference period of time, even though it should
be treated carefully because it is subject to the risk of interpreting outliers as long-
term trends. Even the indicators encapsulating cross sectional and longitudinal elements
cannot be taken at face value but need to be integrated with more in-depth analysis,
which is why they can be considered useful indicators to add to the competitiveness
measurement toolkit enriching rather than replacing the existing ones.
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Figure 5.9: Percentage point changes in Latvian-to-EU28 ratios with respect to 1999
values for PULC, export prices, quality and non-cost competitiveness.
(a) Total PULC, export price and quality indices
(b) Wavrg PULC, export price and quality indices
(c) Total and wavrg non-cost competitiveness
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat Comext data. Note: in every period the differ-
ence is reported between the Latvian-to-EU28 ratios in the year considered and Latvian-to-EU28
ratios of the same parameter in 1999. "Wavrg" parameters are corrected for Latvian product
specialization by measuring them at a product level and then aggregating them by weighting
each product by its share in Latvian exports (in values). "Total" parameters are computed using
the category "total" as an individual product.
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5.3 Concluding remarks
In this Chapter a methodology has been proposed to complement the current indicators
of external competitiveness by providing insights into the capacity of a country’s firms
to compete abroad. In particular, it was shown how information on product "quality"
and "non-cost competitiveness" can be obtained by combining product-level trade data
with estimates of product-level macroeconomic data on marginal costs of production and
consumption. In order to achieve this result, as a preliminary step, it has been tested
whether the verti-zontal model presented in the previous Chapters is fit to deal with
aggregate trade data. After testing the validity of the model in a macro context, it has
been shown how to interpret its parameters and outcomes to deal with aggregation and
data issues related to the different modeling environment. Finally it has been illustrated
a concrete example of how to use the model to obtain competitiveness indicators at the
country product level, showing the evolution of the parameters for Latvia refining the
analysis described in Comite (2012).
The identification strategy proposed is extremely parsimonious in terms of data re-
quirements and is based on a tractable yet comprehensive model of monopolistic compe-
tition with asymmetric product differentiation. Building on the specific properties of a
utility function displaying variable elasticity of substitution and heterogeneity in product
characteristics, the verti-zontal model can be used with aggregate data to identify two
independent components of demand. One, which can be interpreted as an indicator of
product quality, captures all the country-product characteristics that shift demand out-
wards and then increase consumers’ willingness to pay, indicating the possibility to charge
higher margins and sell more. The other, which can be associated with the exporters’
capacity to sell a particular variety for a given level of markups, has been defined non-
cost competitiveness and captures all the product characteristics that affect quantities
sold but not prices.
In the Chapter, it has been shown how these concepts of differentiation can be applied
to trade and macro data to extract information on the evolution of countries’ competitive
performance over time. Different types of country-product indicators, cross sectional and
longitudinal, can thus be built to perform in-depth analyses. It has also been shown
that country-level characteristics may indeed not be sufficient to describe trade patterns.
For example, focusing on the intensive margins of trade for the CN8 exports from EU
countries, importer and exporter dummies alone cannot explain more than 2.5% of the
total data variability, even combined. This would thus represent a theoretical upper
bound on how well country-level characteristics can explain the intensive margin of trade
patterns. To go beyond this threshold, the analytical focus has to be shifted towards
the country-product level, using models that allow for asymmetric varieties such as the
aggregate trade variation of the verti-zontal model presented in this Chapter.
In terms of the data needs, the model is very parsimonious. Unit values and quantities
shipped can be easily found at exporter-product-importer level from Eurostat. The same
is true for unit labor costs for EU Member States, which can be found on Eurostat or the
online dataset AMECO, even though at a higher level of aggregation than trade data.
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There are many directions in which the empirical identification methodology can be
further improved. For instance, it would be possible to exploit the high frequency of
trade statistics to move from a yearly to a monthly analysis, even though macro statis-
tics may have to be somehow adapted to match the same time frequency (which would
require specific assumptions to fill the missing data). Also, it would be possible to obtain
better estimates of marginal costs of production, which take into account non-labor re-
lated variable costs such as energy or input materials, but this would require additional
data and new assumptions on the production function of firms in different sectors, which
is not readily available for all the EU Member States. Furthermore, consumption esti-
mates at a product level have been inferred only indirectly in this Chapter, following a
procedure aimed at getting the most out of the narrowest possible data requirements,
but more precise estimates could be obtained following more sophisticated approaches or
more detailed data. Better measures of product consumption would contribute towards
improving the reliability of the longitudinal indicators, even if the cross sectional indica-
tors would be affected only in absolute terms but not in relative terms, which is one of
the strength of the framework.
Finally, it should be noted that the model is completely agnostic about what drives
product differentiation and how quality upgrading or better non-cost competitiveness
is achieved. Endogenizing firms’ choice of quality or non-cost competitiveness levels
is certainly a promising future avenue of research for both empirical analysis and pol-
icy prescriptions, as it may help design reforms to improve competitiveness. Possible
methodologies that can be followed to address some of these issues, among others, are
discussed in Chapter 6, where the most promising possible future avenues of research are
outlined.
Annex A.1 - Branch-to-Product (CN2) conversion table
In the following table is shown how branch-level unit labor costs (ULCs) derived from Gross
Value Added and Compensation of employees have been allocated to the different CN2 product
categories in order to obtain the product-level physical unit labor costs (PULCs) used in the
analysis. Higher levels of product disaggregation (CN4, CN6, CN8) follow the classification of
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the corresponding CN2 product.
AMECO branches CN2 Product
(following NACE) product description
(rev.1 sections) code
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
1 LIVE ANIMALS
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
2 MEAT AND EDIBLE MEAT OFFAL
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
3 FISH AND CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS AND OTHER
AQUATIC INVERTEBRATES
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
4 DAIRY PRODUCE; BIRDS’ EGGS; NATURAL HONEY;
EDIBLE PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN.
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
5 PRODUCTS OF ANIMAL ORIGIN, NOT ELSEWHERE
SPECIFIED OR INCLUDED
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
6 LIVE TREES AND OTHER PLANTS; BULBS, ROOTS
AND THE LIKE; CUT FLOWERS AND ORNAMENTAL
FOLIAGE
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
7 EDIBLE VEGETABLES AND CERTAIN ROOTS AND
TUBERS
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
8 EDIBLE FRUIT AND NUTS; PEEL OF CITRUS FRUIT
OR MELONS
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
9 COFFEE, TEA, MATE AND SPICES
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
10 CEREALS
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
11 PRODUCTS OF THE MILLING INDUSTRY; MALT;
STARCHES; INULIN; WHEAT GLUTEN
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
12 OIL SEEDS AND OLEAGINOUS FRUITS; MISCELLA-
NEOUS GRAINS, SEEDS AND FRUIT; INDUSTRIAL OR
MEDICINAL PLANTS
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
13 LAC; GUMS, RESINS AND OTHER VEGETABLE SAPS
AND EXTRACTS
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
14 VEGETABLE PLAITING MATERIALS; VEGETABLE
PRODUCTS NOT ELSEWHERE SPECIFIED OR IN-
CLUDED
Agriculture, forestry
and fishing (A + B)
15 ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS AND THEIR
CLEAVAGE PRODUCTS; PREPARED EDIBLE FATS;
ANIMAL OR VEGETAB
Manufacturing (D) 16 PREPARATIONS OF MEAT, OF FISH OR OF CRUS-
TACEANS, MOLLUSCS OR OTHER AQUATIC INVER-
TEBRATES
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Manufacturing (D) 17 SUGARS AND SUGAR CONFECTIONERY
Manufacturing (D) 18 COCOA AND COCOA PREPARATIONS
Manufacturing (D) 19 PREPARATIONS OF CEREALS, FLOUR, STARCH OR
MILK; PASTRYCOOKS’ PRODUCTS
Manufacturing (D) 20 PREPARATIONS OF VEGETABLES, FRUIT, NUTS OR
OTHER PARTS OF PLANTS
Manufacturing (D) 21 MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PREPARATIONS
Manufacturing (D) 22 BEVERAGES, SPIRITS AND VINEGAR
Manufacturing (D) 23 RESIDUES AND WASTE FROM THE FOOD INDUS-
TRIES; PREPARED ANIMAL FODDER
Manufacturing (D) 24 TOBACCO AND MANUFACTURED TOBACCO SUB-
STITUTES
Industry, including
energy (C + D + E)
25 - SALT; SULFUR; EARTHS AND STONE; PLASTERING
MATERIALS, LIME AND CEMENT
Industry, including
energy (C + D + E)
26 ORES, SLAG AND ASH
Industry, including
energy (C + D + E)
27 MINERAL FUELS, MINERAL OILS AND PROD-
UCTS OF THEIR DISTILLATION; BITUMINOUS SUB-
STANCES; MINERAL WAXES
Manufacturing (D) 28 INORGANIC CHEMICALS; ORGANIC OR INORGANIC
COMPOUNDS OF PRECIOUS METALS, OF RARE-
EARTH METALS, OF RADIO
Manufacturing (D) 29 ORGANIC CHEMICALS
Manufacturing (D) 30 PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
Manufacturing (D) 31 FERTILISERS
Manufacturing (D) 32 TANNING OR DYEING EXTRACTS; TANNINS AND
THEIR DERIVATIVES; DYES, PIGMENTS AND OTHER
COLOURING MATTER;
Manufacturing (D) 33 ESSENTIAL OILS AND RESINOIDS; PERFUMERY,
COSMETIC OR TOILET PREPARATIONS
Manufacturing (D) 34 SOAP, ORGANIC SURFACE-ACTIVE AGENTS, WASH-
ING PREPARATIONS, LUBRICATING PREPARA-
TIONS, ARTIFICIAL WAXES,
Manufacturing (D) 35 ALBUMINOIDAL SUBSTANCES; MODIFIED
STARCHES; GLUES; ENZYMES
Manufacturing (D) 36 EXPLOSIVES; PYROTECHNIC PRODUCTS;
MATCHES; PYROPHORIC ALLOYS; CERTAIN COM-
BUSTIBLE PREPARATIONS
Manufacturing (D) 37 PHOTOGRAPHIC OR CINEMATOGRAPHIC GOODS
Manufacturing (D) 38 MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS
Manufacturing (D) 39 PLASTICS AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 40 RUBBER AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 41 RAW HIDES AND SKINS (OTHER THAN FUR SKINS)
AND LEATHER
Manufacturing (D) 42 ARTICLES OF LEATHER; SADDLERY AND HARNESS;
TRAVEL GOODS, HANDBAGS AND SIMILAR CON-
TAINERS; ARTICLES OF
Manufacturing (D) 43 FUR SKINS AND ARTIFICIAL FUR; MANUFACTURES
THEREOF
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Manufacturing (D) 44 WOODAND ARTICLES OFWOOD;WOOD CHARCOAL
Manufacturing (D) 45 CORK AND ARTICLES OF CORK
Manufacturing (D) 46 MANUFACTURES OF STRAW, OF ESPARTO OR OF
OTHER PLAITING MATERIALS; BASKETWARE AND
WICKERWORK
Manufacturing (D) 47 PULP OF WOOD OR OF OTHER FIBROUS CEL-
LULOSIC MATERIAL; RECOVERED (WASTE AND
SCRAP) PAPER OR PAPERBOARD
Manufacturing (D) 48 PAPER AND PAPERBOARD; ARTICLES OF PAPER
PULP, OF PAPER OR OF PAPERBOARD
Manufacturing (D) 49 PRINTED BOOKS, NEWSPAPERS, PICTURES AND
OTHER PRODUCTS OF THE PRINTING INDUSTRY;
MANUSCRIPTS, TYPESCRI
Manufacturing (D) 50 SILK
Manufacturing (D) 51 WOOL, FINE OR COARSE ANIMAL HAIR; HORSEHAIR
YARN AND WOVEN FABRIC
Manufacturing (D) 52 COTTON
Manufacturing (D) 53 OTHER VEGETABLE TEXTILE FIBERS; PAPER YARN
AND WOVEN FABRICS OF PAPER YARN
Manufacturing (D) 54 MAN-MADE FILAMENTS; STRIP AND THE LIKE OF
MAN-MADE TEXTILE MATERIALS
Manufacturing (D) 55 MAN-MADE STAPLE FIBERS
Manufacturing (D) 56 WADDING, FELT AND NONWOVENS; SPECIAL
YARNS; TWINE, CORDAGE, ROPES AND CABLES
AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 57 CARPETS AND OTHER TEXTILE FLOOR COVERINGS
Manufacturing (D) 58 SPECIAL WOVEN FABRICS; TUFTED TEXTILE FAB-
RICS; LACE; TAPESTRIES; TRIMMINGS; EMBROI-
DERY
Manufacturing (D) 59 IMPREGNATED, COATED, COVERED OR LAMI-
NATED TEXTILE FABRICS; TEXTILE ARTICLES OF
A KIND SUITABLE FOR IND
Manufacturing (D) 60 KNITTED OR CROCHETED FABRICS
Manufacturing (D) 61 ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACCES-
SORIES, KNITTED OR CROCHETED
Manufacturing (D) 62 ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING ACCES-
SORIES, NOT KNITTED OR CROCHETED
Manufacturing (D) 63 OTHER MADE-UP TEXTILE ARTICLES; SETS; WORN
CLOTHING AND WORN TEXTILE ARTICLES; RAGS
Manufacturing (D) 64 FOOTWEAR, GAITERS AND THE LIKE; PARTS OF
SUCH ARTICLES
Manufacturing (D) 65 HEADGEAR AND PARTS THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 66 UMBRELLAS, SUN UMBRELLAS, WALKING STICKS,
SEAT-STICKS, WHIPS, RIDING-CROPS AND PARTS
THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 67 PREPARED FEATHERS AND DOWN AND ARTICLES
MADE OF FEATHERS OR OF DOWN; ARTIFICIAL
FLOWERS; ARTICLES OF H
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Manufacturing (D) 68 ARTICLES OF STONE, PLASTER, CEMENT, AS-
BESTOS, MICA OR SIMILAR MATERIALS
Manufacturing (D) 69 CERAMIC PRODUCTS
Manufacturing (D) 70 GLASS AND GLASSWARE
Manufacturing (D) 71 NATURAL OR CULTURED PEARLS, PRECIOUS OR
SEMI-PRECIOUS STONES, PRECIOUS METALS, MET-
ALS CLAD WITH PRECIO
Manufacturing (D) 72 IRON AND STEEL
Manufacturing (D) 73 ARTICLES OF IRON OR STEEL
Manufacturing (D) 74 COPPER AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 75 NICKEL AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 76 ALUMINUM AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 78 LEAD AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 79 ZINC AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 80 TIN AND ARTICLES THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 81 OTHER BASE METALS; CERMETS; ARTICLES
THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 82 TOOLS, IMPLEMENTS, CUTLERY, SPOONS AND
FORKS, OF BASE METAL; PARTS THEREOF OF BASE
METAL
Manufacturing (D) 83 MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES OF BASE METAL
Manufacturing (D) 84 NUCLEAR REACTORS, BOILERS, MACHINERY AND
MECHANICAL APPLIANCES; PARTS THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 85 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT AND
PARTS THEREOF; SOUND RECORDERS AND REPRO-
DUCERS, TELEVISION IMAG
Manufacturing (D) 86 RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY LOCOMOTIVES, ROLLING
STOCK AND PARTS THEREOF; RAILWAY OR
TRAMWAY TRACK FIXTURES AND
Manufacturing (D) 87 VEHICLES OTHER THAN RAILWAY OR TRAMWAY
ROLLING STOCK, AND
Manufacturing (D) 88 AIRCRAFT, SPACECRAFT, AND PARTS THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 89 SHIPS, BOATS AND FLOATING STRUCTURES
Manufacturing (D) 90 OPTICAL, PHOTOGRAPHIC, CINEMATOGRAPHIC,
MEASURING, CHECKING, PRECISION, MEDICAL OR
SURGICAL INSTRUMENT
Manufacturing (D) 91 CLOCKS AND WATCHES AND PARTS THEREOF
Manufacturing (D) 92 MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS; PARTS AND ACCESSORIES
OF SUCH ARTICLES
Manufacturing (D) 93 ARMS AND AMMUNITION;
Manufacturing (D) 94 FURNITURE; BEDDING, MATTRESSES, MATTRESS
SUPPORTS, CUSHIONS AND SIMILAR STUFFED FUR-
NISHINGS; LAMPS AND
Manufacturing (D) 95 TOYS, GAMES AND SPORTS REQUISITES;
Manufacturing (D) 96 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES
Services (G + P) 97 WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS’ PIECES AND AN-
TIQUES
Services (G + P) 98 COMPLETE INDUSTRIAL PLANT
Part III
The ways forward
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Chapter 6
Future avenues of research
After having described in the previous Chapters the spatial interpretation of the verti-zontal
model, its flexible structural form, empirical validation and potential use, in this Chapter some
promising future avenues of research are outlined in which the Model could be fruitfully ex-
tended. Specifically, first the model is employed to test empirically some of the implications
for the transport market of the quadratic utility framework without heterogeneities presented in
Chapter 1. Then, further empirical validation of the verti-zontal model and of its interpretation
and implications are proposed. Finally, theoretical developments of the verti-zontal model are
proposed, which have the merit of deepening the comprehension of the framework and its rich-
ness, but the disadvantage of becoming less prone to be tested empirically because of the higher
number of degrees of freedom.
6.1 Empirical test of the transport costs analysis
In virtually all trade theories transport costs are taken as nearly exogenous parameters, depend-
ing on either the value of the goods shipped (the so-called iceberg transport costs) or the distance
between the producer and the destination market (as in gravity models), implicitly assuming that
shipping costs do not depend on the direction of the shipment. However in Chapter 1 it has been
shown that it would not be rational for the providers of the transport sector to charge the same
price in the two directions, whatever the level of competition on the route (except perfect com-
petition with prices equal to marginal costs, of course). The equilibrium prices emerging in the
transport market would indeed depend on the characteristics of the exporter firms and importing
markets.
In Chapter 1, this point has been made theoretically, so it would be interesting to take the
model to the data to see if it can be useful to rationalize the observed transport cost patterns.
Based on the observation of the transport prices charged by UPS to ship the same good in one
direction and in the other of the same route (Guillin, 2014), prices are found to be systematically
asymmetric in the two directions. For example, shipping the same pallet from Hong Kong to
London is found to be twice as expensive as shipping it from London to Hong Kong. Of course,
the fact that transport prices are asymmetric does not imply that they should behave as described
in Chapter 1, but it may be worth to outline an model that can be used to test its hypotheses.
As for the transport price data, two alternative approaches are present in the literature: either a
direct observation of transaction-level tariffs as Kleinert and Spies (2011) do or the methodology
followed by Pomfret and Sourdin (2010) who estimate transport costs by comparing fob and
cif values of exports. In other words, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) put it Partial and
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incomplete data on direct measures of costs go with inference on implicit costs from trade flows
and prices.
Browsing the literature, it is possible to find several papers aimed at describing a transport
market, as for example Hummels et al. (2009), Behar and Venables (2010) or Behrens et al.
(2009). Different factors have been shown to influence transport prices, including port efficiency
(Blonigen and Wilson, 2008), regional trade agreements (Pomfret and Sourdin, 2009), imbalances
in trade flows (Behrens and Picard, 2011; Jonkeren et al., 2011), distance (Anderson and van
Wincoop, 2003), time (Hummels and Schaur, 2012) or technology choices (Kleinert and Spies,
2011). Each of these elements may be more or less important as a control depending on the
dataset at hand, but they should not affect the main point raised in Chapter 1: the transport
price charged by carriers may be influenced by the demand conditions in the destination of the
shipment. For example, in the case of a monopolistic carrier, it is shown in equation (6.4) that
it would charge exactly the markup that the producer would have charged in the absence of
transport costs, which depends only on the producer’s marginal costs (cs) and quality (αs) and
on the destination’s level of competition (Q).
One important deviation from Chapter 1 is that a pure analysis of transport costs doesn’t
have to include all the complex interactions of the long-run location problem analyzed in Chapter
1. Therefore, room is left to use the verti-zontal model proposed in Chapter 3 in a partial
equilibrium setting, which allows for more flexibility in dealing with the empirical implementation
of the theoretical model. Hence, the next sub-Section outlines a simple verti-zontal model of
asymmetric transport costs.
A verti-zontal model of asymmetric transport costs
Merging the modeling strategy of Chapter 1 with the verti-zontal functional form, the model
here focuses on the interaction between a transport sector providing an undifferentiated shipping
service and a differentiated-good sector. For the sake of the argument, the transport sector is
assumed to be populated by a monopolist with negligible variable costs of delivering the service
but high fixed costs of setting up a network, so that entry is inhibited in the shipping market
even if the carrier makes operating profits. The linear transport costs charged by the carriers are
endogenously determined in the transport sector. The focus is on a market i, where consumers
have access to a high number of varieties produced at home, in region i, or abroad, in any other
region j = −i. Each variety has a negligible mass and cannot choose its price strategically to
affect market aggregates. In addition, the world is composed of many connected regions, each
link being characterized by potentially different and asymmetric transport costs. To keep the
argument as simple as possible, the share of a particular region’s exports to market i is assumed
to be negligible for market aggregates, so as not to give incentive to the carrier in the transport
sector to price the shipping service strategically to affect the price indices in the world markets,
i.e. a carrier shipping variety s from market j to market i does not internalize the impact on the
price index Pi of charging a higher transport price ts,ji.
The differentiated good sector
As in the verti-zontal model (3.48), a representative consumer is assumed to live in region i
whose preferences over different varieties of a differentiated good, qs,i can be described as
Ui =
∫
s∈Si
αsqs,ids−
∫
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∫
s∈Si
∫
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0,i, (6.1)
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where q0,i is a region-specific numéraire good; qs,i is the quantity consumed by the represen-
tative consumer in i of a variety s ∈ Si which can be produced domestically, qs,ii, or abroad, qs,ji.
Throughout the section, after the variety identifier s is reported in the subscript first the region
in which the variety is produced and then the region in which the variety is sold. The parameter
αs, as usual, defines the intensity of preference accorded to the consumption of the differentiated
good, as compared to the region-specific numéraire, q0,i, whose marginal utility in region i is
normalized to unity and which can be thought of as a Hicksian composite good capturing the
marginal utility of consumption of any other good available in the region. The parameter βs,i
can be seen as capturing the taste mismatch between variety s’ horizontal characteristics and the
ideal of the representative consumer in i. As for γ, it represents the degree of substitutability
between any pair of varieties.
Consumers maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint:∫
S,i
ps,iiqs,iids+
∫
S,i
ps,jiqs,jids+ q0,i = Yi
where ps,ii and qs,ii are the price (in terms of the numéraire) and quantities sold of a differ-
entiated variety bought by a consumer living in the same region as the producing firm; ps,ji and
qs,ji are the price and quantity sold of a variety of differentiated good bought by a consumer
living in a region different from the one where the good was produced; q0,i is the quantity con-
sumed of the numéraire whose price is normalized to unity in region i; Yi is the income of the
representative agent living in i.
The demand associated with this preference system is linear and extremely tractable:
qs,i =
αs − γQi − ps,i
βs,i
where Qi =
∫
S,i
qs,ids is the total amount purchased by the representative agent in i of the
differentiated varieties. It can be noted that the price elasticity associated with this demand is
not constant, but it decreases in prices:
s,i = − ps,i
αs − γQi − ps,i
This expression ranges from 0, when ps,i = 0, to −∞, when prices equal the intercept of the
inverse demand function, αs−γQi. This property is key to the results because the intensity of the
price elasticity in the differentiated good sector will indirectly affect the profit-maximizing price
that carriers will charge for their transport service. To see this, first the firm problem is solved
with a fixed cost of entry and a constant marginal cost of production; then the carrier problem
is solved. The operating profit function of a firm producing a variety s of the differentiated good
in i and selling it in all the regions can be written as follows:
Πs,i = (ps,ii − cs,i)qs,ii +
∑
j 6=i
(ps,ij − cs,i − tij)qs,ij − fs,i.
Since markets are segmented and marginal costs of production are assumed to be independent
of the scale of production, the operating profit function of all the firms selling their variety in i
can be generalized as
pis,ji = (ps,ji − cs,i − tji)qs,ji
where tji = 0 when j = i and all the other tji 6= 0 are endogenously determined in the
tranport sector. The profit-maximizing price will then be
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p∗s,ji =
αs − γQi + cs,j + tji
2
. (6.2)
Markups will be:
p∗s,ji − cs,j − tji =
αs − γQi − cs,j − tji
2
and quantities sold in equilibrium will be:
q∗s,ji =
p∗s,ji − cs,j − tji
βs,i
=
α− γQi − cs,j − tji
2βs,i
(6.3)
Notice that when i 6= j the equilibrium inter-regional quantities sold q∗s,ji can be interpreted
as the demand for the transport sector, which is indeed decreasing in the linear transport cost,
tji, which is determined as described in what follows.
The segmented transport sector
To keep the argument as simple as possible, it is assumed that the transport service is undif-
ferentiated and provided by a monopolist carrier.1 In addition, it is assumed that the business
model of the carrier implies high fixed costs of setting up a network and negligible variable costs
per unit shipped (which, together with the assumption of an undifferentiated transport service
also justifies why the focus is on the case of a monopolist). The intuition is that if a train or
a plane is scheduled to depart on with regular schedule, its operating costs will be the almost
same whether it is full or empty but the fixed costs will be relevant.
The carrier is assumed to provide the inter-regional shipment service charging a price tij per
unit shipped. Similarly to the firms in the differentiated sector, the carriers k maximizes profits,
which can be written as
Πk =
∑
j 6=i
∫
s∈S,ji
ts,jiqs,jids− fk
where fk is the fixed cost of setting up the inter-regional distribution network, tji is the price
charged for the transport service from region j to region i, and qs,ji are the quantities shipped by
all the varieties sij produced in j and sold in i. Notice that, given the lack of heterogeneity across
firms within a region, the only source of variability across varieties is the region of production
and the region of consumption. Hence all the shipments from one region to another will be
charge the same price and the profit function can be simplified as
Πk =
∑
j 6=i
tji
∫
s∈S,ji
qs,jids− fk
The carrier is able to perfectly discriminate firms based on the varieties shipped and charge
the profit-maximizing transport price on each bilateral trade flow. The operating profit function
of the carrier can thus be further simplified into the minimalistic form
pik,ji = tjiqji.
1Given the assumption of an undifferentiated service, the generalization to the case of an oligopolistic
or perfectly competitive market is straightforward. It would be more complex to model a differenti-
ated transport sector in which different service characteristics and modes of transport compete in a
differentiated transport sector, but the argument would not be substantially affected.
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This expression intuitively highlights the carrier’s trade-off between higher transport costs
and the volume of shipments. Notably, the exact terms of this trade-off will be influenced by
the the price elasticities in the importing market, as can be seen from (6.2) that firms will
pass through to their costumers half of the transport costs determined in the transport market.
Plugging (6.3) into (6.1) operating profits can indeed be rewritten as
pik,ji =
tji
βs,i
(
αs − γQi − cs,j − tji
2
)
which implies that the optimal transport tariff will be
t∗ji =
α− γQi − cs,j
2
. (6.4)
Note that in this case the monopolist carrier is actually absorbing the entire markup that
would be generated by the firm producing and selling in market i if cs,j = cs,j , as the term
α−γQi−cs,j
2 is exactly the domestic markup (i.e. the markup in absence of inter-regional transport
costs). From (6.2), it can be noted that the producer will only charge t
∗
ji
2 on top of that.
For the purposes of the empirical estimation strategy, it should just be noted that market size
(Qi) is always negatively associated with transport costs, as they lower the margins of exporters
and so lower the capacity of the carrier to extract profits from them:
∂tij
∂Qj
= −γ
2
.
The main hypothesis that can be taken to the data is therefore that the level of competition
in the importing market (for which market size can be a proxy), controlling for everything else
(including bilateral trading partners fixed effects), is negatively related to transport prices. If
confirmed by the data, this factor can be used in future research on transport costs next to the
supply-side factors currently employed.
6.2 Empirical identification of the Verti-zontal parameters
This Section focuses on future empirical exercises that may involve the use of the verti-zontal
model presented in the previous chapters. The first one concerns the possibility of relating the
preference parameters identifiable through the model to an external indicator of quality or taste
mismatch. The second consists in the investigation an issue that is receiving increasing empirical
attention lately: the possible link between consumer income and the preference for high-quality
goods (Bastos and Silva, 2010), beyond the standard Balassa-Samuelson effect (Samuelson, 1994).
Finally, it is shown how the verti-zontal model can be used to rationalize the link between input
quality and firm profitability (Verhoogen, 2012).
6.2.1 External validation of quality and taste mismatch
The preference parameters defined in the verti-zontal model have been shown to be easily identi-
fiable. The corresponding quality and taste mismatch parameters display a remarkable internal
model consistency but have not been related to an external source of validation which can justify
the interpretation attributed to them. The factor analysis undertaken in Chapter 4 goes in the
direction of suggesting some possible sources of vertical and horizontal differentiation. Yet, given
the nature of the dataset, which does not include variety-specific marginal costs of production,
it is not a formal test of the theory but rather a preliminary exploratory exercise.
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A simple methodology can be proposed to determine whether the quality and taste mismatch
parameters identifiable with the verti-zontal model can be legitimately interpreted as such. In
other words, the internal consistency of the parameters of the verti-zontal model grant that the
empirical approach presented in Chapters 4 and 5 can be used to identify one set of firm-level
characteristics associated with higher sales and prices, associated with the parameter α. So this
parameter is essentially a demand shifter pushing the linear demand function outwards, but can
it be called quality? And similarly, the taste mismatch parameter β is essentially a demand
function slope shifter, affecting quantities sold in equilibrium but not price: is it enough to call
it a taste shifter?
As for the quality parameter, one possible way to proceed would be to compare the variety-
specific αs with some objective indicator of quality. For example, for some categories of goods
such as wines there are some rankings or scores given by experts and generally associated with
price, for example Crozet et al. (2012) use an external classification of champagne to calibrate
the productivity and quality parameters using CES preferences and (Brooks, 2003) exploits blind
tasting evaluations. Of course, higher prices in the verti-zontal model do not imply higher quality,
if costs are not accounted for, which meant that a formal comparison between αs and the quality
rank or mark assigned to each variety s needs to rely on a micro-level dataset with information
on firm costs. For example, it is well documented that a land price gap exist between arable
lands associated with specific "appellations" are involved (e.g., Champagne, Cognac), with land
prices in prime lands being significantly more expensive (SAFER, 2012). It is thus theoretically
possible that higher costs drive prices and entrepreneurs find it optimal to produce champagne
for a taste effect (i.e. the profitability may not derive from higher markups but from an increase
in sales).
It would be of course also possible to use the European car dataset employed in Chapters 2
and 4, but information would be needed on the marginal costs of production associated with the
car characteristics driving prices up. It may be noted from Chapter 4 that more fuel efficient
cars are indeed associated with higher prices: are they more valued by consumers or just more
expensive to produce? From the factor analysis in Tables 4.3 and 4.7 they are in fact associated
with lower quantities sold, which would suggest higher costs of production rather than higher
quality, but of course a factor analysis does not measure marginal effects and does not control for
the impact of other correlated variables. This means that among the car characteristics associated
with higher prices and lower quantities, quality and cost elements may be simultaneously present.
Finally, an alternative approach to have an external measure of quality which may be readily
available is to exploit product classifications that include information on inputs or product char-
acteristics. For example, chocolate exports are classified in terms of cocoa content (the higher
implying higher prices) or alcoholic beverages are classified by alcohol content (again, the higher,
the more expensive). These two indicators pose different empirical challenges. For example,
product characteristics need indeed to be universally recognized by consumers as an indication
of higher quality. This means that while in some cases it may be reasonable to assume so (for ex-
ample, everyone would probably agree that fuel efficiency is a good attribute, keeping everything
else constant), others may be more questionable (which may be the case of alcoholic content,
which may not be equally valued in all the destination markets or may have a non-monotonic
relation with the perception of value for consumers). As for the alternative approach of looking
at the input, such as the cocoa content of chocolate exports, the cost of the alternative inputs
should be controlled for to be sure to distinguish cost effects from quality effects. This is because
cocoa is a commodity whose price fluctuates following exogenous shocks such as weather, which
need not be perfectly correlated with the other costs of production, which means that there may
theoretically be cases in which higher cocoa content is associated with lower costs of produc-
tion than the alternative varieties. This calls again for a micro-level dataset where costs can be
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accounted for.
However, solved the data issues mentioned above, the approach to test the consistency be-
tween the external definitions of quality and the one resulting from the verti-zontal model would
be straightforward. For example, it could be observed whether higher αs correlate with higher
alternative definitions of quality. Or, more generally, concordance in ranks could be compared.
As for the definition of taste mismatch, similar empirical problems arise. First of all, micro-
level datasets are needed to be able to compare markups with quantities sold - possibly also
having information on the transport margins incurred by the exporter (which are interpreted as
linear transport costs in the model). Once the data availability issue has been solved, one related
and even more delicate issue of finding an external indication of taste mismatch with respect to
the taste of specific markets. One possible solution would be to exploit information on variations
of the same firm-product variations. Identical varieties of computers or mp3 readers, for example,
are available in different colors for the same price - or similarly DVDs or individual music tracks
are often sold at the same price even if sales differ substantially. These instances of different
varieties sold at the same price, and arguably involving the same costs or production, but sold in
different quantities would be an ideal setting to measure differences in βs. Of course, the main
issue would be that there would be no external definition of taste mismatch, but identification
βs,i would coincide with the observation of a low taste mismatch, which would not really help in
defining an objective external source of identification. In addition, ideally βs,i should depend on
characteristics of the variety and not on the variety itself.
To make a concrete example in the case of cultural industries, a paper by Chung and Song
(2008) studies the film industry in Korea by analyzing the commercial success of movie shown
on Korean theaters and finds that "if cultural elements in a foreign movie were switched to
Korean, the probability of watching that movie increases by 87.5 percent on average". In other
words, for market i = Korea adding Korean cultural elements reduces the βs,i of a movie s by
altering one of the dimensions of horizontal differentiation. In terms of market aggregates, it
means that the βs,i-weighted indices of the Korean movie market are affected by the presence
of Korean cultural elements in such a way that, holding everything else equal, adding Korean
cultural elements in all the movies shown in Korean theaters would increase the toughness of
competition in that particular market. This is an example of a possible use identification and
use of the parameter βs,i is a very specific case, but it may be admittedly difficult to find dataset
which provide sufficiently extensive information on horizontal characteristics of products as to
estimate the impact of individual features or to measure the impact on the market.
Another issue is that taste heterogeneity certainly overlaps with other possible explanations
for the sales variation of firm-products across countries, which have to be distinguished from
consumer taste. For example, Arkolakis (2010) underlines the importance of distribution net-
works in determining total sales and Foster et al. (2012) note that firms appear to build up their
demand gradually over time (even if in the next Section an alternative mechanism is suggested to
motivated the same empirical finding). These alternative explanations may be highly correlated
with taste factors, which can pose some identification challenges (for example, the absence of a
distribution network for a given variety may stem from the mismatch between the variety and
local tastes).
However, quality and taste mismatch as defined in the context of the verti-zontal model are
ready to be confronted with external data. The main issue seems to lie on the availability of
appropriate data, which can combine detailed information at micro level and a sufficiently large
sample to justify the identification of market aggregates.
The reason to undertake this empirical effort is that the quality and taste parameters so
identified would then become available for a much wider set of product markets, including those
for which external quality and taste indicators do not exist. Also, the empirical identification of
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the demand parameters can then be used to strip price indices from quality and taste changes
to get better estimates of GDP growth indicators as currently also pursued by Feenstra and
Romalis (2012).
6.2.2 Income and preference for quality
Turning now to the issue of how the preference parameters estimated through of the verti-zontal
model could be used in future research, there is one proposal suggested by a referee in the
reviewing process of Di Comite et al. (2014) that deserves some attention. The referee suggested
using the quality and taste mismatch parameters to investigate whether richer (representative)
consumers (i.e. richer countries) have a preference for higher quality goods. In other words, in
the theoretical setting of the verti-zontal model no correlation is assumed between αs and βs,i,
but there could indeed be destination-specific characteristics that determine a relation between
quality and taste mismatch. A typical determinant of taste for quality could be income, as
suggested theoretically by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and more recently tested empirically
by Bastos and Silva (2010).
A methodology which can be followed to this end is outlined here, even if preliminary re-
search undertaken in the preparation of the Di Comite et al. (2014) paper has not yielded any
statistically significant result. In a nutshell, the most straightforward approach to test this hy-
pothesis is to see whether the market-specific relation between αs and βs, i is related to market
i’s per capita income. The steps to follow are thus the following.
First, one product must be chosen for which several varieties are observed in the dataset.
Ideally the dataset should include information on costs of production and export prices, but even
in the absence of costs of production an alternative could be to focus on product with little scope
for differences in cost of production (because of institutional or technological issues, for example
products using the same commodity inputs in sectors and countries where the cost of labor is
highly regulated). Once markups are measured, or estimated (or costs are assumed constant
across varieties and prices and quantities observed), then the different export destination may
be associated with a destination specific βs,i for each variety s exported to i. Notice that for
each of these varieties also αs (or differences in αs) can be estimated.
Hence the second step is take at each destination country individually and regress βs,i (or 1βs,i ,
to facilitate the interpretation of the results) over αs. The resulting coefficient could be defined
as the taste for quality in the sense that, for each market i, it shows how much sales, conditional
on markups and thus indirectly on quality, are related to quality. Since the verti-zontal model
allows for the separate estimation of these two parameters, it provides an improvement on existing
approaches using prices alone. The result of this second step is thus a market-specific indicator
of preference for high quality.
The final step is thus to identify the country characteristics of interest and regress countries’
taste for quality over them. The hypothesis of richer consumers preferring high-quality goods
would not be rejected if, for example, per capita GDP of destination markets would be found
to be positively associated with the taste for quality estimates. To help intuition, Figure 6.1
provides an example of the expected observations for a quality-income sorting of countries. With
a country "disliking quality" (i = 1) and a country "liking quality" (i = 4), which happen to be
a poor country the former and a rich country the latter. It can be noticed that this methodology
would also allow to identify a level of income per capita for which consumers would be "quality
indifferent", i.e. with βs,i not being correlated with αs.
In the case of the Belgian exporters’ data, in the absence of information on marginal costs
the approach has been adapted to deal with differences across varieties. After having selected
appropriate products in order to assume constant marginal costs (as for example chocolate with
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of the methodology to identify a preference for quality and its
relation with income.
a specific content of cocoa), differences in quality (∆αs,αr ) have been measured in each market
as
∆αs,αr = 2∆ps,i,pr,i ,
where ∆ps,i,pr,i = ps,i−pr,i. For the sake of tractability, the variety with the lowest αr is defined
as s = 0 with normalization α0 = 0 and all the others are expressed in terms of distance from
the worst-quality variety, so that
α˜s = 2∆ps,i,p0,i .
Similarly, following the same assumptions the distance in βs,i between two varieties (∆βs,i,βr,i)
can be measured as
∆βs,i,βr,i =
ps,i − c
qs,i
− pr,i − c
qr,i
=
ps,iqr,i − pr,iqs,i − c (qr,i − qs,i)
qs,iqr,i
,
which can again be normalized in such a way that
β˜s,i =
ps,iq0,i − p0,iqs,i − c (q0,i − qs,i)
qs,iq0,i
,
Unfortunately, in the case of the Belgian exporters’ data, no statistically significant relation
has been found, but the approach may well deserve to be further refined and applied to similar
research questions in the future.
A similar exercise could be undertaken by shifting the perspective from the income of the
importer to the income of the exporter. As noted by (Schott, 2004), poorer countries tend to
export lower-priced goods to the US than richer countries. Since also marginal costs of production
may be lower in poorer countries, in the light of the verti-zontal model it would not be possible
to say a priori that the quality of their exports is lower, but with a firm-product level dataset
covering more exporting countries, this claim could be tested by fixing one destination country
and measure the different αs of the exporters.
However, it should be remembered that the exporter and importer dummies in Table 5.3 in
Chapter 5 were not able to capture any relevant amount of variability in prices or quantities in
the sample. It is thus likely that the impact of income (or other country-specific features such
as income distribution) will be very limited on the intensive margins of trade. Therefore, it may
be useful to analyze separately the intensive and extensive margins of trade in this context, to
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test whether richer markets differ from poorer markets in terms of the product range consumed,
as opposed to buying higher-quality varieties of the same set of goods.2
6.2.3 Vertical linkages and input quality
Finally, the last empirical development reviewed in this Section in which one variation of the
quadratic utility framework presented here can be fruitfully employed is the analysis of the link
between firm profitability and quality of inputs. The focus in the literature has often been on
the possibility of producing better goods by employing better inputs (Verhoogen, 2012), but in
the context of a vertical linkages framework à la Krugman and Venables (1995), the issue can be
seen from a different perspective: what if higher-quality inputs can be used to substitute capital
the fixed investments needed to set up a firm? To make a concrete example, if a firm can make a
choice between buying a software on the market, or developing one on its own, then the quality
and cost of inputs may influence the amount savings derived from the vertical linkages (i.e., the
external sourcing of part of the production process).
In terms of data, a firm-level dataset with information on firms’ total profits and detailed
information on inputs may suffice (for example, capital goods’ imports should be considered
separately from consumption goods’ imports). Of course, more data can always help as a control,
but since this particular hypothesis does not involve considerations on marginal costs or markups,
there is no specific need for firm-product or firm-product-destination details.
As for the theoretical setting to develop to test the hypothesis of higher-quality (capital
goods’) imports being associated with higher profits, the following model could be followed,
which combines the mechanisms described in Picard and Tabuchi (2013) with the functional
presented as Model II, i.e. a simple quadratic utility framework with quality heterogeneity.
Consider a world economy populated by unskilled workers supplying labor services to a com-
petitive industry producing a homogeneous good (numéraire) and to a monopolistically compet-
itive industry in which each firm produces a variety of a horizontally and vertically differentiated
good. The production of the differentiated good involves also skilled workers. In particular,
differentiated varieties s are associated with a constant marginal cost of production, equal to
the wage (normalized to unity) of cs unskilled workers. To start production, firms are assumed
to face three types of fixed costs, which are given by the requirement to employ, respectively,
physical capital equipment, intermediate goods and skilled labor. All the producers in the mo-
nopolistic sector employ the same technology and are thus homogeneous in their marginal cost
of production.
To make the model tractable, consumer utility and firms’ savings can be characterized by the
same functional form, therefore superscripts ζ and ι are used to distinguish consumers’ demand
for final goods from producers’ demand for intermediates in each market.
Consumer preferences in market i are thus captured by a representative consumer whose
quadratic preferences can be described as
Ui =
∫
s∈Si
αsq
ζ
s,ids−
β
2
∫
s∈Si
(qζs,i)
2ds− 1
2
γ
(∫
s∈Si
qζs,ids
)2
+ qζ0 (6.5)
where qζs,i is individual ζ
′s consumption of variety s ∈ Si of the differentiated good and qζ0 is the
consumption of the numéraire, and the parameters αs, β and γ can be interpreted exactly as in
2Looking at the EU28 cross section dataset used in Chapter 5, for example, it can be seen that while
the Netherlands import 9,569 CN8 products from the other EU countries, the Czech Republic, with a
similar population, imports only 8,968 CN8 products.
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Model II. As usual, the budget constraint of an individual ζ is∫
s∈N
ps,iq
ζ
s,ids+ q
ζ
0 = Y
ζ
i + q¯
ζ
0 (6.6)
where ps,i is the price of variety s, Iζ is the individual’s income and q¯
ζ
0 is her initial endowment
of the numéraire, which is assumed to be sufficiently large to ensure that consumers have positive
demands for the numéraire in equilibrium.
As in equation (3.19), maximization of (6.5) subject to (6.6) yields the following representa-
tive consumer ζ demand function in market i:
qζs,i =
αs − ps,i
β
− γ(Ai − Pi)
β(β + γNi)
(6.7)
where the only difference with respect to (3.19) lies in the presence of the superscript ζ, signaling
that this is the part of demand stemming from final consumption. Therefore it also holds that
Ni =
∫
s∈Si
ds Ai =
∫
s∈Si
αsds Pi =
∫
s∈Si
ps,ids,
where the same market indices apply to consumers and firms.
While in the competitive sector one unit of the homogeneous good is produced with one unit
of unskilled labor and fixes the unskilled workers’ wages to unity, in the monopolistic sector, a
firm producing variety s employs cs units of unskilled labor to produce one unit of the good and
it incurs in a fixed cost of production that consists of two inputs: physical capital equipment and
intermediate goods (and services). Specifically, the capital requirement to run a firm amounts
to K units of the numéraire but, as in Picard and Tabuchi (2013), each firm of type s can
acquire qι(.) units of all intermediate goods at a price p(.) to reduce its cost of physical capital
or operation: thus, physical capital and intermediate goods are input substitutes.3
This means that a part of the physical capital can be replicated by a set of intermediate
inputs at a lower cost. Specifically, the use of a set of all intermediate inputs qι(.) (available in
the country where the firm is producing) reduces the requirement for physical capital by C(.)
units of numéraire, where C(.) is modeled employing the same functional form as the composite
good in the consumers’ preferences, that is
C(qιx,i) =
∫
x∈Si
αxq
ι
x,idx−
β
2
∫
x∈Si
(qιx,i)
2dx− 1
2
γ
(∫
x∈Si
qιx,idx
)2
(6.8)
and the total cost of intermediates is given by
∫
x∈Si pxq
ι
x,idx . Notice that this cost of interme-
diates and the expression for C(.) in (6.8) are common to all firms in the monopolistic sector.
Hence, fixed costs are given by the following expression
f = K − C(.) +
∫
x∈Si
pxq
ι
x,idx.
As in Picard and Tabuchi (2013), each firm has to set the price ps for its variety and to determine
its demand of intermediate inputs qι(.) produced by other firms. Since the former decision
affects operating profits and the latter fixed costs, the two decisions can be disentangled into
the maximization of operating profits and the minimization of fixed costs. Given that firm’s
3As compared to Picard and Tabuchi (2013), for the sake of tractability, the parameters denoting
input-output multipliers, m and k, are set equal to 1.
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cost minimization has the same form as the consumer’s utility maximization, it entails that the
intermediate demand for variety x of each firm has the same form as (6.7) and it is given by
qιs,i =
αs − ps,i
β
− γ(Ai − Pi)
β(β + γNi)
. (6.9)
The minimized fixed cost is then given by
F = K − S[p(.)] (6.10)
where S[p (.)] are the cost savings due to the use of intermediates and they are given by
Si[p (.)] =
α2sNi
2 (β + γNi)
− αs
β + γNi
∫
x∈Si
px,idx+
∫
x∈Si(px,i)
2dx
2β
+ (6.11)
− γ
2β (β + γNi)
(∫
x∈Si
px,idx
)2
,
which is very similar to the indirect utility functions capturing the welfare of consumers resulting
from the system of preferences expressed in (6.5), with the only difference being the income part
of the equation, since consumer surplus also include the exogenous initial allocation of numéraire
and income:
Wi[p (.)] =
α2sNi
2(β + γNi)
− αs
β + γNi
∫
s∈Si
ps,ids+
∫
s∈Si(ps,i)
2ds
2β
+ (6.12)
− γ
2β(β + γNi)
(∫
s∈Si
ps,ids
)2
+ Y ζi + q0,
which is similar to the indirect utility function shown in (1.13), with the only difference that
varieties are here vertically differentiated.
These elements suffice to understand the intuition behind the model. Considering together
the market outcomes associated with Model II in Section 3.3.2 and the analysis of the link
between profits and consumer surplus in Section 3.7.3, it is immediately clear why an increase
in the quality of inputs maps into an increase in cost savings on the fixed costs of setting up a
firm and thus into higher profits.
First of all, notice that by working on fixed costs, the Model II results immediately apply to
the model presented here with vertical linkages in the short run. The only noticeable change in
the model may be just in the long run by altering entry and exit patterns because of lower fixed
costs. However, in the short run firms’ profit-maximizing prices and quantities are not affected,
so the model from the consumer side solves exactly like Model II.
As for the supply side, everything else being exogenously fixed, the key element is the cost
savings’ function S[p (.)], but since it mirrors consumer surplus, the same properties apply as the
ones highlighted in Section 3.7.3. Specifically, consumer surplus as been shown to be equal to
exactly half of the firms’ profits in the quadratic utility framework, but it has also been shown
in Model II that changes in quality are associated with changes in markups and quantities in the
same direction:
∂p∗s,i
∂αs
=
1
2
;
∂q∗s,i
∂αs
=
1
2β
.
Therefore higher quality of intermediates implies higher profits for the producer of the inter-
mediates and lower fixed costs for the firm buying them. With data on intermediates producers
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in addition to intermediates purchasers it would be also possible to check the properties, stem-
ming from the discussion in Section 3.7.3, on the relation between buyers’ profits and purchasers’
savings on fixed costs.
6.3 Theoretical extensions of the verti-zontal model
After having outlined three possible future empirical lines of research, this Section is devoted to
possible directions in which the Verti-zontal framework can be developed theoretically to solve
issues that cannot be tackled by alternative existing model in a similarly elegant way.
First, one assumption of the quadratic utility setting is altered to obtain a framework capable
of reconciling monopolistic competition and oligopolistic behavior; then, based on the results
obtained in Model VIII (the Verti-zontal with an endogenous substitutability parameter, γs,i) it
is shown how a complex issue such as the endogenization of firms’ location in the characteristics
space (in both vertical and horizontal terms) can be turned into an analytically tractable problem;
finally, a verti-zontal model with vertical linkages is outlined and suggested as a way to study
the link between the quality of inputs and firm profitability.
6.3.1 Oligopolistic competition
Monopolistic competition and oligopoly theory have always been seen as alternative frameworks
with little in common. Depending on the market structure at hand, an IO researcher has normally
to take a decision between looking at it through the lens of monopolistic theory or treat the firms
as oligopolists.
The main difference is that firms under an oligopoly look at each other and make strategic
choices depending on the expected competitors’ response. Under monopolistic competition,
instead, firms just take market aggregates as exogenous values that they cannot influence with
their behavior (the assumption of negligibility of each variety for the market).
The fact that these two frameworks are so different does not mean that they cannot be
simultaneously present in a market, as shown by Parenti (2013). Yet, firms competing under one
regime or the other have to be modeled differently and assumed of a different nature.
However, it can be shown that these two market structures can be reconciled into a unifying
functional form by slightly altering the way in which firms interpret their place in the market.
From the description of verti-zontal model (Model V in Chapter 3) it is possible to see how the
sales of a particular variety in the market are directly related to the taste mismatch between the
variety produced and the representative consumer in the destination markets.
Consistently with the monopolistic competition literature, firms are there assumed to take
market indices as given and consider their influence on the aggregates negligible like a drop in
the sea. But what if a variety enjoys a dominant position in a market (think of Coca Cola in
the soft drinks market) or what if high fixed costs limit the number of entrants in a particular
market? Should monopolistic competition just be dismissed as the wrong tool of analysis or
can the framework become more flexible in order not to have to draw a line between what is
monopolistic competition and what is an oligopolistic market? Empirically it is not a trivial
question, as in reality the number of firms in a market is always a finite number, but then how
to choose a threshold to switch from one framework to the other?
Here a solution is proposed, for future research, to bridge the gap between the two market
structures. The mechanism is rather straightforward: firms are allowed to correctly internalize
the real impact that their pricing strategy will have on the aggregate market indices but are
not allowed to collude with other firms (which is consistent with assuming many competitors of
small size, even if not a continuum of competitors as in the standard monopolistic competition
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frameworks). Technically, this implies that the instead of aggregating the mass of varieties
through integrals, the total number of varieties is summed up in the price index:
Pi =
∑
s∈Si
ps,i
βs,i
.
Hence each firm s, knowing its βs,i, can internalize its impact on the general price level in
market i for the differentiated good:
∂Pi
∂ps,i
=
1
βs,i
. (6.13)
This means that if variety s’ taste mismatch with the representative consumer in market i is
bad enough, i.e. if βs,i → +∞, then the impact on the price index disappears and a firm behaves
exactly as in standard monopolistic competition model such as the verti-zontal.
The interesting case is when βs,i is small enough to have a noticeable impact on the price
index, as is shown here. Consider the oligopolistic variation of the verti-zontal utility function,
Ui =
∑
s∈Si
αsqs,ids−
∑
s∈Si
βs,i
2
q2s,ids−
γ
2
∑
s∈Si
∑
r∈Si
qs,iqr,idsdr + q0,
yielding the demand function
qs,i =
αs − ps,i
βs,i
− γ(Ai − Pi)
βs,i(1 + γNi)
where
Ni ≡
∑
s∈Si
ds
βs,i
Ai ≡
∑
s∈Si
αs
βs,i
ds Pi ≡
∑
s∈Si
ps,i
βs,i
ds. (6.14)
Maximizing operating profit,
pis,i = (ps,i − cs,i)qs,i,
firms take accurately into account their impact on the price index as note in (6.13) and
measure the impact of price variations on profits as
∂pis,i
∂ps,i
= qs,i − ps,i − cs,i
βs,i
+
(ps,i − cs,i)γ
β2s,i(1 + γNi)
.
It can already be noted from this point that the first two terms coincide with the verti-zontal
model (i.e., Model V in Chapter 3), but the oligopolistic nature of the solution includes a positive
third term, which shifts equilibrium prices upward, the more so the lower is βs,i, following the
predicted impact of individual price changes on market aggregates. This term accounts for the
fact that an increase in prices for variety s in market i will increase the price index faced by
all the varieties in the market and thus relax the competitive pressure for all the competitors,
including variety s which thus increases its profits.
The resulting optimal pricing strategy, as a function of the price index, can be written as
ps,i(Pi) =
αs + cs,i
2
− γ(Ai − Pi)
2(1 + γNi)
+
(ps,i − cs,i)γ
2βs,i(1 + γNi)
, (6.15)
which is again a combination of the pricing strategy shown in (3.52) and a third term whose
relevance depends on the intensity of the taste mismatch βs,i yielding a higher price than in the
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pure monopolistic competition case in which (6.13) is not internalized. Notice also that, when
βs,i → +∞, then (6.15) converges to (3.52).
Finally markups can be written as a function of the price index Pi and taste mismatch as
ps,i − cs,i =
[
αs − cs,i
2
− γ(Ai − Pi)
2(1 + γNi)
]
(1 + γNi)
(1 + γNi)− γ2βs,i
, (6.16)
where the part in square brackets coincides with the monopolistic competition result Model
V’s equation (3.52) once (3.51) is taken into account and the second term is bigger than one as
long as the parameters γ and βs,i are positive, since it is commonly assumed (and discussed in
Chapter 3) that βs,i > γ .
Notice that (6.16) converges towards the monopolistic competition solution when βs,i → +∞,
but for finite value of βs,i it implies higher markups because firms internalize the impact of their
prices on the market indices.
This framework can be further developed and embedded into a problem à la Parenti (2013).
Yet, the main message concerns the possibility of introducing the oligopolistic idea of strategic
interactions in a context of weak interactions. In other words, firms can be seen as competing
against the market and behave strategically taking into account the reaction of the market, even
without revealing the identities of the competitors in the same market.
6.3.2 Localized competition and endogenous location choices
Another promising development of the quadratic utility framework concerns the endogenization
of location decisions based on the endogenization of the substitutability parameter as presented in
Model VIII of Chapter 3. The main idea is that even if firms could choose the quality and location
on the horizontal characteristics space at no cost, they would still not cluster all in one spot.
The intuition is simple, if the substitutability between pairs of varieties depends on their distance
in the characteristics space, a localized dispersion force interact with the agglomeration force of
chasing demand. This result is known in location theory, but the advantage of a framework based
on monopolistic competition is that always involves smooth interior solutions, as opposed to the
classic Hotelling (1929) problem which may have no solutions, as noted by d’Aspremont et al.
(1979) in the case of a simultaneous decision on selling prices and location, which eludes any Nash
equilibrium solution, if the costs associated with distance are low enough (for example, they are
unitary, i.e. just proportional to the distance covered).4 Notice that there are recent examples
of theoretical IO models with similar properties to the ones presented in this section, such as
Vogel (2008) who develops a Hotelling-like model with cost-heterogeneous firms and shows that
firms choose asymmetric locations in the linear city model, but those models cannot be easily
implemented empirically in an international trade context because are based on the assumption
of perfect substitutability which results in consumers buying only one variety, as opposed to this
framework where consumers rather buy all the varieties displaying positive markups (even if in
quantities depending on horizontal differentiation).
Similarly to traditional models of differentiation, the model presented could be used to study
the pure location problem of a variety in the characteristics space. For example, holding quality
4Any optimal strategy, given the competitor’s strategy, would push the competitor to change her
strategy, which then makes the first competitor’s strategy not optimal anymore and so on, endlessly.
Analytical tractability is restored only when distance is costly enough (for example, when transport costs
are quadratic, such as t = kx2, where k is a constant and x is the distance covered), even if the problem
would yield trivially to a corner solution where firms locate as far as possible from each other to relax
any price competition and enjoy full market power.
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and costs fixed, the profit maximizing positioning of firms can be studied as a function of profits
in the different locations. The typical situation in which this may be useful is the case of cultural
industries, where it could be argued that price variation is limited and horizontal differentiation
important and thus firms could tailor their products to their most profitable markets or, alter-
natively, proposing varieties relatively appealing to different markets (Chung and Song, 2008).
Another interesting field of application is on the decision about how much to invest in quality
upgrading (Kranich, 2007), who uses expenditures in by R&D activities as a proxy for quality.
More in general, the main objective of economic geographers has traditionally been to model
the equilibrium spatial distribution of firms and consumers in a rich, tractable and formally
consistent way (Fujita et al., 2001), so the variation of a monopolistic competition framework
presented here can be a contribution in this direction. The strand of literature on firm location
starts from the seminal works of Weber (1909) and Hotelling (1929), where firms just have to
choose a profit-maximizing location abstracting away from any consideration of product differ-
entiation or heterogeneity in quality, producing costs or even prices.
It is worth noting that the extremeness of these early results is partly attributable to the
assumption of homogeneity of the products sold. In fact, as soon as product differentiation is
introduced in the picture, products start to be perceived by the consumers as imperfect sub-
stitutes and non-corner solutions become achievable, but localized competition becomes more
difficult to maintain. On the basis of this observation product differentiation has become a key
ingredient in all New Economic Geography, which got rid of localized competition and formalized
a non-localized common differentiation across all the varieties in a market (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977; Krugman, 1991), following the tradition of Chamberlin (1933), Spence (1976), Perloff and
Salop (1985) and Salop (1979).
There are recent examples of papers reconciling localized features à la Lancaster (1966) with
non-localized competition mechanisms, as for example Chen and Riordan (2007) with the spokes
model of non-localized spatial competition where consumers have one favorite variety and have
the same distance from all the others (because they have to walk from the tip of a spoke to the
center and then back to the tip of another spoke) or Carballo et al. (2013), where consumers
consume only their ideal varieties and firms have to chase them by producing that particular
variety (at a higher cost, the further is their core competence in producing a particular variety).
In contrast, in the verti-zontal model consumers are allowed to purchase varieties that do not
match their ideal, but do it a "walking cost" of βs,i, i.e. their utility becomes more concave
and they get sooner tired of consuming a variety, the further it is from their ideal. Of course,
the framework of Carballo et al. (2013) where firms can produce non-core varieties at a higher
cost and the Verti-zontal where consumers can choose non-ideal varieties reaching more rapidly
their satiation point are not mutually exclusive, but may rather be seen as describing the same
problem from the demand and the supply perspective.
A two-incumbent example with one entrant
As for the location choice of firms once endogenous substitutability parameters are taken into,
since the approach can be generalized to any quadratic preference framework, it is here illustrate
for all the variations presented in Chapter 3. To provide the basic intuition of the endogenous
location problem when substitutability is endogenous, in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 is first presented
the simplest two-incumbent example with one entrant. Imagine that in market i, represented by
one representative consumer, only two varieties are present, characterized by the same α = 10,
the same marginal costs c = 4 and located in the (β1;β2) space on the points (1;2) and (2;1).5
5For the sake of the argument, the incumbents are said to be two, but in reality it would be more
correct to say that there is a mass of firms, half of which is located in one point and the other half in
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The representative consumer is located at (0;0). One new entrant with the same quality and
cost levels as the incumbent has to choose one location on the characteristics space (this means
that the corresponding variation in Chapter 3 would be Model VII, from which the equations
are drawn). Where would it find more profitable to locate?
In standard location theories the answer is straightforward: the new entrant will locate ex-
actly where the representative consumer is. However, when endogenous substitutability patterns
are taken into account, this choice will be suboptimal. The new entrant would indeed find it
profit-maximizing to locate further away from the consumer in order to relax competition with
the incumbents. In the particular example illustrated here, the profit-maximizing location lies on
(−0.82;−2.46), where operating profits are Πs,i ≈ 1.23, resulting from quantities qs,i ≈ 0.63 and
markup ps,i − cs,i = µs,i ≈ 1.95. The profit level conditional on location are shown on the green
left graph of Figure 6.2, where the vertical black line shows the location of the representative
consumer and the dashed blue vertical line the profit-maximizing location of the new entrant.
The other two graphs in the same Figure show the corresponding markups (in the middle) and
quantities (to the right) and help understand what drive the result.
Figure 6.2: Profits, prices and quantities as a function of location in the two-incumbent
example.
It can be noticed indeed that incumbent competitors distort the "profitability" space around
them by reducing both the level of markup that can be charged to the consumers and the
quantities sold. That is because the γ parameter directly affects the pricing decisions (for of
all the variations). On the other hand, the parameter βs,i alone has been shown not to affect
markups when it varies across varieties. This implies that, as competition wanes, markups of the
new entrant tend to converge to the monopolist level (in the example, ps,i− cs,i = 3), which is a
clear dispersion force. On the other hand, the further the new entrant locates from the consumer,
the lower will be its sales, which means that the new entrant has a clear incentive to locate as
close as possible to the representative consumer in (0; 0), capturing a classic agglomeration force.
The interaction of these two forces results in a framework that ensures interior solutions and
allows for an endogenous asymmetric location of firms, which is quite a new result in the field of
location theories. In addition, the framework proposed here also shows in which direction a firms
should move to get the highest marginal increase in profitability. Imagine that a new entrant
draws randomly its initial location and then it is allowed to relocate. Where would it find profit
maximizing to move?
In Figure 6.3 the answer is provided by plotting on the left a heat map for profits (the redder,
the more profitable the location) and on the right a map of levels with the vectors associated with
the highest gradient for each point in the horizontal characteristics space (the orange arrows).
The interpretation is that if a firm were allowed to make just a marginal step in one direction,
the other. This is because, to keep the problem as simple as possible, the new entrant is not assumed to
affect the incumbents’ outcomes.
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the orange arrows show which direction would be optimal to follow. For example, it is not always
optimal for firms to go directly towards the profit-maximizing (−0.82;−2.46) point, if between
the initial location and that point the firm has to approach the competing varieties.
Figure 6.3: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in the two-incumbent example
Endogenous location in the quadratic utility variations
As explained in this example, the location problem of a new entrant variety is now analyzed in
the quadratic utility variations presented in Chapter 3. Thus, where not stated otherwise, all
the characteristics of the varieties in terms of quality, cost, horizontal and vertical differentiation
are exactly the ones described in the tables of Figures 3.5 for Model I, 3.6 for Model II, 3.7 for
Model III, 3.8 for Model IV, 3.10 for Model V, 3.11 for Model VI, 3.13 for Model VII, 3.15 for
Model VIII. This means that also the market outcomes (prices, markups, quantities) and the
degree of substitutability for the incumbents are exactly the ones reported in Chapter 3.
The exercise consists in determining the expected profits for a new entrant conditional on her
location choices in the horizontal characteristics space. Notice that the most correct interpreta-
tion of the simulation is in terms of mass of firms, rather than individual firms (to abide by the
monopolistic competition assumption of negligibility of each firm and not having to account for
each firm’s βs,i as shown in the previous section). Analyzing the location choice of one potential
entrant, implicitly it is also assumed that the presence of this entrant would not affect the market
outcomes of the mass of incumbents. However, notice that this feature is irrelevant in terms of
the problem analyzed. Indeed, the profitability of new entrants with endogenous substitutability
does not depend on market outcomes, but rather on the structural parameters of the incumbent
competitors (i.e. their αs, βs,i, β1;s,i, β2;s,i, cs,i). This implies that even if the entry of a new
competitor affects the incumbents’ market outcomes, this change in market outcomes will not
feed back into the market outcomes of the new entrant.6 New entrants are assumed to have the
6Notice that this is also true because in the quadratic utility framework there are no income effects.
In fact, if the share of income devoted to the consumption of the differentiated variety were fixed, then
6.3. THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS OF THE VERTI-ZONTAL MODEL 307
same quality and cost levels as the βs,i-weighted average in the market and the only endogenous
choice concerns the location on the (β1;β2) axes. The formula used to determine the endogenous
value of the substitutability parameter is thus adapted from equation (3.37):
γs,i =
8∑
r=1
(αr − cr,i)
βr,idsr,i
.
Distance dsr,i can be calculated in terms of horizontal differentiation or also in terms of distance
in vertical characteristics. In order to isolate the role played by horizontal differentiation, the
distance is measured for all the simulations just in terms of horizontal characteristics. At the
end of the Section it is also illustrated ho introducing vertical differentiation (slightly) alters the
patterns. For the sake of tractability, horizontal differentiation is again defined just in terms of
two abstract orthogonal dimensions of differentiation, called β1 and β2. In the main simulations
distance between varieties is thus measured as
dsr,i =
√
(β1;s,i − β1;r,i)2 + (β2;s,i − β2;r,i)2,
which means that the full formula to express substitutability can be written as
γs,i =
8∑
r=1
(αr − cr,i)
βr,i
√
(β1;s,i − β1;r,i)2 + (β2;s,i − β2;r,i)2
. (6.17)
and, of course, markups are measured as in equation (3.92), which yields the following profit
function:
pis,i =
1
βs,i
[
αs − cs,i
2
− γs,i
2
(Ai − Ci)
(2 + Γi)
]2
, (6.18)
which clearly shows the role played by substitutability in translating tougher competitive condi-
tions into lower form profits.
Models without endogenous substitutability
Before turning to the analysis of the Models where the degree of substitutability depends on
the particular location of a firm in the characteristics space, it is worth to have a look at the
location-specific profitability patterns for Models I, II, III and V, in which the same γ is applied
to all the varieties independently of their actual location.
When γ is not allowed to vary, indeed, each variety in the market suffers from the same
competitive pressure, γQi, which can be seen as a parallel shift downwards for firms’ profits in
market i. Depending on the Model chosen, the extent of the downward shift depends on different
market indices (either weighted or unweighted) that determine Qi.
However, the lack of endogenous substitutability implies that the price charged for a par-
ticular variety is independent of the location of the variety on the horizontal characteristics
space and thus location-specific differences in profits are only driven by changes in quantities.
Hence the expected level of location-specific profits show for all the model without endogenous
substitutability the same pattern shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5.
In particular, Figure 6.4 represents a model without heterogeneity in β, as the thin dashed
orange lines represent the location of the incumbent competitors. Notice that the location of
the market outcomes of competitors would indeed affect also the new entrant. The quadratic preference
framework thus makes the location problem more tractable.
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the competitors is relevant just insofar as it determines the total amount of quantities sold Qi
because of the taste mismatch effect, which is why it may shift the entire distribution of expected
profits upwards or downwards without affecting the general pattern.
In this case, of course, the profit-maximizing location of the entrant (the thick dashed blue
line) coincides with the location of the representative consumer (the thin black line).
It is also unsurprising that, as shown in Figure 6.5, firms’ profits increase monotonically as
they get closer to the representative consumer taste.
This trivial example is not particularly interesting per se, but it can be used as a term of
comparison for the next cases analyzed.
Figure 6.4: Profit patterns as a function of location in Models I, II, III and V without
location-specific substitutability
Figure 6.5: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Models I, II, III and V
without location-specific substitutability
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Symmetric outcomes: Model IV
Turning to the variations where the value of the substitutability parameter depends on the
location of a variety on the horizontal characteristics space, the first example in Model IV,
shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7, based on the characterization of the economy describe in Figure
3.8.
Since costs, quality levels and horizontal differentiation are not variety-specific in Model IV,
the result is a symmetric plot with a global profit maximum at the center (where the entrant
tailors its product characteristics to the representative consumer taste) and a continuum of local
maxima further away from the consumer (and the competitive pressure of the incumbents).
It can be appreciated from Figure 6.6 how the worst location for the entrant is close to the
incumbent, as the similarity between the extant and the new variety would drive their markups
down.
Turning to Figure 6.7 it can also be noticed an interesting feature in terms of possible
dynamics. If a firm is randomly assigned a set of characteristics determining a level of taste
mismatch higher than the incumbents, then a firm deciding to locally improve its operating
profits would be driven further away from the consumer and the global maxima into a remote
local maximum. Therefore initial conditions may determine a suboptimal location even after a
firm is allowed to relocate.
Figure 6.6: Profit patterns as a function of location in Model IV
Figure 6.7: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model IV
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Asymmetric outcomes with symmetrically located competitors
There are two ways to break the symmetry the previous example without altering the location
of firms. One is to allow for cost heterogeneity in Model IV is to allow for cost heterogeneity, as
in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 , the other possibility is to allow for quality differentiation, which amounts
to consider Model VI, as in Figures 6.10 and 6.11.
Model IV’s variety have all the same characteristics as show in Figure 3.8, except for the
values of cost for each variety, for which the values are taken from the table in Figure 3.5.
The simulation on Model VI considers instead the values in the table of Figure 3.11 exactly as
reported.
In both cases the location of competitors is symmetric, but the differences in their char-
acteristics distort the expected profit distribution in asymmetric ways. The numerator of the
pair-specific component of the substitutability equation (6.17) is indeed a function of character-
istics which are independent of the horizontal location of firms.
The general pattern is, however, similar to the one of Model IV, both in terms of the existence
of global and local maxima and the possibility for firms to be stuck in a suboptimal equilibrium if
starting from too far away for the consumer and then following their highest gradient to improve
their operating profits.
One consideration to add is that in both the symmetric and the asymmetric case, there is
no insurance that the global maximum coincide with the location of the consumer (0; 0). If
incumbent varieties match consumer’s taste better than in the example, then the locus of global
maxima points may well be represented by the circle (in the symmetric case) or the irregular
area (in the asymmetric case) around the incumbent varieties.
The relative importance of distance from the consumer (agglomeration force) and compe-
tition effects (dispersion force) of course depends on the calibration of the model, i.e. on the
specific values attributed to the parameters. There is thus some room for empirical calibration
or validation of the model, the only problem being that often the two exercises are mutually
exclusive, in the sense that determining the parameters to fit the empirical observation and then
testing the model on the same empirical observation would not be possible.
Yet, one of the interesting properties of the framework proposed here is that the profitability
of each variety depends on the others’ structural parameters (α, β, γ, c) rather than only appar-
ently on market outcomes. It is indeed true that it is the price index or total quantities that enter
the demand function of each variety, but they are also a function of the structural parameters.
This may allow for the separation of the problem of identifying the structural parameters of firms
and thus the calibration of the model, from the problem of determining the market outcomes of
new entrants or existing firms as a result of changes in competitors’ characteristics (say, quality
upgrading, cost increases or relocation on the characteristics space).
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Figure 6.8: Profit patterns as a function of location in Model IV with heterogeneous
costs
Figure 6.9: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model IV with cost
heterogeneity
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Figure 6.10: Profit patterns as a function of location in Model VI
Figure 6.11: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model VI
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Heterogeneity in horizontal differentiation: Models VII and VIII
Probably the most interesting cases to study are the ones in which the parameters β and γ
are both variety specific. This is the case in Models VII and VIII, whose simulation details
are described in the tables of Figures 3.13 and 3.15. The two models are considered together
because the presence of variety-specific quality levels (in Model VIII) doesn’t affect substantially
the patterns of the simulation, when only horizontal characteristics are taken into account to
determine the level of substitutability γs,i.
The location-specific expected profits in Model VII are shown in Figure 6.13 and its profit
levels and highest profit-marginal-increase stream plots are in Figure 6.14. As in the symmetric
case, it can be noticed that the area around incumbents’ location is the least profitable for new
entrants. Interestingly, the competitive impact of the incumbents of the entrant’s profitability is
different for each variety, even in the absence of differences is costs or quality. In fact, the only
reason for the different impact of incumbents’ competition is their proximity to the consumer.
The intuition is straightforward. Varieties which match better local taste are sold in higher
quantities because of a lower βs,i, ceteris paribus, and this means that the total amount of
goods sold in market i, Qi, is not composed of varieties sold in different shares (even if they are
characterized by the same cost and quality). But this means that a substitutability parameter
attributing the same value γ to all the varieties in the market would not take into account the
pair-specific nature of the concept of substitutability.
Adding quality heterogeneity (or similarly cost heterogeneity) as in Model VIII does not alter
the logic substantially, except that varieties further way from the representative consumer may
exert a competitive pressure similar to the closer varieties if their quality (cost) is high (low)
enough, as the resulting higher markup counterbalances the higher taste mismatch in determining
equilibrium quantities. In Figure 6.15 are plotted the expected profits (to the left), markups (in
the middle) and quantities (to the right) for a new entrant in a market populated by incumbents
as described in the table of Figure 3.15. As usual, the corresponding levels and stream plot of
highest gradient vectors is on Figure 6.16.
To provide some additional intuition on the role played by the location-specific endogenous
level substitutability, in Figure 6.12 is plotted the conditional level of γs,i alone. The higher the
substitutability, the tougher the competition and hence the lower the markups; Substitutability
has thus a location-specific impact on both prices and quantities, as opposed to horizontal differ-
entiation (βs,i) affecting only quantities or vertical differentiation ( αs) having the same impact
independently of the location of a variety.
Figure 6.12: Substitutability intensity as a function of location in Model VIII
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As for the previous cases, also in Model VIII multiple dynamic equilibria are possible, de-
pending on the initial conditions of a variety, and there is not assurance that a variety end up
locating in a global maximum spot by continuously improving its operating profits.
Figure 6.13: Profit patterns as a function of location in Model VII
Figure 6.14: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model VII
6.3. THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS OF THE VERTI-ZONTAL MODEL 315
Figure 6.15: Profits, prices and quantities as a function of location in Model VIII
Figure 6.16: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model VIII
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Altering two firms’ locations in Model VIII
One consideration on the simulations based on the parameter values adopted in Chapter 3 is
that in all the cases the (at least local) profit-maximizing location for a new entrant has always
been exactly on the representative consumer location or very close to it.
However, as show in the two-variety example that need not be the case, but it just resulted
from the fact that the incumbent varieties were distributed around the consumer and did not
allow for any profitable niche farther away from the consumer. To make this point clear, in
Figure 6.18 it is shown what would have been the outcome of the Model VIII simulation with a
minimal alteration of the parameters in the table of Figure 3.15. The only change is that firms
on the bottom left quadrant are moved to the top right In particular Firm 5 is moved from
(−2;−5) to (2; 5) and Firm 6 from (−6;−2) to (1; 2).
As expected, the change is remarkable in terms of preferred location. Due to the new dis-
tribution of the parameter γs,i, shown in Figure 6.17, the expected profits, markups and quan-
tity distributions as a function of location are substantially re-drawn. For example, the profit-
maximizing location in this case is (−1.69;−2.71) and it happens to be a global maximum which
can be reached smoothly starting from any initial point by a constant marginal improvement of
the operating profits.
Figure 6.17: Substitutability intensity as a function of location in Model VIII with altered
firm location
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Figure 6.18: Profits, prices and quantities as a function of location in Model VIII with
altered firm location
Figure 6.19: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model VIII relocating
firms 5 and 6
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Substitutability and quality differences
In the foregoing part of the section, substitutability has been measured only in terms of horizontal
differentiation following equation (6.3.2). This amounts to assuming that two varieties of very
different quality but with the same horizontal characteristics would be more substitutable than
two varieties with exactly the same quality but slightly far away on the horizontal characteristics
space.
While convenient in terms of tractability, the formula to determine the substitutability pa-
rameter can be augmented to include also the vertical distance between pairs of varieties, thus
considering at the same time the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of differentiation. Equa-
tion (6.3.2) can thus be changed into
γs,i =
8∑
r=1
(αr − cr,i)
βr,i
√
(β1;s,i − β1;r,i)2 + (β2;s,i − β2;r,i)2 + (αs − αr)2
. (6.19)
Equation (6.19) may not appear very different from 6.17 and in the variations without qual-
ity heterogeneity it will be irrelevant, but in the models with quality differences it feature an
interesting property: when two varieties coincide in the horizontal characteristics space, if their
quality level differs, the substitutability parameter may still be finite (as opposed to equation
6.17 where γs,i → +∞ when two varieties have the same horizontal characteristics).
In terms of the simulation, this property make the results smoother, as shown in Figures
6.20 and 6.21, where the Model VIII parameters reported in the table of Figure 3.15 have been
used without alteration, which makes them directly comparable to Figures 6.15 and 6.16.
The difference between the two sets of figures is so stark that in Figure 6.21 five varieties
almost seem to have disappeared in terms of expected profitability of the new entrant. The reason
is the following. In this simulation, the entrant is assumed to be exogenously assigned a level of
quality (αs) which is 10% higher than the weighted average in the market, which results in a value
of 11.6.7 This means that the denominator of equation (6.19), for all the variety pairs, cannot
be lower than the vertical distance between the entrant and each incumbent. Since the closest
varieties in terms of quality are varieties of Firms 2, 3 and 5, the location of these firms are the
only place in the horizontal characteristics space where the entrant would suffer from significant
market competition. In the rest of the space, even when overlapping in horizontal characteristics
with incumbent varieties, the expected profits of the entrant would not be significantly affected.
To illustrate this point further, a simple experiment is undertaken. In Figures 6.22 and 6.23
the quality of Firm 8, the one producing the highest-quality variety in the market, has been
reduced from α8 = 15 to α8 = 11. In the case in which substitutability is not affected by quality
differences, this would have resulted in a lower quality index in the market< mathbbAi and higher
expected markups and profits for the entrant everywhere in the characteristics space. However,
when quality differences matter for substitutability, this is not the case. The quality-downgraded
variety is now indeed the closest variety to the entrant in terms of vertical differentiation. For
this reason, the area on the bottom left of Figure 6.23 is now turned into the least appealing
location for the entrant as compared to the previous case, even if the only change in the economy
has been a reduction in quality of one competitor.
7The reason why in this particular simulation the entrant is not assumed to have exactly weighted
average quality, as in most of the other cases, is purely illustrative, because the weighted average value,
10.55, happened to be very close to the quality level of two existing varieties and thus blurring the overall
intuition on the role of vertical distance.
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Figure 6.20: Profits, prices and quantities as a function of location in Model VIII with
quality difference affecting substitutability
Figure 6.21: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model VIII with quality
difference affecting substitutability
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Figure 6.22: EndogLocationModel8deltaQualityAlteration
Figure 6.23: Profit levels and stream plot of its gradient field in Model VIII including
distance in quality altering the quality of Firm 1
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Possible empirical applications
In terms of the empirical applications of this theoretical development, recent papers have been
documenting firm behavior which would be consistent with a theory of monopolistic competition
with endogenous location. For example using firm-level data from Chile, Álvarez et al. (2013)
find that previous export experience influences firms’ decisions to introduce a new product to
new markets. They rationalize it by suggesting that new exporters may reduce their information
gathering costs by observing other exporters’ decisions and thus previous experience exporting a
product, or to a market, helps reduce entry costs for firms in international markets. In the per-
spective of the verti-zontal model with endogenous location decisions in the characteristics space,
an alternative explanation could be that firms learn about their varieties’ characteristics (βs,i)
and their competitors’ proximity (γr,i, which in turn depends on the different βr,i) would reduce
the uncertainty over their export markets performance by collecting information on the taste of
local consumers in the different export markets. Therefore βs,i may also capture knowledge of
local markets preferences and spatial distribution of competitors.
This explanation would be consistent also with the intuition of Foster et al. (2012), suggest-
ing that firms may expand their production following a process of demand accumulation (e.g.,
building a customer base) and possibly fine-tuning of their products to local tastes. Indeed they
find that active accumulation driven by plants’ past production decisions quantitatively domi-
nates passive demand accumulation. Therefore, even in the presence of a demand accumulation
process, this is not exogenous but depends on firms’ decisions, one of which could be the reloca-
tion of its varieties in the characteristics space. On the basis of the framework presented here, a
model can be proposed in which firms may change their location on the characteristics space at
a cost: when the expected benefit from the movement exceeds the cost of adaptation, then firms
would move, otherwise they may be stuck in a sub-optimal location in terms of operating profits
which would be rational choice in terms of total profits.
Finally, turning to the version of the model with substitutability patterns affected by quality
differentiation, the framework could be straightforwardly applied to the study of districts or
clusters of firms (Markusen, 1996). Even assuming that firms in a district employ the same
technology and have the same horizontal differentiation, the simple fact of differentiating the
different varieties in terms of quality may relax competition and be mutually beneficial for all
the participants. Actually, even reducing quality may increase the operating profits of a firm, if
it reduction in markup due to the lower α is compensated by a reduction in γ. This intuition
could contribute to the literature on industrial districts and clusters of firms (Duranton et al.,
2010) or to better policy design (Kourtit et al., 2013).
Concluding remarks
In this Chapter, several possible lines of research have been outlined, which suggests that
quadratic utilities still have much potential to contribute significantly in the field of interna-
tional trade. In particular, it has been shown the capacity of the verti-zontal framework to
simplify empirical identification problems and turn complex theoretical concepts into tractable
and intuitive exercises, which may contribute to expand the capacity of trade economists to
create new and useful knowledge.
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Conclusions
The increasing availability of micro-level trade data calls for the development of a new generation
of trade models in which rich patterns of multi-dimensional heterogeneity across firms can be
easily aggregated and identified. To this end, this Thesis has explored the possibility of inte-
grating location and trade theories of monopolistic competition to propose a spatially motivated
alternative to existing models. In particular, it has shown how asymmetric product differentia-
tion and heterogeneous consumers can be embedded into a standard quadratic utility framework
à la Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Belleflamme et al. (2000) to achieve the double objective of
providing solid theoretical underpinnings to the structure of preferences and improving the fit of
observed data patterns.
A priori, there would be no reason to believe that these two objectives can be achieved
simultaneously. An improvement in the capacity to fit trade data patterns may indeed not
be easy to justify in terms of an underlying theoretical model, as in the case of non-parametric
estimations or when different sources of variability or shocks are employed on an ad hoc basis with
the only aim of better describing the data. At the same time, a theoretically sound framework
with a clear interpretation of each parameter and an intuitive structure needs not perform well
when taken to the data.
The concomitance of these two objectives is therefore somehow serendipitous and the surprise
associated with the discovery motivates the provocative title "More linear than you would say",
which refers to the possibility of rationalizing trade patterns through a quadratic utility yielding
a space-augmented linear demand, as tested in Chapters 4 and 5 with micro and aggregate trade
data, using the verti-zontal model presented in Chapter 3.
Specifically, the first part of the Thesis has analyzed all the alternative modeling choices
available to a trade economist who intends to use a quadratic utility framework with demand
heterogeneity (in Chapter 3) after having provided a spatial interpretation for each demand
parameter (in Chapter 2) and having shown a standard application of quadratic utilities in a
New Economic Geography setting (Chapter 1).
The theoretical analysis has departed from the standard specifications of preferences used in
existing trade models based on monopolistic competition by enriching the demand side and relax-
ing the implicit assumption that all varieties within the same country face symmetric demands.
In particular, varieties have been allowed to be vertically differentiated as well as to have a differ-
ent match with local consumers’ tastes and varying substitutability patterns vis-à-vis each other
variety in each market. In addition, the same variety sold in different countries has been allowed
to face a different demand depending on the interactions between local tastes, substitutability
and competition effects. This has led to a new and tractable framework, inflected into different
model variations, in which taste and quality heterogeneities interact with cost differences and
rich patterns of substitution.
The framework developed in this Thesis clearly distinguishes between vertical and horizontal
differentiation in the presence of consumers displaying love for variety and having the possibil-
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ity to concomitantly purchase different products in varying quantities, which is unprecedented,
considering that existing definitions of horizontal and vertical differentiation stem from discrete
choice models with indivisible varieties and with consumers making mutually exclusive choices.
In addition, the models presented here are able to replicate several results obtained in differen-
tiated oligopoly theory and providing a reconciliation of the two main approaches to product
differentiation, i.e. those developed by Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933).
Since the parameters in the utility function stem directly from the description of a spatial
problem, a clear interpretation rooted in the location theory can be provided, which improves
upon the firm- and country-specific-shock approach that has been used in empirical work to fit
the data with little theoretical underpinnings (Bernard et al., 2011; Hallak and Schott, 2011;
Munch and Nguyen, 2014). The parameters of the class of models proposed here can be written
as a function of observables and no assumption on distribution or functional forms for demand
shocks need to be made. This also leads to identifiable structural parameters on quality and taste
mismatch that account for parallel and slope shifters in demand, which allows for a quantification
of the model primitives and for a comparison with alternative explanations put forward in the
literature to explain the strong quantity variation of identical varieties across countries found in
the data.
Empirically, in the second part of the Thesis, one variation has been selected to deal with
trade data involving the whole manufacturing, the verti-zontal model, which is characterized
by the combination of vertical differentiation at a variety level, horizontal differentiation at a
market-variety level and constant substitutability (Model V in Chapter 3). This model contrasts
with most existing trade models of monopolistic competition that identify cost efficiency as the
main (if not the only) determinant of firm performance in export markets and where demand is
typically assumed to be symmetric across varieties and countries, independently of the products
and countries considered. It thus differs from existing models in allowing the demand function to
vary across varieties within a destination country (which amounts to assuming that preferences
are asymmetric) and for the same variety across destination countries, depending on consumer
taste and product characteristics (which amounts to assuming that consumers across countries
are heterogeneous in taste).
An important prediction arising from taste heterogeneity in consumer preferences is that
firm-product-country exports can be idiosyncratic and display additional variability even after
controlling for firm-product specific productivity and parallel demand shifters. The analysis
in Chapter 4 confirms these results using, first, a publicly available dataset on the European
car market (Goldberg and Verboven, 2005) and, then, a detailed firm-product-country data for
Belgian exporting firms provided by the National Bank of Belgium.
The missing source of variety-market variation in quantities cannot be interpreted by any type
of preferences used in models based on productive efficiency nor by models that rely on efficiency
and quality. In the verti-zontal model, instead, it can be rationalized as heterogeneity in taste
mismatch in the horizontal characteristics space. With the introduction of a location-theory-
motivated taste mismatch, the model can thus address the concerns raised by a growing number
of empirical studies that fail to find evidence in support of existing models when confronted with
micro-level data on the basis of substantial unexplained variability in quantities sold (Baldwin
and Harrigan, 2011; Brooks, 2006; Manova and Zhang, 2012).
As a final remark, notice that all the parameters analyzed in this Thesis have been assumed
exogenous, with no particular individual or joint distributional property. While some parameters
are normally assumed to be correlated, such as quality and marginal costs for example, the focus
of the Thesis on short-run market outcomes has not required any restriction. Still, it is possible
to imagine all the parameters resulting from rational decisions of entrepreneurs, for example
through quality-increasing or marginal-cost-reducing fixed investments in research and develop-
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ment, which leaves room for future research on firms’ choice of their products’ characteristics, as
discussed in Chapter 6 together with other future avenues of research.
Summing up, it is evident that the world around us is not linear and the same is true of
trade flows, which are irregular, cyclical and full of outliers. Furthermore, it can be added that
imposing one particular structure to describe complex phenomena is always a simplification and
quadratic utilities are probably one of the most extreme forms of simplification of reality that
can be conceived. Still, in this Thesis it has been shown how looking at trade patterns through
the lens of the linear demands stemming from quadratic preferences can allow us to interpret
the empirical observation of market outcomes in a theoretically intelligible way, at the same
time providing a spatial justification for the system of preference adopted and fitting the data
surprisingly well.
As famously stated by Box and Draper (1987), essentially, all models are wrong, but some
are useful. Following this maxim, with all their limits, models based on quadratic utilities can
provide an approximation of reality which is at the same time conceptually sound and empirically
convenient, hence striking the right balance to inspire future scientific developments in trade
theory. All in all, the field of international trade may benefit immensely from a more widespread
adoption of quadratic utilities and this Thesis can hopefully contribute in raising awareness on
their potential.
326 Conclusions
Bibliography
Albornoz, F., Calvo Pardo, H. F., Corcos, G. and Ornelas, E. (2012). Sequential exporting.
Journal of International Economics 88: 17–31.
Altomonte, C., Colantone, I. and Pennings, E. (2010). International trade with heterogenous
firms and asymmetric product varieties. Open access publications, Katholieke Universiteit
Leuven.
Álvarez, R., Faruq, H. and López, R. A. (2013). Is previous export experience important for new
exports? Journal of Development Studies 49: 426–441.
Anderson, J. E. and Wincoop, E. van (2003). Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border
puzzle. American Economic Review 93: 170–192.
Anderson, J. E. and Wincoop, E. van (2004). Trade costs. Journal of Economic Literature 42:
691–751.
Anderson, S., de Palma, A. and Thisse, J. (1992). Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differen-
tiation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Antoniades, A. (2008). Heterogeneous firms, quality, and trade. mimeo, Columbia University.
Arkolakis, C. (2010). Market penetration costs and the new consumers margin in international
trade. Journal of Political Economy 118: 1151 – 1199.
Armington, P. S. (1969). A theory of demand for products distinguished by place of production.
IMF Staff Papers 16: 159–178.
Asplund, M. and Nocke, V. (2006). Firm turnover in imperfectly competitive markets. Review
of Economic Studies 73: 295–327.
Baldwin, R. and Harrigan, J. (2011). Zeros, quality, and space: trade theory and trade evidence.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 3: 60–88.
Bastos, P. and Silva, J. (2010). The quality of a firm’s exports: Where you export to matters.
Journal of International Economics 82: 99–111.
Behar, A. and Venables, A. J. (2010). Transport Costs and International Trade. Economics Series
Working Papers 488, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
Behrens, K., Gaigne, C. and Thisse, J.-F. (2007). Is the Regulation of the Transport Sector Al-
ways Detrimental to Consumers? CEPR Discussion Papers 6185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
327
328 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Behrens, K., Gaigné, C. and Thisse, J.-F. (2009). Industry location and welfare when transport
costs are endogenous. Journal of Urban Economics 65: 195–208.
Behrens, K., Lamorgese, A., Ottaviano, G. I. P. and Tabuchi, T. (2004). Testing the Home
Market Effect in a Multi-Country World: The Theory. CEPR Discussion Papers 4468, Centre
for Economic Policy Research.
Behrens, K. and Murata, Y. (2007). General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A
new approach. Journal of Economic Theory 136: 776–787.
Behrens, K. and Picard, P. M. (2011). Transportation, freight rates, and economic geography.
Journal of International Economics 85: 280–291.
Békés, G. and Murakozy, B. (2012). Temporary trade and heterogeneous firms. Journal of In-
ternational Economics 87: 232–246.
Belleflamme, P., Picard, P. and Thisse, J.-F. (2000). An economic theory of regional clusters.
Journal of Urban Economics 48: 158–184.
Benkovskis, K. and Rimgailaite, R. (2011). The quality and variety of exports from the new eu
member states. The Economics of Transition 19: 723–747.
Bernard, A. B., Blanchard, E. J., Beveren, I. V. and Vandenbussche, H. Y. (2012). Carry-Along
Trade. NBER Working Papers 18246, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Bernard, A. B., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. B. and Kortum, S. (2003). Plants and productivity in
international trade. American Economic Review 93: 1268–1290.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B. and Schott, P. K. (2006). Survival of the best fit: Exposure to low-
wage countries and the (uneven) growth of u.s. manufacturing plants. Journal of International
Economics 68: 219–237.
Bernard, A. B., Redding, S. J. and Schott, P. K. (2011). Multi-product firms and trade liberal-
ization. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126: 1271–1318.
Berry, S. T. (1994). Estimating discrete-choice models of product differentiation. The RAND
Journal of Economics 25: 242–262.
Bertrand, J. L. F. (1883). Théorie des richesses: revue de théories mathématiques de la richesse
sociale par léon walras et recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses
par augustin cournot. Journal des Savants .
Blonigen, B. A. and Wilson, W. W. (2008). Port efficiency and trade flows. Review of Interna-
tional Economics 16: 21–36.
Box, G. E. P. and Draper, N. R. (1987). Empirical Model-Building and Response Surfaces. New
York, NY: John Wiley.
Bresnahan, T. F. and Reiss, P. C. (1991). Entry and competition in concentrated markets. The
Journal of Political Economy 99: 977–1009.
Broda, C. and Weinstein, D. E. (2006). Globalization and the gains from variety. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 121: 541–585.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 329
Brooks, E. (2003). Products and prejudice: measuring country-of-origin bias in U.S. wine im-
ports. Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series 1000, Center for
International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
Brooks, E. L. (2006). Why don’t firms export more? Product quality and colombian plants.
Journal of Development Economics 80: 160–178.
Carballo, J., Ottaviano, G. and Volpe Martincus, C. (2013). The Buyer Margins of Firms’ Ex-
ports. CEPR Discussion Papers 9584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Carroll, S. (2013). No physicist is an island. The New York Times, Oct 8, 2013 - NYTimes.com.
Chamberlin, E. (1933). The theory of monopolistic competition. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard
University Press.
Chen, Y. and Riordan, M. H. (2007). Price and variety in the spokes model. Economic Journal
117: 897–921.
Chung, C. and Song, M. (2008). Preference for cultural goods: the case of Korea film Market.
Georgia institute of technology, mimeo, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Comite, F. D. (2012). Measuring quality and non-cost competitiveness at a country-product
level. European Economy - Economic Papers .
Cournot, A.-A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses.
Hachette.
Crozet, M., Head, K. and Mayer, T. (2012). Quality sorting and trade: firm-level evidence for
french wine. Review of Economic Studies 79: 609–644.
d’Aspremont, C., Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J. (1979). On hotelling’s "Stability in competi-
tion". Econometrica 47: 1145–50.
Di Comite, F., Giudice, G., Krastev, R. and Monteiro, D. (2012). EU Balance-of-Payments as-
sistance for Latvia. Foundations of success. European Commission - DG ECFIN, European
Economy. Occasional Paper 120, chap. The evolution of the Latvian external sector: imbal-
ances, competitiveness and adjustment. 40–59.
Di Comite, F., Thisse, J.-F. and Vandenbussche, H. (2014). Verti-zontal differentiation in export
markets. Journal of International Economics (93): 50–66.
Dixit, A. K. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1977). Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity.
American Economic Review 67: 297–308.
Doms, M. and Bartelsman, E. J. (2000). Understanding productivity: Lessons from longitudinal
microdata. Journal of Economic Literature 38: 569–594.
Duranton, G., Martin, P., Mayer, T. and Mayneris, F. (2010). The Economics of Clusters:
Lessons from the French Experience. No. 9780199592203 in OUP Catalogue. Oxford University
Press.
Eaton, J., Eslava, M., Kugler, M. and Tybout, J. (2007). Export Dynamics in Colombia: Firm-
Level Evidence. NBER Working Papers 13531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
330 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Eaton, J., Kortum, S. and Kramarz, F. (2011). An anatomy of international trade: evidence
from french firms. Econometrica 79: 1453–1498.
Eckel, C., Iacovone, L., Javorcik, B. and Neary, J. P. (2011). Multi-product firms at home and
away: cost- versus quality-based competence. CEPR Discussion Papers 8186, CEPR.
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1925). Papers Relating to Political Economy . Macmillan.
Edwards, L. and Lawrence, R. Z. (2010). Do Developed and Developing Countries Compete Head
to Head in High-tech? NBER Working Papers 16105, NBER.
Einav, L. and Levin, J. (2010). Empirical industrial organization: A progress report. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 24: 145–62.
Engel, C. and Rogers, J. H. (2001). Deviations from purchasing power parity: causes and welfare
costs. Journal of International Economics 55: 29–57.
European Commission (2011). Product Market Review 2010-2011: The microeconomic roots of
growth performance and trade competitiveness in the EU. European Economy 8.
Fajgelbaum, P., Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (2011). Income distribution, product quality,
and international trade. Journal of Political Economy 119: 721 – 765.
Feenstra, R. C. (1994). New product varieties and the measurement of international prices.
American Economic Review 84: 157–77.
Feenstra, R. C. and Romalis, J. (2012). International Prices and Endogenous Quality. NBER
Working Papers 18314, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Feenstra, R. C. and Weinstein, D. E. (2010). Globalization, Markups, and the U.S. Price Level.
NBER Working Papers 15749, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Ferreira, F. and Waldfogel, J. (2013). Pop internationalism: Has half a century of world music
trade displaced local culture? Economic Journal 123: 634–664.
Fontagné, L., Gaulier, G. and Zignago, S. (2008). Specialization across varieties and North-South
competition. Economic Policy 23: 51–91.
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J. and Syverson, C. (2008). Reallocation, firm turnover, and efficiency:
selection on productivity or profitability? American Economic Review 98: 394–425.
Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J. C. and Syverson, C. (2012). The slow growth of new plants: learning
about demand? NBER Working Papers 17853, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Fujita, M. (1988). A monopolistic competition model of spatial agglomeration : Differentiated
product approach. Regional Science and Urban Economics 18: 87–124.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. and Venables, A. J. (2001). The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and
International Trade, MIT Press Books 1 . The MIT Press.
Gabszewicz, J., Sonnac, N. and Wauthy, X. (2001). On price competition with complementary
goods. Economics Letters 70: 431 – 437.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 331
Gabszewicz, J. J., Shaked, A., Sutton, J. and Thisse, J. (1981). International trade in differenti-
ated products. International Economic Review 22: 527–534.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J. (1979). Price competition, quality and income disparities. Journal
of Economic Theory 20: 340–359.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J. (1980). Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry. Journal of
Economic Theory 22: 327–338.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and Wauthy, X. Y. (2003). The option of joint purchase in vertically differen-
tiated markets. Economic Theory 22: 817–829.
Gabszewicz, J. J. and Wauthy, X. Y. (2012). Nesting horizontal and vertical differentiation.
Regional Science and Urban Economics 42: 998 – 1002, special issue in honor of Jacques
Thisse.
Gaigné, C. and Behrens, K. (2006). Density (dis)economies in transportation: revisiting the
core-periphery model. Economics Bulletin 18: 1–7.
Gaulier, G., Martin, J., Mejean, I. and Zignago, S. (2008). International trade price indices.
Working Papers 2008-10, CEPII research center.
Gervais, A. (2010). Product quality and firm heterogeneity in international trade. mimeo, Uni-
versity of Notre Dame.
Goldberg, P. K. and Verboven, F. (2001). The evolution of price dispersion in the European car
market. Review of Economic Studies 68: 811–48.
Goldberg, P. K. and Verboven, F. (2005). Market integration and convergence to the law of one
price: evidence from the european car market. Journal of International Economics 65: 49–73.
Gordon, I. (2010). Price and non-price spatial competition. Paper for conference on spatial eco-
nomics and trade, university of strathclyde, mimeo, London School of Economics.
Gorg, H., Halpern, L. and Murakozy, B. (2010). Why do within firm-product export prices differ
across markets? CEPR Discussion Papers 7708, CEPR.
Grubel, H. G. and Lloyd, P. J. (1975). Intra-industry trade: the theory and measurement of
international trade in differentiated products. Macmillan.
Guillin, A. (2014). Why are transport costs asymetric? mimeo, Université Paris-Est Créteil.
Guimares, P. and Portugal, P. (2010). A simple feasible procedure to fit models with high-
dimensional fixed effects. Stata Journal 10: 628–649.
Hallak, J. C. (2004). Product Quality, Linder, and the Direction of Trade. NBERWorking Papers
10877, NBER.
Hallak, J. C. and Schott, P. K. (2011). Estimating cross-country differences in product quality.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126: 417–474.
Hallak, J. C. and Sivadasan, J. (2009). Firms’ Exporting Behavior under Quality Constraints.
NBER Working Papers 14928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
332 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hallak, J. C. and Sivadasan, J. (2013). Product and process productivity. implications for quality
choice and conditional exporter premia. Journal of International Economics 91: 53–67.
Handbury, J. and Weinstein, D. E. (2011). Is New Economic Geography Right? Evidence from
Price Data. NBER Working Papers 17067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Hausman, J. A. (1994). Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition.
Working Paper 4970, NBER.
Helble, M. and Okubo, T. (2008). Heterogeneous quality firms and trade costs. Policy Research
Working Paper Series 4550, The World Bank.
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. and Rubinstein, Y. (2008). Estimating trade flows: Trading partners
and trading volumes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123: 441–487.
Hoberg, G. and Phillips, G. (2010). Product market synergies and competition in mergers and
acquisitions: A text-based analysis. Review of Financial Studies 23: 3773–3811.
Holmes, T. J. and Stevens, J. J. (2012). Exports, borders, distance, and plant size. Journal of
International Economics 88: 91–103.
Hopenhayn, H. A. (1992). Entry, exit, and firm dynamics in long run equilibrium. Econometrica
60: 1127–50.
Hotelling, H. (1929). Stability in competition. The Economic Journal 39: 41–57.
Hummels, D. (2007). Transportation costs and international trade in the second era of global-
ization. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21: 131–154.
Hummels, D. and Klenow, P. J. (2005). The variety and quality of a nation’s exports. American
Economic Review 95: 704–723.
Hummels, D., Lugovskyy, V. and Skiba, A. (2009). The trade reducing effects of market power
in international shipping. Journal of Development Economics 89: 84–97.
Hummels, D. and Schaur, G. (2012). Time as a Trade Barrier. NBER Working Papers 17758,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Hummels, D. and Skiba, A. (2004). Shipping the good apples out? an empirical confirmation of
the Alchian-Allen conjecture. Journal of Political Economy 112: 1384–1402.
Iacovone, L. and Javorcik, B. S. (2008). Shipping good tequila out: investment, domestic unit
values and entry of multi-product plants into export markets. mimeo, University of Oxford.
Irarrazabal, A., Moxnes, A. and Opromolla, L. D. (2010). The Tip of the Iceberg: Modeling
Trade Costs and Implications for Intra-Industry Reallocation. CEPR Discussion Paper 7685,
Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Johnson, R. C. (2012). Trade and prices with heterogeneous firms. Journal of International
Economics 86: 43–56.
Jonkeren, O., Demirel, E., van Ommeren, J. and Rietveld, P. (2011). Endogenous transport
prices and trade imbalances. Journal of Economic Geography 11: 509–527.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 333
Katayama, H., Lu, S. and Tybout, J. R. (2009). Firm-level productivity studies: illusions and a
solution. International Journal of Industrial Organization 27: 403–413.
Khandelwal, A. (2010). The long and short (of) quality ladders. Review of Economic Studies 77:
1450–1476.
Kleinert, J. and Spies, J. (2011). Endogenous Transport Costs in International Trade. IAW
Discussion Papers 74, Institut fur Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (IAW).
Kneller, R. and Yu, Z. (2008). Quality selection, Chinese exports and theories of heterogeneous
firm trade. Discussion Papers 08/44, University of Nottingham, GEP.
Konings, J. and Vandenbussche, H. (2008). Heterogeneous responses of firms to trade protection.
Journal of International Economics 76: 371–383.
Kourtit, K., Nijkamp, P., Fontagné, L., Koenig, P., Mayneris, F. and Poncet, S. (2013). Cluster
policies and firm selection: Evidence from france. Journal of Regional Science 53: 897–922.
Kranich, J. (2007). Too much R&D? - Vertical differentiation in a model of monopolistic compe-
tition. Working Paper Series in Economics 59, University of Luneburg, Institute of Economics.
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade. The
American Economic Review 70: 950–959.
Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy
99: 483–99.
Krugman, P. R. (1979). Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and international trade.
Journal of International Economics 9: 469–479.
Krugman, P. R. and Venables, A. J. (1995). Globalization and the inequality of nations. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 857–80.
Lancaster, K. J. (1966). A new approach to consumer theory. Journal of Political Economy 74:
132.
Lancaster, K. J. (1979). Variety, Equity and Efficiency . Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Latzer, H. and Mayneris, F. (2012). Income distribution and vertical comparative advantage.
Theory and evidence. CORE Discussion Papers 2012034, Université catholique de Louvain,
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Lawless, M. and Whelan, K. (2008). Where do Firms Export, How Much and Why? Research
Technical Papers 6/RT/08, Central Bank of Ireland.
Lerner, A. P. and Singer, H. W. (1937). Some notes on duopoly and spatial competition. The
Journal of Political Economy 45: 145–186.
Manova, K. and Zhang, Z. (2012). Export prices across firms and destinations. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 127: 379–436.
Markusen, A. (1996). Sticky places in slippery space: A typology of industrial districts. Economic
Geography 72: pp. 293–313.
334 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Markusen, J. R. (2013). Putting per-capita income back into trade theory. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 90: 255–265.
Martin, J. (2009). Spatial Price Discrimination in International Markets. Working Papers 2009-
21, CEPII research center.
Martin, J. (2010). Markups, Quality and Transport Costs. Working Papers 17, Centre de
Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
Martin, J. (2012). Markups, quality, and transport costs. European Economic Review 56: 777 –
791.
Martin, J. and Mayneris, F. (2013). High-end variety exporters defying distance: micro facts
and macroeconomic implications. CORE Discussion Papers 2013061, Université catholique de
Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Mayer, T., Melitz, M. J. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2014). Market Size, Competition, and the
Product Mix of Exporters. American Economic Review 104: 495–536.
Mayer, T. and Zignago, S. (2011). Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: The GeoDist database.
Working Papers 2011-25, CEPII.
Mayneris, F. and Poncet, S. (2011). Entry on difficult export markets by Chinese domestic firms:
the role of foreign export spillovers. CORE Discussion Papers 2011063, Université catholique
de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry
productivity. Econometrica 71: 1695–1725.
Melitz, M. J. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2008). Market size, trade, and productivity. Review of
Economic Studies 75: 295–316.
Munch, J. R. and Nguyen, D. X. (2014). Decomposing firm-level sales variation. Journal of
International Economics (forthcoming).
Mussa, M. and Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory
18: 301–317.
Neven, D. and Thisse, J.-F. (1990). On quality and variety competition. in J.J. Gabszewicz,
J.-F. Richard and L. Wolsey, eds., Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and
Optimization. Contributions in Honour of J. Dreze. Amsterdam, North-Holland, 175-199.
OECD (2010). Measuring Globalisation: OECD Economic Globalisation Indicators 2010 . OECD
Publishing, chap. Intra-industry trade. 210–211.
Ohno, K. (1989). Export pricing behavior of manufacturing: A U.S./Japan comparison. Staff
Papers - International Monetary Fund 36: 550–579.
Ottaviano, G. and Thisse, J.-F. (2004). Agglomeration and economic geography. In Henderson,
J. V. and Thisse, J. F. (eds), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics. Elsevier, Handbook
of Regional and Urban Economics 4 , chap. 58, 2563–2608.
Ottaviano, G. I. P., Tabuchi, T. and Thisse, J. (2002). Agglomeration and trade revisited. Inter-
national Economic Review 43: 409–436.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 335
Parenti, M. (2010). Trade under oligopolistic competition in the presence of a competitive fringe.
mimeo, Université Paris I.
Parenti, M. (2013). Large and small firms in a global market: David vs. Goliath. CORE Discus-
sion Papers 2013058, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and
Econometrics (CORE).
Perloff, J. M. and Salop, S. C. (1985). Equilibrium with product differentiation. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 52: 107–20.
Picard, P. and Tabuchi, T. (2013). On microfoundations of the city. Journal of Economic Theory
148: 2561–2582.
Picard, P. M. (2013). Trade, economic geography and the choice of product quality. CORE
Discussion Papers 2013039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research
and Econometrics (CORE).
Picard, P. M. and Okubo, T. (2012). Firms’ locations under demand heterogeneity. Regional
Science and Urban Economics 42: 961–974.
Picard, P. M. and Zeng, D.-Z. (2005). Agricultural sector and industrial agglomeration. Journal
of Development Economics 77: 75–106.
Pomfret, R. and Sourdin, P. (2009). Have Asian trade agreements reduced trade costs? Journal
of Asian Economics 20: 255–268.
Pomfret, R. and Sourdin, P. (2010). Why do trade costs vary? Review of World Economics
(Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv) 146: 709–730.
Ramsey, J. (1969). Tests for specification errors in classical linear least-squares regression anal-
ysis. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) 31: 350–371.
Robinson, J. V. (1933). The Economics of Imperfect Competition. Macmillan.
SAFER (2012). Le marché immobilier rural en 2011. Fédération nationale des sociétés
d’aménagement foncier et d’établissement rural (FNSAFER), Technical Report.
Salop, S. C. (1979). Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10:
141–156.
Samuelson, P. A. (1952). The transfer problem and transport costs: The terms of trade when
impediments are absent. The Economic Journal 62: 278–304.
Samuelson, P. A. (1994). Facets of balassa-samuelson thirty years later. Review of International
Economics 2: 201–26.
Schott, P. K. (2004). Across-product versus within-product specialization in international trade.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 646–677.
Schott, P. K. (2008). The relative sophistication of chinese exports. Economic Policy 23: 5–49.
Schumpeter, J. A. and Nichol, A. J. (1934). Robinson’s economics of imperfect competition.
Journal of Political Economy 42: 249.
336 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1982). Relaxing price competition through product differentiation.
Review of Economic Studies 49: 3–13.
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. (1983). Natural oligopolies. Econometrica 51: 1469–1483.
Spence, M. (1976). Product selection, fixed costs, and monopolistic competition. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 43: 217–35.
Sraffa, P. (1926). The laws of returns under competitive conditions. The Economic Journal 36:
535–550.
Syverson, C. (2007). Prices, spatial competition and heterogeneous producers: an empirical test.
Journal of Industrial Economics 55: 197–222.
Syverson, C. (2011). What determines productivity? Journal of Economic Literature 49: 326–65.
Tirole, J. (1988). The theory of industrial organization, MIT Press Books 1 . The MIT Press.
Vandenbussche, H., Di Comite, F., Rovegno, L. and Viegelahn, C. (2013). Moving up the quality
ladder? EU-China dynamics in clothing. Journal of Economic Integration 28: 303–326.
Verhoogen, E. (2012). Prices, plant size, and product quality. Review of Economic Studies 79:
307–339.
Verhoogen, E. A. (2008). Trade, quality upgrading, and wage inequality in the mexican manu-
facturing sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123: 489–530.
Vives, X. (1999). Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Vogel, J. (2008). Spatial competition with heterogeneous firms. Journal of Political Economy
116: 423–466.
Weber, A. (1909). Theory of the location of industries. University of Chicago Press.
Woerz, J. and Benkovskis, K. (2012). Non-price competitiveness gains of central, eastern and
southeastern european countries in the eu market. Focus on European Economic Integration .
Yamawaki, H. (2004). Who survives in japan? an empirical analysis of european and U.S.
multinational firms in japanese manufacturing industries. Journal of Industry, Competition
and Trade 4: 135–153.
Zhelobodko, E., Kokovin, S., Parenti, M. and Thisse, J. F. (2012). Monopolistic competition:
Beyond the constant elasticity of substitution. Econometrica 80: 2765–2784.
